Managing the Dilemmas of Alliance Burden Sharing

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Notes

1 Mira Rapp-Hooper, Shields of the Republic: The Triumph and Peril of America’s Alliances (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2020), chs. 4-7; John R. Deni, Coalition of the UnWilling and UnAble: European Realignment and the Future of American Geopolitics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2021).

2 Brian D. Blankenship and Benjamin Denison, “Is America Prepared for Great-Power Competition?,” Survival 61, no. 5 (2019): 43–64; Ali Wyne, America’s Great-Power Opportunity: Revitalizing U.S. Foreign Policy to Meet the Challenges of Strategic Competition (Medford, MA: Polity, 2022).

3 Michael Beckley, “The Emerging Military Balance in East Asia: How China’s Neighbors Can Check Chinese Naval Expansion,” International Security 42, no. 2 (2017): 78–119; Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, “Active Denial: Redesigning Japan’s Response to China’s Military Challenge,” International Security 42, no. 4 (2018): 128–169; Eugene Gholz, Benjamin Friedman, and Enea Gjoza, “Defensive Defense: A Better Way to Protect US Allies in Asia,” Washington Quarterly 42, no. 4 (2019): 171–189; Barry R. Posen, “Europe Can Defend Itself,” Survival 62, no. 6 (2020): 7–34; Hugo Meijer and Stephen G. Brooks, “Illusions of Autonomy: Why Europe Cannot Provide for Its Security If the United States Pulls Back,” International Security 45, no. 4 (2021): 7–43; Henrik Larsen, “Adapting NATO to Great-Power Competition,” Washington Quarterly 45, no. 4 (2022): 7–26.

4 Brian D. Blankenship, The Burden-Sharing Dilemma: Coercive Diplomacy in US Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2023).

5 Dan Altman, “By Fait Accompli, Not Coercion: How States Wrest Territory from Their Adversaries,” International Studies Quarterly 61, no. 4 (2017): 881–891.

6 Michèle A. Flournoy, “How to Prevent a War in Asia,” Foreign Affairs, June 18, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-06-18/how-prevent-war-asia; Elbridge Colby and Walter Slocombe, “The State of (Deterrence by) Denial,” War on the Rocks, March 22, 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/03/the-state-of-deterrence-by-denial/.

7 Blankenship, The Burden-Sharing Dilemma, chapters 2 and 4.

8 Mancur Olson Jr. and Richard Zeckhauser, “An Economic Theory of Alliances,” Review of Economics and Statistics 48, no. 3 (1966): 266–279; Barry R. Posen, Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014); Brian Blankenship, “The Price of Protection: Explaining Success and Failure of US Alliance Burden-Sharing Pressure,” Security Studies 30, no. 5 (2021): 691–724.

9 Blankenship, The Burden-Sharing Dilemma, 46, 53, 61-63; John Duffield, Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO’s Conventional Force Posture (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), chs. 5-6.

10 Tongfi Kim, The Supply Side of Security: A Market Theory of Military Alliances (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016); Yasuhiro Izumikawa, “Binding Strategies in Alliance Politics: The Soviet-Japanese-US Diplomatic Tug of War in the Mid-1950s,” International Studies Quarterly 62, no. 1 (2018): 108–120; Alexander Lanoszka, Atomic Assurance: The Alliance Politics of Nuclear Proliferation (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018).

11 Michael Mastanduno, “System Maker and Privilege Taker: U.S. Power and the International Political Economy,” World Politics 61, no. 1 (2009): 121–154; Carla Norrlof, America’s Global Advantage: US Hegemony and International Cooperation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Zachary Selden, “Balancing Against or Balancing With? The Spectrum of Alignment and the Endurance of American Hegemony,” Security Studies 22, no. 2 (2013): 330–364.

12 James D. Morrow, “Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (1994): 270–297; Andres Gannon, “Use Their Force: Interstate Security Alignments and the Distribution of Military Capabilities” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, San Diego, 2021).

