Challenging Liberal Principles: Understanding of Democracy among Populist Radical Right Youth Leaders in Austria and Germany

ABSTRACT

Responding to the growing political success of populist radical right parties, scholars have increasingly examined those parties relationship to democracy. While some consider these parties as a democratic corrective to a crisis of political representation, others point to their ideological conflict with the principles of liberal democracy. We contribute to this debate by exploring the understanding of democracy of populist radical right youth leaders. Specifically, we conducted nine qualitative semi-structured expert interviews with leaders and executive members of the populist radical right youth wings in Austria (Ring Freiheitlicher Jugend/RFJ) and Germany (Junge Alternative/JA). To determine their understanding of democracy, we utilised a vignette technique to simulate governmental decision-making in resolving specific political scenarios. The findings indicate that although the youth leaders recognise democracy as such, their understanding of democracy contains majoritarian and anti-egalitarian aspects that might indirectly curtail liberal principles of democracy. This study thus provides an in-depth analysis of the motivations underlying the intentions of populist radical right youth leaders toward potential transformations of democratic institutions.

Introduction

In recent decades, populist radical right parties have gained widespread electoral support across European democracies. In light of their growing political success and impact, primarily through government participation, scholars have increasingly focused on the intricate relationship between such parties and democracy. Populism is often portrayed either as a pathological political phenomenon or as the most authentic form of political representation (Mudde 2010; Taggart 2002). Scholars therefore emphasise the ambivalent relationship between populism and democracy, recognising its potential as a democratic corrective in terms of inclusiveness while also acknowledging the threat it poses to public contestation (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017; Rovira Kaltwasser 2012). However, by emphasising the will of the people as the only legitimate source in political decision-making, populist parties consider constitutional control by independent courts or critical reporting by the media superfluous (Canovan 1999; Galston 2018). Moreover, combined with a radical right ideology, these parties distinguish between the pure people and the corrupt political elite along nativist lines, targeting minorities perceived as an obstacle to their goal of a homogeneous nation-state (Mudde 2007). The ideology of populist radical right parties is therefore seen as being at odds with fundamental principles and norms of liberal democracy, in particular of checks and balances, civil liberties, and minority rights (Plattner 2010; Rummens 2017).

Empirical research on these parties’ impact on the political system concludes that they are detrimental to democratic quality and should therefore be considered a threat (e.g. Huber and Schimpf 2016; 2017). At the level of citizens, the electoral success of populist radical right parties leads to a decline in satisfaction with democracy among mainstream voters (Fahey, Allen, and Alarian 2022). Yet, even though candidates of populist radical right parties tend to be far more supportive of direct democracy, their electorates do not necessarily mirror these views on democracy, even if they are those who are most dissatisfied with the way democracy works (Bowler et al. 2017). This suggests that there may be differences in attitudes towards democracy between the leaders of populist radical right parties and their supporters.

While there is extensive research on how voters of these parties view and support democracy (e.g. Meléndez and Kaltwasser 2021; Wegscheider, Rovira Kaltwasser, and Van Hauwaert 2023), we still know surprisingly little about the ideas and perceptions of their leading members. This seems particularly important considering the leaders of populist radical right youth wings, as these individuals form the next generation and thus the future leadership of their respective parties. Since youth wings and their leaders usually represent positions in a radicalised form (Bruter and Harrison 2009), it is essential to understand their intentions regarding potential transformations of democratic institutions. Accordingly, the research question of this article is as follows: What is the understanding of democracy of the leaders of populist radical right youth wings?

Existing research on how parties and their leaders view democracy usually relies on analysing party documents such as election manifestos and press releases. Based on this approach, evidence suggests that the German-speaking populist radical right parties of the Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs/FPÖ), the Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland/AfD) and the Swiss People’s Party (Schweizerische Volkspartei/SVP) are united in their demand for more direct popular participation and the restriction of liberal principles that limit majority rule (Engler et al. 2023). Further empirical studies demonstrate that the Austrian FPÖ and the German AfD emphasise the sovereignty of an ethnically and culturally exclusive nation (Corduwener 2014; Kailitz 2020; Lewandowsky, Giebler, and Wagner 2016, 259).

We contribute to these insights by taking a dialectic and in-depth approach to explore the rationales and motivations underlying certain understandings of democracy. Specifically, we conducted nine qualitative semi-structured expert interviews with leaders and executive members of the populist radical right youth wings in Austria (Ring Freiheitlicher Jugend/RFJ) and Germany (Junge Alternative/JA). Employing a vignette technique embedded in the interviews, respondents were exposed to different political scenarios to simulate governmental decision-making. These scenarios have been developed to reflect situations in which liberal principles of democracy are challenged, in particular civil liberties, independent media, rule of law, separation of powers, minority rights, and inclusive citizenship. Our findings show that although the leaders of populist radical right youth wings in Germany and Austria appear to broadly understand and support democratic principles, they show considerable skepticism towards their practical implementation and the functioning of liberal institutions.

In the following section, we define the concept of liberal democracy and the ideology of populist radical right parties. This allows us to identify the principles of liberal democracy that conflict with the ideology of these parties. We then present our case selection and methodological approach. In doing so, we explain the data collection process and how we developed the four hypothetical scenarios embedded in the interviews to capture the youth leaders’ understanding of democracy. Finally, we present and discuss the results and implications of this study.

The Populist Radical Right and Democracy

As a starting point for our considerations, we define the concept of liberal democracy and the populist radical right ideology to identify the principles with which this ideology is most likely at odds. We thereby consider existing studies that analyse the relationship of populist radical right parties and their supporters to democracy. This discussion serves as a theoretical foundation for selecting the relevant principles of liberal democracy to develop the vignettes.

Most definitions of liberal democracy rely on Dahl’s (2000) electoral and procedural components in combination with a set of civil liberties and institutionalised checks and balances (e.g. Bühlmann et al. 2012; Coppedge et al. 2011). Accordingly, liberal democracy is a form of government in which politicians are elected in free and fair elections to represent the interests of citizens. Yet, it emphasises individual civil liberties, especially freedom of expression and minority rights. In addition, liberal democracies typically have a system of checks and balances that prevents the concentration of power and ensures accountability within the government. Following Bühlmann et al. (2012), liberal democracy consists of the principles of freedom, equality, and control, which are guaranteed by various functions and institutions (see also Coppedge et al. 2011). These conceptualisations help us to identify the principles that conflict with the populist radical right ideology.

Populist radical right parties combine their populist outlook with a radical right host ideology. This radical right ideology consists of a nativist and authoritarian worldview. Nativism ‘holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (“the nation”) and that non-native elements (people and ideas) pose a fundamental threat to the homogeneous nation-state’ (Mudde 2007, 22). This exclusive nationalism is complemented by socio-cultural authoritarianism, which states that people must adhere to traditional and social norms, submit to authority and that violations of these rules must be severely punished (e.g. Altemeyer 1981). Populism, by contrast, constitutes a set of ideas ‘that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people’ (Mudde 2004, 543).

Given this combination of populism with exclusive nationalism and socio-cultural authoritarianism, scholars see the populist radical right ideology in conflict with several principles and norms of liberal democracy (Plattner 2010; Rummens 2017). Studies show that populist radical right parties are directed against liberal principles that limit majority rule and are thus seen as an obstacle to the direct implementation of the will of the people (Engler et al. 2023). Furthermore, these parties contradict civil liberties and minority rights, according to which people are less deserving because of ethnic, racial, or cultural characteristics (Corduwener 2014; Kailitz 2020; Lewandowsky, Giebler, and Wagner 2016, 259).

