ABSTRACT
To understand the effects of war on the diplomatic practices of nonstate actors, this article focuses on the wartime diplomacy efforts of Ukrainian think tank experts in the aftermath of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. Drawing on the concept of think tank diplomacy, the study specifically examines how Ukrainian think tankers adapted their diplomacy functions – negotiation, communication, information-gathering and promotion of friendly relations with other countries – under the conditions of the full-out war. The analysis combines insights from existing studies with the authors’ participant observation and original reflexive expert interviews with Ukrainian think tankers. The article reveals how Ukrainian expert professionals, unified by the goal of generating and maintaining international support for their country, adapted their diplomatic practices for asserting greater control over their agendas, engaging in cross-border collaborations and broadening their outreach efforts. By shedding light on the work of Ukrainian think tank experts in times of war, this article showcases the agency of knowledge-producing nonstate actors in wartime diplomacy.
Introduction
How does diplomacy work in times of war? What are the main aims, functions and instruments of actors involved in wartime diplomacy? How do diplomatic practices change with conflict escalation and the breakout of violence? These questions are commonly studied from a state-centred perspective, whereby diplomacy is linked to state power and theorised as either a national asset (along with other, more material capabilities) or a way to moderate the unrestricted use of power by sovereign states (Jönsson Citation2022). Furthermore, studies of wartime diplomacy often centre on belligerents’ negotiations over potential peace settlements with a focus on states, states’ leaders and their agents (professional diplomats) as the main actors involved in the conduct of wartime diplomacy (e.g. Mastro Citation2019, Min Citation2020, Citation2022). However, these actors are not the only ones exercising diplomatic functions in times of war, and not all of these functions are related to peace talks.
To understand the effects of war on diplomatic practices, this article zooms in on think tank–affiliated expert professionals as diplomatic actors in their own right. In a case study of Ukraine’s expert diplomacy, we explore the changes in think tankers’ diplomatic functions, including negotiation, communication, information-gathering and promotion of friendly international relations (cf. Conley Tyler et al. Citation2017), in the aftermath of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. In doing so, we seek to contribute to the literature on diplomacy, expert communities and Ukraine in the following ways. First, we connect the largely separate scholarly discussions of wartime diplomacy and expert diplomacy by examining the practices of think tanks and expert professionals as diplomatic actors in the context of active warfare. Second, we shift the researchers’ gaze away from the great power politics and state actors in wartime diplomacy to demonstrate the importance of expert communities in Ukraine’s collective diplomacy efforts in the face of external aggression.
In the last two decades, the role of think tanks and expert professionals as knowledge agents in foreign policy and global governance as well as their engagement in “parallel diplomacy” have attracted increasing scholarly attention (e.g. Kuus Citation2014, Conley Tyler et al. Citation2017, Kostić Citation2017, Stone Citation2017, Citation2019, Gani Citation2022). However, this scholarship is dissociated from the research on wartime diplomacy, which has traditionally been preoccupied with “great powers”, their alliances and their strategies of waging and ending wars (Stephanson Citation2001, Hendrickson Citation2006, Murray et al. Citation2011). Moreover, the existing studies on experts’ role in foreign policy, global governance and practical geopolitics largely focus on North American and Western European contexts as well as on established transnational think tanks that originated in the Global North. Similar investigations concentrating on other world regions are relatively rare (e.g. Vendil Pallin and Oxenstierna Citation2017, Menegazzi Citation2021), and studies on contemporary think tanks’ engagement in diplomacy as a social practice in countries that are in the state of war or have experienced foreign invasion are – to the best of our knowledge – non-existent. This article addresses this gap by examining how Ukrainian think tanks and the experts affiliated with them have adapted their diplomacy functions in the face of the full-scale war. Drawing on the concept of think tank diplomacy (Conley Tyler et al. Citation2017) and an original set of reflexive expert interviews with Ukrainian think tankers, we demonstrate how Ukrainian experts have unified with a shared agenda and a cohesive voice to effectively communicate their cause, garnering international support for Ukraine’s resistance.
Ukraine, along with Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan – the six countries constituting the “shared neighbourhood” between the European Union (EU) and Russia – has long been regarded by scholars as “an economic and diplomatic battlefield” (Löwenhardt Citation2005, p. 7) and an object of geopolitical competition between the two powers (Amaro Dias Citation2013, Haukkala Citation2015). Although these scholars were right in suggesting that this competition bore severe security risks (cf. Gower and Timmins Citation2009), their EU-and-Russia–centric lenses largely omitted the agency of state and nonstate actors who – as Löwenhardt (Citation2005) put it – were “stuck in the middle”. Critical of this omission, this article, as part of the special section “New Political Agency in Eastern Europe” in this journal, aligns with the growing body of literature that seeks to redirect scholarly attention from Russia and the EU as “the major regional powers” to the agency of political and societal actors in Eastern Europe and particularly in Ukraine (e.g. Axyonova et al. Citation2018, Hendl et al. Citation2023, Kurnyshova Citation2023, Mälksoo Citation2023, Kyselova and Axyonova Citation2024). Our contribution to this body of literature lies in shedding light on the changing character of Ukrainian nonstate actors as diplomacy agents, ready to claim epistemic authority in times of war.
