‘The Straw that Broke the Back’, New Zealand and Britain’s Referendum on European Community Membership, 1975

ABSTRACT

This article examines the role that New Zealand played during the renegotiation of terms and the referendum on Britain’s membership of the European Community in 1975. This topic has received little attention from historians, despite New Zealand trade being among the most prominent negotiating items between the British Government and its European Community partners in that year. For the first time in relation to this topic, this research draws on archival sources from the United Kingdom, New Zealand and the European Community. It concludes that the issue of New Zealand assumed a disproportionate influence on the renegotiated terms agreed in the Dublin Summit of 1975, in large part because British Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Foreign Secretary James Callaghan seized on it as one of the few areas that their Government could obtain substantive results in the renegotiation. There were also longer-term factors at play, suggesting continuities in Britain’s approach to New Zealand and the European Community both before and after accession. This suggests a broader reassessment of Britain’s relations with its former colonies in the context of European Community accession is required.

KEYWORDS:

• European Integration
• Brexit
• New Zealand, United Kingdom
• Interantional history
• decolonisation

Introduction – ‘Help for the Commonwealth’

At the end of May 1975 an official pamphlet from Her Majesty’s Government dropped through the letterboxes of approximately 22 million British households.¹ Titled Britain’s New Deal in Europe, the 15-page document set out the British Government’s recently renegotiated terms for European Community membership, recommending a ‘yes’ vote to stay in, in the upcoming referendum on 5 June. Among the pamphlet’s reasoned points about jobs, food and Britain’s global influence was a personal appeal from Prime Minister Harold Wilson, who felt the Government had secured ‘a deal that will help us, help the Commonwealth and help our European partners’. Importantly, the pamphlet also included a prominent quote from Wallace Rowling, Prime Minister of New Zealand, alongside similar quotes from his Australian and Jamaican counterparts. On a page titled ‘Help for the Commonwealth’ Rowling proclaimed, ‘it would not be in the long-term interest of the New Zealand economy if Britain were to withdraw from the Common Market’.²

Rowling’s pronouncement in favour of British membership barely conveys the challenging process of reaching a satisfactory outcome for New Zealand in the renegotiations of 1974–1975. Three months previously Michael Palliser, UK Permanent Representative at the European Communities in Brussels, had written to Foreign Secretary James Callaghan to warn that ‘New Zealand could be the straw that broke the back of the renegotiation donkey, maybe’.³ A senior British official judging the stakes of the New Zealand issue to be so high raises interesting questions. How and why did the New Zealand Government find itself in a prominent and pivotal position on the question of British membership? And what effect did this have on the renegotiated terms secured by the British Government, and the referendum vote in 1975?

Until recently, historians have been largely reticent to address such questions about 1975, despite it being an important moment both in British political history and the history of European integration. The previous year, 1974, saw two tightly contested General Elections in Britain, with the two largest political parties internally and bitterly divided over the European question. Throughout much of 1974 and the first part of 1975, the British Government ‘renegotiated’ the terms of British membership, which in June 1975 were put to the public in the first UK-wide referendum. For decades this escaped much close scholarly attention apart from David Butler and Uwe Kitzinger’s seminal work.⁴

Some historians of Britain and European integration of the 1970s argue that the Commonwealth had diminishing importance in British political debate in the 1970s, thereby paving the way for the 1975 referendum result, which confirmed British membership for a generation. This interpretation often presumes British membership of the European Community almost entirely precluded ongoing close relations with the Commonwealth. Moreover, Commonwealth institutions, nations and their multifarious interests have sometimes been aggregated, presuming a monolithic entity unilaterally discarded by British policymakers once the value of Community membership was appreciated.⁵ Revisionist historians have shown that the British Labour Governments of 1964–1970 and 1974–1979 were reasonably well-disposed to Commonwealth concerns.⁶ However, scholars have largely ignored or failed to fully explain an obvious point; that at least one Commonwealth country, New Zealand, was deemed important enough by Wilson’s Governments in 1974–1975 to assume a prominent place in the renegotiation and referendum campaign. Moreover, the specific political and economic commitments secured for New Zealand by the British Government in 1975 were substantial, even if the renegotiated terms collectively were not.⁷

Historic understanding of 1975 has improved in recent years, partly in response to the 2016 ‘Brexit’ referendum on British membership of the European Community. Robert Saunders well received Yes to Europe! and Aqui’s The First Referendum cast light on the motivations of the political actors and the political situation in Britain in 1975, demonstrating that perceptions of treatment of the Commonwealth played an important part in the referendum campaigns.⁸ A smattering of articles have also appeared, including Katja Seidel and William Loux’s respective explanations of the Labour Government’s inability to achieve substantial changes to the CAP in 1975.⁹ Stephen Wall’s official history provides a blow by blow account of British decisions, although largely neglects to connect this to the existing historiography nor provide analytical conclusions.¹⁰ From a New Zealand perspective, former diplomats Bruce Brown, Richard Nottage and Graham Ansell have provided summaries of the results of the 1975 renegotiation, although the coverage of this remains far less than the agreement secured for New Zealand dairy trade at Luxembourg in 1971. These are also largely written without recourse to the British and European Community perspectives.¹¹

The few historians that have explained New Zealand’s prominence in the renegotiation and referendum in 1975 point to Harold Wilson’s personal affinity with the Commonwealth, particularly his 1974 quote that he could ‘personally name 44 relatives from New Zealand’.¹² Others show there were political advantages in Wilson rhetoric, with Stephen George describing the phrase as ‘a typical populist touch’.¹³ Aqui notes in passing the electoral benefits that Wilson and his Government gained from presenting improved terms for New Zealand and other Commonwealth countries to the public in the context of the referendum. Wilson hoped this would help reaffirm British membership and bridge the deep rifts in his Cabinet and the Labour Party at large. Aqui also placed Wilson’s advocacy for New Zealand in a longer-term context, noting consistency with previous policy and political decision-making on Britain’s relationship with the European Community.¹⁴

This article pulls together and builds upon the above interpretations for Harold Wilson, James Callaghan and the Labour Government’s support of New Zealand in 1974 and 1975. For the first time in relation to this topic, it uses archival sources from the UK, New Zealand and the European Community collectively. It argues that there were several interconnected factors encouraging the British Government to support the New Zealand cause in 1975. These included Wilson’s personal affinity for New Zealand, which was linked to his experiences of 1967 and 1971¹⁵ However, such concerns were not the main determinants of New Zealand’s prominence in the renegotiation. An enhanced arrangement for New Zealand’s dairy trade and keeping barriers to lamb trade at bay helped deliver several strategic objectives for the British Government in 1975. These were predominantly political and partly economic. Support for New Zealand helped Wilson with his Party and Parliamentary management, which was perhaps his most important consideration. The New Zealand issue appealed to both pro- and anti-marketers, thereby generating support for the renegotiated terms. This appeal was itself derived from perceptions dating from the early 1960s: that treatment of New Zealand trade was a ‘test’ of the political merits of Britain’s Community membership, speaking to longstanding strands of British political and intellectual thinking such as Cobdenite free trade (and its links with cheap food), internationalism and protection of British ‘sovereignty’.¹⁶ Unlike many of the complex and abstract debates about British membership, New Zealand issues were also seen as tangible and easily understood.¹⁷

While many on the right of British politics favoured solutions for New Zealand for sentimental reasons, on the left, improved access for New Zealand, along with other measures such as the Lomé Convention and an enhanced sugar agreement, also demonstrated benefits for small Commonwealth nations. These had grown in political significance, not least in the Labour Party in the 1960s and 1970s, and remained of importance to the British electorate more broadly. Solutions for New Zealand also helped the British Government demonstrate that it was tackling the politically and economically debilitating problem of rising food prices. New Zealand’s dairy and lamb could still be purchased at significant discounts to the Community’s intervention prices. This made solutions for New Zealand in the renegotiations of 1974–1975 more politically and economically attractive than for other Commonwealth products, such as Australian wheat or Canadian beef.¹⁸

