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Abstract
Western psychology, as introduced by Aristotle’s De anima in China, can be traced back to Lingyan lishao (Short Treatise on Matters Pertaining to the Soul), written by the Italian Jesuit Francesco Sambiasi (1582–1649) in 1624 in China. The aim of this article is to figure out the most important characteristics of Lingyan lishao by analyzing some fundamental metaphysical concepts which Sambiasi used to describe the soul and shed light on the question of how Sambiasi used the Aristotelian hylomorphic framework and the Coimbra Commentaries to rewrite Western psychology in Chinese. The first part provides a brief introduction of the sources which Sambiasi used in his Lingyan lishao. The second part considers immortality and the essence of the soul, and the capacities or faculties of the soul will be treated in the third part. Finally, in the fourth part, the transcendental goal of the soul will be discussed.
西方靈魂論或亞里斯多德的《論靈魂》在中國的最早傳播可以追溯到明末清初的一位來自意大利的耶穌會士畢方濟在1624年所寫的《靈言蠡勺》。本篇論文的目的在於分析畢方濟在對靈魂進行描述時所使用的一些最基本的形而上學概念，並探求他是如何使用亞里斯多德的質料形式說 (hylomorphism) 的框架和科因布拉評注 (Coimbra Commentaries) 在中文語境中重寫西方靈魂論的。第一部分著重介紹畢方濟在《靈言蠡勺》中所使用的資料來源；第二部分探討靈魂的不朽性及其本質；而第三部分則著墨于靈魂的諸種能力；至於靈魂的超驗目的則在最後一部分進行討論。
Notes
1 In 1636 Niccolò Longobardo s.j. (Long Huamin 龍華民, 1559–1654) wrote Linghun dao ti shuo 靈魂道體說 (On the Essence of the Soul), and Alfonso Vagnone s.j. (Gao Yizhi 高一志, 1566–1640) had won a good reputation because of his work Xing ling shuo 性靈說 (On the Nature of the Soul). In particular, Giulio Aleni became famous for his work Xingxue cushu 性學觕述 (A Brief Introduction to the Science of Human Nature), but he originally named the work Lingxing pian 靈性篇 (A Treatise on the Nature of the Soul). Based on this draft, he developed Xingxue cushu.
2 For a modern English translation of this work, see CitationAleni 2020.
3 I am using “psychology” not in the modern sense, but in the original etymological sense of the term: psychology is the theory about the soul (ψυχή [psychê] = the soul, λόγος [logos]= the theory or words). The aim of modern psychology is to describe psychological phenomena from an empirical perspective, but ancient Greek psychology tried to explain the body/soul relation and the capacities of the soul.
4 Ruggieri’s Tianzhu shilu 天主實錄 (The True Record of the Lord of Heaven, 1584) had already embarked on an intense debate about the Chinese view of the soul, but its main target was to grapple with the Sino-Buddhists’ view of metempsychosis or the reincarnation of the soul. Ricci introduced the most foundational theological topics or propositions to Chinese people in his work Tianzhu shiyi 天主實義 (The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven, 1603), such as the existence and the nature of God as Supreme Being, the existence of heaven and hell, the immortality of the soul, and reward and punishment in the last judgment.
5 This work is called the Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Jesu in tres libros Aristotelis De Anima (Coimbra, 1592) and was reprinted in Hildesheim by the publisher Georg Olms in 2006. In the Middle Ages, the commentators developed different forms of commentaries, including glosses, paraphrases, and sententiae cum quaestionibus. See CitationBianchi 2011, pp. 9–23.
6 Concerning the view of Longobardo, see CitationLongobardo 2021. This treatise was written by Longobardo in Portuguese between 1623–1630 as “Resposta breve sobre as controversias do Xámtý, tien xîn, lîm hoên.”
7 Cf. CitationZhang Qiong 1999, pp. 366–369.
8 Cf. CitationAleni 2020.
9 Concerning the different definitions of the soul in De anima of Aristotle, see DA II.1–2.
10 See Alexander CitationAphrodisiensis 2008.
11 The commentary of Philoponus on Aristotle’s De anima is a huge work and was translated by different experts and published in many volumes. One of the most important translations is by William Charlton (see CitationPhilphonus 2000).
