The failures of Russian Aerospace Forces in the Russia–Ukraine war and the future of air power

ABSTRACT

In the prelude to the 2022 Russia–Ukraine War, American intelligence had concluded the invasion ‘might take a few days longer’ than Russians expected, but not much longer. The Russian Aerospace Forces was expected to eliminate Ukraine’s air defense and pave the way for Russian troops. What explains the failures of the Russian Aerospace Forces to acquire air superiority? I explore three causal factors to understand these failures – Russian military history and its impact on Russia’s air doctrine, Russian intelligence failures, and Ukrainian resolve and innovativeness. I also highlight the causal role played by the United States in sharing critical intelligence.

KEYWORDS:

• Russia
• Ukraine
• Putin
• Air Power Theory
• missiles
• precision strike

Acknowledgments

The author is deeply grateful to Daniel Byman, Philip Haun, Richard Muller, Wes Hutto, seminar participants in the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS) at the Air University, and seminar participants in the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University. The author also thanks the three anonymous reviewers for their excellent comments and suggestions.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

¹ Ryan Evans, Gen. James Hecker, and Air Marshal Johnny Stringer, ‘Ukraine and Lessons Learned for Airpower and Spacepower’, accessed 22 Aug. 2023, https://warontherocks.com/2023/06/ukraine-and-lessons-learned-for-airpower-and-spacepower/.

² Shane Harris et al., ‘Road to War: U.S. Struggled to Convince Allies, and Zelensky, of Risk of Invasion’, Washington Post, 16 Aug. 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/interactive/2022/ukraine-road-to-war/.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Joshua Yaffa, ‘Inside the U.S. Effort to Arm Ukraine’, The New Yorker, 17 Oct. 2022, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2022/10/24/inside-the-us-effort-to-arm-ukraine.

⁶ Harris et al., ‘Road to War: U.S. Struggled to Convince Allies, and Zelensky, of Risk of Invasion’.

⁷ Jacqui Heinrich and Adam Sabes, ‘Gen. Milley Says Kyiv Could Fall within 72 Hours If Russia Decides to Invade Ukraine: Sources’, Fox News, 5 Feb. 2022, https://www.foxnews.com/us/gen-milley-says-kyiv-could-fall-within-72-hours-if-russia-decides-to-invade-ukraine-sources.

⁸ Greg Miller and Catherine Belton, ‘Russia’s Spies Misread Ukraine and Misled Kremlin as War Loomed’, Washington Post, 19 Aug. 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2022/russia-fsb-intelligence-ukraine-war/.

⁹ Greg Myre, ‘A Frustrated Putin is Likely to “double down” in the Coming Weeks, CIA Says’, npr, 8 Mar. 2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/03/08/1085155440/cia-director-putin-is-angry-and-frustrated-likely-to-double-down.

¹⁰ Anton Troianovski, Michael Schwirtz, and Andrew E. Kramer, ‘Russia’s Military, Once Creaky, Is Modern and Lethal’, The New York Times, 27 Jan. 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/27/world/europe/russia-military-putin-ukraine.html; ‘Putin’s New Model Army’, The Economist, 24 May 2014, https://www.economist.com/europe/2014/05/24/putins-new-model-army.

¹¹ Michael Schwirtz, ‘Ukraine Commanders Say a Russian Invasion Would Overwhelm Them’, The New York Times, 9 Dec. 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/09/world/europe/ukraine-military-russia-invasion.html; Michael Kofman and Jeffrey Edmonds, ‘Russia’s Shock and Awe’, Foreign Affairs, 22 Feb. 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-02-21/russias-shock-and-awe.

¹² Premchand Sanu Kainikara, ‘Russian Concept of Air Warfare: The Impact of Ideology on the Development of Air Power’, Doctoral Dissertation, Adelaide, Australia, Univ. Adelaide, 2005, 4–5, https://digital.library.adelaide.edu.au/dspace/bitstream/2440/22319/2/02whole.pdf.

¹³ Liz Sly, ‘Nine Ways Russia Botched Its Invasion of Ukraine’, The Washington Post, 8 Apr. 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/08/how-russia-botched-ukraine-invasion/.

