Swedish intelligence, Russia and the war in Ukraine: anticipations, course, and future implications

ABSTRACT

As the sole plausible military threat facing Sweden, the Soviet Union and then Russia have consistently been at the top of Swedish intelligence collection priorities. In fact, understanding Russia and its military forces well is a source of pride and self-perceived comparative advantage of the Swedish intelligence community. This article contextualizes Swedish intelligence collection on Russia, including its Cold War antecedents and the persistent counterintelligence threat. It then describes Swedish intelligence reporting in anticipation of the war in Ukraine, including a reported misjudgement that Russia would ultimately not conduct a full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine in its entirety. This ‘intelligence failure’ was reportedly based on the assessment that Russia had assembled insufficient military capabilities to subjugate Ukraine, and that such an operation would be too risky and costly. Coming full circle in again beginning to focus mainly on great power competition and military capabilities in its near abroad, Swedish military intelligence has since reported valuable intelligence on Russian military capabilities, drawing on a combination of collection capabilities.

KEYWORDS:

• Strategic warning
• intelligence failure
• Ukraine war
• Swedish intelligence
• signals intelligence

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Correction Statement

This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Notes

1. Dalsjö ,“Kriget i Ukraina”, 573–74.

2. Forsberg, “Finland and Sweden’s Road to NATO.”

3. Bergquist et al, Konsekvenserna av ett eventuellt finskt Natomedlemskap, 5–7, Bringéus och Eriksson, Säkerhets i ny tid, 154.

4. Leijonhielm, Ett svenskt Leijon, 144; Eriksson, Swedish Military Intelligence, 133.

5. On Swedish HUMINT-collection from sources in the Soviet Union during the Cold War, see for instance Leijonhielm, Ett svenskt Leijon, 91–95.

6. Holmström, “Källor: Så missbedömde Sverige.”

7. Ibid.

8. Holmström, ”Ann Linde: ‘Borde kanske ha insett’.”

9. Holmström, “Politiker kritiserar Must.”

10. Dalsjö, Life-Line Lost, 66–67.

11. Dalsjö, Life-Line Lost, 244–246.

12. Eriksson, Swedish Military Intelligence, 133.

13. Dalsjö, Sweden and its deterrence deficit, 95.

14. Larson et al, Det kaukasiska litmustestet.

15. Dalsjö, Sweden and its deterrence deficit, 96–98, 100–102.

16. See note 6 above.

17. Statsrådsberedningen, Nationell säkerhetsstrategi, 3.

18. MUST, Årsöversikt 2014, 7; SÄPO, Säkerhetspolisens Årsbok 2014, 5–6; Statens Offentliga Utredningar”Försvarets Radioanstalt”, 29–37.

19. See note 11 above.

20. Leijonhielm, Ett svenskt Leijon, 84–87; Agrell, Sprickor i järnridån, 272.

21. Agrell, Sprickor i järnridån, 170–72, 270–73, 301.

22. Leijonhielm, Ett svenskt Leijon, 206.

23. SVT Nyheter, ”Read the Snowden Documents.”

24. Hansén, ”Assessing intelligence oversight”, 944.

25. MUST, Årsöversikt 2014, 13–14.

26. In 2014, the personnel was 70 per cent male and 30 per cent female, and 70 per cent civilian and 30 per cent military. MUST, Årsöversikt 2014, 35. By 2022, the share of female personnel had increased to 40 per cent.

27. Agrell, Sprickor i järnridån, 84–102.

28. Leijonhielm, Ett svenskt Leijon, 47–65; Agrell, Sprickor i järnridån, 188–202.

29. Leijonhielm, Ett svenskt Leijon, 91–95. Agrell, Sprickor i järnridån, 278–80.

30. Agrell, Sprickor i järnridån, 301.

31. Eriksson, Swedish Military Intelligence, 148.

32. Eriksson, Swedish Military Intelligence, 149–150.

33. Eriksson, Swedish Military Intelligence, 48, 53.

34. Eriksson, Swedish Military Intelligence, 141.

35. Eriksson, Swedish Military Intelligence, 48, 53.

36. Leijonhielm, Ett svenskt Leijon, 144.

37. Leijonhielm, Ett svenskt Leijon, 191–194.

38. C.f. Dover, ”Adding value to the intelligence community”, 854–57, on the comparative advantages but also barriers of outside experts contributing to the intelligence community.

39. Nylander and Korsell, Säpo inifrån, 117–128.

40. However, other types of groups, such as the Kurdish PKK, also had a sizable presence in Sweden. SÄPO, Säkerhetspolisens Årsbok 2014, 31–35.