Yet, studies focusing on the electorate of these parties and populist citizens show that their opposition to liberal democracy is much more nuanced. Some studies show that supporters and opponents of populist radical right parties differ significantly in their support for liberal and direct democracy, with supporters of these parties showing less support for liberal democracy and more support for direct democracy (Meléndez and Kaltwasser 2021; Wegscheider, Rovira Kaltwasser, and Van Hauwaert 2023). In contrast, van der Brug et al. (2021) show that support for liberal democracy depends on the incumbency status. Accordingly, populist radical right voters only oppose liberal principles that limit majority rule when their party is in government. Similarly, Fölsch et al. (2024) show that populist citizens support direct democracy mainly when their preferred policy positions are implemented. Zaslove and Meijers (2023) conclude that populist citizens do not fundamentally reject liberal democracy (see also Rovira Kaltwasser and Van Hauwaert 2020), but rather reject representation by political parties and prefer forms of unconstrained majoritarian rule. In a similar vein, Austrian and German citizens holding populist radical right attitudes are more in favour of anti-pluralist decision-making procedures and the popular sovereignty of an exclusive nation (Heinisch and Wegscheider 2020). While there is a unanimous view about the threat to liberal democracy posed by populist radical right parties, we know little about the extent to which leading members stick to their party line or share their voters’ sometimes divergent views on democracy (see also Bowler et al. 2017). Given that party youth wings often adopt radicalised positions (Bruter and Harrison 2009), this group represents the most-likely case for an ideological conflict with liberal principles of democracy.

Based on these definitions and the discussion of previous research, we hypothesise that the understanding of democracy among leaders and executive members of populist radical right youth wings might encounter tensions with three critical facets of liberal democracy. Firstly, the value liberal democracy places on the principle of freedom, including civil liberties such as the right to protest and independent media, may clash with the populist radical right’s concept of an absolute general will of the people, which might view external non-governmental critiques as less necessary. Secondly, the emphasis of liberal democracy on the principle of control through institutions such as constitutional courts and the separation of powers may potentially conflict with the populist radical right's preference for the unfettered power of the people. Thirdly, the principle of equality contradicts the populist radical right ideology, which proceeds from differentiating between people along ethnic, racial, or cultural lines to establish an exclusive and homogeneous nation-state.

In developing our scenarios, we follow the conceptualisations of Bühlmann et al. (2012) and Coppedge et al. (2011) by decomposing the concept of liberal democracy and focusing on the principles of freedom (civil liberties and independent media), control (rule of law and separation of powers) and equality (minority rights and inclusive citizenship). To understand how youth leaders perceive democracy while minimising the potential undesirable effects of direct questioning on a sensitive topic, we adopted a vignette approach described in detail in the methodology section below. We have developed four vignettes, one each for the principles of freedom and control and two for the principle of equality. Before describing the data collection process and the rationale for developing these vignettes, we explain our study's case selection.

Case Description

Our analysis focuses on the youth wings of the Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs/FPÖ) and the Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland/AfD). These parties represent two typical and similar populist radical right parties in comparable political systems. The FPÖ has been a significant force in Austrian politics for decades, and the AfD in Germany has also flourished recently (Arzheimer 2015). In Austria, the FPÖ has been part of the government on three occasions (2000–2003; 2003–2005; 2017–2019) and has repeatedly undergone processes of mainstreaming and renewed radicalisation. The AfD also went through significant political changes and radicalisation during the relatively short period of its existence. Unlike the FPÖ, however, the AfD has never been part of a governing coalition in Germany.

The political systems of Austria and Germany are very similar in terms of context, political culture, and the structure of the party system. Both systems are federalist and thus cause parties to adopt federal structures. Although German democracy, at least at the federal level, is strictly representative, with the Bundestag as the sole locus of popular sovereignty, and Austria formally has a tradition of direct democracy, referendums at the national level have had few political consequences. Despite their rhetoric to the contrary, populists such as the FPÖ have, by and large, failed to capitalise on referendums, so we would not expect significant differences between these parties in Austria and Germany due to specific differences in context. Lastly and importantly, both countries share a somewhat integrated media environment dominated by German print and electronic media. As such, political debates that shape public discourse in Germany also affect political discussions in Austria. German political decisions often serve as reference points for Austrian politicians. This, too, underlines the expected similarity between Austrian and German political leaders in the extent to which their respective political settings influence them.

Despite these similarities, one significant difference concerns the integration of the FPÖ and the AfD into their respective party systems (Zulianello 2020). Leaders and members of a party that has existed for a long time and has even participated in government may have a different understanding of democracy than their counterparts in short-lived parties with whom no one wants to cooperate. Although there are differences between the populist radical right parties in Austria and Germany, mainly regarding their integration into their national party systems and differences in the size and resources of their competitors, the two countries are similar enough to make a comparison. However, even if we consider these differences, the results do not allow us to answer whether these factors influence the understanding of democracy among the populist radical right youth leaders due to the small sample size.

The specific youth wings on which our analysis focuses are the Ring Freiheitlicher Jugend (RFJ) in Austria and the Junge Alternative (JA) in Germany. The Austrian RFJ is an organisation associated with the FPÖ dating back to 1958 and has a federal structure with self-governing sections in all nine Austrian provinces (Luther 2005, 29). Although the RFJ is closely linked to the parent party, its statutory independence allows it to maintain a certain political distance. The German JA was founded in June 2013, four months after the founding of the AfD, and was officially recognised as its youth organisation in November 2015. Like its parent party, the JA has a federal structure with 16 self-governing regional associations corresponding to the German federal states (Herkenhoff 2016; Kleinert 2018, 47). As the JA emphasises in its statutes (Art. 6), it enjoys extensive ideological and statutory independence from the AfD.

Methodological Approach

Data Collection

We conducted qualitative semi-structured expert interviews with leaders and executive members of the RFJ and JA in 2020. However, due to the social and political distance between these parties and social scientists, recruiting and conducting interviews with leading members of populist radical right groups can be challenging (Damhuis and de Jonge 2022). After extensive research and inquiries, we recruited one interviewee per youth wing. The following participants were then recruited using the snowball technique. This allowed us to interview nine individuals, five from the RFJ and four from the JA. The distribution of the characteristics of the interviewees is shown in Table 1.¹ Our sample size might seem small, but this also applies to the population: At the time of data collection, the executive board of the JA consisted of 11 people and that of the RFJ of 17 people. We thus interviewed around a third of executive leaders in both youth wings. Nevertheless, our sample size does not allow for generalisation.

Table 1. Distribution and characteristics of the interviewees.

	Austria (RFJ)	Germany (JA)
Male/Female	4/1	3/1
Ages	22, 26, 27, 30, 32	26, 26, 32, 33
Total	5	4

All participants were informed about the purpose and topic of the interviews. They were assured that all findings would be anonymised, and they voluntarily agreed to be interviewed. The interviews lasted between 10 and 20 minutes each, and the interviewers used the same semi-structured questionnaires in which the vignettes were introduced identically for each interview (see Appendix 1 for the English questionnaires).²

Development of the Scenarios

Exploring people’s views on democracy is challenging, not only because the concept itself is complex and contested in its meaning, but also because people may be reluctant to say what they think (Osterberg-Kaufmann, Stark, and Mohamad-Klotzbach 2020).³ People may be hesitant or unwilling to openly share their genuine opinions about democracy, particularly in settings where such views might be judged, controversial, or potentially dangerous. This reluctance can stem from fear of social backlash, legal repercussions, or simply because they consider their views socially unacceptable. In some cases, individuals might be unaware of their biases or cannot articulate their ideas clearly. This hesitancy makes it even more complex to understand people's genuine perspectives on democracy.