Moreover, ongoing assistance for New Zealand offered a potential pathway for reforming the CAP. The British Government had been forced to accept the CAP (with sheepmeat excluded) as a fait accompli during the accession of 1973. This made the structure of a common sheepmeat regime even more important, as it represented the first occasion Britain could influence a specific aspect of the CAP from inception. Officials and ministers hoped to use a liberal sheepmeat scheme as an exemplar to their more protectionist Community partners, signposting improvements to the CAP as a whole. Britain and New Zealand’s interests were largely aligned on this. British ministers and officials continued to collaborate with New Zealand counterparts in 1975 to fend off a common sheepmeat regime and keep tariffs low, while simultaneously preparing for a future common policy.¹⁹

Importantly, a win for New Zealand trade in the renegotiation would allow British ministers to hold up a tangible, positive result in the areas of agricultural reform and cheap food imports. This became crucial in late 1974, once the British ministers leading the renegotiation decided they would not seek amendments to European Community treaties nor secure wholesale changes to the CAP in advance of the referendum. At that point New Zealand was seized upon as an important renegotiation objective only because, coincidently, Protocol 18 of the Treaty of Accession (the special arrangement for New Zealand dairy products agreed in Luxembourg in 1971) was being reviewed in 1975 anyway. This meant that improvements for New Zealand could be achieved without recourse to Treaty change, making it an attractive proposition for the British Government.²⁰ Broader still, a solution for New Zealand could demonstrate that the British Government had the ability to persuade its Community partners to take actions that were in the British national interest. The British electorate had not seen much evidence of this by 1975, with Britain’s ‘loss of sovereignty’ under regular criticism from anti-Common marketers.²¹

The push for a trade arrangement for New Zealand at the Dublin Summit in 1975 did not originate in Wellington nor 10 Downing Street, but came from Foreign Secretary James Callaghan, who in December 1974 convinced his Prime Minister, who was well disposed to New Zealand in any case, to elevate New Zealand dairy access to the forefront of the renegotiation objectives to be decided at the Dublin Summit in March 1975. This supports the view that Callaghan also had sympathies towards the Commonwealth, affecting his political decision-making.²² Like some other political leaders of the time, Callaghan did not necessarily see Community membership and support of the Commonweath as mutually exclusive. As referenced below, Commission and Whitehall officials felt this reprioritisation of New Zealand came with the risk of harming Britain’s ambitions to improve the European Community budget mechanism.²³

Britain’s support of New Zealand in 1975 was not simply a cynical, short-term ploy for presentational purposes in the referendum. British support for New Zealand agricultural trade in the context of European integration dated at least to Harold Macmillan’s first attempt at entry in 1961–1963, and continued through 1967, 1971 and 1973. Nor did Britain’s political support for New Zealand end with the affirmative referendum result in June 1975. In the second half of the year, Wilson, Agriculture Secretary Frederick Peart and others pressed their European counterparts to make the political declaration secured at Dublin a commercial reality for New Zealand.²⁴ In addition to the considerable political considerations, there were also economic and geo-strategic reasons for continued British support for New Zealand. These included efforts to maintain British export and investment returns from New Zealand, which were imperilled by competition from Asia and the prospect of import controls. Other British considerations included encouraging New Zealand (and Australia) to invest in aid, development and defence in the South Pacific and Southeast Asia, areas in which Britain was retrenching in the mid-1970s.²⁵

From the New Zealand Government’s point of view, British support was appreciated for both political and economic reasons. The impending November election, the rise of Opposition leader Robert Muldoon and ongoing economic problems meant any improvement to New Zealand export returns were of importance to Rowling’s Labour Government in 1975. There was a continued desire to see traditional exports to Britain level out, rather than continue to decline, so they could help the Government manage a chronic terms of trade crisis and remain a basis for economic diversification. The New Zealand Government also maintained its credentials as a member of the Western alliance, retaining defence, aid and development interests in Southeast Asia and the Pacific.²⁶ In this sense, 1975 was marked by continuity in Anglo-New Zealand relations, a point rarely made in existing historiography, which has either tended to suggest that Britain’s accession to the European Community was a ‘brutal snap’, shock and abandonment of New Zealand’s interests forcing a rapid reorientation to the Asia Pacific region; or conversely, that New Zealand’s economic diversification was already well underway by the time Britain eventually joined.²⁷

New Zealand, Renegotiation and the Dublin Summit

For the British Government, New Zealand was initially a peripheral issue for their renegotiation of terms of British membership in the European Community in 1974. There was no specific mention of it in the 1974 Labour Party election manifesto, although support for New Zealand was implicit in the policy priorities of Commonwealth relations, the CAP, and cheaper food. Improvements for New Zealand trade was mentioned in Callaghan’s statements to the Foreign Council in April and June 1975; however, for most of 1974, both he and Wilson seemed willing to leave this task to Agriculture Secretary Frederick Peart. Peart’s calm and considered approach had won trust, respect and several valuable policy concessions from his European Community counterparts in 1974.²⁸

The New Zealand Government was largely content with this. New Zealand officials advised their ministers to stay distanced from the renegotiation and referendum and let the scheduled review of Protocol 18 take its course in 1975 via the European Commission and Council of Agriculture Ministers. It was a view also shared by opposition leader Muldoon.²⁹ New Zealand had gained much prominence in the negotiations for British entry in 1971, which resulted in Protocol 18, a special arrangement allowing for just over 70 per cent of New Zealand dairy trade to remain in the British market five years after entry (at the end of 1977). It was feared that a repeat in 1975 would further cement New Zealand’s reputation as a problematic démandeur in European capitals, hampering diplomatic efforts to broaden its relations with the Community. Moreover, there were concerns that, if the renegotiated terms proved unsatisfactory for Britain or the referendum returned a negative result, possibly fracturing the Labour Government in Britain in the process, then New Zealand would be fingered as a culprit on both sides of the English Channel, putting it in a difficult diplomatic position.³⁰

Both the British and New Zealand approach changed drastically from late 1974. The impetus for this largely came from UK Foreign Secretary James Callaghan. In March 1974, Wilson had cleverly appointed Callaghan, a self-professed agnostic towards European membership, to lead the bulk of the renegotiation from the FCO. Callaghan also chaired the ministerial Committee on European Questions, one of two key committees established by Wilson from March 1974 to administer the renegotiation.³¹ In April 1974 Callaghan had initially taken an aggressive stance towards improved terms. This softened throughout the year, in part through the advice of officials keen to preserve a route to a successful renegotiation and partly because of negative reaction from within the Community. In June, Callaghan delivered a statement to the Council of Foreign Ministers saying Britain would not seek substantial changes to the CAP and the budget, almost certainly removing the need for Treaty changes, and thereby vastly improving the prospects of reaching agreement on the renegotiated terms.³²

Callaghan’s June statement noted ‘we shall need satisfactory and continuing arrangements for New Zealand [dairy]’.³³ This came alongside an emphasis on sugar, which had been stockpiled and rationed over the British summer, and beef.³⁴ However, Peart’s corresponding statement in June suggested that the New Zealand aspects would be pursued in the Agricultural Council once the review of Protocol 18 and proposal for ongoing arrangements were presented by the European Commission.³⁵ Until late 1974 it was assumed that, if a declaration on New Zealand was to be issued by the European Community at the Dublin Summit of March 1975, it would be vague and limited.³⁶

