Through a Glass, Darkly: US-Italian Intelligence Cooperation, Covert Operations and the Gladio ‘Stay-Behind’ Programme

ABSTRACT

This article studies US-Italian ‘stay-behind’ cooperation between 1943 and 1976, when it was terminated, within the context of US covert anti-communist activities in Italy. The paper first provides an overview of the operational activities jointly conducted by the US and Italian intelligence between 1943 and 1947, while detailing the US penetrations of the Italian intelligence system and the early stages of development of a US covert network. Subsequently, it delineates the proliferation of US covert anti-communist networks in north-east Italy, the rise of S/B cooperation and its institutionalisation in the Gladio agreement, as well as the CIA pressures for ‘offsets’ in exchange for its financial support of the Italian S/B programme. In the third part, after analysing the temporary hiatus in US intelligence covert activities, the paper describes the decline and end of US-Italian S/B cooperation and the stepping up of covert operations by both the CIA and the US military intelligence. It demonstrates that Gladio did not occupy a central role in US covert operations against communism until 1976 and that CIA pressures on the Italian military intelligence represented an opportunistic attempt at maximising the ‘return’ on the financial investment in the Italian S/B programme. The article concludes by summarising the pattern of US intelligence activities in Italy in the period under scrutiny and the role of Gladio, and laying out implications for theory-development in the realm of intelligence cooperation.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

^1. The term of art used to describe relations between the intelligence services of two (or more) states is ‘intelligence liaison’. Here nonetheless the broader term ‘intelligence cooperation’ will be employed as it better reflects the depth and breadth of interactions taking place between intelligence systems at the international level.

^2. Richard J. Aldrich, “Beyond the vigilant state: globalisation and intelligence,” Review of International Studies 35, no. 4 (2009), 889–902; Stephen Lander, “International Intelligence Cooperation: An Inside Perspective,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 17, no. 3 (2004): 481.

^3. Nathan Sales, “Counterterrorism and great-power competition,” the Atlantic Council Commentary, September 7, 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/article/counterterrorism-and-great-power-competition; Danny Pronk and Claire Korteweg, Sharing the Burden, Sharing the Secrets: The Future of European Intelligence Cooperation (The Hague: Clingendael Institute, 2021).

^4. For a recent review see: Pepijn Tuinier, “Explaining the depth and breadth of international intelligence cooperation: towards a comprehensive understanding,” Intelligence and National Security 36 no. 1 (2021): 116–38.

^5. For the notion of ‘modern era of intelligence’ see David Tucker, The End of Intelligence Espionage and State Power in the Information Age (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2014).

^6. Clive Jones “Getting the Better of the Bargain: Technical Intelligence, Arms Sales, and Anglo-Israeli Relations 1967–1974,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 32, no. 3 (2021): 531–55;

^7. Loch K. Johnson and Annette Freyberg, “Ambivalent bedfellows: German‐American intelligence relations, 1969–1991,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence 10, no. 2 (1997): 165–79; Bob de Graaff and Cees Wiebes, “Intelligence and the cold war behind the dikes: The relationship between the American and Dutch intelligence communities, 1946–1994”, Intelligence and National Security 12, no. 1 (1997): 41–58.

^8. Constant W. Hijzen and Cees Wiebes, “Mutual Appreciation and Friendship: The American-Dutch Intelligence Liaison from the 1940s to the 1970s,” Journal For Intelligence, Propaganda and Security Studies 12, no. 1 (2018): 7–16; Wolfgang Krieger, “German – American Intelligence Relations, 1945–1956: New Evidence on the Origins of the BND,” Diplomacy & Statecraft, 22, no. 1 (2011): 28–43; Anthony R. Wells, Between Five Eyes: 50 Years of Intelligence Sharing (Oxford: Casamate, 2020); Carleigh A. Cartmell, “Long term intelligence sharing: the Five Eyes and the European Union,” Journal of Intelligence History (2022); Ephraim Kahana, “Mossad-CIA Cooperation,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 14, no.3 (2001): 409–20.

^9. The only exception is: Paul McMahon, “Covert Operations and Official Collaboration: British Intelligence’s Dual Approach to Ireland during World War II,” Intelligence and National Security 18, no.1 (2003), 41–64.

^10. Pepijn Tuinier, Thijs Brocades Zaalberg and Sebastiaan Rietjens, “The Social Ties that Bind: Unraveling the Role of Trust in International Intelligence Cooperation,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence (2022); Pepijn Tuinier, “Explaining the depth and breadth of international intelligence cooperation: towards a comprehensive understanding,” Intelligence and National Security 36, no. 1 (2021): 116–38; Björn Fägersten, “Sharing Secrets: Explaining International Intelligence Cooperation” (PhD dissertation, University of Lund, 2010); James J. Wirtz, “Constraints on intelligence collaboration: The domestic Dimension,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence 6, no.1 (1993): 85–99.

^11. Adam D.M. Svendsen, “Connecting Intelligence and Theory: Intelligence Liaison and International Relations,” Intelligence and National Security 24, no.5 (2009): 700–29. See also Jelle van Buuren, “Analysing international intelligence cooperation Institutions or intelligence assemblages?” in The Future of Intelligence. Challenges in the 21st Century, ed. Isabelle Duyvesteyn, Ben de Jong and Joop van Reijn (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 80–93.

^12. Richard J. Aldrich, “Transatlantic intelligence and security cooperation,” International Affairs 80, no. 4 (2004): 737.

^13. Marc Trachtenberg, “Theory and Diplomatic History,” Historically Speaking 8, no. 2 (2006): 11–13.

^14. Giuseppe De Lutiis, I Servizi Segreti in Italia: Dal Fascismo all’Intelligence del XXI Secolo (Roma: Editori Riuniti, 2010); Giacomo Pacini, Le Altre Gladio: la Lotta Segreta Anticomunista in Italia 1943–1991 (Torino: Einaudi, 2014).