To overcome these challenges, we employed a vignette technique embedded in the qualitative semi-structured expert interviews (Barter and Renold 2000; Hughes and Huby 2004). While this method is not unique in exploring people’s understanding of democracy, it provides an insight into individuals’ subjective experiences and perspectives. Such interviews delve into the ‘lived worlds of meaning’ (Fisher-Smith et al. 2021, 210), capturing the intricate and often deeply personal ways in which members of the populist radical right interpret and navigate their political environment. This method allows researchers to explore the nuanced beliefs, values, and motivations that drive these individuals, providing a richer and more detailed understanding than what can be gleaned from purely quantitative data. The vignette technique is therefore well suited to tackling the problem of social desirability. The fictional but plausible nature of the vignette scenarios can reduce - but of course not eliminate - participants’ tendencies to respond in desired ways (Hughes and Huby 2004; Wilks 2004).

Vignettes are ‘short stories about hypothetical characters in specified circumstances, to whose situation the interviewee is invited to respond’ (Finch 1987, 105) and thus a technique to ‘elicit perceptions, opinions, beliefs and attitudes from responses or comments to stories depicting scenarios and situations’ (Barter and Renold 1999, 1). These narrative scenarios are designed to present respondents with moral quandaries, prompting them to reveal how they would navigate and resolve these challenges. These short descriptions are essential for our qualitative analyses, as they and the answers ‘contain precise references to what are thought to be the most important factors in the decision-making or judgment-making processes of respondents’ (Alexander and Becker 1978, 94).

We have developed four vignettes in which the previously identified principles of freedom (civil liberties and independent media), control (rule of law and separation of powers), and equality (minority rights and inclusive citizenship) are challenged. In developing these vignettes, we have endeavoured to make them as realistic as possible by considering the context of public opinion expressed by citizens and other relevant actors. Given that our questions are specifically aimed at liberal principles, we believe that responses can be analysed as positions on these principles rather than policies or vote-seeking ambitions. We gain insights into specific decision-making approaches by confronting respondents with hypothetical government roles that require them to act. This enables us to unravel their authentic interpretations and applications of democratic principles, thereby enriching our understanding of their genuine grasp of democracy. However, we acknowledge that one crucial task in developing these vignettes is balancing the information to create a realistic but not distracting scenario.⁴

The first scenario focuses on the principle of freedom, specifically on civil liberties and independent media (see Table 2). To determine how respondents feel about civil rights such as freedom of assembly, the scenario involves a demonstration against a current government project. We emphasise that the protesters are not just a small and radical minority by pointing out that the majority of the population rejects the law and that thousands of citizens protest peacefully against it. This reference to public opinion seems essential not only to formulate an authentic scenario but also because the will of the people is fundamental to the populist radical right’s understanding of democracy.

Table 2. Scenario 1: Principle of freedom (civil liberties and independent media).

Imagine that you and your party are part of the government. The government has just passed a law, which was a core project and election promise of your party during the campaign. The law is rejected by the majority of the population. In many cities across the country, thousands of citizens are protesting against the law passed by the government. After several days of protests and failed negotiations, the protesters demand that the government resign. As the daily mass demonstrations continue and international media interest grows, some angry demonstrators begin to camp outside the government building, but the protests remain largely peaceful. There are the following options: The government sticks to the law, remains in office and tries to pacify the protests, or the government gives in to the protests and repeals the law.

Respondents were asked whether they would stick to the law and try to pacify the protest or give in to it and repeal the law. Although the phrases ‘stick to the law’ and ‘give in to the protests’ may have a distinct normative connotation in English, in our view they are comparatively neutral in the German version (‘am Gesetz festhalten’ and ‘die Proteste befrieden’). In addition, the interviewees were asked to explain their approach in detail to make the reasons comprehensible in both directions and avoid the answer being based solely on the valence of the wording. Respondents were also asked what measures they would take to pacify the protests, under what conditions the government should resign, uphold or repeal the law, and how they would deal with violent protests and the independent media.

The second scenario focuses on the principle of control based on the rule of law and separation of powers (Table 3). To determine how respondents feel about these principles, the scenario consists of a situation in which the constitutional court decides that a law is incompatible with the constitution. The coalition partner's proposals contain measures that violate the principles of the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary. Respondents were asked under what conditions they would accept the constitutional court’s decision and repeal the amendment. They were also asked under what circumstances they would use the government’s supermajority in parliament to uphold the constitutional amendment and intervene in the nomination of constitutional judges.

Table 3. Scenario 2: Principle of control (rule of law and separation of powers).

Imagine that you and your party are part of the government. The government has a supermajority in the Austrian Nationalrat/German Bundestag and passes a constitutional amendment which, according to your observation, also enjoys broad public support. Yet, the constitutional court decides that the amendment is not compatible with the constitution. Your coalition partner then proposes a two-point plan: First, the constitutional amendment should continue to be implemented and the ruling of the constitutional court should be ignored on the grounds that this constitutes an unacceptable encroachment on the competences of the government. Second, in order to prevent further confrontations with the constitutional court, some of the judges at the constitutional court are to be replaced by judges close to the government’s political views.

The third scenario addresses the principle of equality and specifically minority rights (Table 4). The scenario involves a national minority enjoying the protection of constitutional minority rights with a state-sponsored bilingual school that is essential for protecting the minority but has become too expensive for the state to run. Of course, ‘too expensive’ has a certain normative implication. In this way, however, we were able to find out whether respondents want to maintain minority rights (or not) despite rising costs. In this respect, the wording allows for a nuanced analysis of the understanding of this principle. Respondents were asked what measures their government would take to ensure the preservation of the school and the protection of the minority and how they would react to protests by a Muslim minority group demanding the same rights. This distinction is intentional, as we are interested in whether minority groups are granted such rights, in order to assess whether the rationale or decision is different for Muslims.

Table 4. Scenario 3: Principle of equality (minority rights).

Imagine that you and your party are part of the government. A national minority, which enjoys the protection of constitutional minority rights, operates a state-supported bilingual school. In addition to the Austrian/German language and culture, students are also taught the language as well as the cultural and religious traditions of their minority. The school is the only one left of its kind and essential for protecting the minority. However, declining enrolment means that running the school has become too expensive for the state. To continue financing the minority school, the state would have to reallocate significant resources from general schools, which would be politically unpopular within the majority population.

The fourth and last scenario is also devoted to the principle of equality and inclusive citizenship in particular (Table 5). The scenario involves an economic crisis that requires steep cuts in benefits. The population is politically polarised into two camps, one advocating benefits only for those born in the country with citizenship and the other advocating benefits for all insured regardless of nationality and citizenship. Respondents were asked which camp they would join and how they would justify their decisions to those protesting and the public.

Table 5. Scenario 4: Principle of equality (inclusive citizenship).

Imagine that you and your party are part of the government. As a result of a fundamental economic crisis, the social security funds are no longer able to maintain their benefits in their existing form. Extreme cuts in benefits are necessary while maintaining the same level of payments, which potentially increases the risk of political riots among the population. Only very limited resources are available in the state budget to top up insurance benefits and thus guarantee the basic needs of the insured. The population is highly polarised and divided into two camps advocating different solutions: The first camp promotes that benefits should only be available to Austrian/German citizens who were born in Austria/Germany and have only Austrian/German citizenship. The other camp demands that benefits should be available to all insured persons regardless of their nationality and citizenship.