At Wilson’s request, in November 1974 the Cabinet Office produced a review of progress on the renegotiations. On New Zealand, it found there was a reasonable chance of achieving extended arrangements for butter, although cheese was more difficult.³⁷ The prospect of success for New Zealand may have piqued the interest of Callaghan, who wrote to Wilson on 20 December 1974 suggesting a solution for New Zealand be prioritised in the renegotiation. Callaghan wrote that, even though the benefits to the British housewife (meaning reduced retail prices) were unclear, there were evident domestic political advantages in the Government talking about sourcing additional cheap food from across the Commonwealth. This, according to Callaghan, was weighed against New Zealand’s reluctance to be seen as ‘cheap food suppliers’, with Australia still less so. The ‘cheap food’ rhetoric also potentially antagonised the French Government, which was conscious of preserving CAP principles, thus jeopardising a successful outcome at the Dublin Summit. The solution, Callaghan felt, was focussing on select Commonwealth products that would not upset the principles of the CAP, improving the chance of success. Arrangements for New Zealand butter and cheese were among the most appealing of these, as the Treaty of Accession prescribed a review in 1975 in any case. Callaghan felt that the Government could present a good record on the Commonwealth overall if it delivered a mix of product-based results, including New Zealand dairy and sugar, in addition to the arrangement for developing Commonwealth countries and emergency aid for Bangladesh and India.³⁸ This approach showed that Callaghan had largely reached the same conclusion as the Macmillan Government during the first accession attempt in 1962. Wilson was personally disposed to New Zealand’s concerns and assented to Callaghan’s proposal. Starting with a speech by Wilson to Labour Mayors in December 1975, the language on New Zealand changed to reinforce its newfound political importance.³⁹

Callaghan and Peart assembled an initial proposal to take to the New Zealanders for their feedback.⁴⁰ The elevation of New Zealand dairy to the forefront of the renegotiation came as a surprise in Wellington. In late January (traditionally a quiet, mid-summer month), New Zealand officials were given only two days over a weekend to respond to the British proposal. This sought, on New Zealand’s behalf, annual price reviews and non-degressive annual fixed quantities of around 160,000 tons of ‘butter equivalent’, a phrase designed to get around Protocol 18’s lack of specificity on cheese. After hurried consideration, the New Zealand Cabinet Economic Committee felt the new situation provided New Zealand with ‘an unexpectedly strong bargaining position’, as a majority of British ministers wanted to stay in the Community, so would seek a good outcome for New Zealand to achieve this. Preparations were made for Prime Minister Rowling and Trade Minister Joseph Walding to visit London and Community capitals in February and March respectively, seeking an arrangement for a minimum of five years and proportionately linking the price received for New Zealand dairy exports to the Community intervention price.⁴¹ Even though the new British proposal was embraced, New Zealand ministers and officials made clear in meetings in Community capitals that London was the driving force. They aimed to protect New Zealand’s reputation in the event of a failed renegotiation or ‘no’ vote in the referendum. This was to the chagrin of Downing Street and Whitehall, where it was seen to undermine the negotiation position with European partners.⁴²

The elevation of New Zealand to the forefront of the renegotiation at a relatively late stage was not welcomed in Brussels. As Lindsay Aqui has shown, the European Commission was generally an ally to the UK through the renegotiation.⁴³ However, it was initially hostile to a detailed agreement on New Zealand at the Dublin Summit on 10–11 March 1975. This seemed an objection on procedure, as much as principle. The view, articulated by President François-Xavier Ortoli, Commissioner for External Relations Christopher Soames and others, was that it was for the Commission, not the heads of government, to deliver the review of Protocol 18 and to propose the ongoing import arrangements for New Zealand. The Commission also objected to setting import prices for an important commodity three to five years in advance, preferring to reserve pricing decisions until closer to the time to account for market changes. There was also concern that British proposals on New Zealand dairy would not be accepted in Community capitals, placing the entire renegotiation, and therefore British membership, in peril.⁴⁴

Several European Community capitals also had a negative response to the late proposal on New Zealand dairy. Unsurprisingly French Ministers expressed disapproval, especially on the proposed price remedy, which they felt would heighten the ‘butter mountain’. However, there were suggestions from Paris that compromises could be made on butter quantities.⁴⁵ The Republic of Ireland and Denmark Governments were also negative, while the Netherlands Government objected more to the proposed quantities than increased prices (an inverse of the French position).⁴⁶ The West German Government, strongly in favour of continued British membership, was more positive on New Zealand, to the extent it proposed its own quantity formula for butter. However, this was a transitional arrangement, rather than a permanent one.⁴⁷ The only unequivocally positive responses came from Italy and Luxembourg.⁴⁸

The negative reaction from Europe, especially President François-Xavier Ortoli in Brussels, induced UK Permanent Representative in Brussels Michael Palliser to write to Callaghan saying, ‘New Zealand could be the straw that broke the back of the renegotiation donkey, maybe’ (as noted in the introduction). Palliser was concerned that France and FRG may use the New Zealand issue to prevent meaningful progress on the budget, and that without Commission support the Dublin talks would fail.⁴⁹ Other officials cautioned Wilson and Callaghan that pressing hard on New Zealand dairy was not necessarily in Britain’s interests, and that the importance of a special arrangement for New Zealand had diminished through economic diversification.⁵⁰ Such official caution on New Zealand was reminiscent of 1971, when Con O’Neill and other officials were less inclined to push for satisfactory terms for New Zealand, relative to their political masters.

It was not only civil servants who raised concerns. Chancellor of the Exchequer Denis Healey wrote to Wilson a week ahead of the Dublin Summit, urging the Prime Minister to dilute the draft political statement on New Zealand to help secure a better solution for Britain on the budget mechanism. Healey contrasted a costly arrangement for New Zealand with improvements to the budget mechanism, which would benefit the Treasury by over £100 m a year.⁵¹ Other ministers were unsure too, with junior Foreign Minister Roy Hattersley arguing for ‘realism’ in the objectives for New Zealand.⁵² Trade Secretary Peter Shore and Prices and Consumer Protection Secretary Shirley Williams were among the Cabinet ministers suggesting arrangements for Commonwealth producers and improvements to the CAP did not go far enough, although they were firmly in opposing camps when it came to the broader question of Community membership (Shore against and Williams for).⁵³

Wilson, Callaghan and Peart strongly pushed back against the Commission, European Community member states, and their own ministers and officials by re-emphasising the great political importance of securing an enhanced arrangement for New Zealand.⁵⁴ Wilson wrote to each of the Community Governments, restressing the political importance of getting an adequate solution for New Zealand.⁵⁵ Callaghan responded to Palliser’s straw metaphor by saying the pressure must be maintained on President François-Xavier Ortoli as ‘this is a case of political necessity and I hope the Commission won’t interpose itself unduly, or we will be heading for the rocks’.⁵⁶

Callaghan was also unhappy at officials’ suggestions the British Government should accept a diluted formula on New Zealand (along the lines proposed by FRG) to help secure a better outcome on the budget. After Deputy Permanent Secretary Oliver Wright had written as much to Wilson, Callaghan wrote to his Prime Minister to say it was ‘not good enough. I don’t think there should be any “trade off” here. In my view we should put our statement in and then fight for it and, if necessary, break down. And we should go all the way on the budget too … if it appears in the press, that will be all the more reason for standing fast on the wording [for New Zealand] or its equivalent’.⁵⁷

Such bullishness emphasises the political importance assumed by New Zealand, although there was some evidence of Wilson and Callaghan softening their approach to ensure the best chance of agreement at Dublin. At the Summit, Britain sought a declaration of political intent, rather than a statement that established policy, to avoid any suggestion of eroding the Commission’s policy-making powers. Wilson, Callaghan and Peart also pressed the New Zealanders to ensure that their demands conformed to what the British considered realistic. Before Rowling headed to London in February 1975, New Zealand’s Cabinet Economic Committee agreed he should seek continued non-degressive exports of 160,000 tonnes of milk fat equivalent for five years after 1977, with 40,000 tonnes of this to be cheese, and a price formula linked to the Community intervention price (the level of which should be agreed in discussion with Wilson).⁵⁸ After Rowling and Walding’s discussions with British counterparts, the target quantity for Dublin was revised down to 120,000 tons per year over three years, with no or very limited degression.⁵⁹