^15. For an excellent account of this kind of activities see: Mario Del Pero, “The United States and Psychological Warfare in Italy, 1948–1955,” The Journal of American History 87, no. 4 (2001): 1304–34.

^16. Francesco Cacciatore, “Stay-behind Networks and Interim Flexible Strategy: the Gladio Case and US Covert Intervention in Italy in the Cold War,” Intelligence and National Security 36, no. 5 (2021): 642–59; Giuseppe De Lutiis, I Servizi Segreti in Italia, passim; Giacomo Pacini, Le Altre Gladio, passim. A similar interpretation had been put forward already in the first half of the 1990s by the parliamentary committees tasked with inquiring into the Gladio affair. See Camera dei Deputati, DOC XLVIII, n.1, Relazione del Comitato Parlamentare per I Servizi di Informazione e Sicurezza e per il Segreto di Stato sulla «Operazione Gladio», March 4 1992; Senato della Repubblica, Camera dei Deputati, DOC. XXIII, n.51, Commissione Parlamentare d’Inchiesta sul Terrorismo in Italia e sulle Cause della Mancata Individuazione dei Responsabili delle Stragi, Relazione sull’inchiesta condotta sulle vicende connesse all’operazione GLADIO, April 14–15 1992.

^17. The only study that considers penetrations in relation to Gladio is: Leopoldo Nuti, “The Italian Stay-Behind network – The origins of operation Gladio,” Journal of Strategic Studies 30, no. 6 (2007): 955–80.

^18. Research on covert action distinguishes three broad types of activities according to their degree of violence: propaganda; political action, from funnelling money to a political party to fomenting riots, and paramilitary action, from training insurgent groups to assassination, Rory Cormac, Calder Walton & Damien Van Puyvelde, ‘What Constitutes Successful Covert Action? Evaluating Unacknowledged Interventionism in Foreign Affairs’, Review of International Studies 48, no.1 (2022): 112. See also: Hager Ben Jaffel, Alvina Hoffmann, Oliver Kearns, and Sebastian Larsson, “Collective discussion: Toward critical approaches to intelligence as a social phenomenon,” International Political Sociology 14, no. 3 (2020): 323–44.

^19. For the contribution of this type of research design see: Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil Wars (New York: Oxford UP, 2006), 284.

^20. Jennifer E. Sims, “Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals, and Details,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 19, no. 2 (2006): 197. See also: H. Bradford Westerfield, “America and the World of Intelligence Liaison,” Intelligence and National Security 11, no. 3 (1996): 523–60.

^21. William Rosenau, ‘Liaisons Dangereuses? Transatlantic Intelligence Cooperation and the Global War on Terrorism’ in Cooperating Against Terrorism: EU-US Relations Post September 11 - Conference Proceedings (Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College, 2007), 31–40.

^22. Pepijn Tuinier, Thijs Brocades Zaalberg and Sebastiaan Rietjens, The Social Ties that Bind: Unraveling the Role of Trust in International Intelligence Cooperation.

^23. Robert Dover, Hacker, Influencer, Faker, Spy: Intelligence Agencies in the Digital Age (London: Hurst, 2022), 10.

^24. James Igoe Walsh, The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing (New York: Columbia UP, 2010), 5–10; Chris Clough, “Quid Pro Quo: The Challenges of International Strategic Intelligence Cooperation,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 17, no. 4 (2004): 601–13; Stéphane Lefebvre, “The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence Cooperation,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 16, no. 4 (2003): 527–42; Don Munton, “Intelligence Cooperation Meets International Studies Theory: Explaining Canadian Operations in Castro’s Cuba,” Intelligence and National Security 24, no. 1 (2009): 119–38.

^25. Björn Fägersten, “Bureaucratic Resistance to International Intelligence Cooperation – The Case of Europol,” Intelligence and National Security 25, no. 4 (2010): 502.

^26. Jennifer E. Sims, “Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals, and Details,” 200.

^27. Richard J. Popplewell, “The KGB and the Control of the Soviet Bloc: The Case of East Germany,” in Knowing Your Friends: Intelligence inside Alliances and Coalitions from 1914 to the Cold War, ed. Martin S. Alexander (London: Frank Cass, 1998): 255–7; Dennis G. Molinaro ed. Bridge in the Parks: The Five Eyes and Cold War Counter-Intelligence (Toronto: Toronto UP, 2021); Diana Bolsinger, “Not at Any Price: LBJ, Pakistan, and Bargaining in an Asymmetric Intelligence Relationship,” Texas National Security Review (2021-2022), https://tnsr.org/2021/11/not-at-any-price-lbj-pakistan-and-bargaining-in-an-asymmetric-intelligence-relationship.

^28. Stato Maggiore Difesa, Il Servizio Informazioni militare italiano: Dalla sua costituzione alla fine della Seconda Guerra Mondiale (Roma: Ministero della Difesa, 1957), 101–7.

^29. Archive of the Historical Office of the Army General Staff (Archivio dell’Ufficio Storico Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito), Section I-3 Calderini Collection, doc. n. 90045/s4, Stato Maggiore Difesa, “Nuova denominazione Sim e varianti ordinamento interno,” May 21 1945. Giuseppe Conti, Una guerra segreta. Il Sim nel secondo conflitto mondiale (Bologna: il Mulino, 2010).

^30. Matteo Faini, Spies and their Masters: Intelligence – Policy Relations in Democratic Countries (London: Routledge, 2021), 90–91; Maria Gabriella Pasqualini, Intelligence Italiana dal 1949 al 1977 (Rome: AISI, 2011), 17.

^31. Timothy J. Naftali, X-2 and the Apprenticeship of American Counterespionage, 1942–1944 (PhD Dissertation, Harvard University: Unpublished, 1993), 574.