Think tanks and think tankers in diplomacy: a conceptual lens
In international relations, diplomacy can be broadly defined as “a form of mediated exchange amongst polities”, aiming to promote certain interests and influence other actors and events in the international system (Garsten and Sörbom Citation2023, p. 99; cf. Neumann Citation2012, Trager Citation2016). Historically, diplomacy was seen as the prerogative of states and the actors formally representing these states (e.g. Satow Citation1922), which is also reflected in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. However, more recent studies suggest that a plethora of other actors, including public intellectuals, scientists, artists, diaspora members and transnational expert groups, can perform diplomatic functions informally (Kelley Citation2014, Gregory Citation2016, Desmoulins and Rondot Citation2018, Stone and Douglas Citation2018, Hasić and Karabegović Citation2020, Popkova Citation2020, Garsten and Sörbom Citation2023). National think tanks and the expert professionals affiliated with them complement this list (Conley Tyler et al. Citation2017).
Although the concept of “think tanks” may be “fuzzy, mutable and contentious” (Medvetz Citation2012, p. 23), most scholars studying them would agree that these are organisations pursuing policy-oriented research and offering advice to policymakers (cf. McGann Citation2007, Stone Citation2013, Abelson Citation2018). Traditionally seen as analytical powerhouses, think tanks may also perform a range of functions that go beyond policy research and the generation of policy solutions (McGann Citation2016, Allern and Pollack Citation2020, Jezierska and Giusti Citation2021). They may develop comprehensive narratives that shape policy agendas and public discourses, monitor reform processes, channel intellectual resources to actors beyond the policymaking domain, including mass media, offer platforms for the exchange of ideas and policy debates between various actors (e.g. politicians, academics and business groups), explain complex (geo)political, economic and social phenomena to the broader public, legitimise (or challenge) certain policy decisions and decision-makers, and engage in public and elite education. Central to these functions are the concepts of think tanks as “knowledge generators”, who produce original policy-related knowledge, and “knowledge brokers”, who link different knowledge pools and transfer knowledge between the fields (in the Bourdieusian sense) where this knowledge is produced and those where it is in demand (cf. Meyer Citation2010, Conley Tyler et al. Citation2016).
Putting forward the concept of “think tank diplomacy”, Conley Tyler et al. (Citation2017) extend the above list of think tank functions and suggest that these organisations can also be involved in diplomatic activities. The authors particularly distinguish between four main functions of think tanks in diplomacy: negotiation, communication, information-gathering and promotion of friendly relations. These functions can be performed by think tanks directly, when they themselves are engaged in diplomacy, or indirectly, when they exercise these functions by supporting states and their formal representatives (e.g. government officials and professional diplomats) through further education and training (Conley Tyler et al. Citation2017, pp. 26–27).
Thus, think tanks’ direct involvement in diplomatic negotiations entails “providing inputs as advisors before and during negotiations”, whereas their indirect involvement runs down to offering negotiation trainings and workshops to diplomats (Conley Tyler et al. Citation2017, p. 26). The communication function directly exercised by think tanks comes close to what is commonly understood as “public diplomacy” (Nye Citation2008). It suggests targeting foreign audiences, for instance, through outreach activities, including publications, engagement with media and participation in public events, with the aim of influencing and attracting the publics of other countries. The communication function indirectly exercised by think tanks includes formal training or coaching in communication techniques offered by think tankers to diplomats or preparing a manual on how to conduct public diplomacy. The information-gathering function entails witnessing, collecting and reporting specialised information, ranging from confidential intelligence to open-access statistical data (when exercised directly), or building the information-gathering capacities of government agents and future policy experts (when exercised indirectly). Finally, think tanks can directly promote friendly relations between states by providing “a forum for officials to engage with each other and discuss issues openly” – that is, by offering a “safe space” for exchange; or they can provide advice to states on how they can improve their relations and thus indirectly contribute to the cultivation of friendly inter-state relations (Conley Tyler et al. Citation2017, p. 26).
As admitted by Conley Tyler et al. (Citation2017), the boundaries between these categories of functions can be blurred, and, in practice, think tanks can concurrently exercise several diplomacy functions. Nevertheless, the approach by Conley Tyler et al. (Citation2017) offers a useful conceptual framework for our study because it focuses specifically on think tanks as diplomacy actors and allows us to account for a broad spectrum of think tanks’ activities in the diplomatic field, including those that go beyond the public domain. In addition, this approach emphasises the changing character of diplomatic encounters, the variety of diplomatic tools, and the dynamic settings within which the think tanks operate both domestically and internationally.