On price, Walding suggested to European Commissioner for External Affairs Christopher Soames in Brussels that New Zealand butter exports be accorded 76 per cent of the Community intervention price on an ongoing basis from 1978 (up from the current 46 per cent level), to which Soames reacted negatively.⁶⁰ Although the New Zealanders suggested this was just a negotiating mark, mention of such a high price annoyed Callaghan and senior officials, who were keen to present a New Zealand solution as alleviating high food prices. Callaghan brusquely told Walding that he did not want food from New Zealand that was as expensive as Community food, not least because the Chancellor of the Exchequer would not permit the balance of payments costs involved.⁶¹ British ministers and officials were also irked by New Zealand’s (accurate) comments in Community capitals that it was London, rather than Wellington, behind the elevation of New Zealand onto the Dublin Summit agenda.⁶²

Partly to impose some discipline on the New Zealanders, Peart and his officials prepared a secret memorandum of understanding between the British and New Zealand Governments, to be agreed by the respective Prime Ministers. This outlined what Britain was prepared to seek on New Zealand’s behalf prior to and at the Dublin Summit.⁶³ Even though it was intended to be flexible, and Peart made clear that some objectives may not be achieved, the memorandum represented a substantial British commitment towards seeking New Zealand’s objectives. It aimed to automatically set New Zealand dairy prices as a percentage of the Community intervention price, with an initial goal of 65 per cent. It also sought dairy quantities of not less than 121,000 tonnes per annum from 1978 to 1980, with annual reviews of both price and quantity. As in 1971, there was agreement to pursue a Community guarantee that it would not dump surplus dairy into third markets.⁶⁴ The political importance of the memorandum was reinforced by the fact that the price concessions for New Zealand butter would cost Britain around £25 m of foreign exchange annually, and more if cheese were to be included. To the Community it would mean accepting New Zealand permanently retaining a large share of the UK dairy market.⁶⁵ British ministers and officials impressed the need for secrecy of the memorandum, especially from Community capitals and the opposition party in New Zealand.⁶⁶ To this author’s knowledge, this document has not been previously mentioned in published sources.

The UK Government’s soft peddling on procedural positions and emphasis on the political importance of a New Zealand solution seemed to bring the European Commission onside. On 1 March 1975, Edmund Wellenstein, Director General of External Relations at the European Commission, prepared a draft statement on New Zealand largely along the lines of British wishes (but without a specific pricing formula), to be delivered at the Council of Foreign Ministers Meeting scheduled for 4 March.⁶⁷ At the Council, Callaghan gave the proposal his enthusiastic endorsement. His opening statement impressed that ‘for the United Kingdom, New Zealand was not and could not be just another developed country, it was almost a part of ourselves’.⁶⁸ After a short discussion, the Council agreed the matter was of such political significance that it should be referred to the Dublin Summit. It was now clear that New Zealand and the budget would be the two outstanding items to be addressed in Dublin.⁶⁹ Also on 4 March, Peart delivered his aforementioned statement to the Council of Agriculture Ministers, outlining Britain’s intention to keep regulation and tariffs for New Zealand lamb to a minimum.⁷⁰ In the intervening days, Wilson sent his Personal Private Secretary Robert Armstrong to Paris to speak to the French Secretary-General and several ministers, where he received the feedback that, in the French view, Britain was being ‘more New Zealand than the New Zealanders’.⁷¹

At the Dublin Summit 1975

Some scholars suggest that Wilson pressed too hard on the New Zealand issue at the Dublin Summit, to the detriment of securing a better arrangement on the budget mechanism.⁷² In fact, the European Commission’s papers suggest that nearly all aspects of the New Zealand text in the Dublin Declaration were settled at a day-long discussion at the pre-summit meeting of COREPER, the Committee of Permanent Representatives of the member states of the European Community. In Palliser’s absence, the UK was represented by Frederick Kearns from the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries, who upheld much of what the Commission proposed in the face of lengthy counter-arguments by other representatives. The British gave way on some minor points. The Committee replaced the words ‘annual review’ with a not dissimilar ‘periodic review’. On price, the British argument to have the New Zealand price indexed against the Community intervention price alone was removed, in an effort by the Commission to avoid establishing prices several years in advance. The final text indicated New Zealand dairy price reviews should consider (but not be indexed against) the intervention price, along with considering changes to costs in New Zealand, freight costs and market conditions in each of the Community countries.⁷³

On butter quantities, COREPER concluded (except for the French delegate), there should be a continued slow and linear degression in New Zealand dairy exports along the lines already established for 1973–1975. An intervention by Wilson in the later heads of government meeting slightly amended this to indicate the dairy quantities allowed in 1980 should be approximate to the 1975 levels, which gave the impression degression would not necessarily apply. In fact, the use of 1975 was an error as dairy export figures were as yet unknown for that year. The Declaration should have referred to the 1974 figures (both dates were included on the Commission’s published version of the Declaration). A side discussion between Callaghan and Ortoli clarified that the quantities of New Zealand dairy imports for 1980 ‘should be close to’ 125,000 tonnes of dairy products, which was the 1974 figure. This remained a matter of ‘bona fides’ between the two men.⁷⁴

Much of the COREPER discussion focussed on whether New Zealand cheese should be eliminated from the British market altogether from 1978, as Protocol 18 had prescribed. Kearns asked that ‘the door not be closed’ on New Zealand cheese, while several delegations, including Denmark, argued the inverse. Wellenstein wanted to avoid placing the Commission in the position of proposing the total removal of cheese, so left ‘dairy products’ as suggested text in brackets in the draft Declaration, with an indication to the heads of government that agreement on this had not been reached in the Committee. The heads of government subsequently approved the suggested text and, at Wilson’s urging, included a pledge that the cheese issue will be addressed with ‘appropriate urgency’.⁷⁵

Wilson’s opening statement to the heads of government at Dublin put the New Zealand case strongly. He stressed the particularly close links between Britain and New Zealand, and that the British people think the ‘Community’s willingness to respond to these deep emotions is a test of the Community’s ability to take account of the political interests of its members’. This echoed the arguments of the British accession applications in 1961–1963, 1967 and 1971, in which New Zealand was also regarded as a ‘test’ of terms agreed by Britain upon entry. Wilson said New Zealand had always been a ‘crucial’ issue, stemming from concerns he raised in 1967, and that the arrangement secured in 1971 ‘was far from satisfactory’. Slightly disingenuously, he stated that ‘New Zealand has always figured high in the list of renegotiation requirements’.⁷⁶

A short discussion followed, at which the Dutch and Danish leaders expressed opposition. The issue was then put aside, followed by a nine-hour discussion on the budget mechanism and other matters. The New Zealand topic was returned to late on the Summit’s second day, when agreement came relatively easily. As mentioned above, the heads of government made minor changes to affirm the wording on cheese and commit the Commission to present proposals with appropriate urgency.⁷⁷

The British Government gave way considerably on the budget mechanism during the Summit. There is debate as to why Wilson did not press this issue with more force. It is clear there was strong opposition to the budget proposals, particularly from FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. Stephen Wall writes that Wilson was ‘bored’ and ‘unmotivated’ on the budget issue, while much more concerned about New Zealand and steel.⁷⁸ It may not be a coincidence that agreement on the New Zealand issue came with relatively little discussion, shortly after Britain gave way on the budget. French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing was reasonably encouraging in response to Wilson’s opening statement on New Zealand, accepting an extension for butter exports for three years, along with the need to ensure an equitable return for New Zealand farmers taking production costs into account. He was less positive on cheese, which ‘represented a political problem’. Wilson pressed hard for a speedy resolution of the Protocol 18 review (by April, as he had agreed with Rowling), although Ortoli suggested that July was more realistic.⁷⁹