^32. Salvatore J. LaGumina, The Office of Strategic Services and Italian Americans: The Untold Story (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2016), 47.

^33. Max Corvo, The OSS in Italy 1942–1945: A Personal Memoir (New York: Praeger, 1989), 125, 137; US Army, Counter Intelligence Corps History and Missions in World War II (Baltimore: CIC Center, 1951); Richard Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America’s First Central Intelligence Agency (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 93–113; Peter Tompkins, “The OSS and Italian Partisans in World War II,” Studies in Intelligence 41, no. 5 (1998): 95–103.

^34. Timothy J. Naftali, X-2 and the Apprenticeship of American Counterespionage, 343, 615.

^35. Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, doc. 45, Minutes of Meeting of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, November 14 1945.

^36. Timothy Naftali, ARTIFICE: James Angleton and X-2 Operations in Italy, in The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II ed. George C. Chalou (Washington DC: National Archives & Record Service, 1992), 219–30, 224. Richard Harris Smith, OSS, cit., 98, 116.

^37. Federico Umberto D’Amato was an extremely influential member of the Italian intelligence community during the Cold War, well deep links with both the CIA and many European intelligence organisations. See: Giacomo Pacini, La Spia Intoccabile. Federico Umberto D’Amato e l’Ufficio Affari Riservati (Torino: Einaudi, 2021).

^38. Timothy J. Naftali, X-2 and the Apprenticeship of American Counterespionage, and Villa Angleton: The United States and Italian Intelligence, (paper presented at the March 1998 conference on “Italy and the US 50 Years after the Marshall Plan,” Roma, Center for American Studies).

^39. Trevor Barnes, “The Secret Cold War: The C.I.A. and American Foreign Policy in Europe, 1946–1956. Part I,” The Historical Journal 24, no. 2 (1981): 405.

^40. Kaeten Mistry, The United States, Italy and the Origins of Cold War Waging Political Warfare, 1945–1950 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2014), 20.

^41. CIA Crest, “Army CIC Nets in Europe: Net Project: Los Angeles” https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/ARMY%20CIC%20NETS%20IN%20EASTERN%20EUROPE_0001.pdf.

^42. Since its foundation in 1948 UAR de facto conducted, internally, both intelligence and operational activities, these however were performed somehow unofficially as, according to the law, they were not comprised among the office’s tasks.

^43. CIA Crest, “CIC CONTROL DATA FORM 1-A” January 1, 1950, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/HASS%2C%20KARL_0005.pdf .

^44. FRUS, 1948, Volume III, Western Europe, Doc. 440, NSC 1/1, Report by the National Security Council the Position of the United States with Respect to Italy, November 14 1947.

^45. Michael Warner, “The CIA’s office of policy coordination: From NSC 10/2 to NSC 68,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 11, no. 2 (1998): 215.

^46. FRUS 1945–1950, The Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Doc. 241, Memorandum from Houston to Hillenkoetter, September 25 1947, e Doc. 306, Memorandum from Wisner to Hillenkoetter, October 29 1948.

^47. Initially called ‘Office of Special Projects’ it was very soon renamed OPC, see Stephen J.K. Long, “Strategic Disorder, the Office of Policy Coordination and the Inauguration of US Political Warfare against the Soviet Bloc, 1948–50,” Intelligence and National Security 27, no. 4 (2012): 459–87.

^48. Memorandum from Wisner to Hillenkoetter, cit.

^49. OSO, previously the OSS Strategic Services Unit (SSU) was founded in 1946 within the Central Intelligence Group e was responsible for the conduct of covert intelligence collection activities. See Michael Warner & Kevin C. Ruffner, “The Founding of the Office of Special Operations (U),” Studies in Intelligence 44, no. 2 (2000), 2.

^50. FRUS, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955, Doc. 127, The Foreign Intelligence Programme of NSC 135, August 15 1952.

^51. CIA Crest, AEDEPOT, 2, Memorandum 0015, Domestic Operations Base February 5 1965, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/AEDEPOT%20%20%20VOL.%202_0015.pdf.

^52. History and Public Policy Programme Digital Archive, George F. Kennan, ‘The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare’ [Redacted Version] April 30 1948 https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114320.pdf?v=94 .

^53. FRUS, 1951 VOL. I National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Doc. 18 Attachment to Memorandum for the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary: Draft Statement of Policy Prepared by the Senior Staff of the National Security Council, May 8 1951.

^54. Maria Gabriella Pasqualini, Carte Segrete dell’Intelligence Italiana, cit., 278.

^55. Ambrogio Viviani, Storia dei Servizi Segreti Italiani (Roma: Adnkronos Libri, 1986), 328–30.

^56. CIA Crest, “Office of Reports and Estimates, Western Europe Branch,” Branch Weekly working paper, June 21 1949 https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79-01090A000400010002-5.pdf.

^57. Leopoldo Nuti, The Italian Stay-Behind Network, 962.

^58. Internet Archive, Obopus/Bfiend, vol. 21, https://archive.org/details/OBOPUS/OBOPUS%20BFIEND%20Vol.%2021%20%28BGFIEND%20OPERATIONS%29/OBOPUS%20BFIEND%20%20%20VOL.%2021%20%28BGFIEND%20OPERATIONS%29_0002; Beatrice Heuser, “Covert action within British and American concepts of containment, 1948–51,” in British Intelligence, strategy and the Cold War, 1945–1951 ed. Richard J. Aldrich (London: Routledge, 1992), 64–83.

^59. CIA Crest, SPECIAL COLLECTION: Intelligence, Policy, and Politics: The DCI, the White House, and Congress, Doc. no. 5166d49199326091c6a6007a.