¹⁴ Dan Parsons, ‘Ukraine Situation Report: 80% Of Kyiv’s Airpower Remains Intact’, The Warzone, 20 Sept. 2022, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-situation-report-surface-to-air-missiles-have-wreaked-havoc-on-russian-aircraft.

¹⁵ Mykhaylo Zabrodskyi et al., ‘Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2002’ (London, UK: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 30 Nov. 2022), 30, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/preliminary-lessons-conventional-warfighting-russias-invasion-ukraine-february-july-2022.

¹⁶ Phillips Payson O’Brien and Edward Stringer, ‘The Overlooked Reason Russia’s Invasion Is Floundering’, The Atlantic, 9 May 2022, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/05/russian-military-air-force-failure-ukraine/629803/.

¹⁷ Sly, ‘Nine Ways Russia Botched Its Invasion of Ukraine’.

¹⁸ Zabrodskyi et al., ‘Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2002’, 40 & 45.

¹⁹ Ibid., 45.

²⁰ James Sterrett, Soviet Air Force Theory, 1918–1945 (New York, NY: Routledge, 2007), 59, 78–79; Kainikara, ‘Russian Concept of Air Warfare’, 114–15.

²¹ Robert A. Kilmarx, A History of Soviet Air Power (London, UK: Faber and Faber, Inc., 1962), 177.

²² Von Hardesty and Ilya Grinberg, Red Phoenix Rising: The Soviet Air Force in World War II (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2012), 371.

²³ Ibid., 137.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid., 138–53.

²⁶ Ibid., 270.

²⁷ Sterrett, Soviet Air Force Theory, 1918–1945, 120–22.

²⁸ Ibid., 122–23; Kainikara, ‘Russian Concept of Air Warfare’, 128.

²⁹ Kilmarx, A History of Soviet Air Power, 185; Kainikara, ‘Russian Concept of Air Warfare’, 123.

³⁰ Raymond L. Garthoff, ‘Introduction’, in Military Strategy: Soviet Doctrine and Concepts, ed. Marhsal V. D. Sokolovsky (London, UK: Pall Mall Press, 1963), xi.

³¹ Raymond L. Garthoff, ‘Soviet Air Power: Organization and Staff Work’, in The Soviet Air and Rocket Forces, ed. Asher Lee (New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1959).

³² Kainikara, ‘Russian Concept of Air Warfare’, 182–84.

³³ Marhsal V. D. Sokolovsky, ed., Military Strategy: Soviet Doctrine and Concepts (London, UK: Pall Mall Press, 1963), 232.

³⁴ Marcel de Haas, Russian Security and Air Power 1992–2002 (New York, NY: Frank Cass, 2004), 106.

³⁵ Ibid., 106–7; Kainikara, ‘Russian Concept of Air Warfare’, 183–84; David Halloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983), 30–35.

³⁶ Jaganath Sankaran, ‘Russia’s Anti-Satellite Weapons: A Hedging and Offsetting Strategy to Deter Western Aerospace Forces’, Contemporary Security Policy 43, no. 3 (June 2022): 442–50.

³⁷ Mary C. Fitzgerald, ‘The New “Aero-Space” War in Soviet Military Thought’, in The Soviet Military and the Future, ed. Stephen J. Blank and Jacob W. Kipp (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 72–81..

³⁸ de Haas, Russian Security and Air Power 1992–2002, 164.

³⁹ Ibid., 142–43, 163.

⁴⁰ Anton Lavrov, ‘Russian Military Reforms from Georgia to Syria’, A report of the CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), November 2018), 15, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-military-reforms-georgia-syria.

⁴¹ See ‘Poor Planning Doomed Russian Warplanes’, WIRED, 20 Aug. 2000, https://www.wired.com/2008/08/poor-planning-d/; Dmitry Solovyov, ‘Friendly Fire Downed Russia Jets in Georgia-Report’, Reuters, 8 Jul. 2009, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL8262192; David Axe, ‘In 2008, Georgia’s Missile Crews Bloodied the Russian Air Force – Now They’re Getting Ready To Do It Again’, Forbes, 14 Sept 2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2020/09/14/in-2008-georgias-missile-crews-bloodied-the-russian-air-force-now-theyre-getting-ready-to-do-it-again/?sh=49624a232f77.