Wilson himself later said the gains for New Zealand at Dublin were ‘illusory’.⁸⁰ However, that seems to considerably underplay them. The Dublin Declaration represented a substantial political achievement for New Zealand, although the credit can barely be attributed to its own diplomacy. Just three months earlier the New Zealand Cabinet Economic Committee had thought the most that could be achieved at Dublin was a vague expression of principles, and the Declaration vastly exceeded this. Despite not being legally binding, the Declaration established a firm instruction to the Commission to review Protocol 18 and set post-1977 dairy imports in a way that advantaged Britain and New Zealand. The Commission gave informal undertakings to the heads of government that firm proposals on price and quantities would be established by July and considered by the Agricultural Council in the Autumn, which fitted with the desired timeline, ahead of the General Election in New Zealand in November (although in the Commission’s view, this did not commit it to a decision on cheese until 1977). The Declaration also noted the ‘Community should not deprive New Zealand of outlets [for dairy products], which are essential for it’, and that quantities exported in 1980 should remain close to those sent in 1974 and 1975. Not only was this in line with New Zealand and Britain’s secret pre-Summit objectives, it established the principle of New Zealand dairy products remaining a major part of the British market after the end of the transition period, and therefore for the foreseeable future. The worst fears of a total exclusion of New Zealand dairy from the British market had almost certainly been averted. On price, the assurances were vague, proposing ‘fair’ periodic reviews that considered the Community intervention price along with other extraneous factors. This reflected the Commission’s wish to retain control of an important commodity import price. The Declaration also indicated ‘ever closer cooperation be developed between the institutions of the Community and the New Zealand authorities with the objective of promoting in their mutual interest an orderly operation of world markets’. A potential world dairy agreement remained on the cards, and the Declaration’s wording encouraged the Commission to commence annualised informal consultations with New Zealand officials from November 1975.⁸¹

Wilson was wary of an adverse New Zealand Government reaction to the Dublin Declaration, which could be detrimental to his efforts to secure Cabinet, Parliament and public approval for the renegotiated terms. To keep Rowling onside he sent a lengthy letter appraising the agreement secured in Dublin. Wilson felt that, although the talks were ‘difficult’, the UK had secured the vital points set out in the memorandum of understanding, except for an automatic adjustment of price. Wilson thought it would still be possible to negotiate for New Zealand the targeted butter price of 65 per cent of the Community intervention price during the Protocol 18 review, although it would be difficult to automatically tie this to the Community price.⁸² This indicated yet further detailed and complex talks on dairy prices between New Zealand, the UK and Community for months and years in future.

Rowling’s letter crossed Wilson’s. It conveyed gratitude while keeping the political pressure on his British counterpart. Rowling wrote that ‘we in New Zealand very much appreciated the efforts of you and your colleagues’, and that there was ‘real scope for improvement in New Zealand’s position’. He also felt that ‘New Zealand's trading relations with Britain, now over a century old, are not only of special economic importance to us. They are a significant part of the wide range of political and bilateral links between our two countries which, I believe, are highly valued by us both’. However, Rowling differed from Wilson by saying the Declaration was less specific than New Zealand would have wished and ‘far less satisfactory’ than the pre-Summit proposal. Rowling reiterated the importance of tying the New Zealand butter price to the Community intervention price and bringing the Commission’s proposals forward as quickly as possible (implicitly to give his party a ‘win’ ahead of the November election, and to maximise the political opportunity provided by the referendum). This implication, later explicitly stated by Rowling to UK High Commissioner in Wellington David Scott, was that the New Zealand Government may express dissatisfaction about the renegotiated terms if a satisfactory pricing proposal did not appear before the referendum.⁸³

This threat from Rowling was never carried out and both his and Wilson’s public statements remained upbeat. Wilson (over-optimistically) suggested in a press conference that New Zealand dairy products would no longer be subject to degressivity. Rowling’s public statement after Dublin noted ‘the goodwill of the Member States and the Commission towards New Zealand … I am grateful that the British Government, which raised this issue, has shown such understanding of New Zealand’s position’.⁸⁴ The media reaction to the Dublin Declaration was also positive in both Britain and New Zealand. In the latter, it was slightly muted, possibly reflecting the lack of clarity on pricing and that there were other more pressing economic travails facing New Zealand in 1975 than European integration. New Zealand ministers and opposition spokespeople did not want to engage in a public debate about the merits of British membership.⁸⁵

New Zealand and the Referendum

In his recent book about the 1975 referendum, Saunders concludes that ‘Commonwealth sentiment formed one of the strongest cards in the anti-market pack’.⁸⁶ For many Britons ‘Commonwealth’ mostly meant the white Commonwealth, especially Australia and New Zealand, (although there was also a significant constituency concerned about the underdeveloped world, which drove interest in the treatment of Caribbean sugar and imports from Africa, which eventually found partial solution in the Lomé Convention 1975).⁸⁷ A report by the Social Policy Centre in 1974 found that Australia (36 per cent), New Zealand (34 per cent) or the US (17 per cent) were the countries that people thought Britain should join with instead of Europe.⁸⁸ In this context Britain in Europe (BIE), the organisation leading the campaign to stay in, attempted and largely succeeded in neutralising the Commonwealth as an issue for the anti-marketeers in the referendum debate. The key message was that the Commonwealth was previously against British entry, but now supported it.⁸⁹

In May 1975, the Anti-Common Market campaign organisation National Referendum Campaign (NRC), suggested the New Zealand Government was underplaying the antipathy of the New Zealand people towards British membership. In doing so they quoted Tom Weal, Chairman of the New Zealand Anti-Common Market Association. The New Zealand High Commissioner in London Hugh Watt issued a strong rebuttal to the NRC and Weal’s claims, calling suggestions that New Zealanders wanted Britain out of the Common Market ‘irresponsible’, and arguing that Weal’s organisation, with a membership of 380, could not possibly represent New Zealand’s view. Watt also maintained that Community membership was a decision for Britain to make.⁹⁰ NRC’s own research suggested that the High Commissioner had truth on his side. A phone survey of 500 New Zealanders found that 49.4 per cent of respondents wanted Britain to remain in the European Community and only 3 per cent thought New Zealand would benefit if Britain withdrew.⁹¹

A further fillip for New Zealand came in May 1975 when the European Commission issued its annual review of the operation of Protocol 18, in which it signalled further periodic price improvements. Walding issued a warm, optimistic statement in response, in which he noted ‘It is satisfying to see that the EEC Commission has now come to recognise the need for frequent price adjustments’.⁹² Nonetheless, despite British prompting, New Zealand ministers unsurprisingly declined to publicly support the ‘Yes’ campaign in the lead up to the referendum (in this sense the New Zealand Government continued to distinguish itself from Australian ministers and officials, who tended to be more publicly critical of the European Community). Rare exceptions to the New Zealand Government’s long-practiced neutrality included assistance for Britain at the Kingston CHOGM in April-May 1975. During a bitter debate in which many Commonwealth members criticised Britain’s Community membership, Rowling showed support of the British position by speaking in favour of the parts of the CHOGM Communiqué welcoming the Lomé Convention and looking forward to ‘the further development of relations between the EEC … on the one hand and developing countries, including the Asian and other Commonwealth countries on the other’.⁹³

Another exception to the New Zealand Government’s neutrality on the referendum was the UK Government pamphlet quoting Rowling, mentioned in the introduction. There is no evidence to suggest Rowling gave consent for his name to be used in this way, and it may be telling that the quote itself was made several months beforehand, at a press conference in Paris. This suggests it may have been inadvertent on Rowling’s behalf, or was primarily aimed at a French audience, rather than indicating a firm New Zealand endorsement of British membership to the British public.⁹⁴

British Support for New Zealand After the Referendum

The renegotiated terms that Wilson and Callaghan brought back from Dublin were, in turn, accepted by the Cabinet (voting 18–17 in favour) and a largely uncritical Parliament. This was partly thanks to the new Conservative Party leader Margaret Thatcher, who confirmed her support for Britain in Europe. In the 5 June Referendum around two-thirds of voters opted for Britain to stay in the Community, although as several scholars have pointed out, the British public endorsement of membership was ‘unenthusiastic’.⁹⁵ Nonetheless, it was the result that Wilson and most in the British Government wanted, suggesting the tactical use of the New Zealand issue in 1975, alongside other campaign issues, paid off. However, it would be wrong to suggest that Wilson and senior ministers opportunistically or cynically seized upon the New Zealand issue for the sole reason of presentational benefits in the referendum. Support for New Zealand trade access in the context of British membership dated from the early 1960s.⁹⁶ Moreover, such support remained after the referendum, when New Zealand’s political leverage appeared diminished.