Adopting this approach, our study simultaneously advances the concept of think tank diplomacy in the following directions. First, rather than focusing on think tanks as unitary actors, we emphasise their collective nature and lend agency to individual expert professionals working in or with these institutions. Hence, we use the terms “think tank diplomacy” and “expert diplomacy” interchangeably, accounting for both the collective and individual initiatives of think tank–affiliated experts in performing diplomatic activities. Second, we showcase think tankers’ political and intellectual autonomy and their ability to pursue their own international agenda. We thus build on Kelley’s postulation that “[d]iplomatic action exists wherever its core capabilities are to be found” and that nonstate actors can conduct diplomacy alongside states. Finally, our analysis expands the conceptual discussion of think tanks and expert diplomacy by placing it in the context of war. Whereas the above approach was developed to map the diplomatic activities of the think tanks that do not find themselves directly affected by ongoing warfare, our study seeks to capture the possible shifts in the diplomacy functions of think tanks and the experts affiliated with them under the conditions of war.
Data and methods
This research utilises three types of data. First, we rely on the existing studies on think tank activities in Ukraine. These include policy papers, mapping exercises and surveys of think tank experts conducted by Ukrainian think tanks themselves or with their participation in 2014–2016 – that is, in the aftermath of the Euromaidan revolution, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the start of the war in the east of Ukraine (e.g. Kermach and Sukharyna Citation2016) – and in the first year of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 (Lvova Citation2022, Christoph et al. Citation2023). These data were used to identify and contextualise the possible shifts in think tanks’ activities, including diplomacy, within a longer timespan.
Second, we engaged in the participant observation of Ukrainian think tankers’ involvement in five (semi)public events related to the Russo–Ukrainian war or Ukraine’s cooperation with the EU, which were held in Brussels, Berlin, Prague, Warsaw and Ghent between November 2022 and May 2023 (). The participant observation was used as a complementary method to reflexive expert interviews (detailed below), with the view to ease our entry as researchers into the Ukrainian think tanker community and establish rapport with them through direct exchanges, where possible (cf. Kawulich Citation2005). At the time of data collection, we monitored key events and activities with representatives of Ukrainian think tanks, envisaging the possibility of meeting our potential interviewees in person. In doing so, instead of interfering in our participants’ schedules, we joined some of their planned activities on-site (cf. Musante Citation2015). The choice of the events for participant observation was thus mainly motivated by our intention to gain access to the prospective interviewees, although at times we were constrained by the closed (not-for-public) format of some events and our own schedules.
Table 1. Events attended by authors for participant observation.
The selected events were of different scales, ranging from a few dozens of participants to over 200 attendees; they targeted various audiences, including European policymakers and expert communities, members of civil society, academic scholars and university students. Notably, Ukrainian think tankers participated in some of these events as contributors (e.g. keynote speakers, panellists or discussants) and in others as (co)organisers, which attests to their performance of distinct diplomacy functions. Hence, in addition to establishing rapport with Ukrainian experts, the participant observation allowed us to gain first-hand insights into their different international engagements and better understand the real-time dynamics of their work in the context of the full-scale invasion.
Third, and most importantly, we conducted an original set of 14 semi-structured reflexive expert interviews with Ukrainian think tankers in the period between December 2022 and July 2023 (on reflexive interviewing, see Pessoa et al. Citation2019, Perera Citation2020). The interviews were intended to reveal the think tankers’ own perspectives on their work and identify the shifts in their diplomacy practices after the start of the full-scale war. Most of the interviews took place online via Zoom, which allowed us to connect with participants located in Ukraine. Several interviews were conducted in person (in combination with participant observation) during the interviewees’ trips to the EU for conferences and other events. Most interviews were conducted in English, with a few conducted in Ukrainian when preferred by the interviewees.
Ensuring a sample of respondents fully representative of the entire population of Ukrainian think tanks (assessed at roughly 90 institutions in 2022, according to Christoph et al. Citation2023) is an aim that cannot be achieved in times of ongoing war, as this population is in flux. Since February 2022, many Ukrainian think tanks and their staff members had to relocate, downscale or change the scope of their activities; some closed their websites or ceased to exist (Lvova Citation2022). Nevertheless, in our study, we strived to achieve a sample with broad representation across the fields of specialisation, institutional types and geographical locations of think tanks in Ukraine.
Looking at the Ukrainian think tank landscape, more than two-thirds of them (63) are based in the capital, Kyiv (Christoph et al. Citation2023). Regardless of their geographical location, they focus on various policy issues, ranging from public administration reform, anti-corruption measures and local self-government to economic development, security and defence policy, and countering foreign propaganda (Christoph et al. Citation2023). Some of them have affiliations with the state or public universities, whereas the majority present themselves as independent entities (Axyonova and Zubko Citation2017). Reflecting this diversity, our interviewees hailed from various fields of expertise, including international relations, security, economics, European integration and law, and represented different types of institutions, ranging from university-based and government-affiliated to state-independent think tanks ().Footnote1 In our study, we also aimed to capture the heterogeneity of our interviewees’ backgrounds: some had prior diplomatic and state-related positions, and others were from academic or media backgrounds. Most of the think tanks our informants represented were based in Kyiv, but we also included organisations with offices in other regional centres.Footnote2
Table 2. List of interviews.