Analytical Approach

For the analysis of the interviews, we used content-structuring qualitative content analysis, which is best suited to deriving categories inductively and deductively (Mayring 2019). Specifically, we used the principles of democracy as deductive categories. Accordingly, most categories existed before the data collection. However, an initial reading of the interviews showed that it would not be sufficient to distinguish between ‘approving’ and ‘rejecting’ passages. Therefore, we inductively added the category ‘neutral’ for each principle and then coded all interviews (the detailed codebook can be found in the Appendix). A single sentence was defined as the minimum coding unit (Mayring and Fenzl 2019, 636), which could also be enlarged depending on the context. This means that, depending on the context, several sentences or an entire response paragraph could also be coded. For instance, if a respondent clearly expressed their critical position towards minority rights within a single sentence, only the corresponding sentence was coded. However, if the perspective was explained in longer statements and the position only became clear when considering the entire paragraph, then the entire passage was coded.

After finalising the codebook, two researchers coded the interviews, with one coding the Austrian interviews and the other coding the German interviews. Throughout the coding process, we took several measures to ensure intercoder reliability. Due to the interpretative components of the procedure and the flexible coding units, there is, as usual for qualitative research (Cho and Trent 2020) a certain amount of leeway for the coders. In line with pertinent methodological literature (e.g. Flick 2005; Mayring and Fenzl 2019), we therefore did not calculate any reliability coefficients, as the goal is not complete agreement between coders. Instead, as proposed by Mayring and Fenzl (2019, 637) we selected two interviews (one from each case) that both coders coded independently. We then compared the coding decisions and discussed non-agreements. As a result of this discussion, we specified our general coding advice (e.g. clarification that individual passages can be assigned to several categories) and revised and extended our examples for each category. Finally, after revising and completing the coding, both coders checked each other's coding decisions.

Subsequently, we analysed the coded passages vertically (i.e. for both youth wings and one principle, to identify similarities and differences) and horizontally (i.e. for one youth wing and all principles, to assess the respective youth wings’ understanding of democracy). This enables us to identify overarching tendencies and individual or party-specific differences in the participants’ understanding of democracy.

How Populist Radical Right Youth Leaders View Democracy

Before turning to the specific dimensions, it is worth noting that interviewees generally recognised the selected democratic principles. More often, they supported it in general and tended to criticise the implementation of certain aspects of the principle in their respective political systems. Accordingly, most interview sections were coded as either approving or neutral, while rejecting passages were comparatively rare (see Table 6).

Table 6. Distribution of responses to the democratic principles.

	Approving			Neutral			Rejecting
	JA	RFJ	Total	JA	RFJ	Total	JA	RFJ	Total
civil liberties	4	6	10	5	9	14	0	0	0
independent media	4	0	4	3	6	9	1	2	3
rule of law	6	16	22	3	3	6	0	2	2
separation of powers	6	7	13	5	7	12	1	2	3
minority rights	1	2	3	5	5	10	6	12	18
inclusive citizenship	5	4	9	2	3	5	2	5	7
Total	26	35	61	23	33	56	10	23	33

Principle of Freedom (Civil Liberties and Independent Media)

We now turn to the analysis of our interviews, starting with the first vignette. In this scenario, respondents were asked how they would deal with a law against which mass protests have arisen. In general, both the RFJ and JA leaders displayed a strong commitment to upholding the law, considering it a pivotal project and an election promise even if mass protests were directed against it. Respondents from both youth wings emphasised their – democratically legitimised – claim to power: They argued that the law must be implemented despite the protests and that one should ‘never withdraw law’ (JA2). From their point of view, it is the government's responsibility towards their voters to deliver on election promises. Therefore, as the government, one needs ‘a certain toughness’ (JA2):

‘If it's the right thing to do, then of course that's what we were elected for it, and that may sound harsh, but you must take unpopular measures and get through it if it's important to you. If it doesn't escalate. (…) Basically, I'm a stickler for principles and would say that we should go through with it and hope that the situation will calm down.’ (JA3)

Thus, especially for the case of the JA, we note an a priori belief that only one’s political goals and ideas are the ‘right’ ones for society and the public interest. However, this is not necessarily an expression of anti-pluralistic attitudes but somewhat of a solid commitment to one’s pledges.

Notably, the RFJ and JA leaders did not criticise the (peaceful) mass protests but instead emphasised the right to freedom of expression and demonstration. At the same time, the protesters were discredited as a ‘supposed majority’ (RFJ3, JA3), who often represent only ‘a very loud and angry minority’ (RFJ5) from which the government should not allow itself to be blackmailed (RFJ1, RFJ3, RFJ4). JA interviewees also justified their argument by presuming the demonstrators to be predominantly a vocal minority ‘incited’ (JA3) by the media to create an anti-government atmosphere (JA1) deliberately. This had to be ‘endured’ (JA2) by the government. While respondents were not in favour of restricting civil liberties, they attributed a high degree of democratic legitimacy to the implementation of their political projects while attempting to delegitimise the concerns of the protesting majority. Most importantly, these statements also highlight the anti-democratic rhetoric by discrediting the actual majority and reconstituting them as a minority.

Although the RFJ and JA leaders wanted to uphold the right to demonstrate as a fundamental democratic principle, the commitment to a firm and proactive law and order policy became very clear when the protests turned violent. In this case, all respondents favoured cracking down on demonstrations ‘with the full force of the law’ (RFJ5, JA1, JA2).

Differences between JA and RFJ occur when asked how to defuse the conflict. During the interviews, RFJ leaders proposed forms of deliberation, such as discussions with protesters (RFJ1, RFJ2), public education (RFJ4), and parliamentary dialogue (RFJ3). However, for a final resolution of the conflict, ‘all democratic means could and should of course be exhausted’ (RFJ3) by initiating a referendum when the required quorum is reached. Thus, in addition to deliberative forms of dialogue, direct democratic means were also brought into play, partly because the respondents, thrust into the role of situational decision-makers, doubted that the demonstrators’ opinions represented a majority. Nevertheless, holding a referendum provided an alternative source of legitimacy for the government's actions outside the parliamentary framework.

The JA’s attitude toward discussion, deliberation, and direct democracy was less clear-cut than the RFJ. One of the respondents showed a willingness to take these ‘concerns to heart’ (JA4) if the protests became very widespread and the law ‘perhaps put lives at risk’ (JA4). Respondents could also imagine withdrawing the law if it proved ineffective (JA1, JA2). Another interviewee proposed calling for a referendum to legitimise the government's course of action (JA3). However, he also argued that the government would have to resign if a majority were to oppose the law. Notwithstanding this somewhat ambivalent attitude, most respondents remained resolute and ruled out the possibility of the government resigning. Instead, they considered it a ‘sign of weakness’ (JA2) and expressed ‘fear for democracy’ (JA1) if most of the population protested the law in a way that could potentially threaten the government. Importantly, this could also be interpreted as democratic perseverance, meaning respondents would not allow violent protesters to chase them out of office.

With regard to the role of the media, the answers of RFJ and JA leaders were again mostly similar. Concerning the independence of the media, the respondents saw the role of the media as crucial. However, while all respondents generally supported media freedom, they considered the media not independent and even hostile. On the one hand, the leaders regarded the press as inevitably motivated by party politics (RFJ3) and criticised their ‘political activist’ (JA1) coverage that would become a ‘catalyst’ (JA3) for the protests. On the other hand, the respondents advocated defusing the situation utilising their proactive information policy and an open approach to the media. One JA interviewee argued that ‘exchange and dialogue’ with the media were necessary to convey the advantages of the law proactively but also to ‘take the path of simply ensuring transparency’ (JA4). The representatives of the JA also relied on ‘communicating directly with the population bypassing the media’ (JA2), for example, via social media. In this context, the responses mentioned that the FPÖ was allegedly unfairly criticised by the press and its policies were deliberately misrepresented (RFJ2). JA interviewees even called for abolishing public broadcasting (JA1, JA4), which some interviewees claim is ‘dictated’ (JA3, similarly JA1) by politicians. For both youth wings, thus, a certain cynical attitude toward the free media became clear.