13 David Clay Large, Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Blankenship, The Burden-Sharing Dilemma, chap. 2.

14 Selden, “Balancing Against or Balancing With?”; Blankenship, The Burden-Sharing Dilemma.

15 Yukinori Komine, “Whither a ‘Resurgent Japan’: The Nixon Doctrine and Japan’s Defense Buildup, 1969–1976,” Journal of Cold War Studies 16, no. 3 (2014): 88–128; Thomas Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism (Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).

16 Blankenship, The Burden-Sharing Dilemma,107-109; Jong-Sup Lee and Uk Heo, The US-South Korean Alliance, 1961-1988: Free-Riding or Bargaining? (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2002), chs. 4-5; Sung Gul Hong, “The Search for Deterrence: Park’s Nuclear Option,” in The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea, ed. Pyŏng-guk Kim and Ezra F. Vogel (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 483–510.

17 Luis Simón, “Understanding US Retrenchment in Europe,” Survival 57, no. 2 (2015): 157–172; Trump White House Archives, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington DC: White House, 2017), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf; Jim Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2018), https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.

18 Jim Garamone, “Official Talks DOD Policy Role in Chinese Pacing Threat, Integrated Deterrence,” U.S. Department of Defense, June 2, 2021.

19 Ronald R. Krebs and Jennifer Spindel, “Divided Priorities: Why and When Allies Differ Over Military Intervention,” Security Studies 27, no. 4 (2018): 575–606; Tongfi Kim and Luis Simón, “A Reputation versus Prioritization Trade-Off: Unpacking Allied Perceptions of US Extended Deterrence in Distant Regions,” Security Studies 30, no. 5 (2021): 725–760.

20 John Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” International Security 15, no. 1 (1990): 5–56; Robert J. Art, “Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO,” Political Science Quarterly 111, no. 1 (1996): 1–39.

21 James Goldgeier, “Less Whole, Less Free, Less at Peace: Whither America’s Strategy for a Post-Cold War Europe?,” War on the Rocks, February 12, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/02/less-whole-less-free-less-peace-whither-americas-strategy-post-cold-war-europe/; Anthony Constantini, “Understanding Europe’s Shift to the Right,” Politico, September 30, 2022, https://www.politico.eu/article/understanding-europes-shift-to-the-right/.

22 Andrés Gannon and Daniel Kent, “Keeping Your Friends Close, but Acquaintances Closer: Why Weakly Allied States Make Committed Coalition Partners,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 65, no. 5 (2021): 889–918; David A. Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009); James D. Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry,” American Journal of Political Science 35, no. 4 (1991): 904–933; Jeremy Shapiro and Jana Puglierin, “The Art of Vassalisation: How Russia’s War on Ukraine Has Transformed Transatlantic Relations,” European Council on Foreign Relations, April 4, 2023, https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-art-of-vassalisation-how-russias-war-on-ukraine-has-transformed-transatlantic-relations/.

23 Hubert Zimmermann, Money and Security: Troops, Monetary Policy and West Germany’s Relations with the United States and Britain, 1950-1971 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

24 Michael Mastanduno, Economic Containment: CoCom and the Politics of East-West Trade (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992).

25 Norrlof, America’s Global Advantage, chap. 6; Carla Norrlof et al., “Global Monetary Order and the Liberal Order Debate,” International Studies Perspectives 21, no. 2 (2020): 109–153; Susan Strange, Mad Money:When Markets Outgrow Governments (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998); Barry Eichengreen, Exorbitant Privilege: The Rise and Fall of the Dollar (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman, “Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion,” International Security 44, no. 1 (2019): 42–79.

26 Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl, “Gold as a Diplomatic Tool: How the Threat of Gold Purchases Worked as Leverage in International Monetary Relations, 1960–68,” in The Global Gold Market and the International Monetary System from the Late 19th Century to the Present: Actors, Networks, Power, ed. Sandra Bott (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2013), 159–80; Timothy Andrews Sayle, Enduring Alliance: A History of NATO and the Postwar Global Order (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019), chs. 2-3, 6.

