Caught off guard? Evaluating how external experts in Germany warned about Russia’s war on Ukraine

ABSTRACT

While Germany’s response to the Russo-Ukrainian war continues to be intensely scrutinised, with much attention focusing on the Zeitenwende debate and Berlin’s reluctance to pull its weight in NATO, we know little about how Germany anticipated the outbreak of war. The picture that has emerged is one of significant surprise among German policymakers when Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Germany’s foreign intelligence service (Bundesnachrichtendienst, BND) has been criticised for failing to issue strong warnings, whereas BND officials have argued that their warnings went unheeded. This article contributes to discussions of what intelligence producers and policymakers could have been expected to know by exploring how selected external experts in Germany warned about a Russian attack on Ukraine. By reconstructing open expert assessments of the emerging crisis between 1 November 2021 and 23 February 2022, this article finds that researchers in German think tanks and academia provided a steady flow of timely, accurate and convincing warnings. The findings suggest that external experts are especially well positioned to uncover structural vulnerabilities that threatening actors can exploit, discuss politically inconvenient trends, and offer actionable warnings. This adds to discussions of how external expertise can support intelligence production and crisis decision-making.

KEYWORDS:

• Ukraine
• Russia
• Russo-Ukrainian war
• Germany
• warning
• external experts
• surprise
• post-mortem

Acknowledgements

The author is most grateful to the interviewees for taking time out of busy schedules and for sharing invaluable insights. Special thanks go to Jeff Michaels for comments on an earlier draft and to Mark Phythian and David Strachan-Morris for feedback on the paper and superb editorial support.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Supplemental data

Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2024.2330133.

Notes

1. For Anglo-American warnings that had reportedly been communicated to Berlin by then, see: Banco et al., “Something Was Badly Wrong.”; Röpcke, ”Russlands Kriegspläne.”

2. Gebauer and Hammerstein, “Germany’s Escape from Afghanistan.”

3. Deutscher Bundestag, “Zwischenbericht.”

4. Bolzen et al., “Deutschland ist das.”

5. Minzarari, “Failing to Deter Russia’; Driedger, ”Did Germany Contribute.”

6. e.g. Mader and Schoen, “No Zeitenwende (Yet)”; Mello, “Zeitenwende”; Masala, Bedingt abwehrbereit. See also the work of the “Action Group Zeitenwende” at the German Council on Foreign Relations. (last accessed February 15, 2024). https://dgap.org/en/research/programs/alfred-von-oppenheim-center-future-europe/action-group-zeitenwende .

7. e.g. Bunde, “Lessons (to Be) Learned?”; Schneckener, “Gestörter Empfang.”

8. e.g. Lamby, Ernstfall; Adler, Die Ukraine und wir; Thumann, Revanche.

9. Volmer, “Ich Weigere Mich.” [own translations, as all translations in this article].

10. Phoenix, “Christian Lindner Statement.”

11. Quoted in: Schneckener, “Gestörter Empfang,” 280.

12. For a detailed discussion, see e.g., Schneckener.

13. Deutsche Welle, “German Spy Chief.”

14. Amann et al., “Was für Eskalation spricht.”

15. Amann et al.

16. Quadbeck, “BND-Chef Kahl.”

17. Der Spiegel, “BND-Präsident Kahl”; Quadbeck, “BND-Chef Kahl.”

18. Deutscher Bundestag, “Nachrichtendienste warnen.”

19. Deutscher Bundestag.

20. Die Welt, “Habeck beklagt Fehleinschätzungen.”

21. e.g. Schneckener, “Gestörter Empfang,” 286.

22. Driedger and Polianskii, “Utility-Based Predictions.”

23. e.g. Dover, “Adding Value”; Meyer et al., Estimative Intelligence.

