Intelligence & the Russo-Ukrainian war: introduction to the special issue

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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Correction Statement

This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Notes

1. See, for example, York, ‘‘World’s first TikTok war.”

2. Omand, How Spies Think.

3. Putin vs. the West, series 2:1, “Invasion,” BBC, 29 January 2024: https://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/m001ttrx/putin-vs-the-west-at-war-1-invasion

4. Putin vs. the West, series 2:1, “Invasion,’ BBC, 29 January 2024: https://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/m001ttrx/putin-vs-the-west-at-war-1-invasion

5. Cited in Politi et al, “Biden’s Information War With Putin.”

6. Sage, “French Spy Chief is Ousted Over Failure to Predict War.”

7. French media reported other reasons for his dismissal. Vincent, “Les leçons de la guerre en Ukraine.”

8. Vincent, “Guerre en Ukraine.”

9. See also the analysis of Michael Jonsson, “Swedish Intelligence, Russia and the War in Ukraine: Anticipations, Course, and Future Implications,” in this volume.

10. Vincent, “Les leçons de la guerre en Ukraine.”

11. See also Perrin & Todeschini, “Ukraine: Un an de Guerre. Quels enseignements pour la France,” 1.

12. We would like to thank Damien Van Puyvelde for this analysis of the case of France.

13. Trofimov, Our Enemies Will Vanish, 21.

14. Matthews, Overreach, 197–198; Plokhy, The Russo-Ukrainian War, 143.

15. Quoted in Luce, “The World from Washington.”

16. Politi et al, “Biden’s Information War.”

17. Blinken, “on Russia’s Threat to Peace and Security.”

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Fleming, “Director GCHQ’s speech on global security amid war in Ukraine.”

21. Ibid.

22. Ministry of Defence, “Update on Ukraine, 17 February 2022,” https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=317713153732492&set=pb.100064814287886.–2207520000&type=3&locale=en_GB, (accessed 27 Feb 2024).

23. Ministry of Defence, “Update on Ukraine, 24 February 2022,” https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=322467986590342&set=pb.100064814287886.–2207520000&type=3&locale=en_GB, (accessed 27 Feb 2024).

24. Defence Intelligence, “Update on Ukraine, 08 March 2022,” https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=330397982464009&set=pb.100064814287886.–2207520000&type=3&locale=en_GB, (accessed 27 Feb 2024).

25. Defence Intelligence, “Update on Ukraine, 6 June 2023,” https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=653922093444928&set=pb.100064814287886.–2207520000&type=3&locale=en_GB, (accessed 27 Feb 2024).

26. Defence Intelligence, “Update on Ukraine, 17 July 2023,” https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=667589352078202&set=pb.100064814287886.–2207520000&type=3&locale=en_GB, (accessed 27 Feb 2024)

27. Defence Intelligence, “Ukraine Update, 17 August 2023,” https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=697709089066228&set=pb.100064814287886.–2207520000&type=3&locale=en_GB, (accessed 27 Feb 2024).

28. Defence Intelligence, “Ukraine Update, 26 February 2024,” https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1762048072320688408, (accessed 27 Feb 2024).

29. Defence Intelligence, “Ukraine Update, 24 February 2024,” https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1761316030121423346, (accessed 27 Feb 2024).

30. Defence Intelligence is the UK Ministry of Defence intelligence capability but is not an intelligence agency as such.

31. Ministry of Defence, “Defence Intelligence – Communicating Probability,” 17 February 2023: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/defence-intelligence-communicating-probability, (accessed 27 Feb 2024).

32. Nicholls, “RAF Wyton.”

33. Sabbagh, “UK closer to large-scale conflict than in many years, Defence official says.”

34. Zegart, ‘Open Secrets’.

35. Luce, “The World from Washington,” On the claims of a US intelligence role, see Cooper et al, “US Intelligence Helped Ukraine Strike Russian Flagship, Officials Say.”

36. Dylan et al, “The Autocrat’s Intelligence Paradox,” 387.

37. Miller & Belton, “Russia’s spies misread Ukraine and misled Kremlin as war loomed,” In his March 2022 Canberra speech, Jeremy Fleming noted how, “we believe Putin’s advisers are afraid to tell him the truth,” Fleming, “Director GCHQ’s speech,” See also, the assessment in Riehle, The Russian FSB, Ch.7.

38. Fleming, “Director GCHQ’s speech.”

39. Cited in York, ‘‘World’s first TikTok war”.

40. Holligan & Vandy, “MH17: Three guilty as court finds Russia-controlled group downed airliner,” (accessed 27 Feb. 2024).

41. Kivimäki, “Tankspotting: Russian T90s in the Donbas,” (accessed 27 Feb. 2024).

42. Bellingcat Investigations Team, “Russia’s Kremenchuk Claims versus the Evidence,” (accessed 27 Feb. 2024).

43. Olejnik, “Smartphones blur the line between civilian and combatant,” (accessed 27 Feb. 2024).

44. Ibid.

45. Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law, 46.

46. Freese, “Smart Phones Enabling Decisive Effects at Tactical Level in Ukraine.”

47. Judah, “How Kyiv was saved by Ukrainian ingenuity as well as Russian blunders.”

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Mark Phythian

Mark Phythian is Professor of Politics in the School of History, Politics & International Relations, University of Leicester and co-editor of Intelligence and National Security.

David Strachan-Morris

David Strachan-Morris, SFHEA, MSecII is the Programme Director for the Distance Learning MA in Intelligence and Security and Co-Director of Distance Learning for the School of History Politics & International Relations at the University of Leicester. Previously, he worked as a political and security risk analyst in the private sector and served in the British Army as an intelligence operator. He is on the editorial boards of the Journal of Policing Intelligence and Counterterrorism, the Journal of Security Intelligence and Resilience Education, and Intelligence and National Security as well as being a board member of the Europe Chapter of the International Association for Intelligence Education.