Principle of Control (Rule of Law and Separation of Powers)

In the second scenario, which involved a popular constitutional amendment being blocked by the Constitutional Court, the responses from both youth leaders were overarchingly marked by a general acceptance of the rule of law, yet differences in their approaches emerged. All RFJ leaders declared they would enforce the amendment if it had the appropriate majorities. On the other hand, the JA respondents unanimously argued that the Federal Constitutional Court ruling should be accepted because the separation of powers was regarded ‘the basis of [their] democracy’ (JA2). For all JA leaders, this was also the main argument they would use when communicating this decision to the public. Interviewees also suspected disregarding the court would lead to even more significant public criticism, given that the German Federal Constitutional Court enjoyed great prestige and public approval (JA1, JA3).

Nevertheless, the institution of the Constitutional Court was not questioned by any of the RFJ leaders. Accordingly, court decisions were to be respected regardless of whether they corresponded to one's own opinion (RFJ5), as this was considered ‘a fundamental element of the understanding of democracy’ (RFJ2).

‘Of course, I can't question the Constitutional Court as the highest instance of the judiciary in this country, as a truly fundamental institution in a constitutional state. Even if I don't like to accept it, but the Constitutional Court has absolute authority, of course, and if it decides that, then it must be obeyed, none of that helps.’ (RFJ2)

At the same time, the respondents also suggested how an already repealed law could be constitutional (RFJ1, RFJ5).

In general, no preferences became evident about challenging or undermining the rule of law or the separation of powers. Mainly among the RFJ, there was a consensus that such a move would undermine the separation of powers (RFJ1, RFJ2, RFJ3, RFJ4, RFJ5). Instead, it was suggested that there would always be ways of bringing such legislation into line with the constitution (RFJ1, RFJ5). Two JA respondents (JA2, JA4) also argued that the government should bring the legislation into line with the judgment by the court. However, two JA interviewees (JA3, JA1) indicated that they would possibly ignore the court, using their majority to change the constitution if the issue was of great relevance or if they perceived the court’s decision to be politically motivated. As one interviewee put it: ‘constitutions are not set in stone’ (JA3).

Moreover, JA interviewees were critical about the appointment of judges. These respondents sharply criticised that the judges of the German Constitutional Court were elected by the parliament (Bundestag) and the state chamber (Bundesrat), respectively (with a two-thirds majority). For the leaders interviewed, this implied, ‘in fact we have no separation of powers, because the constitutional judges are appointed by the political majority’ (JA1). There was disagreement on how they would deal with the government’s nomination of judges. Some respondents could imagine maintaining this procedure: ‘it doesn't correspond to the ideal, but that's the way political realities are, they don't always correspond to the ideal. And then maybe it's naïve to say, no, I won't do it’ (JA3). It would be ‘normal’ (JA2) to elect politically close judges (JA2). By contrast, another interviewee rejected that and proposed the direct election of judges instead (JA1).

In comparison, the RFJ interviewees again preferred direct democratic means, such as launching a referendum, which the Constitutional Court should not simply overturn in the case of an affirmative vote. Accordingly, ‘Constitutions are not set in stone’ (RFJ2), and ‘if the Austrian people expressed their support for a Constitutional amendment by direct democratic means, I would also go through with it, even after reservations by a Constitutional Court or despite reservations by a Constitutional Court’ (RFJ4). This underscores the RFJ’s preference for direct democracy, especially if the population supports the respective law and the possibility of using this procedure to legitimise constitutional amendments in the long term.

In summary, the RFJ and JA leaders again demonstrated a commitment to democratic principles and respecting the courts. However, interviewees from both youth wings also suggested ways to ‘bypass’ the court's rulings. The JA also partially doubts the ‘correct’ implementation of these democratic principles.

Principle of Equality (Minority Rights)

In the third scenario, a minority that enjoys the protection of constitutional minority rights needs financial support to continue operating a state-supported bilingual school. RFJ and JA leaders’ responses revealed varying attitudes concerning protecting minority rights. The respondents agreed that the majority should not be disadvantaged or ‘suffer at the expense of the minority’ (RFJ1). The JA interviewees agree that the majority's interests ‘take precedence’ (JA1, JA2, JA4), especially when the minority is already ‘in decline’ (JA2), as the decreasing demand for schools in this scenario suggested to the interviewee. Thus, the interviewee does not see the weakness of the minority as a reason to protect it but as an additional affirmation that one should act in the interest of the majority. RFJ interviewees suggested either limiting school operations or closing the school altogether because while it is ‘nice to have’ a ‘minority school’ (RFJ4) and they have to decide for themselves how to deal with the limited funding available, but they have to realise that ‘in the end, they are the minority’ (RFJ2). It was pointed out that there are constitutional rights for national minorities that are already sufficient and do not need to be expanded (RFJ1, RFJ2). If financial resources had to be reallocated due to decreasing demand, it was unacceptable that this should happen at the expense of the majority population (RFJ1). The minority would have to integrate with the majority population. Thus, a clear preference was expressed against minority rights in the sense that the minority had to make do with ‘the freedoms that are possible under the constitution’ (RFJ2) and should realise that segregation is detrimental to integration (RFJ4).

‘Well, I would say to the minority, you are in Austria, you enjoy security, freedom, and the rule of law here. But in return you must fit into our society socio-politically, after all you are part of it and live here and enjoy all the advantages that you have in Austria.’ (RFJ4)

The leaders interviewed also feared that children in bilingual schools would not learn enough German (JA1, JA4) and even segregate themselves from society because only public schools put an ‘emphasis on integration’ (JA4). Generally, any minority must ‘adapt to the majority’, because ‘it cannot be that we give up everything because we want to please everyone’ (JA1). This is understood as a quid pro quo for an immigrant to enjoy the benefits of the welfare state (JA1). However, the attitude of the JA toward minority rights was less uniform than that of the RFJ. One interviewee argued that minority rights generally contradicted the principle of equal treatment and should thus be abolished:

‘And I think anyway, even there, I come from the libertarian corner, that there shouldn't be such a thing, that the influence of the state should be minimal, so I'm just ideologically convinced that minority rights should be dismantled or that there should be no such thing at all.’ (JA3)

Other interviewees thought about compromise solutions without generally questioning minority rights. For example, they proposed that children could learn their minority`s language as part of an expanded curriculum in public schools (JA2, JA4). Interviewees repeatedly mentioned the private sector: They are in favour of private schools playing a role in this question (JA2) or associations conveying the minority culture (JA4) and relying on other ‘private initiatives’ (JA3). This can be implemented by minorities, especially religious ones (JA2), provided sufficient demand exists because there should be no government funding (JA3, JA4).

However, RFJ and JA show different approaches when comparing an ethnic minority with a religious minority such as Muslims. Among RFJ leaders, there was a clear preference not to treat Muslims equally but to demand strict integration. While constitutional rights were still acknowledged for national minorities, these same minority rights were not to be granted to Muslims, and thus any segregation was unanimously rejected. The political and cultural legacy ostensibly informed these more favourable views toward traditional ethnic groups of autochthonous ethnic minorities in Austria, such as the Slovenes and Croats (RFJ2, RFJ3). By contrast, the Muslim minority was perceived as entirely foreign and having immigrated only in recent years (RFJ4). They were expected to integrate into Austrian culture and the Austrian value system (RFJ5), for which learning the language and customs was considered important. Accordingly, ‘anyone who comes to Austria, because they want to live here, must also adapt to our traditions and values’ (RFJ1). While Muslims should be granted the right and ‘opportunity to practice their religion’ (RFJ4), the preference of the RFJ is that this should be done in private. Any further expansion of minority rights would, in their eyes, promote the creation of a ‘parallel society’ that would ‘divide the people’ (RFJ4).