The European Commission published its proposal for post-1977 New Zealand dairy imports in July 1975. As New Zealand and Britain had been asking, this was delivered before the summer holidays, so gave the potential for agreement in the Council of Agricultural Ministers in the Autumn, in time for the New Zealand General Election in November. On butter quantities, the Commission proposed New Zealand be allowed to export 129,000 tons in 1978, 121,000 tons in 1979 and 113,000 tons in 1980. The post-1980 figures would be decided in 1978. On price, it proposed periodic examinations taking account of the criteria laid down at Dublin.⁹⁷ New Zealand officials acknowledged positives in the overall quantities, which averaged 121,000 tons, approximately what was sought in Dublin, but they were unhappy at the continued presence of degression. There was also unease at the lack of mention of cheese, with the Commission seeing itself uncommitted to a timeframe on this.⁹⁸

Yet again, New Zealand found a willing advocate in the British Prime Minister. New Zealand High Commissioner Hugh Watt raised the problems with Wilson at a Durham Miners’ Gala in July 1975 and the Prime Minister pledged to make the New Zealand case to Community heads of government at the upcoming Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in Helsinki in September. Wilson’s talking points for the Summit, which was a major milestone in European détente, argued for the Community to ‘take a constructive line’ that ended degressivity and agree a satisfactory pricing arrangement before the New Zealand election in November.⁹⁹

Wilson’s pressure, combined with that of Peart and the New Zealanders, encouraged the Council of Agricultural Ministers to agree a price increase for New Zealand butter in the face of French, Irish and Danish opposition on 6 November 1975. An 18 per cent price increase was secured from 1 January 1976, in line with that of the previous year, and not far from the 65 per cent of the Community intervention price sought at Dublin, although an automatic link with the Community price proved elusive. In return, the New Zealand Government agreed to limit butter exports to the Community in 1976 to 122,000 tonnes.¹⁰⁰

A Change of Government in New Zealand

The dairy price increase had little effect on the New Zealand General Election on 29 November, which was handsomely won by Robert Muldoon’s National Party by 55 seats to Labour’s 32 (a 23-seat swing from 1972). Muldoon has most often been characterised as a reactionary figure, determinedly preserving New Zealand’s political and economic links with Britain in the face of economic and geo-political forces moving in the opposite direction. James Belich described him as ‘an appropriate commander of recolonisation’s last stand’.¹⁰¹ However, British officials did not necessarily see him like that at the time. In the lead up to the 1975 election the UK High Commissioner in Wellington David Scott was concerned that the abrasive Muldoon ‘consciously models his policy on Enoch Powell’, and that like Kirk, he would muster an anti-British populist sentiment, including imposing import controls that would harm British business interests.¹⁰² Fears seemed to be realised shortly after the election when, at one of his first press conferences, Muldoon announced a ‘temporary ban’ on all immigration from Britain and Ireland, although this was lifted within two weeks. Muldoon subsequently announced his first overseas trip would be to London, ‘because of the undiminished warm feeling of the New Zealanders for Britain’. The confusing signals prompted Scott to report to London that ‘we have been both lightly slapped and then offered a kiss’.¹⁰³

Muldoon appointed the affable Southland farmer Brian Talboys as Deputy Prime Minister, giving him the foreign affairs and overseas trade portfolios.¹⁰⁴ Among Talboys’ first tasks was visiting Community capitals in January and February 1976 to argue New Zealand’s case on ending dairy degressivity, retaining cheese exports, and establish principles for potential sheepmeat regulation. Coming from the centre-right, he may have found the Labour Government in London cooler than his predecessor Walding, although like Walding, Wilson agreed to meet him personally.¹⁰⁵ In an unprecedented and symbolic move, Talboys made Brussels his first stop rather than London. This was observed positively in the Commission.¹⁰⁶ It was not enough to dissuade the Council of Agricultural ministers from imposing degressivity of dairy products in the British market. With Wilson’s support, Peart continued to argue for an averaged single quantity over the three years, rather than a reduction, but all other Community delegates disagreed, and some even felt the degressive amounts were too generous. New Zealand’s case was encumbered by the continued vast surpluses in the Community dairy market.¹⁰⁷ New Zealand’s argument may also have also been hampered by its own import restrictions and a decision to ban the purchase of cars on credit, which harmed European manufacturers.¹⁰⁸ The European Community regulation on the extension of Protocol 18 eventually passed in June 1976, with quantities marginally above those proposed by the Commission in July 1975, and with slow degression in place (125,000 tonnes of butter in 1978, 120,000 tonnes in 1979 and 115,000 tonnes in 1980). The future of New Zealand cheese exports after 1977 remained unresolved.¹⁰⁹

Conclusions

This article demonstrates the remarkable position that New Zealand assumed in the context of UK-European Community relations in 1975, out of proportion to its proximity, strategic importance and economic heft. This challenges the notion that British accession was a significant break in Anglo-New Zealand relations. Significant continuities remained in the pattern of interaction in 1975 from previous attempts at British entry in 1961–1963, 1967 and the successful application of 1973. These continuities include New Zealand’s position as a ‘test’ of the merits of British Community membership, marking the British Government’s ability to negotiate advantageous terms and the Community’s ability to grant concessions. New Zealand achieved this because of its prominence in previous entry attempts, its ability to appeal across the British political spectrum as an ‘insider’, and historical institutionalism within the British polity (particularly amongst politicians – officials were less supportive). This builds upon the work of recent revisionists who have shown that, in addition to Wilson’s personal disposition, there were political motivations for the British Government’s prioritisation of New Zealand in 1975. It shows that these derived from Britain’s search for political solutions in the renegotiation that would hold together a rancorous British Labour Party and Parliamentary majority for European membership. A remedy for New Zealand appealed to both the left and right, and pro and anti Common Marketeers, not least because it demonstrated help for small Commonwealth nations and preserved Britain’s access to cheap food. Importantly, a solution on New Zealand did not require a Treaty change and had a good chance of success, thanks to the fact Protocol 18 was under review in 1975 anyway. This drove the British Government, yet again, to extraordinary measures on New Zealand’s behalf, including agreeing a secret Memorandum of Understanding that was in large part achieved at the Dublin Summit. Moreover, the solution for New Zealand was a good one. It politically committed the Community to allow New Zealand to retain a sizable share of the British dairy market beyond transition. This indicates Anglo-New Zealand relations were evolving in the mid-1970s, but not necessarily deteriorating, and significant connections remained. That New Zealand was not necessarily ‘shocked and betrayed’ by British entry into the European Community, and that Britain continued to advocate on its behalf as a Community member, indicates a broader reappraisal of Britain’s relationship with its former colonies in the 1970s is required.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Aqui, “Government Policy and Propaganda,” 12.

2 Britain’s New Deal in Europe, HM Government, 1975, viewed online via LSE Library, https://digital.library.lse.ac.uk/objects/lse:fug282yox.

3 Telegram, UKREP Brussels to FCO London, ‘New Zealand: Renegotiation’, 18 February 1975, FCO 30/2928, The National Archives, Kew, United Kingdom (TNA).

4 Butler and Kitzinger, The 1975 Referendum.

5 May, “The Commonwealth and Britain’s Turn to Europe, 1945–73,” 37; Reynolds, Island Stories, 198; Grob-Fitzgibbon, Continental Drift, 301, 320, 468; Barker, Britain in a Divided Europe, 1945–1970, 185; Young, Britain and European Unity, 1945–1992, 173–4.

6 Morgan, Callaghan: A Life, 456; Alexander, “A Tale of Two Smiths”; Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 18–20, 433–4.