24. Arcos, Drumhiller, and Phythian, Academic-Practitioner Divide.

25. Meyer, Franco, and Otto, Warning about War.

26. Meyer, Sangar, and Michaels, “How Do Non-Governmental Organizations.”

27. Miller, “Audience Costs.”

28. Gleditsch, “One without the Other?”; Gleditsch, “This Research Has.”

29. Bressan and Bergmaier, “From Conflict Early Warning.”

30. Anderson et al., “Considering Practices.”

31. Beaumais and Ramel, “Diplomats, Soldiers.”

32. Sweijs and Teer, “Practices, Principles.”

33. Bell, “Conflict Early Warning Systems.”

34. Bressan and Bergmaier, “From Conflict Early Warning.”

35. Fomin et al., “International Studies.”

36. Bennett, “Using Process Tracing.”

37. Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 198; Meyer, Sangar, and Michaels, “How Do Non-Governmental Organizations”; Meyer, Franco, and Otto, Warning about War.

38. One example of the latter for the case under study is Konrad Muzyka’s blog: https://rochan-consulting.com [last accessed 14/02/2024].

39. Dover, “Adding Value,” 854.

40. e.g. Meyer, Franco, and Otto, Warning about War; Guttmann and Michaels, “How Germany and the UK”; Michaels, “How Surprising Was,” 167–71.

41. Dover, “Adding Value.”

42. Grabo, Handbook of Warning Intelligence, 366–67.

43. Meyer, Franco, and Otto, Warning about War; Meyer et al., Estimative Intelligence; Ikani and Meyer, “The Underlying Causes”; Bressan and Bergmaier, “From Conflict Early Warning.”

44. Guttmann et al., “Introduction,” 5.

45. Michaels, “How Surprising Was”, 159; Guttmann et al., “Introduction”, 5.

46. Guttmann et al., “Introduction”, 5.

47. Ikani et al., “Expectations from Estimative Intelligence,” 34.

48. Michaels, “How Surprising Was”, 160 [emphasis in original].

49. Ikani et al., “Expectations from Estimative Intelligence”, 33; Michaels, “How Surprising Was”, 159.

50. Grabo, Anticipating Surprise, 39–40.

51. Ikani, Guttmann, and Meyer, “An Analytical Framework,” 205.

52. Michaels, “How Surprising Was,” 161.

53. Meyer, “Can One ‘Prove’”

54. Soest, “Why Do We Speak.”

55. Others, such as the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA) or the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi), had different geographic/thematic foci at the time and did not contribute substantially to an understanding of the evolving crisis.

56. See, for instance: https://laender-analysen.de [last accessed 14/02/2023].

57. Putin, “Historical Unity.”

58. Sonne, Dixon, and Stern, “Russian Troop Movements.” See also: https://rochan-consulting.com/russian-land-forces-movements-in-october/ [last accessed 14/02/2023].

59. Amiel, “Russia’s Military Build-Up.”

60. Pickrell, “A Russian Invasion.”

61. Harris and Sonne, “Russia Planning Massive.”

62. TASS News Agency, “Путин Заявил.”

63. RFE/RL, “Ukraine Says.”

64. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Press Release.”

65. Crimea Realities, “Фейки о Химатаке На Донбассе.”

66. President of Russia, “Annual News Conference.”

67. McLeary, “Russian Buildup near Ukraine.”

68. Wolkow, “Öffentliche Meinung in Russland.”

69. Härtel, “Das deutsch-ukrainische Verhältnis.”

70. Dempsey, “Judy Asks.”

71. For a similar analysis, without a clear warning, see: Hartwich, “Mittäter oder Trittbrettfahrer?.”

72. Behrends, “Warum die neue Koalition.”

73. Härtel, ”Russischer Truppenaufmarsch.”

74. Härtel.

75. Marangé and Stewart, “Rench and German Approaches,” 40.

76. Skrypnyk, “Eine Bedrohung.”

77. Lucas, “Der Westen.”

78. Meister, “Russia’s Military Buildup.”

79. Brüggmann, Kersting, and Klöckner, “Neue Bundesregierung.”

80. Samus, “Putins Großmachtsucht.”

81. von Twickel, ”Die Eskalation.”