41. Gustafsson and Ranstorp, Swedish Foreign Fighters.

42. In August 2023, the terrorism threat level was increased from level 3 to 4 in Sweden, on a 1–5 scale. In October 2023, two Swedes were killed in a terrorist attack in Brussels, targeted due to their nationality. SVT Nyheter, ”Terrorhotnivån i Sverige”; Yle Nyheter, ”Två äldre män ihjälskjutna i Bryssel.”

43. SÄPO, Säkerhetspolisen 2017, 50–53.

44. Jonsson, ”Espionage by Europeans”, 7.

45. Jonsson, ”Europe’s Decade of the Spy.”

46. Bergqvist, ”Person inför rätta för spioneri”.

47. Zangana, ”Konsult hade tusentals bilder”; Wikström and Börjesson, ”Göteborgare döms – var spion.”

48. Uggla, ”Livstids fängelse för en av spionbröderna.”

49. Stockholms Tingsrätt, Målnummer B14349–21 Dom 2023-01-19.

50. Örstadius, Carlsson and Holmström, ”Man häktad för brott mot rikets säkerhet.”

51. Ibid.

52. Widén, ”The Wennerström Spy Case”.

53. Stockholms Tingsrätt, Målnummer B14349–21, 15, 18.

54. Stockholms Tingsrätt, Målnummer B14349–21, 13.

55. Stockholms Tingsrätt, Målnummer B14349–21, 27–33.

56. Stockholms Tingsrätt, Målnummer B14349–21, 36–37.

57. Stockholms Tingsrätt, Målnummer B14349–21 Dom 2023-01-19.

58. Westberg, ”Ett av de allvarligaste spionfallen”.

59. Braw, ”Sweden Spy Scandal.”

60. Westerberg, Hurinsky and Constantini”,Bröder döms till fängelse”.

61. Dahl and Canoilas. ”Livstidsdom mot spionbroder”; SVT Nyheter”Hovrätten fastställer livstids”.

62. Jonsson and Gustafsson, ”Espionage by Europeans”, 45–46.

63. Jonsson and Gustafsson, ”Espionage by Europeans”, 73–74.

64. Weiss, ”The hero who betrayed his country.”

65. Westberg, ”Ett av de allvarligaste spionfallen”.

66. Ronge, ”SÄPO stängde hemligt nätverk”; Bergqvist”Nätverket som kartlade försvarets hemligheter”.

67. Holmström ”Officer döms till fängelse – röjde anläggningar.”

68. Dagens Juridik, ”Nämndeman döms.”

69. SVT Nyheter, ”Det ryska paret levde Svenssonliv”.

70. SVT Nyheter, ”FOI kände till ryska agenten”.

71. Sadikovi and Hurinsky”,Misstänkta paret hade bostad på samma våning som GRU-agent”. They owned the apartment 1999–2015, after which their daughter owned it until 2019.

72. SVT Nyheter, ”Spionmisstänkte mannen begärs häktad”.

73. Hurinsky”Man frias i mål”; Stockholms Tingsrätt”.Friande dom i målet om grov olovlig”.

74. Ilves and Giles, ”Why can’t Europe see that it’s at war with Russia?.”

75. Corera, ”Inside the spies”; Harris and Sonne”,Russia planning massive military offensive”.

76. Harris et al, ”Road to war.”

77. Reportedly, U.S. agencies were for instance of sharing too much with Ukrainian counterparts until shortly before the invasion. Harris et al, ”Road to war.”

78. See note 76 above.

79. C.f. Meijer and Brooks, ”Illusions of Autonomy”, 17.

80. See note 76 above.

81. For a related point, on how intrawar warnings are more often heeded than prewar warning, since the cost of response has already been reduced, see Wirtz “Are Intelligence Failures Still Inevitable?“, 317–18.

