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Abstract
This study seeks to contribute to our knowledge on ‘Russia-sympathising’ tendencies in Europe. By means of content analysis, it examines how the far left (N = 26) and the far right (N = 33)—namely, the two party families where benign views on Russia are expected to occur most commonly—have reacted to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The findings provide insights into the prevalence and nature of ‘Russia-sympathising’ trends in contemporary European party politics.
Notes
1 See also Braghiroli (Citation2015), Ishiyama et al. (Citation2018), Onderco (Citation2019).
2 This study uses the label ‘Russia sympathy’ as an umbrella term for a range of (more or less) favourable views on Russia. It is a rough translation of the German Russlandversteher (or Russland-Versteher), meaning someone who ‘understands’ Russia and its behaviour. While not perfect, it is preferred to (the too narrow, categorical and definitive) ‘pro-Russian’ and (the too personified) ‘Putin-sympathising’ (German: Putinversteher or Putin-Versteher). The antithesis of ‘Russia sympathy’ is perhaps ‘Russia anxiety’, that is, fear, disregard or contempt of Russia (see Smith Citation2020 for a historical survey).
3 To be clear, I do not argue that Russia sympathy occurs only in these two families (or, for that matter, that virtually all far-left and far-right parties sympathise with Russia). However, of the 40 European parties that Snegovaya (Citation2022, p. 411; see also the online Appendix) identifies as ‘openly [embracing] pro-Russian positions’, at least 26 can be classified as either far left (six ‘radical left’ parties) or far right (15 ‘radical right’ parties and at least five of the parties classified by Snegovaya as ‘conservative’).
4 Transliteration from Russian and/or Ukrainian adheres to journal guidelines and is not indicative of any political or cultural preferences by the author.
5 The conflict has generated a large amount of literature. If not otherwise indicated, the following summary of the main events is based on readings of the early authoritative book-length treatments by Wilson (Citation2014b), Menon and Rumer (Citation2015), Sakwa (Citation2015), and Charap and Colton (Citation2017). Wilson provides a largely Ukrainian/Western perspective while Sakwa shows understanding also of the Russian mindset. The studies by Menon and Rumer, and Charap and Colton, respectively, strike a balance between different perspectives. In addition, I have also used the detailed chronology of key events (November 2013–February 2015) provided by Black and Plekhanov (Citation2016). For discussions on the historical background to the current conflict—the fragile post-Cold War peace system, the complex nature of Russo–Ukrainian relations throughout the post-Soviet era and the differing domestic developments of the two countries, see Wilson (Citation2014b, ch. 1–3), Menon and Rumer (Citation2015, pp. 22–52), Sakwa (Citation2015, ch. 1–3), Charap and Colton (Citation2017, ch. 1–2).
6 The role of the far right in the Maidan protests and, more specifically, in the massacres of 18–20 February is a hotly debated issue. While the Russian narrative of a Western-orchestrated coup d’état led by fascists and neo-Nazis is an exaggeration (for surveys of protest participants, see Onuch Citation2015; Shestakovskii Citation2015; Onuch & Sasse Citation2016), recent systematic evaluations indicate that far-right actors played a non-negligible (or even key) role in the protests (Ishchenko Citation2016; Kudelia Citation2018; Katchanovski Citation2020). In the subsequent 2014 parliamentary elections, however, far-right parties received only limited popular support.
7 The majority of Western legal experts consider the Russian takeover as a violation of international law (see, for example, Grant Citation2015). For a dissenting view, see Geistlinger (Citation2014).
8 On public opinion in Donbas at the start of the conflict, see Giuliano (Citation2018).
9 DNR and LNR remained unrecognised until 21 February 2022 when the Russian President Vladimir Putin acknowledged their independence.
10 At one end, the conflict is viewed as a largely home-grown civil war (see for example, Sakwa Citation2015; Matveeva Citation2016), and at the other as a Russian invasion (see for example, Wilson Citation2014b; Bowen Citation2019). For balanced discussions, see Hauter (Citation2021) and, above all, Arel and Driscoll (Citation2023, ch. 6–7).
11 For a detailed analysis of the Minsk agreements see Åtland (Citation2020).
12 According to OHCHR (Citation2022), the total number of conflict-related casualties in Ukraine 2014–2021 was between 51,000 and 54,000, with 14,200–14,400 killed (including 3,404 civilians) and 37–39,000 injured.
13 See, ‘US–Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership’, US Department of State, 10 November 2021, available at: https://www.state.gov/u-s-ukraine-charter-on-strategic-partnership/, accessed 12 March 2024.
14 For different perspectives on key events in 2021–2022, see Roberts (Citation2022), Savelyev (Citation2023).
15 For good overviews, see Götz (Citation2016) and, more generally, Götz (Citation2017).
16 For variants of this argument, see, for example, Braun (Citation2014), Mead (Citation2014), Allison (Citation2017), Kuzio (Citation2017, Citation2023), Marples (Citation2022).