^60. Internet Archive, CIA-RDP80B01676R002300050017-6, Director’s meeting, April 26 1951; CIA-RDP80B01676R002300050022-0, Director’s meeting, May 4, 1951; CIA-RDP80B01676R002300070024-6, Director’s Meeting September 6 1951, https://archive.org/details/DIRECTORSMEETING80B01676R0023000500176; Appunto 1517/921.24/01 SISMI a CESIS, April 20 1991, ACS Direttiva Renzi/PCM/DIS/2113/1989–1993/46/18: DIS_2113C_f0046_d0015.pdf.

^61. Matthew M. Aid, “The Declassified History of American Intelligence Operations in Europe: 1945–2001,” Introductory Essay for the Documentary Collection The US Intelligence Community’s 70-Year Presence in Europe (Leiden: Brill, 2015), https://primarysources.brillonline.com/browse/us-intelligence-on-europe.

^62. CIA Crest, Memorandum from Special Operations, May 2, 1951 https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/HASS%2C%20KARL_0009.pdf and Memorandum from Special Operations, May 18 1951 https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/HASS%2C%20KARL_0010.pdf.

^63. For an overview of the problems related to Italy’s eastern border in those years see: James Edward Miller, The United States and Italy, 1940–1950: The Politics and Diplomacy of Stabilization (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), 162–163 and John L. Harper, America and the Reconstruction of Italy, 1945–1948 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1986).

^64. CIA Crest, CIC Report PIR-9124 April 16 1951 https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/HASS%2C%20KARL_0008.pdf; Note from CIA Director to SR Department C, September 16 1952 www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/HASS%2C%20KARL_0027.pdf; Note from CIA to CIC, 201 File, August 15 1952 https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/HASS%2C%20KARL_0021.pdf.

^65. CIA Crest, Memo from Intel Control to CIA Director, December 23 1954 https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/HASS%2C%20KARL_0108.pdf.

^66. CIA Crest, SPECIAL COLLECTION: Intelligence, Policy, and Politics: The DCI, the White House, and Congress, Doc. no. 5166d49199326091c6a6007a.

^67. Pro-memoria da Direttore SIFAR a Capo di SMD: Organizzazione Informativa-Operativa nel Territorio Nazionale Suscettibile di Occupazione Nemica, October 8 1951, ACS Direttiva Renzi/PCM/DIS/2113/1989–1993/26/4: DIS_2113C_f0026_d0003, 7.

^68. CIA Crest, SPECIAL COLLECTION: Intelligence, Policy, and Politics: The DCI, the White House, and Congress, Doc. no. 5166d49199326091c6a6007a

^69. Appunto SIFAR: Rapporti tra il Servizio Italiano ed i Servizi Collegati in merito ai programmemi S/B, November 23, 1959 ACS Direttiva Renzi/PCM/DIS/2113/1989–1993/42/17: DIS_2113C_f0042_d0016.pdf.

^70. Archivio Storico Senato, Terrorismo e Stragi (X-XII leg.) (hereafter ASS, TS X-XII), Unit 5, Folder 8, Rapporto Ufficio «R» SAD 069161: Sezione SAD – Dati per la relazione quadriennale (1956–1959), October 22 1959.

^71. CIA Crest, Memorandum from CIA Director to SR C Division, September 11, 1952 https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/HASS%2C%20KARL_0023.pdf; Memorandum from CIA EE net to CIA Western Europe Division Italian Branch: CIC Detachment 35 Project ‘Los Angeles’ https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/HASS%2C%20KARL_0032.pdf; Memo from Senior Representative to Chief WE Division: Meeting in Rome: SIFAR, Interior Ministry sad German Service according to HASS, August 12, 1953 https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/HASS%2C%20KARL_0056.pdf

^72. CIA Crest, Intel Control Memorandum October 23, 1953 https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/HASS%2C%20KARL_0057.pdf.

^73. James L. Gilbert, John P. Finnegan, Ann Bray, In the Shadow of the Sphynx: A History of Army Counterintelligence (Fort Belvoir: US Army Intelligence and Security Command History Office, 2005), 127.

^74. CIA Crest, Memo from Secret Control: Plan LABLAZE Progress Report, January 12, 1954 https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/HASS%2C%20KARL_0068.pdf; Memo from CIA Chief Italian Branch to Chief WE, August 19, 1954 https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/HASS%2C%20KARL_0087.pdf; Memorandum for CIA Chief of Foreign Intelligence: Alleged Investigation of CIA by the Italian Ministry of Interior November 28, 1954 https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/HASS%2C%20KARL_0105.pdf.

^75. Nota nr. 501754/5/1 da SIOS a SIFAR, senza titolo, 17 Marzo 1954 ACS/Direttiva Renzi/MD/AC/Piazza Fontana (1969)/ROS/ROS RAE [1992 – 2013]/1: Attività di supporto alle indagini del giudice istruttore Salvini nell’ambito delle inchieste sull’eversione di destra (1992 – 2013)/884: documenti 1954–1970 su reti informative americane in Italia (2001 ago. 27).

^76. FRUS, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955, Doc. 250, National Security Council Directive, NSC 5412/2, December 28, 1955.

^77. Appunto SIFAR R/40/681/SAD, da Ufficio «R» – Sezione SAD a Capo Servizio: Relazione sul corso effettuato negli U.S.A. dal gruppo di personale «SAD-CAG», undated, ACS Direttiva Renzi/PCM/DIS/2113/1989–1993/30/86: DIS_2113C_f0030_d0085.pdf.

^78. Ordine di Servizio SIFAR n. 59, September 28, 1956 ACS Direttiva Renzi/PCM/DIS/2113/1989–1993/18/5: DIS_2113C_f0018_d0004.pdf.

^79. Appunto SIFAR H/57/0: Risposta ai quesiti del Servizio Americano riguardanti il programmema comune S/B, March 26, 1958 ACS Direttiva Renzi/PCM/DIS/2113/1989–1993/46/55: DIS_2113C_f0046_d0051.pdf, 3.