27 Hubert Zimmermann, “The Improbable Permanence of a Commitment: America’s Troop Presence in Europe during the Cold War,” Journal of Cold War Studies 11, no. 1 (2009): 3–27; Kori Schake, “NATO after the Cold War, 1991-1995: Institutional Competition and the Collapse of the French Alternative,” Contemporary European History 7, no. 3 (1998): 379–407; Barry R. Posen, “European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to Unipolarity?,” Security Studies 15, no. 2 (2006): 149–186; Rachel Rizzo, “The United States Should Rally Behind European Strategic Autonomy,” European Leadership Network, October 29, 2018, https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/the-united-states-should-rally-behind-strategic-autonomy/; Erik Brattberg, “How Washington Views New European Defense Initiatives,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 3, 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/03/03/how-washington-views-new-european-defense-initiatives-pub-81229.

28 Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, “Eastbound and Down: The United States, NATO Enlargement, and Suppressing the Soviet and Western European Alternatives, 1990–1992,” Journal of Strategic Studies 43, no. 6–7 (2020): 816–846; Schake, “NATO after the Cold War.”

29 Guy Chazan and Michael Peel, “US Warns against European Joint Military Project,” Financial Times, May 14, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/ad16ce08-763b-11e9-bbad-7c18c0ea0201?shareType=nongift; Jon Harper, “Trump Administration Considering Restricting European Access to US Defense Market,” National Defense, June 17, 2019, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2019/6/17/trump-administration-considering-restricting-european-access-to-us-defense-market.

30 Douglas Hamilton and Charles Aldinger, “EU Force Could Spell NATO’s End, Cohen Says,” Washington Post, December 6, 2000, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2000/12/06/eu-force-could-spell-natos-end-cohen-says/534c01b8-00b7-483c-b5d1-aed36b19a7b5/; Robert E. Hunter, “The European Security and Defense Policy: NATO’s Companion — or Competitor?” (RAND Corporation, April 29, 2002), chap. 6, https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1463.html.

31 Sara Bjerg Moller, “China’s Rise Is Exactly the Kind of Threat NATO Exists to Stop,” Washington Post, March 12, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/chinas-rise-is-exactly-the-kind-of-threat-nato-exists-to-stop/2021/03/11/c3adfad6-8211-11eb-81db-b02f0398f49a_story.html.

32 Liana Fix, “Germany’s China Policy: Has It Learned From Its Dependency on Russia?,” Council on Foreign Relations, November 14, 2022, https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/germanys-china-policy-has-it-learned-its-dependency-russia; Sheryn Lee and Benjamin Schreer, “Will Europe Defend Taiwan?,” Washington Quarterly 45, no. 3 (2022): 163–182; Radek Sikorski, “Europe’s Real Test Is Yet to Come,” Foreign Affairs, June 20, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/europe/european-union-defense-war-ukraine.

33 Jamil Anderlini and Clea Caulcutt, “Europe Must Resist Pressure to Become ‘America’s Followers,’ Says Macron,” Politico, April 9, 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/emmanuel-macron-china-america-pressure-interview/; Melissa Eddy, “As U.S. Tries to Isolate China, German Companies Move Closer,” New York Times, April 12, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/12/world/europe/germany-china-trade.html.

34 David C. Kang, “Still Getting Asia Wrong: No ‘Contain China’ Coalition Exists,” Washington Quarterly 45, no. 4 (2022): 79–98.

35 World Bank, World Development Indicators, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD; Beckley, “The Emerging Military Balance in East Asia”; U.S. Department of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” 2023, 52-69, https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.

36 Posen, “Europe Can Defend Itself;” World Bank, World Development Indicators.

37 Raphael S. Cohen and Gabriel Scheinmann, “Can Europe Fill the Void in U.S. Military Leadership?,” Orbis 58, no. 1 (2014): 39–54; Deni, Coalition of the UnWilling and UnAble; Meijer and Brooks, “Illusions of Autonomy.”

