Bamboo in a storm: the Russia-Ukraine war and Vietnam’s foreign policy (2022–2024)

Abstract

This article examines the strategic impact of the Russia-Ukraine war on Vietnam’s foreign policy and Vietnam’s responses to the war. It argues that although the war has triggered diverse, even opposing, responses from Vietnam’s ruling elite, it has not changed the general direction of Vietnam’s foreign policy because it has not directly and fundamentally affected Vietnam’s quest for security, resources, and identity. However, the war posed moral and strategic dilemmas for Hanoi, tore the web of geopolitical partnerships upon which Vietnam relied to secure its place in the world, and threatened to shake Russia’s unique and critical role in Vietnam’s foreign relations. Hanoi responded by reinforcing the current paradigm of its foreign policy, performing a delicate balancing act between the great powers, and deepening ties with the major powerhouses in its surrounding region. By taking ‘one step backward, then two steps forward’ in its relations with the United States, Hanoi succeeded in keeping both Moscow and Washington close to itself despite their mutual hostility. Its loyalty to Moscow helped to keep Russia on its side rather than on Beijing’s side in the South China Sea. In the long term, however, the costs of this ‘bamboo diplomacy’ may outweigh its benefits.

Keywords:

• Russia-Ukraine war
• Russia-Vietnam relations
• US-Vietnam relations
• Vietnam’s grand strategy
• Vietnam’s security and foreign policy
• Vietnam’s strategic calculus

Acknowledgements

This article would not have been written without Rajneesh Verma’s initiative. The author is grateful to Verma, Alexander Düben, Carlyle Thayer, Murray Hiebert, the two anonymous reviewers and the editors of The Pacific Review for their valuable comments on earlier versions of the article. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not reflect those of his employers.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 For a discussion of the turning points of Vietnamese foreign policy since the mid-1980s, see Vuving (2023a).

2 This fear persisted long afterward. A public warning about a “war of invasion” by the “hostile forces” (Hanoi’s code name for the United States) appeared in an article by Defense Minister Thanh (2012).

3 In 2020, out of a total foreign trade of US$ 570 billion, Vietnam’s bilateral trade with Russia amounted to US$ 4.93 billion or 0.86 percent. Vietnam’s two-way trade with Ukraine in the same year was US$ 579 million, or 0.1 percent. Source: https://oec.world/en.

4 The narrative is based on Communist Vietnam’s version of history, which characterizes both the American military involvement in the 1960s and 1970s and the presence of British troops in Vietnam to disarm the Japanese after the end of World War II as invasions.

5 For alternative views on Vietnam’s strategy regarding the South China Sea disputes, see Do (2021); Thayer (2017); Vuving (2014).

6 An example is “Sự dối trá trắng trợn của Tổng thống Zelensky về Nga khiến nhà báo Mỹ tức giận” [President Zelensky’s Blatant Lie about Russia Has Angered an American Journalist], Doanh nghiệp Việt Nam [Vietnamese Enterprise], 15 June 2023, which is identical in both title and content with an article published on the same day in the Kremlin’s mouthpiece Sputnik at https://sputniknews.vn/20230615/su-doi-tra-trang-tron-cua-zelensky-ve-nga-khien-mot-nha-bao-my-tuc-gian-23602385.html. Doanh nghiệp Việt Nam later re-titled it as “Tổng thống Zelensky bị cáo buộc lừa dối người Mỹ” [President Zelensky Accused of Lying to Americans] but its contents remained intact. See https://doanhnghiepvn.vn/quoc-te/tong-thong-zelensky-bi-cao-buoc-lua-doi-nguoi-my/20230615014351707. The original title stays in some links from the outlet’s other articles, for example: https://doanhnghiepvn.vn/quoc-te/bi-an-nhung-linh-dac-nhiem-afghanistan-dang-chien-dau-cho-wagner-pmc/20230615094128044.

7 Conversations with US and Vietnamese officials and experts, July-November 2022.

8 Conversations with Vietnamese officials and experts, April 2023.

9 Conversations with Vietnamese officials, July 2023; Diamond & Liptak (2023); Deputy Foreign Minister Ha Kim Ngoc’s briefing to retired senior Vietnamese officials, Thang Long Club, Hanoi, 21 September 2023, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TwShhmi-0gk; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UQ0TtUQ-F38.

10 Ha Kim Ngoc’s briefing, Thang Long Club, 21 September 2023; Vuving (2022).

Additional information

Funding

This research did not receive any financial support.