⁴² Lavrov, ‘Russian Military Reforms from Georgia to Syria’, 15–16.

⁴³ ‘Text of Newly-Approved Russian Military Doctrine’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 9 Feb. 2010, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/2010russia_military_doctrine.pdf.

⁴⁴ Военная доктрина Российской Федерации [Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation], RGRU, 25 Dec. 2014, https://rg.ru/documents/2014/12/30/doktrina-dok.html

⁴⁵ Anya Loukianova Fink, ‘The Evolving Russian Concept of Strategic Deterrence: Risks and Responses’, Arms Control Association, Aug. 2017, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2017–07/features/evolving-russian-concept-strategic-deterrence-risks-responses.

⁴⁶ Michael Simpson et al., ‘Road to Damascus: The Russian Air Campaign in Syria, 2015 to 2018’ (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2022), 85, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1170–1.html; Anton Lavrov, ‘The Russian Air Campaign in Syria: A Preliminary Analysis’ (Washington, D.C.: CNA, June 2018), 4, https://www.cna.org/reports/2018/06/russian-air-campaign-in-syria.

⁴⁷ Lavrov, ‘The Russian Air Campaign in Syria: A Preliminary Analysis’, 4.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 2; Simpson et al., ‘Road to Damascus: The Russian Air Campaign in Syria, 2015 to 2018’, 79.

⁴⁹ Simpson et al., ‘Road to Damascus: The Russian Air Campaign in Syria, 2015 to 2018’, 85–86.

⁵⁰ Mikhail Rostovsky, Сергей Шойгу рассказал, как спасали российскую армию [Sergei Shoigu told how the Russian army was saved], MKRU, 22 Sept. 2019, https://www.mk.ru/politics/2019/09/22/sergey-shoygu-rasskazal-kak-spasali-rossiyskuyu-armiyu.html

⁵¹ Seth Jones, ‘Russia’s Battlefield Success in Syria: Will It Be a Pyrrhic Victory?’, CTC Sentinel, October 2019, 4–5.

⁵² Michael Kofman, ‘Zapad 2021: What We Learned From Russia’s Massive Military Drills’, The Moscow Times, 23 Sept. 2021, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/09/23/zapad-2021-what-we-learned-from-russias-massive-military-drills-a75127.

⁵³ Congressional Research Service, ‘Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects’ (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service (CRS), 13 Feb. 2023), 4, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47068.

⁵⁴ Benjamin S. Lambeth, ‘The Winning of Air Supremacy in Operation Desert Storm’ (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1993), 3, https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P7837.html.

⁵⁵ Justin Bronk, Nick Reynolds, and Jack Watling, ‘The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence’ (London, UK: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 7 Nov. 2022), https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/russian-air-war-and-ukrainian-requirements-air-defence; Ian Williams, ‘Putin’s Missile War: Russia’s Strike Campaign in Ukraine’ (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), May 2023), 19, https://www.csis.org/analysis/putins-missile-war.

⁵⁶ Bronk, Reynolds, and Watling, ‘The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence’, 25.

⁵⁷ Mike Pietrucha, ‘Amateur Hour Part II: Failing the Air Campaign’, War on the Rocks, 11 Aug. 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/08/amateur-hour-part-ii-failing-the-air-campaign/.

⁵⁸ The White House, ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom. DoD News Briefing − 4/01/2003. DoD News Briefing – Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers’, The White House, 1 Apr. 2003, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/04/20030401–5.html.

⁵⁹ Bronk, Reynolds, and Watling, ‘The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence’, 27.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 8.

⁶¹ Richard P. Hallion, Storm over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992), 166 & 174.

⁶² Ibid., 166.