The JA leaders, in contrast, were partly more eager to avoid ‘direct criticism of Islam’ (JA3). They also explained that their preference for private initiatives for securing minority rights also applies to members of the Muslim minority, if they ‘do not pose a threat’ (JA3) to society. Nonetheless, schools for the Muslim minority are partly perceived as more problematic than bilingual schools for other minorities. Since ‘Islam is not part of our culture’ (JA3), these schools may hinder integration: ‘You have to see which ethnic groups are less integrated here; these are frankly often the Muslims’ (JA4). Others argue that one cannot ‘pick a favorite minority’ (JA1) and thus must treat all minorities equally, for example, by principally allowing public schools to offer ‘Muslim education’ (JA2). In the respondents’ view, however, this invariably meant that minorities must adapt to the ‘historically grown’ (JA1) majority.

In summary, the RFJ and JA leaders shared the view that the interests of the majority should be prioritised and that strict integration was essential. However, differences occurred concerning the consequence and consistency of this opinion. On the one hand, all RFJ leaders were clear about their rejection of minority rights, especially regarding the Muslim minority. On the other hand, the responses of the JA interviewees showed more variety, ranging from a general rejection of minority rights to their general acceptance. Moreover, they made fewer differences between national and Muslim minorities.

Principle of Equality (Inclusive Citizenship)

In the last scenario, we were interested in respondents’ views on whether social benefits should be reserved for Austrians/Germans only or available for all persons who obtained social insurance in Austria/Germany by working or being dependent family members. Here, the outcome was divided within and between the two youth wings. While some critical voices suggested that social benefits should also include foreigners, most RFJ leaders preferred making benefits available only to persons with Austrian citizenship. This perspective was less common among the JA leaders, who all started from their self-perception as ‘advocates of the achievement principle’ (JA1). Assuming that ‘their livelihoods contribute the most to the economy’ (JA4), one respondent would give priority to Germans in terms of social welfare, which, however, ‘does not mean that there is no room for people with a migration background’ (JA4). Other interviewees did not limit the performance-based criteria for acquiring welfare benefits to those with German citizenship. Regardless of nationality, ‘if someone has paid in, then he has the right to get the benefit out. Full stop’ (JA2). Making cuts according to nationality would not be ‘fair’ (JA1). The option of receiving social welfare might even be an ‘incentive for immigrants to do something positive’ (JA3).

However, as all RFJ leaders, some JA leaders raised concerns that people wanted to ‘immigrate into the social systems’ (RFJ1), which was seen as an ‘abuse’ (JA2) of the welfare state and constituted a frequent lament on the political right. There, the Austrian/German social welfare system is viewed as a pull factor for immigrants from poorer countries. For the interviewees, it was utterly unacceptable that people immigrate to Austria/Germany only to profit from the welfare system while not contributing to it in return (RFJ3, RFJ4). As a result, RFJ and JA leaders want to maintain substantial barriers to acquiring citizenship. They argued that the Austrian state has a clear obligation to its citizens for only they have cultural ties and, thus loyalty to the country. Although Austrian citizens should be given preferential treatment, the RFJ leaders do not want to deny these rights to other EU citizens (RFJ3).

JA respondents, too, favoured policies that made it ‘very difficult to get into this social welfare system’ (JA3) and wanted to ensure ‘that only German citizens pay in’ (JA2), as only those should receive benefits who have paid in. These considerations range from linking work permissions to citizenship (JA2) to ‘driving immigration to zero and deporting en masse’ (JA3) and then restarting it with stricter criteria for immigration. Although most JA respondents initially indicated that they would not give preference to persons with German citizenship, interviewees favoured changing immigration law so that foreigners would rarely benefit from the German welfare system.

Thus, notwithstanding slight differences, both RFJ and JA preferred restricting access to the social welfare system to Austrian/German citizens and expressed fears regarding abuse of the social welfare system. Taken together, the scenarios on minority rights and inclusive citizenship highlight that both RFJ and JA leaders restrict their egalitarian understanding of democracy to German/Austrian national majority members.

Discussion and Conclusion

This study aimed to explore the understanding of democracy among leaders of the populist radical right youth wings in Austria and Germany. We used a vignette technique embedded in qualitative semi-structured expert interviews to simulate governmental decision-making in resolving specific political situations, with scenarios carefully selected to reflect the democratic principles of freedom, control, and equality. While there was variation in responses within and between groups of respondents, both groups of leaders generally showed respect for democratic principles when presented as general principles such as fundamental freedoms and emphasised the importance of the rule of law and the separation of powers. This nuanced finding also aligns with previous research that examines understandings of democracy among populist (radical right) voters and sympathisers (e.g. van der Brug et al. 2021, Rovira Kaltwasser and Van Hauwaert 2020). However, the respondents were more skeptical about the actual functioning of democratic institutions, especially when principles conflicted and a resolution was required. For example, the courts were seen as compromised by politically motivated judges and partisan appointments, the media were regarded as politically hostile to the respondents’ parties, and stood accused of fomenting protests against a populist radical right government. Although there was general support for maintaining the democratic rules of the game, several interviewees also considered majoritarian approaches such as referendums or amendments of the constitution through a supermajority as viable solutions.

Respondents suggested using the full force of the law in the face of violent protests as a forceful counter-reaction. They emphasised the importance of governments being capable of acting forcefully or smartly to avoid appearing weak. Interestingly, the leaders of both youth wings did not seem interested in showing responsiveness to popular positions as opposed to their preferences but rather pushed on with their agenda. While respondents were generally skeptical of the current implementation of liberal democratic institutions, we did not find a fundamental rejection of such principles that undergird the current regime. Therefore, although an outright rejection of liberal democracy was not evident, we could detect a certain level of skepticism about the workings of liberal democracy and an openness to alternative modes of decision-making.

Regarding an inclusive or exclusive understanding of citizenship, both RFJ and JA showed a majoritarian understanding of democracy, especially when minority rights conflicted with majority sentiments. However, respondents reacted differently. While several respected minority rights in principle, they were nonetheless consistently least supportive whenever minority needs conflicted with majority interests. The most exclusionary understanding of democracy was concerning the Muslim minority and immigrant rights. Representatives of both youth organisations generally showed little willingness to compromise with minorities, with some questioning the need for their separate protection. Muslims and immigrants were viewed mainly as problems that did not deserve special consideration. However, some representatives emphasised the merit principle, arguing that people without citizenship should also receive benefits provided they have paid into the system.

Overall, the understanding of democracy that emerged in our interviews contains majoritarian and anti-egalitarian aspects that, while not per se leading to an apparent rejection of the liberal principles of democracy, would at least indirectly curtail them: Media and citizens who question the government must be overcome, direct democratic means are seen as alternative decision-making venue in conflictual but resolvable situations, minorities must adapt because the will of the majority always takes precedence, and too much diversity is seen as a danger to the stability of democracy. The findings concerning the youth wing leaders’ understanding of democracy are thus broadly in line with what the literature suggests about populist radical right parties in Europe (Mudde 2017, 56). In part, the existing liberal-democratic framework is seen as potentially hostile to their agenda and viewed with a degree of mistrust. Popular sovereignty and the majority principle are recognised, but a homogenising understanding of people and nations puts minorities under exclusionary pressure.