Importantly, all interviewees engaged with both domestic and international audiences and demonstrated a degree of involvement in international networks. Almost all of the selected think tanks had a pro-EU agenda and actively engaged in promoting domestic reforms and advancing Ukraine’s European course. While the chosen sample implies certain limitations to the generalisability of our findings, the focus on the EU-oriented think tanks provides relevant insights in light of Ukraine’s candidate status and evolution of political, military and economic ties between the EU and Ukraine since the onset of Russia’s full-scale war in February 2022.
After transcribing the interview recordings and reviewing the interview memos, the analysis proceeded through a combination of inductive and deductive approaches. Hereby, we used a mind mapping technique, suggested by Fearnley (Citation2022), to identify and systematise the main themes originating from the interview data, which did not necessarily reflect the thematic blocks of our interview guide. The latter included questions concerning professional paths of the interview partners, their perceptions of the mission and priorities of the think tanks they represented, the changes in their work and daily practices triggered by the full-scale invasion, domestic and international influence channels of their think tanks (including access to policymakers), their involvement in international networks and public diplomacy activities. Based on the interview data, we first identified the key themes (or patterns of meaning) shared by the interviewees, such as the strong motivation to garner international support for Ukraine, post-2022 changes in the domestic and international opportunity structures, practical constraints on the work of think tanks resulting from the full-fledged war and their coping strategies, the importance of international networks and outreach to foreign publics and policymakers, and rather cautious assessments of the self-attributed experts’ impact on their target audiences. Next, we juxtaposed the data with the analytical categories deriving from the concept of think tank diplomacy, i.e. think tank functions, by Conley Tyler et al. (Citation2017). Rooted in the ideas of interpretive research (Willig Citation2014), this methodological choice was driven by an attempt to minimise the superimposition of our conceptual lens on the interview data, allowing us to first delve into the insights of the interviewees and only then collate these insights with our conceptual framework.
A brief history of Ukrainian think tanks and the origins of Ukraine’s expert diplomacy
Today’s landscape of Ukrainian think tanks traces its roots to the early 1990s, when the country regained its independence. During this formative period, the first generation of state-independent think tanks, such as the Razumkov Centre and the International Centre for Policy Studies, were established as non-governmental organisations with the support of international donors (Keudel and Carbou Citation2021). Although these donors played a crucial role in facilitating the development of the state-independent think tank community in Ukraine, the dependence of the latter on foreign funding also posed challenges, raising questions about the legitimacy of think tanks as knowledge producers, as they navigated between the donors’ agendas, interests of Ukrainian policymakers and needs of the Ukrainian society (Axyonova and Schöppner Citation2018).
Prior to 2022, two pivotal events in Ukraine’s history had a significant impact on the development of the think tank landscape. The first was the 2004 Orange Revolution, which was followed by the opening up of the state structures to consultations with civil society actors, including state-independent think tanks. Although it did not fundamentally change the think tanks’ ability to influence policy or their donor dependency, this period witnessed growing numbers of think tanks in Ukraine and their increased attempts to target more diverse audiences and shape public discourse (Axyonova and Zubko Citation2017, Keudel and Carbou Citation2021).
The second pivotal event was the 2013–2014 Euromaidan revolution, which ushered in a new era for Ukraine’s European ambitions and opened a unique window of opportunity for pro-European and pro-reform civil society actors (Shapovalova and Burlyuk Citation2018). With their renewed focus on aligning with the EU agenda, the post-Euromaidan country’s leadership and policymakers faced a growing demand for expertise from outside the government circles (Yesmukhanova Citation2019). This surge in demand led to not only the establishment of new think tanks with a focus on EU-related issues but also the elevation of some experts to government positions. This, in turn, increased think tankers’ access to government officials, creating a more direct channel for exchanges between policymakers and expert professionals (Axyonova and Schöppner Citation2018).
The post-Euromaidan period also saw an unprecedented growth in the overall number of think tanks. By early 2022, Ukraine was home to around 90 such institutions, which were primarily based in Kyiv (Christoph et al. Citation2023). However, despite this notable increase in numbers, some studies have questioned the actual ability of Ukrainian think tanks to influence policy and pointed at their continued dependence on international donor funding (Kermach and Sukharyna Citation2016).
Simultaneously, the post-Euromaidan period was marked by severe challenges for the Ukrainian leadership and society following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its covert involvement in starting the war in the east of Ukraine. Aiming to garner international support for the country, the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) launched the preparation of the country’s first Public Diplomacy Strategy, which was eventually adopted in March 2021 (Bureiko Citation2021). The Strategy was a result of a comprehensive six-year-long consultation process involving the active engagement of policymakers with the country’s expert community (Interview 12). Several expert professionals, specialising in the field of foreign policy and not affiliated with the state structures, were approached by the MFA for insights and recommendations on the Strategy’s main priorities (Interview 12).