⁶³ Government Accountability Office (GAO), ‘Operation Desert Storm: Evaluation of the Air Campaign’ (Washington, D.C.: Government Accountability Office (GAO), June 1997), 87, https://www.gao.gov/products/nsiad-97–134.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ken Dilanian et al., ‘U.S. Intel Helped Ukraine Protect Air Defenses, Shoot down Russian Plane Carrying Hundreds of Troops’, CNBC News, 26 Apr. 2022, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/us-intel-helped-ukraine-protect-air-defenses-shoot-russian-plane-carry-rcna26015.

⁶⁶ Benjamin S. Lambeth, ‘Kosovo and the Continuing SEAD Challenge’, Aerospace Power Journal, Summer 2002, 9.

⁶⁷ Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Coporation, 2001), 109; Lambeth, ‘Kosovo and the Continuing SEAD Challenge’, 16.

⁶⁸ Zabrodskyi et al., ‘Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February – July 2002’, 24.

⁶⁹ Illia Ponomarenko, ‘Ukraine’s Old Air Defense Proves Unexpectedly Effective in Combat’, The Kyiv Independent, 16 Mar. 2022, https://kyivindependent.com/ukraines-old-air-defense-proves-unexpectedly-effective-in-combat/.

⁷⁰ Bronk, Reynolds, and Watling, ‘The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence’, 17; Zabrodskyi et al., ‘Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February – July 2002’, 25.

⁷¹ Bronk, Reynolds, and Watling, ‘The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence’, 13.

⁷² Ibid., 28; Zabrodskyi et al., ‘Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February – July 2002’, 24.

⁷³ Jaganath Sankaran, ‘How Ukraine Fought Against Russia’s Air War’, Lawfare, 22 Jan. 2023, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/how-ukraine-fought-against-russias-air-war.

⁷⁴ Jiri Valenta, ‘From Prague to Kabul: The Soviet Style of Invasion’, International Security 5, no. 2 (Fall 1980): 133–36; Mark Galeotti, Afghanistan: The Soviet Union’s Last War, 1st edition (New York, NY: Frank Cass, 1995), 12–13.

⁷⁵ Zabrodskyi et al., ‘Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February – July 2002’, 8–10; Sly, ‘Nine Ways Russia Botched Its Invasion of Ukraine’.

⁷⁶ Frederick W. Kagan et al., ‘Putin’s Military Options’, Putin’s Likely Courses of Action in Ukraine – Part 2 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Study of War, December 2021), 14, https://www.understandingwar.org/report/putins-likely-courses-action-ukraine-part-2.

⁷⁷ Zabrodskyi et al., ‘Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February – July 2002’, 26.

⁷⁸ Miller and Belton, ‘Russia’s Spies Misread Ukraine and Misled Kremlin as War Loomed’.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.; George Grylls, ‘Ukrainians Kill Russian General Who said War Would Take Hours’, The Times, 26 Mar. 2022.

⁸¹ Mark Galeotti, ‘How Vladimir Putin’s Shrinking Inner Circle Led to the Invasion of Ukraine’, The Telegraph, 26 Feb. 2022, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/02/26/vladimir-putins-shrinking-inner-circle-led-invasion-ukraine/; Yaffa, ‘Inside the U.S. Effort to Arm Ukraine’.

⁸² Zabrodskyi et al., ‘Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February – July 2002’, 26.

⁸³ Headquarters, Department of the Army, ‘Reconnaissance, Security, and Tactical Enabling Tasks – Volume 2’ (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Mar. 2013), 3–2, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3–90/fm3-90_2.pdf.

⁸⁴ Alex Horton and Shane Harris, ‘Russian Troops’ Tendency to Talk on Unsecured Lines Is Proving Costly’, The Washington Post, 27 Mar. 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/03/27/russian-military-unsecured-communications/.

⁸⁵ Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, ‘Operation Z: The Death Throes of an Imperial Delusion’ (London, UK: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 22 Apr. 2022), 3–5.

⁸⁶ Bronk, Reynolds, and Watling, ‘The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence’, 7.

⁸⁷ Zabrodskyi et al., ‘Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February – July 2002’, 26.

⁸⁸ Alexander Mladenov, ‘Russia’s Intense Air and Missile Defence Operation in Ukraine War’, KEY.AERO, 27 July 2023, https://www.key.aero/article/russias-intense-air-and-missile-defence-operation-ukraine-war.