38 Jaroslaw Adamowski, “Estonia increases defense spending to buy air defense systems, more weapons,” Defense News, March 25, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/03/25/estonia-increases-defense-spending-to-buy-air-defense-systems-more-weapons/; “Lithuania to Ramp Up Military Spending, PM Says,” Reuters, March 7, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/lithuania-ramp-up-military-spending-pm-says-2022-03-07/; Tim Stickings, “Nato Member Latvia to Raise Military Spending to 2.5% of GDP,” National News, March 30, 2022, https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/europe/2022/03/30/nato-member-latvia-to-raise-military-spending-to-25-of-gdp/; Ana-Roxana Popescu, “Poland to Increase Defence Spending to 3% of GDP from 2023,” Janes, March 4, 2022, https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/poland-to-increase-defence-spending-to-3-of-gdp-from-2023; “Poland to Raise Defence Spending to 5% of GDP, Highest Level in NATO, Says Ruling Party Chief,” Notes from Poland, July 18, 2022, https://notesfrompoland.com/2022/07/18/poland-to-raise-defence-spending-to-5-of-gdp-highest-level-in-nato-says-ruling-party-chief.

39 Judy Dempsey, “NATO’s European Allies Won’t Fight for Article 5,” Carnegie Europe, June 15, 2015, https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/60389; Moira Fagan and Jacob Poushter, “NATO Seen Favorably Across Member States,” Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, February 10, 2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/02/09/nato-seen-favorably-across-member-states/; Meijer and Brooks, “Illusions of Autonomy”; Mark Leonard and Ivan Krastev, “Peace versus Justice: The Coming European Split over the War in Ukraine,” European Council on Foreign Relations, June 15, 2022, https://ecfr.eu/publication/peace-versus-justice-the-coming-european-split-over-the-war-in-ukraine/ “Russia Must Not Be Humiliated despite Putin’s ‘historic’ Mistake, Macron Says,” Reuters, June 4, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-must-not-be-humiliated-despite-putins-historic-mistake-macron-2022-06-04/.

40 David Herszenhorn et al., “Germany Loses EU Sway as Eastern Europe Turns Away over Russia,” Politico, May 31, 2022, https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-loses-eu-sway-as-eastern-europe-turns-away-over-russia/; “The Baltics Fear European ‘Strategic Autonomy,’” Economist, October 4, 2018, https://www.economist.com/europe/2018/10/04/the-baltics-fear-european-strategic-autonomy.

41 John Vandiver, “German Army ‘Too Thin’ on Resources to Make Lithuania Brigade Viable, Leader Says,” Stars and Stripes, December 27, 2023, https://www.stripes.com/theaters/europe/2023-12-27/germany-army-lithuania-brigade-12478191.html.

42 Michael Shurkin, “The Abilities of the British, French, and German Armies to Generate and Sustain Armored Brigades in the Baltics” (RAND Corporation, April 12, 2017), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1629.html; Posen, “Europe Can Defend Itself”; Ben Barry et al., “Defending Europe: Scenario-Based Capability Requirements for NATO’s European Members,” IISS Research Paper (Institute for Strategic Studies, April 2019), https://www.iiss.org/research-paper//2019/05/defending-europe.

43 Steven Erlanger, “When It Comes to Building Its Own Defense, Europe Has Blinked,” New York Times, February 4, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/04/world/europe/europe-defense-ukraine-war.html.

