Thailand’s new soft power focus and the makings of a paradox

Abstract

Soft power, obtained when a state develops the ability to attract rather than coerce other actors because of the legitimacy of its values, has been on the national agenda in Thailand since 2010, when efforts were made to expand the Kingdom’s creative industries. However, under nearly a decade of military rule after the May 2014 coup d‘état, Thailand focused largely inward in order to secure its legitimacy and survival, consequently curtailing soft gains. The military junta frequently targeted public dissent, including Thai activist rappers Danupa “Milli” Kanaterrakul and Rap Against Dictatorship (RAD). This article reviews soft power and state repression during the Prayut Chan-o-cha era and makes two critical arguments, that nation branding and soft power, related concepts, require a degree of authenticity and that Thailand’s soft power is increasingly outside of the government’s ability to completely control. Consequently, in a new semi-democratic environment under Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin, successful soft power and nation branding efforts are likely to occur outside the Kingdom’s ideological constraints or self-serving elite interests or risk an unwanted paradox and an operating environment contradictory to either objective.

Keywords:

• Soft power
• nation branding
• thailand
• power
• legitimacy

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

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