Since the similarities in the responses of RFJ and JA respondents predominate, it seems that a populist radical right party's understanding of democracy is independent of the constitutionally defined democratic framework, as we found no evidence that respondents from Germany reacted differently than respondents from Austria, where the constitutional approach to democracy is more functionalist. To assess the answers from the ranks of the JA and RFJ even more precisely, it would be helpful to replicate the study by presenting the same scenarios to functionaries from youth wings of other parties in Austria and Germany and compare them with the answers from the JA and RFJ. Moreover, replicating the interviews with larger samples and extending them to other national settings would be important to minimise selection effects and enable cross-country comparisons. To this end, the vignettes need to be revised and improved in order to capture the understanding of democracy independently of party’s ideology and to be applicable to different contexts.

Our vignettes represent an innovative attempt to use scenario-based interviews to engage with politicians who are often reluctant to work with mainstream media and academia. However, it also comes with limitations that are important to acknowledge. Our interview technique is of course not unique in capturing the genuine understanding of democracy of the youth leaders. Investigating their concepts remained inferential and interpretative. Moreover, due to the complexity of the concept in question, the vignettes were often quite complex, and several participants had to inquire to understand the scenarios. Finally, while the vignettes did an excellent job in stimulating detailed and coherent answers, social desirability could have played a certain role. This might also be one reason for the observation that our respondents showed respect for most of the democratic principles, at least in theory.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Luise Anter

Luise Anter is a Research Associate at the Institute of Media and Communication at Technische Universität Dresden.

Uwe Backes

Uwe Backes is Deputy Director and Adjunct Professor at the Hannah Arendt Institute for Totalitarianism Studies at Technische Universität Dresden.

Reinhard Heinisch

Reinhard Heinisch is Professor of Political Science at the Department of Political Science at the University of Salzburg.

Steffen Kailitz

Steffen Kailitz is an Academic Researcher at the Hannah Arendt Institute for Totalitarianism Studies at Technische Universität Dresden.

Carsten Wegscheider

Carsten Wegscheider is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Department of Political Science at the University of Münster.

Notes

1 As we have assured the interviewees anonymity, we cannot provide an individual attribution of characteristics that would otherwise allow unique identification. This concerns in particular the roles that the interviewees take on in the youth organisations. However, in the case of both the RFJ and the JA, these were leaders and members of executive boards in national bodies.

2 Please contact the corresponding author for the original German version of the questionnaires.

3 We would like to thank Susanne Pickel, who developed a first version of these vignettes in 2014 to investigate the understanding of democracy of political elites in Slovenia and Romania.

4 The reviewers noted that the exact wording of the vignettes and questions sometimes contained complicated and value-laden terms and cues that could affect the responses and thus their interpretations. While we acknowledge this criticism and discuss this challenge further in the conclusion, we believe that references to policies and public opinion are essential to the context of the scenarios in order to develop realistic political situations. Furthermore, given that the questions relate specifically to democratic principles and not policies, we believe that respondents understood the scenarios as intended.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Scenarios and Questionnaire in English

Preface:

In the following, I will confront you with four political scenarios as they could happen in the real world in this or a similar way. Please tell me how you would react and behave in the different situations.

Freedom (civil liberties and independent media):

Vignette: Imagine that you and your party are part of the government. The government has just passed a law, which was a core project and election promise of your party during the campaign. The law is rejected by the majority of the population. In many cities across the country, thousands of citizens are protesting against the law passed by the government. After several days of protests and failed negotiations, the protesters demand that the government resign. As the daily mass demonstrations continue and international media interest grows, some angry demonstrators begin to camp outside the government building, but the protests remain largely peaceful. There are the following options: The government sticks to the law, remains in office and tries to pacify the protests, or the government gives in to the protests and repeals the law.

Opening question: What would you do in this situation?

Follow-up question #1: What measures would you take to pacify the protests?

Follow-up question #2: Under what conditions should the government uphold the law and when should they just give in to the protests and repeal the law?

Follow-up question #3: Under what conditions should the government resign?

Follow-up question #4: What would you do if the protests turn violent?

Cooling-down question: What role do you think the media play in such protests and how would you deal with the media?

Control (the rule of law and separation of powers):

Vignette: Imagine that you and your party are part of the government. The government has a supermajority in the Austrian Nationalrat/German Bundestag and passes a constitutional amendment which, according to your observation, also enjoys broad public support. Yet, the constitutional court decides that the amendment is not compatible with the constitution. Your coalition partner then proposes a two-point plan: First, the constitutional amendment should continue to be implemented and the ruling of the constitutional court should be ignored on the grounds that this constitutes an unacceptable encroachment on the competences of the government. Second, in order to prevent further confrontations with the constitutional court, some of the judges at the constitutional court are to be replaced by judges close to the government’s political views.

Opening question: What would you do in this situation?

Follow-up question #1: Under what conditions would you accept the decision of the constitutional court and cancel the constitutional amendment?

Follow-up question #2: Under what circumstances would you use the government’s supermajority in parliament to uphold the constitutional amendment?

Follow-up question #3: Under what circumstances would you intervene in the nomination of the judges of the constitutional court?

Cooling-down question: How would you justify your decision to the population, which shows broad support for the law?

Equality (minority rights):

Vignette: Imagine that you and your party are part of the government. A national minority, which enjoys the protection of constitutional minority rights, operates a state-supported bilingual school. In addition to the Austrian/German language and culture, students are also taught the language as well as the cultural and religious traditions of their minority. The school is the only one left of its kind and essential for protecting the minority. However, declining enrolment means that running the school has become too expensive for the state. To continue financing the minority school, the state would have to reallocate significant resources from general schools, which would be politically unpopular within the majority population.

Opening question: What would you do in this situation?

Follow-up question #1: What measures would you take to ensure the maintenance of the school and thus the protection of the minority?

Follow-up question #2: Under what conditions should the school be closed?

Follow-up question #3: There are strong protests from the Muslim minority to get the same rights as the national minority and to run a state-supported bilingual school. How would you react to this?

Cooling-down question: How would you justify your decisions to the minorities and to the majority population?

Equality (inclusive citizenship)

Vignette: Imagine that you and your party are part of the government. As a result of a fundamental economic crisis, the social security funds are no longer able to maintain their benefits in their existing form. Extreme cuts in benefits are necessary while maintaining the same level of payments, which potentially increases the risk of political riots among the population. Only very limited resources are available in the state budget to top up insurance benefits and thus guarantee the basic needs of the insured. The population is highly polarised and divided into two camps advocating different solutions: The first camp promotes that benefits should only be available to Austrian/German citizens who were born in Austria/Germany and have only Austrian/German citizenship. The other camp demands that benefits should be available to all insured persons regardless of their nationality and citizenship.

Opening question: What would you do in this situation?

Follow-up question #1: Would you try to distribute the scarce financial resources for the benefit of the autochthonous Austrian/German population, or would you provide the benefits regardless of citizenship and nationality?

Follow-up-question #2: How would you justify your decision to the protesting camps and the population in general?

Appendix 2: Codebook for the Interviews

General coding advice

• The goal is to code as much as possible and as little as necessary. This means that the coded text must be comprehensible without context. It is therefore possible to code only single sentences (minimal coding unit) as well as to extend the coding to an entire response paragraph.

• It is not necessary to code the whole interview. Passages that do not refer to any of the principles can remain uncoded.

• Passages are coded as to whether they are disapproving, ambivalent or approving the respective principle:

  • o Disapproving: Interviewee rejects/argues against the respective principle and/or uses examples that reveal a critical attitude.

  • o Neutral: Interviewee does not commit to a clear stance on the principle - e.g. by endorsing the principle in general but criticising the specific implementation or reflecting on case-specific exceptions.

  • o Approving: Interviewee endorses/argues in favour of the respective principle and/or uses examples that reveal a positive attitude.

