Understanding Putin’s Russia: a continuing challenge for Western intelligence

ABSTRACT

For Western intelligence communities, charged with providing advance notice of adverse developments around the world, Russia under Putin has had to become top priority for study, as was the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Using secret intelligence to help assess the motives and intent of the Kremlin leadership is essential but remains as hard, not least because of the extreme violence of the regime towards anyone suspected of betraying confidences to assist the West. Putin has provided his own explanation for his invasion of Ukraine in 2022 that illuminates his world view and belief in Russia as a Slavic nation, of which Ukraine is seen as part. Putin’s background in the KGB is regime is seen as providing continuity with the brutal repressions of the Stalin era. The different methods used by Western intelligence to assess Russia are reviewed highlighting the additional digital sources available today. The warning failures of Western intelligence to provide strategic notice of Putin’s aggressive actions are explained by inadequate situational awareness, erroneous explanation of his motives, leading to poor estimation of his subsequent moves, the exception being US and UK prediction of the 2022 invasion itself.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. Plokhy, Russo-Ukrainian War, ch. 1.

2. Sovodnik, ”Karamazov and Putin,” 1.

3. ibid. 5.

4. Omand, How Spies Think, ch. 1.

5. Walton, Russian Assassination, ch.1.

6. Galeoti, “Active Measures,” 3.

7. Soldatov and Borogan, “Rebirth of Russian Spycraft,” 10.

8. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, 95–97

9. Omand, How Spies Think, 84.

10. Ibid. 67.

11. Goodman, “The Dog That Did Not Bark,” 529–551.

12. Andrew & Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive, 326.

13. Butler, Weapons of Mass Destruction, 14.

14. Sims, Decision Advantage, ch. 1.

15. Omand, How Spies Think, 9.

16. Barrass, Great Cold War, 139–42.

17. Andrew, Secret Service, 496.

18. Garthoff, “Anglo-Soviet Relations,” 550.

19. Wilson, “Monroe Doctrine,” 322.

20. Jeffery, MI6, 655.

21. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, 322.

22. Bird and Bird, “Iron Curtain,” 9.

23. Ferris, GCHQ, 526.

24. Ibid., 676.

25. Geraghty, BRIXMIS, 10.

26. Herman, Intelligence Power, 30

27. Omand, Nudge to Novichok, 6–8.

28. Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, 25.

29. Barrass, The Great Cold War.n 298.

30. Andrew and Gordievsky, 489.

31. Plokhy, Russo-Ukrainian War ch. 1.

32. Putin, “Russians and Ukrainians,” 24.

33. Plokhy, Russo-Ukrainian War, 2

34. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, 41.

35. Putin, “Russians and Ukrainians,” 66.

36. Davies, Economic Intelligence,

37. Alibek, Biohazard; Rimmington, Secret Weapon.

38. Mills, Russia’s Use of Nuclear Threats,

39. CNN, 3 February 2022.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

David Omand

David Omand Visiting Professor King’s College London.