![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
This study examines the Security Service of Ukraine’s (SBU) use of its Telegram channel for social media outreach during the Russo-Ukrainian war. It employs a qualitative thematic analysis of Telegram posts published between February 2022 and October 2023 to investigate the SBU’s communication strategies. The study identifies the SBU’s focus on themes such as collaboration and treason, showcasing its operational successes, and countering Russian espionage in its social media messaging. The findings provide insights into the SBU’s approach to engaging the Ukrainian public, in contrast with traditional concepts of intelligence communication, and emphasise its role in influencing public discourse.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1. ”Telegram: Contact @SBUkr.”
2. Hauter, Russia’s Overlooked Invasion The Causes of the 2014 Outbreak of War in Ukraine’s Donbas. With a Foreword by Hiroaki Kuromiya., 174.
3. Higgins, ”MH17 - The Open Source Evidence.”
4. Veiligheid, ”Onderzoek naar telecommunicatie – MH17 vliegramp – Openbaar Ministerie.”
5. Kaul, ”Ukraine’s Current Counterintelligence Capabilities”, 2.
6. Kaul, ”The Evolution of the Security Services of Ukraine: Institutional Change in the Post-Soviet Security Apparatus”, 175.
7. Kaul, 175.
8. Kaul, ”Ukraine’s Current Counterintelligence Capabilities”, 4.
9. Omand, ”Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT)”, 355.
10. Petersen, ”Three Concepts of Intelligence Communication”, 317.
11. Omand, Bartlett, and Miller, ”Introducing Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT)”, 805.
12. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 235.
13. Treyger, Cheravitch, and Cohen, Russian Disinformation Efforts on Social Media, 107.
14. ”The IO Offensive.”
15. Omand, ”Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT)”, 363.
16. Landon-Murray, ”Social Media and US Intelligence Agencies: Just Trending or a Real Tool to Engage and Educate?”, 67.
17. McLoughlin, Ward, and Lomas, ”’Hello, World’: GCHQ, Twitter and Social Media Engagement”, 233.
18. Luțai, ”European Intelligence Services Just Signed up on Social Media. An Analysis of Secret Services and Social Media Platforms”, 216.
19. Landon-Murray, ”Social Media and US Intelligence Agencies: Just Trending or a Real Tool to Engage and Educate?”, 78.
20. Kaul, ”Ukraine’s Current Counterintelligence Capabilities.”
21. ”06 Integration of the Ukrainian Tech Sector for Civil Defense By Jerry England, TRADOC G-2 - Red Diamond Newsletters – Operational Environment and Threat Analysis Directorate.”
22. Thomas and Bhat, ”A Comprehensive Overview of Telegram Services-A Case Study”, 290.
23. ”Telegram Global MAU 2022.”
24. Ford, ”Ukraine, Participation and the Smartphone at War”, 15.
25. ”SBU_Telegram_Feb22-Oct23.Xlsx – Google Spreadsheets.”
26. Byrne, ”A Worked Example of Braun and Clarke’s Approach to Reflexive Thematic Analysis”, 1396.
27. Campbell et al., ”Reflexive Thematic Analysis for Applied Qualitative Health Research.”
28. Braun and Clarke, Thematic Analysis : A Practical Guide, 141.
29. ”Telegram: Contact @SBUkr.”
30. ”Telegram: Contact @SBUkr.”
31. ”Telegram: Contact @SBUkr.”
32. ”Telegram: Contact @SBUkr.”
33. ”Telegram: Contact @SBUkr.”
34. ”Telegram: Contact @SBUkr.”
35. ”Telegram: Contact @SBUkr.”
36. ”Telegram: Contact @SBUkr.”
37. ”Telegram: Contact @SBUkr.”
38. ”Telegram: Contact @SBUkr.”
39. ”Telegram: Contact @SBUkr.”
40. ”Telegram: Contact @SBUkr.”
41. ”Makiivka.”
42. ”The Mobile Network Battlefield in Ukraine – Part 2 | Enea.”
43. WarTranslated, ”Can We Believe the Russian Phone Calls Intercepted and Published by Ukrainian SBU and GUR?.”
44. ”Telegram: Contact @SBUkr.”
45. ”Telegram: Contact @SBUkr.”
46. ”Telegram: Contact @SBUkr.”
47. Kaul, ”Ukraine’s Current Counterintelligence Capabilities.”
48. ”Telegram: Contact @SBUkr.”
49. ”Telegram: Contact @SBUkr.”
50. ”SSU’s Chatbot Helps Destroy Hundreds of Enemy Military Vehicles and Even Several Generals – Ilya Vitiuk.”
51. Schrijver, ”The Wise Man Will Be Master of the Stars.”
52. Ekman and Nilsson, ”Ukraine’s Information Front”, 20.
53. Riemer and Sobelman, ”Coercive Disclosure”, 20.
54. Magen, ”Strategic Communication of Israel’s Intelligence Services: Countering New Challenges with Old Methods”, 272.
55. Petersen, ”Three Concepts of Intelligence Communication”, 317.
56. Petersen, 317.
57. Petersen, 320.
58. Petersen, 319.
59. Slick, ”2022 Public Attitudes on US Intelligence”, 2.
60. Petersen, ”Three Concepts of Intelligence Communication”, 320.
61. ”Le plan Vigipirate.”
62. ”National Terrorism Advisory System | Homeland Security.”
63. Petersen, ”Three Concepts of Intelligence Communication”, 321.
64. Petersen, 322.
65. ”Threat Intelligence | Cyber Threat Intelligence Platform.”
66. Petersen, ”Three Concepts of Intelligence Communication”, 323.
67. Lostri, Lewis, and Wood, ”A Shared Responsibility”, 3.
68. Schmitt, ”Ukraine Symposium – Using Cellphones to Gather and Transmit Military Information, A Postscript.”
69. Clark, ”The Protection of Intelligence Sources and Methods.”
70. ”Ukraine’s Fusion of Cyber and Kinetic Warfare.”
71. Fluri et al., ”Intelligence and Security Services Reform and Oversight in Ukraine – An Interim Report”, 55.
72. ”500 נחקרים, ומיליוני שיחות פינוי ואזהרה.”
73. Dylan and Maguire, ”Secret Intelligence and Public Diplomacy in the Ukraine War”, 34.
74. Clack and Johnson, The World Information War: Western Resilience, Campaigning, and Cognitive Effects.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Peter Schrijver
Peter Schrijver is a PhD researcher affiliated with the Netherlands Defence Academy. His academic interests focus on Ukraine’s operations in the information environment.