In the document, expert diplomacy was defined as a distinct component within the public diplomacy framework and aimed to connect with expert communities and journalists abroad, for instance, by organising events and conferences that would serve to advance the foreign policy goals of Ukraine (MFA of Ukraine Citation2021, p. 13). Countries in Europe and North America were identified as the main geographical priorities for these activities (MFA of Ukraine Citation2021, p. 26). The Strategy further acknowledged the importance of research and analytics for diplomatic action and pushed for more inter-institutional cooperation among the different actors involved in public diplomacy (Bureiko Citation2021). This strategic move aimed at integrating the expertise from university-based and independent think tanks into the country’s diplomatic efforts and prepared the ground for the self-positioning of expert professionals as diplomacy actors in the years to come.
Ukrainian think tanks and expert diplomacy in times of full-scale war
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 prompted an unprecedented boost of knowledge production and public engagement by Ukrainian expert groups, including think tanks (Axyonova and Lozka Citation2023). This knowledge is often explicitly addressed at European audiences – both political decision-makers and the public – with the aim of elucidating Ukraine’s (geo)political stance, explaining the situation on the ground and raising support for the country. These manifestations of knowledge production and strategic communication with external audiences attest to the Ukrainian experts’ active involvement in the country’s collective public diplomacy efforts. However, public diplomacy is not the only domain of diplomatic activities in which Ukrainian think tankers are involved. Structured along the categories suggested by Conley Tyler et al. (Citation2017), the subsequent sub-sections examine whether and how Ukrainian think tank–affiliated experts exercised each of the four diplomacy functions – negotiation, promotion of friendly relations, information-gathering and communication – after February 2022 and how the conditions of the full-out war affected their engagement.
Negotiation
As suggested by Conley Tyler et al. (Citation2017), think tanks’ contributions to diplomatic negotiation processes can include providing inputs or advice to the negotiating parties before and during the negotiation rounds, acting as dialogue facilitators or mediators as well as offering negotiation trainings to diplomats. Hereby, facilitating conflict-related intergovernmental negotiations is not a common task for national think tanks but it can be performed by transnational think tanks (in the broader sense of the term) in cases where conventional diplomacy does not work (Conley Tyler et al. Citation2017, 29–34). In turn, experts from national think tanks can assist government officials and diplomats by building relations and offering strategic advice, which can be used by governments during negotiations or in preparation to them. In a war setting, such negotiations can be expected to aim at a potential ceasefire or a peace agreement between the belligerents as well as cover humanitarian issues and the related logistics.
Following the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, two major “domains” of high-level diplomatic negotiations emerged as a direct consequence of the war. These included several rounds of internationally brokered peace talks between Ukraine and Russia, held from late February until late March 2022 in an unsuccessful attempt to halt the hostilities, as well as later negotiations over the Initiative on the Safe Transportation of Grain and Foodstuffs from Ukrainian ports, also known as the “Black Sea Grain Initiative” or the “grain deal” (Lynch Citation2022). Both “domains” of negotiations were facilitated by external actors, including Turkey and Israel in the former case and the United Nations and Turkey in the latter. None of our respondents mentioned being involved in the preparation or conduct of these negotiation processes or consulted on the issues at stake.
The initial peace talks were held under the conditions of extreme pressure, in the immediate aftermath of Russia’s full-fledged invasion, leaving no time or space for domestic expert consultations. In the case of the “grain deal”, the initial proposal came from an advisor to the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, a Swiss-based, transnationally active, non-profit organisation engaged in conflict mediation and discreet diplomacy (Lynch Citation2022; on discreet diplomacy and transnational think tanks, see Garsten and Sörbom Citation2023). The negotiations took several months for the agreement to be signed. However, also in this case, there is no evidence to suggest that Ukrainian think tankers were in any way involved in the preparation or negotiation processes. Both negotiation “domains” were entirely government-led endeavours (follow-up email exchange, Interview 1).
For think tank–affiliated policy experts to be consulted on the matters of high-level diplomatic negotiations, at least two crucial conditions need to be fulfilled. First, there needs to be a demand for the knowledge, know-how or skills on the part of the key decision-makers and negotiators that only these experts can provide. Second, the experts need to have direct access to the decision-makers. Although there might have been demand for specific expert knowledge on the part of the Ukrainian leadership to exercise wartime diplomacy, the access of many think tankers to the key decision-makers in Kyiv considerably decreased after the start of the full-out war. Several interviewees in our study representing state-independent think tanks reported a disruption of previously established channels of communication with state authorities (Interviews 3, 9, 13, 14) and the “need to compete for their attention” (Interview 6). Others suggested that even state-affiliated think tanks had no relevance in informing political decision-making (Interview 2) or suffered budget cuts and hence were concentrating on other priorities (Interview 5). These insights suggest that the opportunity structures for think tankers to engage with state authorities have changed after the start of the full-scale invasion, especially in comparison with the situation in the first years after the Euromaidan revolution (cf. Kermach and Sukharyna Citation2016, Yesmukhanova Citation2019, Christoph et al. Citation2023). These changes in the opportunity structures and the closed character of war-related negotiations left no room for Ukrainian think tankers to contribute to the negotiation processes. Simultaneously, in the new context of the full-scale invasion, the think tanks’ priorities shifted towards generating international support for the Ukrainian cause. Hence, think tankers directed their activities more towards external audiences, which is especially evident in their promotion of friendly relations with European partners and Ukraine’s possibility of accession to the EU.