7 Stephen George considered the renegotiation a ‘tactical device’ in An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community (Oxford: 1994), second edition, 77; Sean Greenwood described it as a ‘sham’ in Britain and European Integration Since the Second World War (Manchester: 1996), 100; John Young agreed with Greenwood in Britain and European Unity, 1945–1999 (2nd ed.) (Baskingstoke: 2000), 113; and Dominic Sandbrook called it a ‘sideshow’ in Seasons in the Sun: The Battle for Britain, 1974–1979 (London: 2013), 315, 321. Also see Pine, Harold Wilson and Europe.

8 Wall, The Official History of Britain and the European Community; Saunders, Yes to Europe!; Aqui, The First Referendum.

9 Loux, “The Impact of Global Commodity Prices”; Seidel, “Britain, the Common Agricultural Policy”; Seidel, “The Challenges of Enlargement and GATT Trade Negotiations,” 352–70.

10 Wall, From Rejection to Referendum, 1963–1975.

11 Ansell, “New Zealand and the EU”; O’Brien, “Britain, the EU and New Zealand”; Nottage, “Economic Diplomacy”; Brown, “New Zealand in the World Economy,” 31.

12 Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 18–20, 433–4.

13 George, An Awkward Partner, 86.

14 Aqui, The First Referendum, 8, 154–55.

15 ‘Record of conversation between Sir Oliver Wright and the NZ High Commissioner [sic] in London’, 7 February 1975, FCO 24/2153, TNA.

16 Ludlow, “Safeguarding British Identity or Betraying It?” 18–34.

17 11 March 1975, ‘New Zealand brief by Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food’, FCO 30-2929, TNA

18 Loux, “The Impact of Global Commodity Prices,” 86–108; Seidel, “Britain, the Common Agricultural Policy and the Challenges of Membership,” 179–203; Aqui, The First Referendum, 154–55.

19 Note of a Meeting between Roy Hattersley and Brian Talboys, 8 March 1975, PREM 16/1785, TNA.

20 Note, James Callaghan to Harold Wilson, ‘Access for Commonwealth Food’, 6 December 1974, PREM 16/395, TNA.

21 For example, leaflet by the Commonwealth Industries Association, ‘12 Reasons why Britain should not join the European Common Market’, UWK-NS/14, Historical Archives of the European Union, Fiesole, Italy (HAEU); Record of a meeting between the Prime Minister and Christopher Soames, 6 March 1975, PREM 16/409, TNA; AUEW pamphlet, ‘Vote no to the Common Market’, LSE Library Brexit Collection, online at https://digital.library.lse.ac.uk/.

22 Morgan, Callaghan: A Life, 456.

23 Telegram, UKREP Brussels to FCO London, ‘New Zealand: Renegotiation’, 18 February 1975, FCO 30/2928, TNA; Note, James Callaghan to Harold Wilson, ‘Access for Commonwealth Food’, 6 December 1974, PREM 16/395, TNA.

24 For example: ‘Prime Minister’s Brief for the CSCE Summit in Helsinki, Access for NZ Dairy Products’, July 1975, PREM 16/396, TNA; Letter, NZHC London to Frederick Peart, 8 October 1975, FCO 30/2738, TNA.

25 ‘Country Assessment Sheet: New Zealand’, 24 September 1975, FCO 30/2738, TNA.

26 ‘Consultations with New Zealand – Record of Plenary Sessions’, 24 -25 November 1975, BAC-048-1984/1085, HAEU.

27 For the ‘shock and abandonment’ narrative see Singleton and Robertson, Economic Relations Between Britain and Australasia 1945–1970, 6; Belich, Paradise Reforged, 54–68, 368–78; Smith, A Concise History of New Zealand, 207; Grier and Munger, “Breaking Up is Hard to Do”; and Pocock, “Deconstructing Europe,” 330. Economic historians questioning the ‘shock’ thesis include McAloon, Judgements of All Kinds, 17; Saunders et al., The Trading Relationship between the United Kingdom and New Zealand; Easton, Not in Narrow Seas, 13, 460–61; and Hall, Emerging from an Entrenched Colonial Economy, 183.

28 Document de travail, ‘Declaration faite par le Ministre britannique de l’agriculture’, 18 June 1974, BAC-48-1984/415, HAEU; Aqui, The First Referendum, 148.

29 Report of meeting between Robert Muldoon and Christopher Soames in Brussels, ‘New Zealand’, 4 March 1975, FCO 30/2929, TNA. The European Community report is at ‘Report from Meeting of Robert Muldoon, NZ Leader of Opposition, with Sir Christopher Soames’, 4 March 1975, UWK-NS/53, HAEU.

30 Cabinet Economic Committee Memorandum, ‘NZ/EEC: British Renegotiation Dairy Products’, 28 January 1975; Cabinet Memorandum, ‘Report on visit to EEC Capitals’, 30 April 1974, both at R20825122, Archives New Zealand, Wellington, New Zealand (ANZ); ‘Record of conversation between Sir Oliver Wright and the NZ High Commissioner [sic] in London’, 7 February 1975, FCO 24/2153, TNA.

31 Wilson craftily gave pro-marketeers majorities in both committees. See Aqui, The First Referendum, 120.

32 Ibid., 126.

33 Telegram, FCO London (Callaghan) to UK Embassy Paris, ‘Renegotiation: New Zealand’, 18 February 1975, FCO 30/2928, TNA.

34 Aqui, The First Referendum, 126, 134–36.

35 Document de travail, ‘Declaration faite par le Ministre britannique de l’agriculture’, 20 June 1974, BAC-48-1984/415, HAEU.

36 Cabinet Economic Committee, ‘Minutes of a Meeting’, 29 January 1975, R20825122, ANZ.

37 Wall, From Renegotiation to Referendum, 552.

38 Note, Callaghan to Wilson, ‘Access for Commonwealth Food’, 6 December 1974, PREM 16/395, TNA.

39 ‘Record of a meeting between the Prime Minister and Sir Christopher Soames’, 6 March 1975, PREM 16/409, TNA.

40 ‘New Zealand brief by FCO and MAFF’, 11 March 1975, FCO 30/2929, TNA.

41 Cabinet Economic Committee, ‘Minutes of a Meeting’, 29 January 1975, and Cabinet Committee on Policy and Priorities, ‘Minutes of Meeting’, 5 February 1975, both at R20825122, ANZ.

42 Note, South West Pacific Department, FCO to UK Embassy Ireland, ‘Renegotiation and New Zealand’, 26 February 1975, FCO 30/2929, TNA.

43 Aqui, The First Referendum, 131.

44 Telegram, UKREP Brussels to FCO London, ‘Renegotiation: New Zealand: Talk with President of the Commission’, 23 February 1975, and Telegram, UKREP Brussels to FCO London, ‘Renegotiation: New Zealand’ 23 February 1975, both at FCO 30/2928, TNA.

45 Telegram, UK Embassy Paris to FCO London, ‘Renegotiation: New Zealand’, 21 February 1975, PREM 16/395, TNA; Telegram, UK Embassy Paris to FCO London, ‘Renegotiation: New Zealand’, 22 February 1975, FCO 30/2928, TNA.

46 Telegram, UK Embassy The Hague to FCO London, ‘Renegotiation: New Zealand’, 4 March 1975, PREM 16/396, TNA.

47 Telegram, UK Embassy Bonn to FCO London, ‘Renegotiation: New Zealand’, 21 February 1975, FCO 30/2928, TNA; Telegram, UK Embassy Bonn to FCO London, ‘Renegotiation: New Zealand’, 24 February 1975, PREM 16/395.

48 Telegram, UK Embassy Rome to FCO London, ‘Renegotiation: New Zealand’, 26 February 1975; Telegram, UK Embassy Luxembourg to FCO London, ‘Renegotiation: New Zealand’, 24 February 1975, both at FCO 30/2928, TNA.

49 Telegram, UKREP Brussels to FCO London, ‘New Zealand: Renegotiation’. 18 February 1975, ibid.

50 ‘FCO Brief for the Visit of the Prime Minister of New Zealand’, 10 February 1975, ibid.