⁸⁹ Justin Bronk, ‘The Mysterious Case of the Missing Russian Air Force’, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 28 Feb. 2022, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/mysterious-case-missing-russian-air-force.

⁹⁰ Watling and Reynolds, ‘Operation Z: The Death Throes of an Imperial Delusion’, 4.

⁹¹ Bronk, ‘The Mysterious Case of the Missing Russian Air Force’.

⁹² Abraham Mahshie, ‘Ukraine says it can Deter a Russian Invasion with Air Defenses; NATO Calls for “Adjustments”’, Air & Space Forces Magazine, 10 Dec. 2021, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/ukraine-says-it-can-deter-a-russian-invasion-with-air-defense-nato-calls-for-adjustments/.

⁹³ John Simpson, ‘Russia’s Crimea Plan Detailed, Secret and Successful’, BBC, 19 Mar. 2014, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26644082.

⁹⁴ Chris Pocock, ‘Ukraine Has Lost 22 Aircraft to Rebel Forces’, AIN, 26 Nov. 2014, https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/defense/2014-11-26/ukraine-has-lost-22-aircraft-rebel-forces; ‘Ukraine Has Lost Half Its Warplanes’, War is Boring, 25 Jan. 2015, https://warisboring.com/ukraine-has-lost-half-its-warplanes/.

⁹⁵ ‘Ukraine has Lost Half its Warplanes’.

⁹⁶ ‘Ukrainian Air Force Prepares for Battle’, Medium, 7 Apr. 2014, https://medium.com/war-is-boring/ukrainian-air-force-prepares-for-battle-f70e106506a6.

⁹⁷ David Cenciotti, ‘Rescued From Crimea, Ukrainian MiG-29 Returns to Service’, War Is Boring, 5 Aug. 2014, https://warisboring.com/rescued-from-crimea-ukrainian-mig-29-returns-to-service/.

⁹⁸ Alexander Mladenov, ‘Inside Ukraine’s Extensive but Ageing Air Defence System’, KEY.AERO, 17 Jan. 2022, https://www.key.aero/article/inside-ukraines-extensive-ageing-air-defence-system.

⁹⁹ Greg Miller and Isabelle Khurshudyan, ‘Ukranian Spies with Deep Ties to CIA Wage Shadow War against Russia’, The Washington Post, 23 Oct. 2023; Adam Entous and Michael Schwirtz, ‘The Spy War: How C.I.A Secretly Helps Ukraine Fight Putin’, The New York Times, 25 Feb. 2024, Digital edition.

¹⁰⁰ John Wendle, ‘The Fighting Drones of Ukraine’, Smithsonian Magazine, February 2018, https://www.smithsonianmag.com/air-space-magazine/ukraines-drones-180967708/.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Gregory Sanders et al., ‘Rising Demand and Proliferating Supply of Military UAS’ (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), May 2023), 26, https://www.csis.org/analysis/rising-demand-and-proliferating-supply-military-uas.

¹⁰³ Burak Ege Bekdil, ‘Turkey and Ukraine to Coproduce TB2 Drones’, Defense News, 4 Feb. 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/02/04/turkey-and-ukraine-to-coproduce-tb2-drones/.

¹⁰⁴ Burak Ege Bekdil, ‘Ukraine is Set to Buy 24 Turkish Drones. So Why hasn’t Russia Pushed Back?’, Defense News, 29 Sept. 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/unmanned/2021/09/29/ukraine-is-set-to-buy-24-turkish-drones-so-why-hasnt-russia-pushed-back/.

¹⁰⁵ Bekdil, ‘Turkey and Ukraine to Coproduce TB2 Drones’.

¹⁰⁶ Ponomarenko, ‘Ukraine’s Old Air Defense Proves Unexpectedly Effective in Combat’; Sebastien Roblin, ‘Patriot Missiles aren’t the Answer for Ukrainian Air Defense’, The National Interest, 4 Dec., 2021, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/patriot-missiles-aren%E2%80%99t-answer-ukrainian-air-defense-197556.