Promotion of friendly relations
According to Conley Tyler et al. (Citation2017), think tanks can promote friendly relations among countries by providing platforms for exchange among various stakeholders, including foreign and domestic decision-makers, experts and civil society representatives. This can be achieved through convening conferences, roundtables, smaller-scale meetings and other events – that is, offering “safe spaces” for professional exchanges. In the face of external aggression, such activities of Ukrainian think tanks have pursued the goal of securing international backing for the country’s resistance and commonly targeted European and North American allies. However, the think tanks’ possibilities to convene conferences and other events in Ukraine have drastically changed under the war conditions.
Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the whole territory of Ukraine has been subjected to continuous missile attacks, which has left no “safe space” for Ukrainian think tankers to engage in this diplomatic function “at home”. The interviewed think tank experts faced multiple challenges, particularly at the start of the full-scale invasion. The need for frequent office relocations due to shifting battlefronts disrupted the activities of some think tanks (Interviews 9, 14). For others, previously running projects came to a standstill, as donors halted their funding (Interviews 3, 4, 14). Some organisations and their affiliated experts shifted their focus towards volunteering and humanitarian assistance (Interview 8, 9). In some cases, think tank experts joined the armed forces of Ukraine and fought on the actual battlefield, not the metaphoric “battlefield of ideas” (Interview 13). Several think tanks faced office closures lasting for two or three months, and remote work became a necessity (Interview 9). Amidst Russia’s continuous attacks across the entire country, experts faced power shortages, making it difficult, if not impossible, to plan and organise on-the-ground activities, which was especially evident in the first year of the full-scale invasion (Interviews 4, 8, 13).
Nevertheless, the initial phase of disruptions in Ukrainian think tanks’ work was followed by the development of adaptation strategies and innovative ways to navigate the new situation. Recognising the limitations of their traditional operations inside the war-torn country, think tankers started transferring their own events to online spaces and leveraged existing transnational partnerships to establish “safe spaces” in alternative locations. For instance, in February 2023, the Ukrainian think tank Prism UA hosted its inaugural expert forum in collaboration with the Stockholm Center for East European Studies in Sweden (SCEEUS Citation2023). The event convened experts from Ukraine, Sweden and various other countries to discuss topics such as Ukraine’s EU integration and European security. Similar events took place in other locations, whereby collaborations between Ukrainian and European think tanks were instrumental in collectively establishing “safe spaces” that transcended geographical boundaries (e.g. PO4).
Moreover, some of the interviewed experts who relocated abroad at least temporarily acquired additional affiliations with EU-based think tanks. This development not only allowed them to expand their contacts but also facilitated their integration into existing initiatives and fora, where they could contribute to steering discussions about Ukraine. For instance, some of our interviewees were affiliated with an EU-based think tank that opened its doors to numerous Ukrainian experts, thus including them into its own networks and giving them the opportunity to initiate various events and behind-closed-doors engagements with European policymakers (Interviews 2, 7).
Using such transnational networks, Ukrainian think tankers were able to contribute to the establishment of a platform for informal exchange among stakeholders in the EU–Ukraine Solidarity Lanes, an initiative aiming to identify and secure alternative logistics routes for the export and import of goods to and from Ukraine (Interview 8). Started as an ad hoc project in reaction to the disruption of the regular logistics by the active warfare, the platform illustrates the effectiveness of think tank experts in setting up channels for informal discussions with Ukraine’s European allies amid the full-scale war. Overall, by the end of 2022, many Ukrainian think tankers were able to adapt to the new situation and develop coping strategies (for instance, through the pivot to transnational networks), which enabled them to continue fostering friendly relations with the partners in the EU and beyond.
Information-gathering and reporting
As part of their diplomatic functions, think tanks often engage in collecting, analysing and reporting specialised information, which serves as the basis for decision-making by governments and other stakeholders involved in diplomatic action (Conley Tyler et al. Citation2017). Prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukrainian think tank experts performed this function by providing their research findings both to domestic decision-makers and to international organisations and donors, who were among the main consumers of think tanks’ knowledge products (Gerasymchuk Citation2017). Hereby, some think tanks, especially those focusing on the promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law as well as on the approximation agenda with the EU, took over the role of watchdogs, engaging in the oversight of the reform processes initiated by the Ukrainian government in the post-Euromaidan period.
The full-out war altered the previously established opportunity structures for the rapport of think tankers with domestic policymakers and their counterparts in the EU. Notably, the start of the war boosted international organisations’ and European governments’ demand for professional expertise and insights coming from within the country. Several interviewees mentioned an increased external interest in their work, evident, for instance, through foreign diplomats’ requests to join the think tanks’ mailing lists and closed consultation rounds, especially in the first months after the full-scale invasion (Interviews 3, 4, 7). For some think tankers, this translated into much easier and more direct access to European policymakers and other external stakeholders (Interviews 3, 7). For others, this resulted in their involvement in the formation of new transnational policy networks, which included European and Ukrainian officials and expert professionals not affiliated with state structures (Interview 8). An expanded outreach to European policymakers even prompted one of the interviewed think tanks to consider institutionalising their presence in Brussels (Interview 1).