82. Minzarari, ”Russia’s brinkmanship.”

83. In addition, Behrends and Umland warn in their analyses for LibMod, as mentioned in the previous and next sections.

84. Behrends, ”Memorial, das sind wir.”

85. Utrikespolitiska institutet, ”The Wider Implications.”

86. N-TV, ”Die Eskalation.”

87. Behrends, ”Die erste Krise.”

88. Umland, ”Beuteobjekt Ukraine.”

89. Behrends, ”Mehr Realität wagen.”

90. Fücks, ”Dialogue Yes, Appeasement No.”

91. Gressel, ”Der russische Aufmarsch.”

92. Fischer, ”Moskaus Verhandlungsoffensive.”

93. Klymenko, ”Sicherheitsrisiken.”

94. Joana, ”Experte zur Ukraine-Krise.”

95. Kaim, ”Ukraine-Konflikt.”

96. Meister, ”Was möchte Russland?.”

97. Sierakowski, ”Was Kasachstan.”

98. Umland, ”Gebt der Ukraine.”

99. Weber, ”The Need For.”

100. Burkovskyi, ”Russland stellt”

101. Sierakowski, ”Has Biden Surrendered Ukraine?.”

102. Klein, ”Ukraine-Konflikt.”

103. Mitchnik, ”Deutschland und der Westen.”

104. LibMod, ”Niemand bedroht uns.”

105. Sierakowski, ”The View from Kyiv.”

106. Brunnbauer, ”Warum ein Angriff.”

107. Emendörfer, ”Ukraine-Konflikt mit Russland.”

108. Tagesschau, ”Ukraine.”

109. Behrends, ”Für eine verantwortliche Sicherheitspolitik.”

110. van Ackeren, ”Ukraine am Abgrund.”

111. Görmann, ”Ukraine-Konflikt eskaliert.”

112. Klein, ”Russia’s Military Buildup.”

113. Klein.

114. N-TV, ”Vielleicht ist Putin.”

115. Deutschlandfunk Kultur, ”Hybrider Kampf.”

116. Hofman, ”Russia’s Hybrid War.”

117. Deutschlandfunk Nova, ”Die russische Armee.”

118. NDR, ”Experte für Verteidigungspolitik.”

119. Wiegold, ”Ukraine/Russland/NATO.”

120. Pawlak, ”TV-Kolumne”; N-TV, ”Expertin Pagung.”

121. Fix and Kimmage, ”What Does Putin Want.”

122. Quoted in: Fix and Kimmage.

123. Zeit Online, ”Experten fordern Korrektur.” For a detailed critical evaluation of Germany’s approach to Russia and the lessons that should have been learned, see: Umland, ”The Ruins of Ostpolitik.”

124. Umland, ”How Germany’s Nord Stream.”

125. Taylor, ”Is Putin Bluffing?.”

126. Behrends, ”Putin verstehen.”

127. Heißler, ”Russlands Invasion.”

128. Krause, ”Wir müssen akzeptieren.”

129. For a detailed discussion: Meister, ”Russia’s Military Buildup.”

130. Fix, ”Germany’s Russia Test.”

131. For a prominent critique by DGAP’s President, see: Enders, ”Realistische Deutsche Russlandpolitik.”

132. Promote Ukraine, ”War or Another Manoeuvre?”

133. Dylan and Maguire, “Secret Intelligence,” 50.

134. Deutschlandfunk Nova, ”Die russische Armee.”

135. N-TV, ”Vielleicht ist Putin.”

136. N-TV, ”Expertin Pagung”; Klein, ”Russia’s Military Buildup.”

137. Fix and Kimmage, ”What Does Putin Want.”

138. Korablyova, ”Warum Selenskyj”; Felder, ”Putin nimmt Selenski.”

139. Trubetskoy, ”Mission Ruhe.”

140. Dover, ”Adding Value.”

141. Deutschlandfunk, ”Politologe Varwick”; Gesellschaft für Sicherheitspolitik, “Aufruf,” December 5, 2021.

Additional information

Funding

The author gratefully acknowledges the past support of the Generalitat de Catalunya/AGAUR [grant 2020 BP00210] and the UK Economic and Social Research Council [Grant ES/R004331/1].

Notes on contributors

Eva Michaels

Eva Michaels is an Assistant Professor in Intelligence and Security at Leiden University’s Institute of Security and Global Affairs. She is also affiliated with the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals (IBEI) as a Senior Research Fellow. Her research explores how Europeans anticipate and respond to crisis due to the escalation of violent conflict. Eva is a co-editor of Estimative Intelligence in European Foreign Policymaking (Edinburgh University Press, 2022).