44 Steven Erlanger and Christopher F. Schuetze, “Germany Adopts a More Muscular Security Plan. Critics Call It ‘Weak,’” New York Times, June 14, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/14/world/europe/germany-national-security-strategy.html; “Germany Wavers on Military Spending,” Wall Street Journal, May 8, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/germany-wavers-on-military-spending-defense-berlin-olaf-scholz-ukraine-russia-nato-11651258628; George Bogden, “A Year After Germany’s ‘Sea Change,’ Policy Change Remains Elusive,” War on the Rocks, March 14, 2023, https://warontherocks.com/2023/03/a-year-after-germanys-sea-change-policy-change-remains-elusive/; Bojan Pancevski, “When Russia Invaded Ukraine, Germany Promised to Rearm. One Year Later, It Is Having Second Thoughts,” Wall Street Journal, March 2, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/when-russia-invaded-ukraine-germany-promised-to-rearm-one-year-later-it-is-having-second-thoughts-b08d783b; Christopher F. Schuetze, “Germany’s Much-Vaunted Strategic Pivot Stalls,” New York Times, November 29, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/29/world/europe/germany-military-strategic-pivot-stalls.html; Alexander Ratz, “Germany Hits 2% NATO Spending Target for First Time since End of Cold War,” Reuters, February 14, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/germany-hits-2-nato-target-first-time-since-1992-reports-dpa-2024-02-14/.

45 Josef Joffe, “Europe’s American Pacifier,” Survival 26, no. 4 (1984): 174–181; Tanisha Fazal, State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).

46 Adam P. Liff and G. John Ikenberry, “Racing toward Tragedy?: China’s Rise, Military Competition in the Asia Pacific, and the Security Dilemma,” International Security 39, no. 2 (2014): 52–91; Darren J. Lim and Zack Cooper, “Reassessing Hedging: The Logic of Alignment in East Asia,” Security Studies 24, no. 4 (2015): 696–727; Michael Beckley, “Enemies of My Enemy,” Foreign Affairs, February 14, 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/new-world-order-enemies-my-enemy-china.

47 Brock F. Tessman, “System Structure and State Strategy: Adding Hedging to the Menu,” Security Studies 21, no. 2 (2012): 192–231; Kang, “Still Getting Asia Wrong.”

48 Takuya Matsuda, “Japan’s Emerging Security Strategy,” Washington Quarterly 46, no. 1 (2023): 85–102; Eric Heginbotham, Samuel Leiter, and Richard J. Samuels, “Pushing on an Open Door: Japan’s Evolutionary Security Posture,” Washington Quarterly 46, no. 2 (2023): 47–67; Adam P. Liff, “Kishida the Accelerator: Japan’s Defense Evolution After Abe,” Washington Quarterly 46, no. 1 (2023): 63–83; Leilani Chavez, “South Korea to Increase Defense Spending over Five Years,” Defense News, December 13, 2023, https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2023/12/13/south-korea-to-increase-defense-spending-over-five-years/.

49 Beckley, “The Emerging Military Balance in East Asia”; Ashley Townshend, Brendan Thomas-Noone, and Matilda Steward, “Averting Crisis: American Strategy, Military Spending and Collective Defence in the Indo-Pacific,” United States Studies Centre, August 2019, https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/averting-crisis-american-strategy-military-spending-and-collective-defence-in-the-indo-pacific; Colby, “How to Win America’s Next War”; Flournoy, “How to Prevent a War in Asia.”

50 Gholz, Friedman, and Gjoza, “Defensive Defense.”

51 Michael Hunzeker and Alexander Lanoszka, “A Question of Time: Enhancing Taiwan’s Conventional Deterrence Posture,” Center for Security Policy Studies, Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University, November 2018, https://csps.gmu.edu/publications/a-question-of-time/; Michael Hunzeker, “Taiwan’s Defense Plans Are Going Off the Rails,” War on the Rocks, November 18, 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/11/taiwans-defense-plans-are-going-off-the-rails/; Raymond Kuo, “The Counter-Intuitive Sensibility of Taiwan’s New Defense Strategy,” War on the Rocks, December 6, 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/12/the-counter-intuitive-sensibility-of-taiwans-new-defense-strategy/; Michael Beckley, “America Is Not Ready for a War With China,” Foreign Affairs, June 10, 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-06-10/america-not-ready-war-china; Larry Diamond and James O. Ellis, “Deterring a Chinese Military Attack on Taiwan,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 79, no. 2 (2023): 65–71.