^80. Appunto da CESIS a SISMI n.2113.6.5/417.3^ Operazione «GLADIO» – Forza numerica e materiali di scorta dell’organizzazione, November 22 1990 ACS Direttiva Renzi/PCM/DIS/2113/18/54: DIS_2113C_f0018_d0053.pdf.

^81. Appunto n.2113.6.5.7/4/3^ da CESIS a PCM: Organizzazione «GLADIO» - Testo accordo «Stay Behind» January 15 1991 ACS Direttiva Renzi/PCM/DIS/2113/1989–1993/30/16: DIS_2113C_f0030_d0015.pdf; Appunto SIFAR: Rapporti tra il Servizio Italiano ed i Servizi Collegati in merito ai programmemi S/B, November 23 1959, ACS Direttiva Renzi/PCM/DIS/2113/1989–1993/42/17:DIS_2113C_f0042_d0016.pdf.

^82. Appunto SIFAR R/40/681/SAD, da Ufficio «R» – Sezione SAD a Capo Servizio: Relazione sul corso effettuato negli U.S.A. dal gruppo di personale «SAD-CAG» (9 ottobre-15 novembre 1957), November 19 1957, ACS Direttiva Renzi/PCM/DIS/2113/1989–1993/30/86: DIS_2113C_f0030_d0085.pdf

^83. ASS, TS X-XII, doc. 17, Appunto del Senatore Paolo Emilio Taviani concernente la ‘Segreteria Speciale del Patto Atlantico’ istituita negli anni cinquanta presso il Ministero dell’interno, 93.

^84. Senato della Repubblica V Legislatura Doc. XXIII, N. 1, Commissione Parlamentare D’Inchiesta sugli Eventi del giugno-luglio 1964 – Relazioni di Minoranza (Roma: Senato della Repubblica, 1971), 307–308, 339.

^85. Appunto SIFAR H/57/0: Risposta ai quesiti del Servizio Americano riguardanti il programmema comune S/B, March 26, 1958 ACS Direttiva Renzi/PCM/DIS/2113/1989–1993/46/55: DIS_2113C_f0046_d0051.pdf, pp. 4–7.

^86. ASS, TS X-XII, Unit 4, folder 8, L’operazione Gladio a due anni di distanza dall’accordo del 26 novembre 1956, December 3, 1958; ASS, TS X-XII, Unit 5, folder 13, Nota del Direttore del SIFAR: Studio di AFSOUTH su forze di resistenza, December 4, 1957.

^87. Faini, Spies and their Masters, 93.

^88. Appunto SIFAR SR 273 February 8 1959; Nota 7302 Centro CS SIFAR Padova, July 15, 1960 both quoted in Giacomo Pacini, le altre Gladio.

^89. CIA Crest, Source Report Network Los Angeles, September 13, 1957 https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/HASS%2C%20KARL_0121.pdf.

^90. Appunto SIFAR, no title, no protocol, February 1957, ACS/Direttiva Renzi/MD/AC/Piazza Fontana (1969)/ROS/ROS RAE [1992 – 2013]/1: Attività di supporto alle indagini del giudice istruttore Salvini nell’ambito delle inchieste sull’eversione di destra (1992 – 2013)/884: documenti 1954–1970 su reti informative americane in Italia (2001 ago. 27).

^91. Appunto SIFAR n. 22415252, Rete di Informazione Americana nell’Italia Settentrionale, May 19 1958, ACS/Direttiva Renzi/MD/AC/Piazza Fontana (1969)/ROS/RAE [1992 – 2013]/1: Attività di supporto alle indagini del giudice istruttore Salvini nell’ambito delle inchieste sull’eversione di destra/884: documenti 1954–1970 su reti informative americane in Italia (2001 ago. 27).

^92. Lettera da Capo Centro CS PD a Capo Ufficio D, May 22 1958 and Lettera da Capo Centro CS PD a Capo Ufficio D, May 26 1958 ACS/Direttiva Renzi/MI/DPS/DCPP/Piazza della Loggia (1974)/Procedimento penale 91/1997/Attività di polizia giudiziaria della DCPP/Relazione della DCPP del 4/1/2008/2: Documenti acquisiti nell’archivio SISMI/1: Documenti dal fascicolo 1956-1-M-302 ‘Collaborazione con uffici USA-SETAF-VR nel settore della sicurezza’ (1958).

^93. Nota n. 8848 Centro C.S. di Trieste, June 20, 1955; Nota n. 12243 del Centro C.S. di Trieste, October 12 1959; Nota n. 7095 Centro C.S. di Padova, September 6, 1972 all in ACS/Direttiva Renzi/MD/AC/Piazza Fontana(1969)/ROS/RAE/1: Attività di supporto alle indagini del giudice istruttore Salvini/412: Rapporto del ROS/9: Trasmissione di schede relative ai personaggi emersi nel corso delle indagini e ritenuti inseriti in strutture di intelligence statunitensi ed atlantiche (1997 giu. 30).

^94. Pro-Memoria per Il Sig. Comandante del Centro C.S. VR: Collaborazione SETAF-SIFAR, June, 9 1958 ACS/Direttiva Renzi/MI/DPP/DPS/DCPP/Piazza della Loggia(1974)/Procedimento penale 91/1997/Attività di polizia giudiziaria della DCPP/Relazione della DCPP del 4/1/2008/2: Documenti acquisiti nell’archivio SISMI/1: Documenti dal fascicolo 1956-1-M-302 ‘Collaborazione con uffici USA-SETAF-VR nel settore della sicurezza’ (1958)/5: APPUNTO (1958 giu. 09).