• Individual passages can be assigned to several categories (e.g. if a passage is in general supportive of a principle but disapproves of its current implementation).

• Reference to the principles can be both direct (i.e. interviewee directly mentions principle) and indirect (i.e. interviewee does not mention the respective principle, but their answers and the examples they use refer to one of the principles). Consequently, the coded passages for a category may come from responses to all vignettes - for example, as participants address the role of free media in different scenarios.

Coding Categories

1. Protection of civil liberties

Is coded if the passage refers to the protection of civil liberties, e.g. if there should (not) be freedom of speech, freedom of protest, freedom of cooperation, religion, science, or freedom from politically motivated persecution. This category is also coded if the interviewee describes or comments on current (non-)protection of civil liberties as (s)he perceives it in their home country or elsewhere.

Examples

• Disapproving: (not coded)

• Neutral: ‘First of all, I believe that mass demonstrations very often claim to represent the real majority. This is not always the case in my political experience. On the contrary, it is often a very loud and angry minority, so I am critical of this.’ (RFJ5); ‘The stupidest thing in communication is always when you take action against the demonstrators, you wouldn't do that. I would probably rephrase it a bit: Quasi, approach the people or show that you are willing to communicate, but never take out the law.’ (JA2)

• Approving: ‘If there is no reason for it, if a government in Austria tries, as I said, to curtail the constitutionally given fundamental rights and freedoms or to install a surveillance state, then for me that would be a reason why a government has to go, because that contradicts our constitution, and if a government acts contrary to the constitution in general, then it also has to go.’ (RFJ4); ‘Everyone has a right to demonstrate, but no one has a right to become violent and to riot and destroy other people's belongings.’ (JA4)

2. Independent media

Is coded if the passage refers to independent media, e.g. if outlets should (not) be/are (not) free from political constraints, free to air diverse political views, and able to reach the citizenry. This category is also coded if the interviewee describes or comments on current (in-)dependency of media as (s)he perceives it in their home country or elsewhere.

Examples

• Disapproving: ‘The role of the media is certainly a very, very big one and it is one of the big weaknesses of the FPÖ or of the things that are negative for us that the great mass of the media are politically very far left and therefore use every opportunity to criticize us and to interpret things negatively.’ (RFJ3)

• Neutral: ‘Of course, the media always play a very, very important role because they can push certain topics or exclude certain people and groups from the discourse. That's why I see the function of the media as very, very important, especially in such scenarios, because on the one hand they could calm the situation, but on the other hand they could also heat up the atmosphere.’ (RFJ2); ‘(…) the media are free, they have to decide for themselves what headlines they put in. But well, I expect neutral reporting from public broadcasting and not political-activist reporting.’ (JA1)

• Approving: ‘I would somehow be far from dictating to the media what they have to write or not write. Or not to write, that's actually quite far from my mind, that idea.’ (JA3); ‘the media are free, they have to decide for themselves what headlines they put in. (…) We have free media, that's also right, that is all guaranteed by the constitution, so I can only express my opinion, I can say I don't like it. I have no other option, I can only appeal to morality.’ (JA1)

3. Rule of law

Is coded if the interviewee refers to the rule of law, i.e. whether all citizens and institutions including (executive) political actors the executive (and persons and agencies under his/her control) should be/are accountable to the same law, as defined by the constitution, treaties, statutes, and as interpreted by the judiciary limited government. This category is also coded if the interviewee describes or comments on the current implementation or effectiveness of the rule of law as (s)he perceives it in their home country or elsewhere.

Examples

• Disapproving: ‘Well, if I have a majority in the Austrian National Council that amends the constitution, then I can amend the constitution, and the Constitutional Court can't say anything against it if I amend the constitution.’ (RFJ2)

• Neutral: ‘If the government has a majority to change the constitution, a supermajority, why should the constitutional court even deal with it afterwards? […] But a supermajority of the national council simply changes the constitution, and that no longer needs to be reviewed.’ (RFJ3); ‘if a law is right, then you have to enforce it. The past has already proven that public mood can also tip in the other direction and that, let's say, a mood can also be deliberately fanned by demonstrators (…) if I am inwardly convinced that it is right, then I would stick to it.’ (JA1)

• Approving: ‘A law must always conform to the constitution. If the law is in conformity with the constitution and, as I said, is supported by a majority in parliament and even then, I really must say, was one of the election promises, then the people enjoys the protection of confidence that the people can trust that even in spite of protests they will stick to their line because they were elected for that line.’ (RFJ5)

4. Separation of powers

Is coded if the interviewee refers to the separation of powers, e.g. if there should (not) be multiple veto points, legislative power, judicial review, judicial liberty and horizontal accountability, that is, effective checks on rulers. This category is also coded if the interviewee describes or comments on current implementation or effectiveness of the separation of powers as (s)he perceives it in their home country or elsewhere.

Examples

• Disapproving: ‘I would ask the Austrian people. I would initiate a referendum as a government, especially if I as a government have the majority to amend the constitution, I would hold a referendum and let the Austrian people decide by direct democratic means, and if the Austrian people expresses its support for the constitutional amendment by direct democratic means, I would also go through with it, even after reservations by a constitutional court or despite reservations by a constitutional court.’ (RFJ4)

• Neutral: ‘Constitutions are not set in stone. They are also, to put it simply, rules of the game that a society sets for itself, the supreme rules of the constitution. But that does not mean that the rules cannot be changed if a large majority of the population and the people in a country want to do so.’ (RFJ2)

• Approving: ‘You have to believe in the separation of powers, that's the basis of our democracy and you have to guarantee that. (…) we have a separation of powers, we have the judiciary here that says something different, and then you have to accept that. You have to explain it to the majority behind it.’ (JA2)

5. Minority rights

Is coded if the interviewee refers to whether civil liberties, participation, representation, protection, and politically relevant resources should (not) be equally guaranteed for minorities and if there should (not) be any additional rights and rules regarding minorities, such as quota. This category is also coded if the interviewee describes or comments on current existence of minority rights as (s)he perceives it in their home country or elsewhere.

Examples

• Disapproving: ‘I believe that constitutional minority protections do not attach to a school.’ (RFJ2); ‘I think anyway, even there, I come from the libertarian corner, that there shouldn't be such a thing, that the influence of the state should be minimal, so I'm just ideologically convinced that minority rights should be dismantled or that there should be no such thing at all.’ (JA3)

• Neutral: ‘So public schools they can open as they like, where they can then also offer Muslim education as they like. But a religious school should not be supported by the state, the state should remain secular.’ (JA2)

• Approving: ‘So the minority rights would in any case be preserved or must be preserved, because they are constitutionally given and guaranteed, I would not change that.’ (RFJ4)

6. Inclusive citizenship

Is coded if the interviewee refers to whether all citizens and permanent residents should (not) enjoy the protections of the law. This category is also coded if the interviewee describes or comments on current implementation or effectiveness of inclusive citizenship as (s)he perceives it in their home country or elsewhere.

Examples

• Disapproving: ‘(…) the Austrian state has a very clear primary duty to its own citizens and this duty must be worked off and after the duty comes the voluntary part, and when the duty is done one can also take care of other matters.’ (RFJ5)

• Neutral: ‘I believe, as I said, that the first criterion is to have citizenship or that of another EU member state, then in Austria you have certain benefits in any case, and then the third country nationals who have already paid into the system. In other words, the distinction is made between those who have come here and have actually done something for this system and those who have come here and have never paid anything into the system.’ (RFJ3)

• Approving: ‘I'll be blunt and say that I don't care whether Germans, Russians or Poles have paid into the system, I don't care, everyone who has paid into the social security system should have a corresponding claim.’ (JA1)