52 Heginbotham and Samuels, “Active Denial”; Matsuda, “Japan’s Emerging Security Strategy”; Heginbotham, Leiter, and Samuels, “Pushing on an Open Door”; Liff, “Kishida the Accelerator.”

53 Rosella Cappella Zielinski and Samuel Gerstle, “Paying the Defense Bill: Financing American and Chinese Geostrategic Competition,” Texas National Security Review 6, no. 2 (2023): 58.

54 Robert Levinson, “Abandon Old Assumptions About Defense Spending,” War on the Rocks, March 8, 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/03/abandon-old-assumptions-about-defense-spending/.

55 Connor O’Brien, “On Defense Spending, a Democratic Brawl Is Brewing,” Politico, October 28, 2020, https://www.politico.com/news/2020/10/28/democratic-brawl-brewing-on-defense-spending-433435; Matt Vallone, “Forecasting Defense Spending in an Age of Uncertainty,” War on the Rocks, March 20, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/03/forecasting-defense-spending-in-an-age-of-uncertainty/; Matt Vallone, “U.S. Defense Spending During and After the Pandemic,” War on the Rocks, July 31, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/07/u-s-defense-spending-during-and-after-the-pandemic/.

56 Richard Fontaine, “Taking On China and Russia,” Foreign Affairs, November 18, 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/taking-china-and-russia.

57 Luis Simón and Zack Cooper, “Rethinking Tradeoffs Between Europe and the Indo-Pacific,” War on the Rocks, May 9, 2023, https://warontherocks.com/2023/05/rethinking-tradeoffs-between-europe-and-the-indo-pacific/.

58 Blankenship, The Burden-Sharing Dilemma, 48-53, 60-63, 93-101.

59 Joo-Hong Nam, America’s Commitment to South Korea: The First Decade of the Nixon Doctrine (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

60 World Bank, World Development Indicators, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.CD.

61 Alicja Ptak, “Poland to Spend 4% of GDP on Defence This Year, Highest Current Level in NATO,” Notes From Poland, January 31, 2023, https://notesfrompoland.com/2023/01/31/poland-to-spend-4-of-gdp-on-defence-this-year-highest-current-level-in-nato/.

62 Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966).

63 Paul C Avey, Jonathan N Markowitz, and Robert J Reardon, “Do US Troop Withdrawals Cause Instability? Evidence from Two Exogenous Shocks on the Korean Peninsula,” Journal of Global Security Studies 3, no. 1 (2018): 72–92; Lanoszka, Atomic Assurance; Izumikawa, “Binding Strategies in Alliance Politics”; Brian Blankenship, “Promises under Pressure: Statements of Reassurance in US Alliances,” International Studies Quarterly 64, no. 4 (2020): 1017–1030.

64 Blankenship, “The Price of Protection”; Blankenship, The Burden-Sharing Dilemma; Brian Blankenship, “Do Threats or Shaming Increase Public Support for Policy Concessions? Alliance Coercion and Burden Sharing in NATO,” International Studies Quarterly, Forthcoming; Jordan Becker et al., “Transatlantic Shakedown: Presidential Shaming and NATO Burden Sharing,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, April 21, 2023.

65 The evidence on the relationship between U.S. troop deployments and allied defense spending is mixed; see Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations; Carla Martínez Machain and T. Clifton Morgan, “The Effect of US Troop Deployment on Host States’ Foreign Policy,” Armed Forces & Society 39, no. 1 (2013): 102–123; Blankenship, “The Price of Protection.”

66 Avery Goldstein, “Discounting the Free Ride: Alliances and Security in the Postwar World,” International Organization 49, no. 1 (1995): 39–71; Alexander Lanoszka, “Do Allies Really Free-Ride?,” Survival 57, no. 3 (2015): 133–152; Blankenship, “The Price of Protection.”