¹⁰⁷ Yaffa, ‘Inside the U.S. Effort to Arm Ukraine’.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Air Force Command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, ‘Air Force Vision 2035’ (Kyiv, Ukraine: Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, May 2020), 36–37, https://chtyvo.org.ua/authors/Ministerstvo_oborony_Ukrainy/Air_Force_Vision_2035_anhl.pdf.

¹¹⁰ Yaroslav Trofimov, ‘Ukraine’s Special Forces Hold Off Russian Offensive on Kyiv’s Front Lines’, Wall Street Journal, 4 Mar. 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraines-special-forces-hold-off-russian-offensive-on-kyivs-front-lines-11646417190; Julian Borger, ‘The Drone Operators Who Halted Russian Convoy Headed for Kyiv’, The Guardian, 28 Mar. 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/28/the-drone-operators-who-halted-the-russian-armoured-vehicles-heading-for-kyiv.

¹¹¹ Bronk, Reynolds, and Watling, ‘The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence’, 11–12; Zabrodskyi et al., ‘Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February – July 2002’, 26 & 29.

¹¹² Justin Bronk, ‘Ukraine Needs Air Defense Assistance to Protect Hard-Won Victories on the Ground’, War on the Rocks, 16 Nov. 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/11/ukraine-needs-air-defense-assistance-to-protect-hard-won-victories-on-the-ground/.

¹¹³ Zabrodskyi et al., ‘Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2002’, 29.

¹¹⁴ James Marson, ‘Putin thought Ukraine Would Fall Quickly. An Airport Battle Proved him Wrong’, The Wall Street Journal, 3 Mar. 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/putin-thought-ukraine-would-fall-quickly-an-airport-battle-proved-him-wrong-11646343121; Liam Collins, Michael Kofman, and John Spencer, ‘The Battle of Hostomel Airport: A Key Moment in Russia’s Defeat in Kyiv’, War on the Rocks, 10 Aug. 2023, https://warontherocks.com/2023/08/the-battle-of-hostomel-airport-a-key-moment-in-russias-defeat-in-kyiv/.

¹¹⁵ Holger Roonemaa and Eero Epner, ‘How Estonia’s Military Intelligence Secretly Helped Ukraine’, VSquare, 15 Sept. 2023, https://vsquare.org/how-estonias-military-intelligence-secretly-helped-ukraine/; Marson, ‘Putin Thought Ukraine Would Fall Quickly. An Airport Battle Proved him Wrong’.

¹¹⁶ Marson, ‘Putin thought Ukraine Would Fall Quickly. An Airport Battle Proved him Wrong’.

¹¹⁷ Tim Ripley, ‘Gunship Down’, AirForces Monthly Magazine, March 2023, 43–44.

¹¹⁸ Marson, ‘Putin thought Ukraine Would Fall Quickly. An Airport Battle Proved him Wrong’.

¹¹⁹ Mark Urban, ‘The Heavy Losses of an Elite Russian Regiment in Ukraine’, BBC News, 2 Apr. 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60946340; Marson, ‘Putin Thought Ukraine Would Fall Quickly. An Airport Battle Proved Him Wrong’.

¹²⁰ Zhanna Bezpiatchuk, ‘Ukraine War: Chornobaivka Airbase, Symbol of Russian Defeat’, BBC News, 29 Nov. 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63754797.

¹²¹ Sean M. Wiswesser, ‘Potemkin on the Dnieper: The Failure of Russian Airpower in the Ukraine War’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 2023, 11.

¹²² Lawrence Freedman, ‘Why War Fails: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine and the Limits of Military Power’, Foreign Affairs, August 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2022-06-14/ukraine-war-russia-why-fails.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Bezpiatchuk, ‘Ukraine War: Chornobaivka Airbase, Symbol of Russian Defeat’.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Zabrodskyi et al., ‘Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February – July 2002’, 44.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 29.