12 See CitationTuominen 2009, pp. 158–163.
13 Cf. CitationAverroes 1999.
14 Most of the short commentaries (jami) were written early in his career and contain summaries of Aristotlean doctrines. The middle commentaries (talkhis) contain paraphrases that clarify and simplify Aristotle’s original text. The middle commentaries were probably written in response to his patron caliph Abu Yaqub Yusuf’s complaints about the difficulty of understanding Aristotle’s original texts and to help others in a similar position. The long commentaries (tafsir or sharh), or line-by-line commentaries, include the complete text of the original works with a detailed analysis of each line. The long commentaries are very detailed and contain a high degree of original thought and were unlikely to be intended for a general audience. Only five of Aristotle’s works had all three types of commentaries: Physics, Metaphysics, On the Soul, On the Heavens, and Posterior Analytics.
15 See CitationAquinas 1999.
16 See CitationDe Boer 2013, pp. 15–35.
17 CitationDuceux 2010, pp. 503–506.
18 Concerning the Jesuit education program in philosophy, see CitationBlum 2012.
19 Concerning the enterprise of translating the Aristotelian works into Chinese by the Jesuits in the 17th century, see CitationMeynard 2017.
20 CitationShen 2005, pp. 577–578.
21 See CitationHuang – Wang 2013, pp. 352–353. Huang Zhipeng mentions that some Korean experts have read this work, so it had some influence on the scholars in the Sinosphere; cf. CitationHuang Zhipeng 2021, pp. 140–147.
22 DA I.1, 402a5–9.
23 LYLS, p. 320. In this article, I use the edition published in the Ming Qing zhi ji Xixue wenben 明清之際西學文本 [Works of the Western Learning in Ming and Qing Dynasty], edited by Huang Xingtao and Wang Guorong and published in 2013 by Zhonghua shuju 中華書局.
24 The term zili zhi ti (substance) originates from Ricci’s Tianzhu shiyi 天主實義.
25 亞尼瑪，是自立之體；是本自在者；是神之類；是不能死；是由天主造成；是從無物而有；是成於賦我之所、賦我之時；是爲我體模；是終賴「額辣濟亞」譯言「聖寵」，賴人之善行，可享真福. LYLS, p. 320.
26 Before Aristotle gives three definitions about the soul in DA II.1, he makes a differentiation between ensouled or living things and non-ensouled or non-living things. Only those things which have life (ζωήν, zōēn) are ensouled and have a soul. Aristotle uses the concept of natural bodies (σώματα φυσικά, sómata physiká) to describe those ensouled things, and they seem to be substances in a primary sense. The three definitions are: (1) Tentative definition: It is necessary, then, that the soul is a substance as the form of a natural body which has life in potentiality (ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα τὴν ψυχὴν οὐσίαν ϵἶναι ὡς ϵἶδος σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμϵι ζωὴν ἔχοντος. DA III.1, 412a19–21). (2) More precise definition: Hence the soul is the first actuality of a natural body which has life in potentiality, and this sort of body would be one which is organic (διὸ ἡ ψυχή ἐστιν ἐντϵλέχϵια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμϵι ζωὴν ἔχοντος. τοιοῦτον δὲ ὃ ἂν ᾖ ὀργανιόν. DA II.1. 412a2729).
(3) Ultimate definition: Hence, if it is necessary to say something which is common to every soul, it would be that the soul is the first actuality of an organic natural body (ϵἰ δή τι κοινὸν ἐπὶ πάσης ψυχῆς δϵῖ λέγϵιν, ϵἴη ἂν ἐντϵλέχϵια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ. DA II.1, 412b4–5).
27 See DA II.1, 412b10–27.
28 Some commentators believed that the active intellect in DA III.5 did not belong to the human soul or was not a faculty of the human soul, but it was divine and could be identified with God or the Unmoved Mover, whereas some others insisted on the belief that the active intellect as a capacity of the soul belonged to the human being. So, it is controversial whether the active intellect is an immortal thing or not. Thomas Aquinas and Averroes held completely opposite views about the active intellect: for Averroes, the active intellect is a single and immortal substance, but for Thomas, the active intellect is only a capacity of the intellective soul, hence it belongs to individuals and is not a substance itself. The biggest threat of Averroes’ interpretation was that he made the individuality or individual personality impossible, because he thought that all human beings share the same common active intellect. Concerning the view of Averroes, see CitationAverroes 1999, II.7,138, 15–20.