Simultaneously, the onset of the full-out war had variant effects on the rapport of Ukrainian think tankers with domestic policymakers. Whereas some reported disruptions in previously established channels of access to domestic politics (Interviews 3, 9, 13, 14), others informally took over the tasks of state agencies that were no longer capable of collecting and delivering crucial statistical data to the policymakers in Kyiv (Interview 4). Moreover, as Ukraine applied for EU membership four days after the start of Russia’s full-fledged invasion, some think tanks assisted the Ukrainian government in preparing the EU questionnaire for the candidate status (Interview 13).
Overall, the war accelerated the developments in Ukraine’s EU integration path, offering new opportunities but also posing challenges for Ukrainian expert professionals. Interviewee 14 remarked:
The EU candidacy seemed 10 years from where we were, but it has already been more than a year since we got it in June last year. […] Things have started to move very quickly with accession to the EU. Sometimes, we think that they move too quickly. (Interview 14)
In sum, the conditions of the full-out war required adaptation of think tankers to the changed opportunity structures in their rapport with domestic and international stakeholders. Simultaneously, it had varied effects on the think tanks’ ability to exercise their information-gathering and reporting function, which largely depended on the think tanks’ areas of expertise, their capacities to continue collecting relevant data in the context of war, the demand for particular knowledge by Ukrainian and international decision-makers and the think tankers’ involvement in domestic, European and transnational networks that enabled the knowledge transfer.
Communication
As informal diplomacy agents, think tanks may also engage in a multifaceted communication strategy aimed at reaching broader foreign audiences and influencing international public discourse (Conley Tyler et al. Citation2017). Think tanks typically operate websites, publish reports and policy briefs, give interviews to traditional and online media and maintain social media presence. Through these channels, they can disseminate their research findings, policy recommendations and expert insights to the foreign publics. Thus, depending on their reputation and outreach, think tank experts may be instrumental in shaping their country’s image on the global stage (McGann Citation2007). At the same time, their ability to effectively engage with broader audiences is contingent upon the prevailing opportunity structures within the existing political system and the international landscape (Abelson Citation2018).
The onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion marked a pivotal moment for Ukrainian think tankers in this regard. It not only presented them with significant challenges but also created an unprecedented demand for their inputs in the international media coverage of the war, thus opening unique prospects for them to articulate their perspectives via foreign media channels (Interviews 2, 4). In this context, the primary goal of think tankers became to amplify Ukraine’s voice on the global stage, emphasising the urgency of the situation and the significance of international support (Interviews 4, 7, 12).
Consequently, think tank experts engaged in an intensified media campaign. They authored blogs, commentaries and op-eds published by prominent international media outlets such as Le Monde (Halushka and Litra Citation2024) or Politico (Getmanchuk and Halushka Citation2023). They provided frequent interviews on TV and radio and actively commented on social media. One of our respondents stated:
There is no luxury for you to wait. If you can do this interview or this public talk today, do not delay it, do not say “No”. I’ve been in this situation so many times in the past months when I basically have no power in me, but then someone says to me, “Can you talk to us this evening?” And I say, “Yes, of course”. […] When someone is now dying in the trenches in Ukraine, that’s the least I can do – another talk, another interview. I am reaching out to any audience now. (Interview 11)
Notably, all the interviewed think tanks had established channels for international engagement well before 2022. These included maintaining their digital presence through their official websites and social media platforms both in English and Ukrainian. However, the start of Russia’s full-out war triggered a shift towards emphasising international outreach and intensifying interaction with non-Ukrainian audiences. Even a predominantly domestically oriented think tank (Interview 10) began translating more material from Ukrainian to English and more actively using its English-only Twitter/X account. Similarly, since 2022, another foreign policy–focused think tank (Interview 11) has undertaken a deliberate practice of translating all policy reports into English, even if originally written in Ukrainian, to enhance their international outreach and impact.
Ukrainian think tankers also started participating in a wide array of events, not confined to their traditional spaces, to reach diverse audiences. To inform foreign publics about the realities on the ground, one of the interviewed think tanks orchestrated a series of engagements across universities in Europe to reach out to students and faculty members (Interview 1; PO3). Another interviewee, currently residing abroad, reported attending events in a local church upon invitation, as they considered it an effective way to connect with locals and broaden the reach of their messaging (Interview 11). As Ukrainian diaspora structures in Europe are transforming due to the mass exodus of people fleeing the war and increased social activism of Ukrainians abroad, think tank experts now residing in the EU member states become integral participants and often the drivers of the diaspora’s activities. Due to their unique positioning, these experts demonstrate a distinct potential in facilitating communication, fostering collaborations and strengthening connections between Ukrainians and their counterparts in the EU (Interview 6).