¹²⁸ Matthew Luxmoore and Michael R. Gordon, ‘Russia’s Army Learns from its Mistakes in Ukraine’, The Wall Street Journal, 24 Sept. 2023, https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/russias-army-learns-from-its-mistakes-in-ukraine-a6b2eb4; Julian E. Barnes, Helene Cooper, and Eric Schmitt, ‘As Ukraine Prepares for a Second Year at War, the Prospect of a Stalemate Looms’, The New York Times, 21 Dec. 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/21/us/politics/ukraine-russia-war-stalemate.html.

¹²⁹ Steve Trimble, ‘Russian Aircraft Losses Total 176 In Ukraine: RAF Chief’, Aviation Week Network, 13 July 2023, https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/aircraft-propulsion/russian-aircraft-losses-total-176-ukraine-raf-chief.

¹³⁰ Zabrodskyi et al., ‘Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2002’, 29.

¹³¹ Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, ‘Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine’ (London, UK: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, May 19, 2023), 20–21, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/meatgrinder-russian-tactics-second-year-its-invasion-ukraine.

¹³² Zabrodskyi et al., ‘Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2002’, 30.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ ‘Russia Is Starting to Make Its Superiority in Electronic Warfare Count’, The Economist, 23 Nov. 2023, https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/11/23/russia-is-starting-to-make-its-superiority-in-electronic-warfare-count; Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Yurii Shyvala, ‘“Jamming”: How Electronic Warfare Is Reshaping Ukraine’s Battlefields’, The New York Times, 12 Mar. 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/12/world/europe/ukraine-drone-russia-jamming.html.

¹³⁵ David L. Stern and Serhii Korolchuk, ‘Russia’s Air Power Roars Back into the War with Devastating Guided Bombs’, The Washington Post, 11 Mar. 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/03/11/russia-glide-bombs-air-force-avdiivka/.

¹³⁶ Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 13.

¹³⁷ Phil Haun and Colin Jackson, ‘Breaker of Armies: Air Power in the Easter Offensive and the Myth of Linebacker I and II in the Vietnam War’, International Security 40, no. 3 (Winter 2015): 139–78.

¹³⁸ Daniel Byman and Matthew C. Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 30–33; Daniel L. Byman and Matthew C. Waxman, ‘Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate’, International Security 24, no. 4 (Spring 2000): 15.

¹³⁹ Olena Harmash, ‘Russian Missiles Pound Ukraine’s Energy System, Force Power Outages’, Reuters, 10 Feb. 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-forces-strike-ukraine-air-raid-sirens-wail-across-country-2023-02-10/; ‘Russia Strikes Kyiv, Zelenskiy Says Moscow’s Forces Being “Destroyed”’, Reuters, 20 June 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-launches-overnight-air-attack-ukraine-east-west-2023-06-20/.

¹⁴⁰ Ian Williams, ‘Putin’s Missile War: Russia’s Strike Campaign in Ukraine’ (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), May 2023), 25, https://www.csis.org/analysis/putins-missile-war. See also Igor Kossov, ‘How Many Missiles Does Russia Have Left?’, The Kyiv Independent, 13 Jan. 2023, https://kyivindependent.com/how-many-missiles-does-russia-have-left/. This article provides a tally of 3,500 missiles, including anti-ship missiles and air/missile defense interceptors that have been repurposed by the Russians as offensive strike missiles.

¹⁴¹ Constant Meheut, ‘Russia Pounds Several Ukrainian Regions With Missiles’, The New York Times, 8 Jan. 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/08/world/europe/ukraine-russia-missiles.html.

¹⁴² Thibault Spirlet, ‘Russia Exploits Ukraine Air Defense Shortages in Attacks: White House’, Business Insider, 8 Feb. 2024, https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-exploits-ukraine-air-defense-shortages-in-attacks-white-house-2024–2.

¹⁴³ Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Julian E. Barnes, and Natalia Yermak, ‘Russia, Learning From Costly Mistakes, Shifts Battle Tactics’, The New York Times, 17 June 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/17/world/europe/russia-ukraine-war-tactics.html.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Jaganath Sankaran

Jaganath Sankaran is an assistant professor in the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin and a non-resident fellow in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution. He has published in International Security, Contemporary Security Policy, Journal of Strategic Studies, Journal of East Asian Studies, Asian Security, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Arms Control Today, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, and other outlets.