29 ST Ia, q. 75, a. 2. Coimbra, Liber II, c. 1, q. 2, a. 2, 49: “Inter animas sola intellectiva est subsistens secundo modo. Probatur, quia omnes animae, excepta intellectiva, educuntur de materiae potestate … ”
30 De Memoria, 450a11–14. Albert the Great and Peter Lombard followed the Augustinian tradition in treating the memory, the intellect and the will as three capacities of the intellective soul, whereas Aquinas thought that the intellective soul had only two capacities: the intellect and the will, and memory was included in the intellect. See ST Ia, q.79,a.7.
31 DA II.2, 414a31–32.
32 DA II.2, 414b1–2.
33 LYLS, p. 325.
34 See CitationAugustine of Hippo 1991, IX, X, XIV.
35 惟明悟獨在亞尼瑪，不在有質之所。其在全不系於肉體，既不在有質之所，而獨在亞尼瑪，即與亞尼瑪同是恒在。雖肉體滅，有質之所亦滅，而此為不滅，故不能死. LYLS, p. 332.
36 故亞尼瑪藉明悟以克明明德，其在亞尼瑪之國，如大天下之有日也。吾人既有此光，可得窮理格物，致極其知，以至於萬物之根本。若有人明悟萬事，而不識根本，如在大光中，而目眩如盲，與黑獄無別，豈[不惜]哉？ LYLS, p. 333.
37 For the three kinds of desire, see DA III.10, 433a23.
38 DA III.5, 430a10–16. Translation according to Christopher Shields, CitationAristotle 2016, p. 61.
39 既为可明，则受明悟者加之光而遂明之，明其全大于分矣。又如物有白者，则是可见之白。日光未至，但为可见之白，不为已见之白。日光既至，遂从而见之。作明悟所为者，如白可受见也。受明悟，如施之光而见白也. LYLS, p. 330.
40 既而归于作明悟者，不惟尽脱于物之体质，并悉捐弃其为彼为此，但留物之精微，众物所公共者，则可得而明悟之矣 … LYLS, p. 330.
41 For a more detailed analysis of all the 25 similarities between the soul and God, see CitationMeynard 2015, pp. 228–239.
42 今言亞尼瑪與天主相似，特是假借比喻，爲是其影像耳。形與影，不爲相等之物，亦無大小多寡可爲比例也. LYLS, p. 339.
43 亞吾斯丁曰：天主造成人之亞尼瑪，爲通達至美好。通而愛之，愛而得之，得而享之，曰「額辣濟亞」者，以明天上真福，非人之志力. LYLS, p. 322.
44 In Metaphysics XII.6-9, Aristotle identifies the Unmoved Mover with the divine intellect, and the life of the divine intellect is the life of contemplation, the perfect and eternal self-contemplation.
45 ST, I, qu. 2. art. 3.
46 故亞吾斯丁曰: 費祿蘇菲亞，總歸兩大端。其一論亞尼瑪，其一論陡斯。亞尼瑪者令人認己; 論陡斯者，令人認其源。論亞尼瑪者，使人可受福; 論陡斯者，使人享福. LYLS, p. 319.
47 Cf. CitationLongobardo 2021.
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Tian Shufeng 田书峰
Tian Shufeng, Ph.D. in Philosophy, Greek Philology and Catholic Theology from the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, München, is currently an associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy of Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou China. His research interests include ancient Greek Philosophy, especially the Philosophy of Aristotle and Plato, Christian Philosophy, German Philosophy (Kant and Heidegger), and the History of Reception of Aristotelian and Platonic Philosophy in the Middle Ages and in China. He is a member of the Chinese Association of Greek and Roman Philosophy. Among his publications are: “The Soul as the Immanent Form: Aristotle on the Hylemorphic Understanding of the Soul-body Relation,” Zhexue yanjiu 哲学研究 / Philosophical Research (2022); “The First Treatise on Aristotelian Ethics in China and Its Origin,” Guoxue yu xixue 国学与西学 / International Journal of Sino–Western Studies (2021); “Aristotle on the Separability of the Intellective Soul,” Zhexue yu wenhua 哲学与文化 / Universitas: Monthly Review of Philosophy and Culture (2017). He is also working on the Chinese edition of Aristotle’s De anima with Introduction and Commentaries in Chinese. It will be published in 2024.