^95. Appunto SIFAR s.p.: Rapporti tra il Servizio Italiano ed i Servizi Collegati in merito ai programmemi S/B November 23, 1959, ACS Direttiva Renzi/PCM/DIS/2113/1989–1993/42/17: DIS_2113C_f0042_d0016.pdf

^96. Dennis Rempe, The Past as Prologue? A History of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in Colombia, 1958–66 (Carlisle: US Army War College, 2002).

^97. Appunto SIFAR B/139/0 Riorganizzazione del Progetto «GLADIO». Proposta del Servizio Americano, March 23, 1959 and Appunto SIFAR H/149/0 Riorganizzazione del progetto «GLADIO». Considerazioni del Servizio Italiano, April 15, 1959, ACS Direttiva Renzi/PCM/DIS/2113/1989–1993/46/55: DIS_2113C_f0046_d0051.pdf.

^98. Rapporto Ufficio «R» - Sezione «SAD»: Le Forze Speciali del SIFAR e operazione GLADIO, June 1, 1959 ACS Direttiva Renzi/PCM/DIS/2113/1989–1993/18/5: DIS_2113C_f0018_d0004.pdf, 11.

^99. Appunto 05/3297/72 5^ Sezione SAD a Direttore del SID, December 4, 1972, ACS Direttiva Renzi/PCM/DIS/2113/1989–1993/30/105: DIS_2113C_f0030_d0102.pdf, 2.

^100. Appunto Ufficio ‘D’: Collaborazione D/SIFAR – CIC/SETAF, 11 Ottobre 1959 ACS/Direttiva Renzi/MI/DPS/DCPP/Piazza della Loggia (1974)/Procedimento penale 91/1997/Attività di polizia giudiziaria della DCPP/Relazione della DCPP del 4/1/2008/2: Documenti acquisiti nell’archivio SISMI/5: Documenti dal fascicolo 1959-1-4-108 ‘Progetto per la costituzione di un centro di CS SIFAR/CIC a Padova’ (1959 – 1960)/3: APPUNTO; Appunto per il Signor Capo Ufficio: Visita a Roma del maggiore Albert VADA del CIC/SETAF, 15 marzo 1960 ACS/Direttiva Renzi/MI/DPS/DCPP/Piazza della Loggia (1974)/Procedimento penale 91/1997 [1997 – 2008]/Attività di polizia giudiziaria della DCPP/Relazione della DCPP del 4/1/2008/2: Documenti acquisiti nell’archivio SISMI (1958 – 1972)/5: Documenti dal fascicolo 1959-1-4-108 ‘Progetto per la costituzione di un centro di CS SIFAR/CIC a Padova’ (1959 – 1960)/5: APPUNTO PER ILSIGNOR CAPO UFFICIO (1960 mar. 15).

^101. FRUS 1958–1960, Volume VII, Part 2, Western Europe, doc. 278, National Security Council Report NSC 6014 Draft Statement of US Policy toward Italy, August 16 1960.

^102. National Security Action Memorandum No. 2: Development of Counter-Guerrilla Forces, February 23, 1961, https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKNSF/328/JFKNSF-328-003.

^103. Camera dei Deputati, DOC XLVIII, n.1, 40–41

^104. ASS, TS, X-XII, unit 4, folder 7, Appunto Ufficio «R» SIFAR R/44817.032.149: Programmemi di intensificazione dell’attività addestrativo-operativa della sezione «SAD» e del «CAG», November 16, 1963.

^105. FRUS 1964–1968, Volume XII, Western Europe, Doc. 116, Memorandum from the President Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson: Italian Covert Political Assistance, August 4, 1965. See also: Leopoldo Nuti, ‘Le relazioni tra Italia e Stati Uniti agli inizi della distensione’ in Agostino Giovagnoli e Silvio Pons (eds.), L’Italia repubblicana nella crisi degli anni settanta, vol. I, Tra guerra fredda e distensione (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2003).

^106. Mario Del Pero & Federico Romero, “The United States, Italy and the Cold War: Interpreting and Periodising a Contradictory and Complicated Relationship,” in Italy in the International System from Détente to the End of the Cold War: The Underrated Ally, ed. Antonio Varsori and Benedetto Zaccaria, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 25.

^107. FRUS 1964–1968, Volume XII, Western Europe, Doc. 113, Memorandum for the Record: Meeting of the 303 Committee, June 28, 1965; Doc. 125, Memorandum from the Ambassador to Italy to the Under-Secretary for Political Affairs, September, 12, 1966; Doc. 133, Memorandum for the Record: Meeting of the 303 Committee, August 22, 1967.

^108. Appunto n. 05/016/020/S da Ufficio ‘R’ a Ufficio ‘D’: Richiesta notizie sul Sig. LUONGO, January 23 1968 ACS/Direttiva Renzi/MI/DPS/DCPP/Piazza della Loggia (1974)/Procedimento penale 91/1997 [1997 – 2008]/Attività di polizia giudiziaria della DCPP/Relazione della DCPP del 2/1/2008/4: Documenti acquisiti presso l’archivio SISMI (1945 – 2008)/1: Documenti consegnati dal SISMI (1968 – 2007)/14: RICHIESTA NOTIZIE SUL SIG. LUONGO (1968 gen. 23).

^109. Matthew M. Aid, “The Declassified History of American Intelligence Operations in Europe: 1945–2001”.

^110. Appunto Ufficio «R» SIFAR Gladio 100: Operazione comune GLADIO: Situazione e Sviluppi, January 26, 1966, ACS Direttiva Renzi/PCM/DIS/2113/1989–1993/43/27: DIS_2113C_f0043_d0026.pdf.

^111. Appunto Ufficio «R» SIFAR Gladio 1002: Operazione comune GLADIO: Attività addestrativa, January 26, 1966. See also Francesco Cacciatore, ‘Stay-behind Networks and Interim Flexible Strategy’, 653–654.