In this context, a significant dimension of Ukrainian experts’ communication is the proactive response to Russia’s war propaganda (Interviews 2, 3, 4). Although not entirely new, this activity has gained prominence in think tankers’ diplomacy efforts in the post-2022 period. Experts have emphasised the importance of counteracting the impact of Russian disinformation primarily on foreign audiences but also on Ukrainians living abroad (Interviews 2, 4). For instance, during our participant observation, we witnessed how Ukrainian think tankers actively engaged with the university public by presenting examples of false claims from Russian disinformation campaigns and subsequently debunking them (PO3).
Overall, the escalation of Russia’s war on Ukraine has had a profound impact on the communication and public engagement strategies of Ukrainian experts, largely driven by the urgency of the situation and its rapidly changing dynamics as well as a sense of importance of reaching out to broader audiences outside Ukraine. Most significantly, it has created an environment in which, regardless of their affiliation, background and current location, Ukrainian experts speak with one voice, united by the goal of generating and maintaining international support for Ukraine to win the war.
Conclusion
To spotlight the role of nonstate actors in wartime diplomacy and understand the effects of war on their diplomatic practices, this article explored the changes in Ukrainian think tankers’ diplomacy functions, including negotiation, promotion of friendly international relations, information-gathering and communication (cf. Conley Tyler et al. Citation2017), following Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. Our analysis revealed several major shifts in the performance of these functions by Ukrainian think tanks and the expert professionals affiliated with them under the war conditions. These shifts reflected their altered relations with the Ukrainian state, external partners and international audiences.
First, the onset of the full-fledged war changed the opportunity structures for the expert community to interact with the state officials in Kyiv. On the one hand, the volatile war environment required the centralisation of power to ensure prompt reactions to the constantly changing situation. This resulted in the disruption of previously established channels for experts’ inputs and diminished the access of many think tankers to political decision-makers, especially in the first months of the full-scale invasion. Illustrative of this development was the absence of Ukrainian think tankers’ inputs in the process of preparing the initial peace talks and the negotiations over the “grain deal”. On the other hand, the start of Russia’s invasion created a vacuum of internal expertise in some governmental agencies involved in collecting statistical data and other information essential for the state to perform its functions. This vacuum was filled by the think tanks who were able to quickly adjust to the new context and take over the tasks previously performed by governmental organisations. Simultaneously, Ukraine’s progress towards the EU membership created a novel environment that elevated the role of think tanks and expert professionals focussing on the approximation agenda as policy advisors and oversight agents.
In response to the new situation, Ukrainian think tankers increasingly turned to international collaborations and transnational networks. They recognised the value of cross-border partnerships in amplifying their voices and expanding their presence in Europe. These collaborations not only enabled many Ukrainian think tanks to remit the severe negative consequences of the physical warfare on their operational capacities but also helped them to access additional resources, share insights and build new alliances with international counterparts who shared their goals.
Finally, the war escalation compelled Ukrainian think tank experts to proactively exercise more control over their agendas. Rather than reacting to the demands of others – be it the international donor community or the Ukrainian government – many think tankers took the initiative to address critical issues related to the war, national security and Ukraine’s European future. Driven by the shared mission to secure sustained international support for their country, these experts have shifted their focus towards more direct engagements with European policymakers and diverse international audiences. As they assert more control over their agendas, engage in cross-border collaborations and broaden their outreach, Ukrainian think tank experts claim their epistemic authority in shaping discourses and policies both within the country and internationally.
Zooming out, this study has demonstrated the prominent role of nonstate actors in several domains of collective wartime diplomacy. This included their efforts in promoting friendly relations with allies, information-gathering and communicating with foreign audiences but not war-related negotiations, which remained the prerogative of the state. It is important to acknowledge that this study’s findings may not be automatically transferable beyond the case of Ukraine. Moreover, our observations are confined to a particular period of time (with the main focus on the first year and a half of the full-scale invasion), based on a rather limited number of experts’ insights and conditioned by the very nature of research in a volatile war environment. All these factors call for caution in drawing more general conclusions about expert professionals’ diplomatic engagements in war settings. Nevertheless, as a showcase of nonstate actors’ agency, this study offers an important point of departure for future research on expert diplomacy in times of war and demonstrates that such research is feasible, despite the challenges of war circumstances.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Fabienne Bossuyt, Andrey Makarychev, Nadiia Bureiko, Markus Hochmüller, Diane Stone, Heiko Pleines, the participants of the Research Colloquium of the Department of Politics and Economics of the Research Centre for East European Studies at the University of Bremen and two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments on earlier versions of this article. We are also most grateful to our expert interview participants for sharing their insights.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Additional information
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Notes
1 The term “state-independent think tanks” refers here to the organisations that do not have direct institutional links to the government (or other state institutions) and do not rely on the state as the primary source of their funding (cf. Axyonova Citation2024).
2 The list of interviews in does not specify the location of regional offices, because – in combination with the area of expertise of our interview partners – this information would de-anonymise them due to the relatively small number of think tanks and experts with particular specialisations based not in Kyiv.
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