51 Note, Dennis Healey to Harold Wilson, ‘Renegotiation: New Zealand and the budget’, 6 March 1975, FCO 30/2929, TNA.

52 ‘Record of a meeting between the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister of New Zealand, Chequers’, 10 February 1975, PREM 16/395, TNA.

53 Letter, Peter Shore to James Callaghan, 2 February 1975, PREM 16/409, TNA.

54 Telegram, FCO London (Callaghan) to European Community Posts, ‘Renegotiation: New Zealand’, 20 February 1975, PREM 16/395, TNA.

55 Telegram, FCO London to Bonn and other EEC posts, ‘Renegotiation’, 27 February 1975, FCO 30/2929, TNA.

56 Callaghan quoted in: Note, P.J. Weston to Braithwaite, ‘Renegotiation: New Zealand’, 24 February 1975, FCO 30/2928, TNA.

57 Note, P.J. Weston to Butler, ‘New Zealand’, 26 February 1975, FCO 30/2928, TNA.

58 Cabinet Economic Committee, ‘Minutes of a Meeting’, 29 January 1975, R20825122, ANZ.

59 ‘New Zealand brief by FCO and MAFF’, 11 March 1975, FCO 30/2929.

60 Telegram, UKREP Brussels to FCO London, ‘Renegotiation: New Zealand’, 26 February 1975, FCO 30/2928, TNA.

61 ‘Record of conversation between Callaghan and Walding at the FCO’, 29 February 1975, FCO 30/2929, TNA.

62 Note for the Prime Minister, ‘Renegotiation and New Zealand’, 18 February 1975; Telegram, UK Embassy Bonn to FCO London, ‘Renegotiation: New Zealand’, 19 February 1975, PREM 16/395, TNA.

63 Note, Peart to Wilson, ‘New Zealand’, 3 March 1975, FCO 30/2929, TNA.

64 ‘Memorandum of Understanding between the United Kingdom and New Zealand’, 3 March 1975, ibid.; Letter from Peart to Walding, 7 Match 1975, FCO 24/2153, TNA.

65 Note, Peart to Wilson, ‘New Zealand’, 3 March 1975, FCO 30/2929, TNA.

66 ‘New Zealand brief by FCO and MAFF’, 11 March 1975, ibid.

67 Telegram, UKREP Brussels to FCO London, ‘Renegotiation: New Zealand’, 1 March 1975, PREM 16/396, TNA.

68 Telegram, UKREP Brussels to FCO London, ‘Renegotiation: New Zealand’, 4 March 1975, ibid.

69 Wall, From Rejection to Referendum, 575.

70 ‘Minister’s Statement on Sheepmeat – Speaking Note’, 4 March 1975, PREM 16/396, TNA.

71 Wall, From Rejection to Referendum, 574; and Letter, P.D. Nairne to R.T. Armstrong, ‘Pre-Dublin: Mr Armstrong’s Visit to Paris’, 4 March 1975, FCO 30/2929, TNA.

72 For example, Wall, From Rejection to Referendum, 576.

73 Note, ‘Genese et interpretation de la declaration adoptee par les chefs de gouvernement’, 15 March 1975, BAC-48-1984/415, HAEU.

74 Ibid.

75 Ibid.; Telegram, European Commission to EEC delegations internationally, ‘Dublin-Bilan du Premier Conseil European’, 13 March 1975, BAC-48-1984/415, HAEU.

76 ‘New Zealand brief by FCO and MAFF’, 10–11 March 1975, FCO 30/2929, TNA.

77 Wall, From Renegotiation to Referendum, 576; Note, ‘Genese et interpretation de la declaration adoptee par les chefs de gouvernement’, 15 March 1975, BAC-48-1984/415, HAEU.

78 Wall, From Renegotiation to Referendum, 576.

79 ‘Record of EEC Heads of Government Meeting at Dublin Castle’, 10 March 1975, PREM 16/636, TNA.

80 Wilson, Final Term: The Labour Government, 1974-1976.

81 ‘Dublin Declaration 10–11 March 1975’, BAC-048-1984/1085, HAEU.

82 Letter from Wilson to Rowling, 14 March 1975, FCO 30/2929, TNA.

83 Letter from Rowling to Wilson, 14 March 1975, ibid.

84 Telegram, UKHC Wellington to FCO London, ‘Renegotiation: New Zealand’ 14 March 1975, ibid.

85 ‘Brief for the Call by the Hon R D Muldoon MP’, 13 March 1975; ‘Record of Conversation between the Minister of State and the New Zealand Leader of Opposition’, FCO 30/2929, TNA.

86 Saunders, Yes to Europe, 265.

87 Alexander, “A Tale of Two Smiths”; and Saunders, Yes to Europe, 269.

88 Hedges, “The Final Four Years,” 59.

89 Saunders, Yes to Europe, 265.

90 ‘Press Statement by the New Zealand High Commission’, 14 May 1975, FCO 30/2929, TNA.

91 Neil Marten papers, c.1132, Bodleian Libraries, Oxford, cited in Saunders, Yes to Europe, 270.

92 Walding is quoted in Letter, F.B. Wheeler to S.G. Cook, ‘Protocol 18: Annual Commission Report’, 5 May 1975, FCO 30/2929, TNA.

93 ‘Final Communiqué, CHOGM in Kingston Jamaica’, 29 April-6 May 1975, Commonwealth Secretariat, available online at https://library.commonwealth.int/Library/Catalogues/Controls/Download.aspx?id=2296; McIntyre, “From Singapore to Harare,” 92.

94 Britain’s New Deal in Europe, HM Government, 1975, viewed online via LSE Library, https://digital.library.lse.ac.uk/objects/lse:fug282yox; Telegram, UK Embassy Paris to FCO London, ‘Renegotiation: New Zealand’, 25 February 1975, FCO 30/2928, TNA.

95 Butler and Kitzinger, The 1975 Referendum, 23, 45 and 280; Aqui, The First Referendum, 239, 263.

96 McDougall, “Buttering Up.”

97 Communication de la Commission au Conseil, ‘Au Sujet du Regime Particulier Concernant le Beurre en Provenance de la Nouvelle-Zélande Après 1977’, 23 July 1975, BAC-48-1984/415, HAEU.

98 ‘Minutes of a Meeting of Officials with Eric Deakins’, 26 August 1975, R17722938, ANZ.

99 ‘Prime Minister’s Brief for the CSCE Summit in Helsinki, Access for NZ Dairy Products’, July 1975, PREM 16/396, TNA; Best et al., International History of the Twentieth Century and Beyond, 287.

100 ‘New Zealand: Annual Review for 1975’, FCO 24/2315, TNA.

101 Belich, Paradise Reforged, 393.

102 Telegram, UKHC Wellington to FCO London, ‘Auckland Speech’, 6 November 1975, FCO 24/2151, TNA.

103 ‘New Zealand Annual Review for 1975’, FCO 160/176, TNA.

104 ‘Memories’, FC5, Frank Corner Papers, New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Wellington, New Zealand.

105 ‘Visit of Mr Talboys: Composite Foreign Affairs Brief’, 8 February 1976; ‘Note on the Call on the Prime Minister by the Deputy Prime Minister of New Zealand’, 9 February 1976, PREM 16/1785, TNA.

106 Note to Mr D. Hannay, ‘Visit of the New Zealand Foreign Minister’, 19 January 1976, BAC-048-1984/1085, HAEU.

107 ‘Record of Mr Talboys’ talks with Mr Lardinois’, 3 February 1976, BAC-048-1984/1085, HAEU; and Cabinet Economic Committee Memorandum, ‘New Zealand/EEC: Visit of Deputy Prime Minister’, 16 January 1976, R20825122, ANZ.

108 Note, Leslie Fielding to Mr Hijzen, ‘Protectionism in New Zealand: Need for bilateral consultations’, 16 March 1976, BAC-048-1984/1085, HAEU.

109 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1655/76, 29 June 1976, BAC-048-1984/1085, HAEU.