^112. Giacomo Pacini, le altre Gladio, 210.

^113. Nota da Ministro della Difesa a Capo di Stato Maggiore della Difesa: Disciplina del Servizio Informazioni della Difesa, June 25, 1966 ACS Direttiva Renzi/PCM/DIS/2113/1989–1993/24/4: DIS_2113C_f0024_d0003.pdf.

^114. Appunto da SISMI a CESIS n.1183/921.24/01: COPACO Richiesta Concernente i dati numerici relativi alle strutture del Servizio Preposte alla «GLADIO», 1956–1990, December 23, 1991 ACS Direttiva Renzi/PCM/DIS/2113/1989–1993/30/128: DIS_2113C_f0030_d0125.pdf.

^115. CIA Crest, AEDEPOT, 2, Memorandum 12, Project WUDEPOT: Current and Future Status, March 15, 1965. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/AEDEPOT%20%20%20VOL.%202_0012.pdf.

^116. CIA Crest, CIA Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Bulletin, June 5, 1968, 5. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79T00975A011300080001-7.pdf; CIA Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Bulletin, December 9, 1968. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79T00975A012700070001-3.pdf.

^117. Appunto da SISMI a CESIS n.1100.921.24/01 «Operazione Gladio», November 20, 1990 ACS Direttiva Renzi/PCM/DIS/2113/1989–1993/18/50: DIS_2113C_f0018_d0049.pdf, 2; Appunto SID/05/3204/72: Operazione Gladio, Guerra Non Ortodossa e Direttive SMD e/o NATO, March 6 1972 ACS Direttiva Renzi/PCM/DIS/2113/1989–1993/46/55: DIS_2113C_f0046_d0051.pdf; Appunto CESIS a PCM N. 2113.6.5.7/122/3^, May 27, 1991, ACS Direttiva Renzi/PCM/DIS/2113/1989–1993/30/89: DIS_2113C_f0030_d0088.pdf.

^118. Franco Ferraresi, Threats to Democracy: the Radical Right in Italy after the War (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1995), 52–63; Anna Cento Bull, Italian Neofascism. The Strategy of Tension and the Politics of Nonreconciliation (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012), 19, 31.

^119. As noted by Virgilio Ilari, during the 1960s members of the former Osoppo Brigade who had merged into Gladio’s network in Friuli, always vehemently anti-communist, became even more radical and, in the face of the growing left-wing riots of the end of the 1960s, proved increasingly willing to escalate the fight against communism. It has been ascertained that the leadership of this section of the S/B organisation, particularly col. Specogna, had contacts with ON in the Triveneto area. This evidence, in conjunction with the US heavy intelligence footprint in the region, has been at the roots of the theories and interpretations, advanced through the years by many scholars, maintaining Gladio’s active participation in neofascist subversive activities. The problem with these interpretations is that, first, currently available sources and archives do not provide any clue (not to mention evidence) about operational links between ON and Gladio’s network in Friuli, beside occasional interactions between individual members of the two; second, and perhaps most important, such interpretations are characterised by a remarkable, and tendentious, confusion between the US military intelligence’s covert networks and the CIA-sponsored S/B organisation in north-east Italy. See Commissione Parlamentare D’Inchiesta sul Terrorismo in Italia e sulle Cause della Mancata Individuazione dei Responsabili delle Stragi, Doc. XXIII, n. 64 VOL. 3, 272.

^120. It was impossible to find what the acronym USETA stands for. Appunto 04/2114/S/2^ da Ufficio ‘D’ a Ufficio ‘R’: Joseph Luongo, February 6, 1968 ACS/Direttiva Renzi/MI/DPS/DCPP/Piazza della Loggia (1974)/Relazione della DCPP del 2/1/2008/4: Documenti acquisiti presso l’archivio SISMI (1945–2008)/1: Documenti consegnati dal SISMI il 28/7/2007 (1968–2007)/16: ESITO NOTIZIE SUL SIG. LUONGO (1968 feb. 06).

^121. Appunto 05/006/020 da Ufficio ‘R’ a Capo Servizio: Collaborazione con USETA, February 7, 1968 ACS/Direttiva Renzi/MI/DPS/DCPP/Piazza della Loggia (1974)/Procedimento penale 91/1997/Attività di polizia giudiziaria della DCPP/Relazione della DCPP del 4/1/2008/2: Documenti acquisiti nell’archivio SISMI/6: Documenti dal fascicolo ‘Collaborazione del SID con il servizio informazioni dell’esercito USA in Europa (ODCSI-USAREUR)’ (1968 – 1972)/2: COLLABORAZIONE CON USAREUR (USETA) (1968 ago. 20).

^122. Appunto n.7420 da Centro CS di PD a Signor Capo Ufficio ‘D’: Verona-Personale USA operante sotto copertura, August 8, 1968 ACS/Direttiva Renzi/MI/DPS/DCPP/Piazza della Loggia (1974)/Relazione della DCPP del 4/1/2008/2: Documenti acquisiti presso l’archivio SISMI (1958–1972)/4: Documenti dal fascicolo 1960-1-M-302/6 ‘Collaborazione con il CIC/SETAF di Vicenza’ (1968)/3: VERONA PERSONALE USA OPERANTE SOTTO COPERTURA (1968 ago. 08).

^123. Appunto Capo Ufficio ‘D’: Personale USA operante sotto copertura, August 24, 1968 ACS/Direttiva Renzi/MI/DPS/DCPP/Piazza della Loggia (1974)/Relazione della DCPP del 4/1/2008/2: Documenti acquisiti presso l’archivio SISMI (1958–1972)/4: Documenti dal fascicolo 1960-1-M-302/6 ‘Collaborazione con il CIC/SETAF di Vicenza’ (1968)/4: PERSONALE USA OPERANTE SOTTO COPERTURA (1968 ago. 24).