82. Miller and Belton, ”Russia’s spies misread Ukraine.”

83. Ibid.

84. See note 76 above.

85. See note 82 above.

86. Harris et al, ”Road to war”; Sonne et al, ”Battle for Kyiv.”

87. Risen and Klippenstein, ”The CIA Thought Putin Would Quickly Conquer”; Harris et al, ”Road to war.”

88. Dalsjö, Jonsson and Norberg, ”A Brutal Examination.”

89. See note 82 above.

90. See note 6 above.

91. C.f. Agrell, Vi såg det inte komma, 15–28; Jensen”,Intelligence Failures”, 263.

92. Holmström, ”Källor: Så missbedömde Sverige”; Holmström, ”Politiker kritiserar Must.”

93. Jensen, ”Intelligence Failures”, 267–269.

94. Agrell”,Väntar ett storkrig runt hörnet?”; Persson”Små stater göre sig icke besvär”.

95. See note 6 above.

96. Jensen, ”Intelligence Failures”, 273.

97. Shapira, ”The Yom Kippur intelligence failure”, 981–982.

98. See note 6 above.

99. Ibid.

100. Försvarsberedningen, Kraftsamling, 31.

101. Shapira, ”The Yom Kippur intelligence failure”, 980–81; Agrell, Vi såg det inte komma, 18–19.

102. Shapira, ”The Yom Kippur intelligence failure”, 985; Agrell, Vi såg det inte komma, 23–24.

103. See note 8 above.

104. Notably, French and German officials questioned U.S. warnings based on a similar logic. Harris et al, ”Road to war”

105. See note 76 above.

106. See note 8 above.

107. Bodin”,Mustchefen Lena Hallin”.

108. Bodin”,Mustchefen Lena Hallin”.

109. Linde, cited in Holmström, ”Ann Linde: ‘Borde kanske ha insett’.”

110. See note 6 above.

111. C.f. Shapira, ”The Yom Kippur intelligence failure”, 982–987, that argues that part of Israel’s intelligence failure was a flawed understanding of foundational cultural and social aspects of Egypt’s decision-making” and to recognize that Egypt was willing to take major risks to erase perceived humiliation and restore dignity.

112. Försvarsberedningen, Kraftsamling, 16. Author’s translation, emphasis added.

113. Harris et al, ”Road to war”; Holmström, ”Ann Linde: ‘Borde kanske ha insett’”; Miller and Belton, ”Russia’s spies misread Ukraine”

114. Borer, Twing, and Burkett”Problems in the Intelligence-Policy”; Jensen, ”Intelligence Failures”, 274–75.

115. See note 9 above.

116. Holmström, ”Politiker kritiserar Must”; Holmström, ”Ann Linde: ‘Borde kanske ha insett’.”

117. See note 6 above.

118. Strömberg and Nilsson”Så gick det till”; Also c.f. Wirtz “Are Intelligence Failures Still Inevitable?“, 317–18, on the disincentives of policy-makers to respond to prewar warnings.

119. C.f. Jensen, ”Intelligence Failures”, 274–75.

120. See note 12 above.

121. Försvarsberedningen, Försvaret av Sverige, 14–19; MUST Årsöversikt 2014, 11.

122. Eriksson, Swedish Military Intelligence, 78–79.

123. MUST intelligence analyst, cited in Eriksson, Swedish Military Intelligence, 77.

124. Eriksson, Swedish Military Intelligence, 72–75.

125. Eriksson, Swedish Military Intelligence, 84–86.

126. Bang, ”Institutional influence on assessments”, 56.

127. Shapira, ”The Yom Kippur intelligence failure”, 982–983.

128. Shapira, ”The Yom Kippur intelligence failure”, 988.

129. Dahl, ”Missing the Wake-up Call.”

130. Dalsjö, Sweden and its deterrence deficit, 93, 105–106.

131. Sullivan, Larsson and Gressel, ”In Major Shift.”

132. MUST, Årsöversikt 2014, 10–11.

133. MUST, Årsöversikt 2014, 7. Author’s translation. Its sister agency FRA had also received similarly broadened collection requirements. Statens Offentliga Utredningar”Försvarets Radioanstalt”, 29–37.

134. MUST, Årsöversikt 2023, 12–25.

135. Försvarsberedningen, Försvaret av Sverige, 14.

136. Försvarsberedningen, Försvaret av Sverige, 19.

137. Försvarsberedningen, Kraftsamling, 15.

138. C.f. Dalsjö, ”Sweden and its deterrence deficit”,105–106.

139. See note 9 above.

140. Hagvall ”Svensk spaning på ryska trupper”

141. Försvarsberedningen, Kraftsamling, 15.

142. Regeringen, ”Kommittédirektiv”, 1.

143. Regeringen, ”Kommittédirektiv”, 5–6.

144. Regeringen, ”Kommittédirektiv”, 7.

145. Regeringen, ”Kommittédirektiv”, 8–14.

146. Agrell, Vi såg det inte komma, 181–207.

147. Jonsson, Oscarsson and Starbrink”,Carl Bildt ska vässa arbetet”.

148. Agrell, Sprickor i järnridån, 301.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Michael Jonsson

Michael Jonsson holds a Ph.D in political science from the Department of Government at Uppsala University and works as a Deputy Research Director at the Swedish Defense Research Agency (Sw. FOI). Dr. Jonsson has published i.a. with Survival, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, European Security and Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. He is also the editor (with Svante Cornell) of Crime, Conflict and the State in Postcommunist Eurasia (Pennsylvania University Press, 2014).