^124. Scholars agree that it is unclear whether the US military intelligence was following directives from the Department of Defense or the Army or coversely was acting on his own initiative. See Guido Formigoni, Storia dell’Italia nella Guerra Fredda (Il Mulino: 2016), 868–869 and Lucrezia Cominelli, L’Italia sotto tutela. Stati Uniti, Europa e crisi italiana degli anni Settanta (Milano: Mondadori, 2014), 86–89.

^125. See for instance footnote 40 in Leopoldo Nuti, “Commitment to NATO and Domestic Politics: The Italian Case and Some Comparative Remarks,” Contemporary European History, 7, no.3 (1998) Theme Issue: Changing Perspectives on European Security and NATO’s Search for a New Role. From the 1960s to the Present: 361–377.

^126. Commissione Parlamentare D’Inchiesta sul Terrorismo in Italia e sulle Cause della Mancata Individuazione dei Responsabili delle Stragi, Doc. XXIII, n. 64 VOL. 2, Book I, 9^th Session, February 12, 1997 and 12^th Session, March 20, 1997. See also: https://guidosalvini.it/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/TESTO1.doc.

^127. For Maletti’s version see: Commissione Parlamentare D’Inchiesta sul Terrorismo in Italia e sulle Cause della Mancata Individuazione dei Responsabili delle Stragi, Doc. XXIII, n. 64 VOL. 1, Book IV, Testimony by Gen. Maletti, March 12, 1997, 420 and A. Sceresini, N. Palma e M.E. Scandaliato, Piazza Fontana, noi sapevamo (Reggio Emilia: Aliberti, 2010), 86–89. For Taviani’s basically identical version see: Paolo Emilio Taviani, Politica a memoria d’uomo (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2002), 380–381.

^128. CIA Crest, Memorandum from Helmut Sonnenfeldt to Henry Kissinger: Italy: Political Situation, NSC et al., January 27, 1970. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/LOC-HAK-4-1-16-8.pdf.

^129. FRUS, 1969–1976 VOL. XLI Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972, Doc. 208 Memorandum for the Record: Minutes of the Meeting of the 40 Committee, March 10, 1971, 702.

^130. FRUS, 1969–1976 VOL. XLI Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972, Doc. 224 Memorandum from the Chief of the European Division, Directorate of Plans to Director of Central Intelligence, October 13, 1972, 735.

^131. CIA, The Pike Report (Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 1977), 194; Claudio Gatti, Rimanga tra Noi. L’Italia e la Questione Comunista dal punto di vista Americano (Milano: Leonardo, 1991), 125.

^132. Appunto 05/3297/72 5^ Sezione SAD a Direttore del SID, December 4, 1972 ACS Direttiva Renzi/PCM/DIS/2113/1989–1993/30/105: DIS_2113C_f0030_d0102.pdf, 2.

^133. Nota CESIS 2114.25.1 May 20, 1991, ACS Direttiva Renzi/PCM/DIS/2113/1989–1993/19/83: DIS_2113C_f0019_d0082.pdf.

^134. The Resistance Intelligence Committee (RIC) was an interdepartmental organisation whose membership included the CIA, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) of the State Department, and the various branches of the armed forces. It was founded in 1953 and was specifically tasked with developing programmes to support resistance movements in Communist countries. CIA Crest, Resistance Intelligence Committee: Organisation and Function, May 2, 1956. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85S00362R000600030002-0.pdf.

^135. ASS, TS, X-XII, series 1, unit 4, folder 21, Verbale stenografico della riunione tenuta il 15/12/1972 con il servizio americano, 17, 21, 31–33. Phoenix was a programme designed to improve intelligence coordination and operations aimed at identifying and dismantling the communist underground during the Vietnam War. Controversially, it included targeted assassinations. For an overview see William Rosenau & Austin Long, The Phoenix Programme and Contemporary Counterinsurgency (Santa Monica: RAND, 2009).

^136. ASS, TS, X-XII, series 1, unit 5, folder 9, Appunto SID/05/32053/73 Valutazione Informativa operativa delle eventuali esigenze Stay-Behind nell’Italia Meridionale e in Sicilia, April 24, 1973.

^137. Appunto SID H/889/0: Memorandum di Intesa (M.D.I.), February 13, 1973 ACS Direttiva Renzi/PCM/DIS/2113/1989–1993/30/110: DIS_2113C_f0030_d0107.pdf.

^138. FRUS 1969–1976 VOL. E–15, Part 2, Western Europe, 1973–1976 Second Revised Edition, Doc. 349. National Intelligence Estimate 24–1–74: Prospects for and Consequences Of Increased Communist Influence in Italian Politics, July 18, 1974, 1068–1070.

^139. FRUS 1969–1976 VOL. E–15, Part 2, Western Europe, 1973–1976 Second Revised Edition, Doc. 354. Memorandum Prepared for the 40 Committee, January 21, 1975 and Doc. 360. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Ford: Covert Action Programme in Italy, November 29, 1975, 1079.

^140. FRUS 1969–1976 VOL. E–15, Part 2, Western Europe, 1973–1976 Second Revised Edition, Doc. 375. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Ford, July 26, 1976, 1137–1138.

^141. The complete texts of all the memorandums of cooperation are in ASS TS, X-XII, series 1, unit 4, folder 21.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Niccolò Petrelli

Niccolò Petrelli is Assistant Professor at Roma Tre University, Department of Political Sciences. Previously he was Eisenhower Defense Fellow at the NATO Defense College, post-doctoral fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leeds, visiting scholar at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) in Herzliya. He is the author of Israel, Strategic Culture and the Conflict with Hamas: Adaptation and Military Effectiveness, 1987–2014 (Routledge, 2018) and his works have been published, among others, in: The Journal of Strategic Studies, Intelligence & National Security, Small Wars & Insurgencies, The International History Review.