17 For a brief and nuanced history of NATO’s enlargement in the post-Cold War era, see Walker (Citation2016). The alleged US ‘no-NATO-enlargement’ pledge to the USSR in the early 1990s is contested. Kramer (Citation2009, p. 54) argues that ‘declassified evidence [shows that] no such assurances were ever given or sought’ while Shifrinson—based on newly released government documents—claims that ‘US officials repeatedly offered the Soviets informal assurances—a standard diplomatic practice—against NATO expansion … throughout the spring, summer and fall of 1990’ (Shifrinson Citation2016, p. 11).
18 For a range of perspectives in this tradition, see, for example, Mearsheimer (Citation2014, Citation2022), Sauer (Citation2017), Cohen (Citation2019), Sakwa (Citation2019), Karaganov (Citation2022).
19 Due to recent changes in party identity, the set of parties included differs slightly from PopuList. Regarding the far left, I follow recent judgments (Bischoff & Kosiara-Pedersen Citation2023; Dunphy Citation2023) in not considering the Danish Socialistisk Folkeparti (Green Left, formerly Socialist People’s Party) and the Irish Sinn Fein as far-left parties. In the case of Spain, I include Partido Comunista de España (Communist Party of Spain—PCE) rather than its electoral alliance Izquierda Unida (United Left), and for Portugal I include Partido Comunista Português (Portuguese Communist Party—PCP) rather than the coalition Coligação Democrática Unitária (Unitary Democratic Coalition). Two minor Irish parties are excluded due to lack of data. Far-left parties included in this study but currently not in PopuList are the democratic socialist (Ómarsdóttir & Erlingsdóttir Citation2023) Vinstrihreyfingin–grænt framboð (Left–Green Movement—VG) in Iceland and the Croatian newcomer Radnička fronta (Workers’ Front—RF). Concerning the far right, I do not include the formerly far-right Hungarian party Jobbik (Hyttinen Citation2022; Borbáth & Gessler Citation2023), nor do I include the Polish borderline case Kukiz’15 (Kosowska-Gąstoł & Sobolewska-Myślik Citation2017; Fijał Citation2022). I also exclude the Hungarian ‘satellite’ party Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt (Christian Democratic People’s Party). I include the Polish Konfederacja rather than its member parties. Far-right parties included here but not in PopuList are four newcomers with a relatively clear-cut far-right profile: the Bulgarian Vazrazhdane (Revival), the Croatian Domovinski pokret (Homeland Movement—DP) the Romanian Alianța pentru Unirea Românilor (Alliance for the Union of Romanians—AUR) and—with some hesitation—the Dutch Juiste Antwoord 2021 (Correct Answer 2021—JA21). From both families, I exclude parties that are considered as members of an ethnoregionalist family (such as Spanish and Croatian regionalists), parties that were dissolved before February 2022 (such as Symmachía Politón (Citizens’ Alliance) in Cyprus) and parties lacking seats in the national parliament as of February 2022 (such as Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy (Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia) in Czechia).
20 One could think of collecting data also by conducting an expert survey or by analysing the parliamentary speeches, voting behaviour or social media postings of individual politicians. Expert surveys are, however, more time-consuming than content analyses while studies of politicians provide less authoritative (less valid) data on parties’ collective views.
21 I preferred statements published as early as possible (after 23 February 2022), but in some cases more detailed (but substantively similar) statements with a later publication date were used instead of earlier ones. For some parties, I used more than one statement (that is, two to three). I preferred statements by the party as a collective actor, such as declarations by the party board or the central committee. When no such text was to be found on the party website, I used statements by the party leader or, in some cases, by other prominent party actors (for example, foreign policy spokespersons). In a few cases, I made use of information from other sources than party websites (for example, media sources or social media postings). (The lack of collective statements is more common among far-right parties, reflecting their often decidedly leader-centred nature.) Tables A3 and A4 in the online Appendix provide detailed information on the statements used.
22 The scheme broadly follows Goertz’s (Citation2020) three-level concept structure. At the basic level, we thus find the concept at the core of this article (that is, the level of sympathy with Russia’s offensive on Ukraine). The concept’s core features (perception of the military offensive itself, of its background and of its possible solutions) are at the secondary level, and the seven (1+4+2) variables listed in at the data–indicator level. For a conceptual scheme, see Figure A1 in the online Appendix.
23 ‘O PCP apela à promoção de iniciativas de diálogo e à paz na Europa’, Portuguese Communist Party, 24 February 2022, available at: https://www.pcp.pt/pcp-apela-promocao-de-iniciativas-de-dialogo-paz-na-europa, accessed 12 March 2024.
24 ‘Anakoínosi týpou—Apántisi tou proédrou tis Ellinikís lýsis Kyriákou Velópoulou stin dílosi tou prothypourgoú anaforiká me ta gegonóta stin Oukraína’, Greek Solution, 24 February 2022, available at: https://elliniki-lisi.gr/anakoinosi-typou-apantisi-tou-proedrou-tis-ellinikis-lysis-kyriakou-velopoulou-stin-dilosi-tou-prothypourgou-anaforika-me-ta-gegonota-stin-oukrania, accessed 12 March 2024.
25 ‘Deklaratsiya na PG na Vazrazhdane po povod na voenniya konflikt’, Vazrazhdane, 1 March 2022, available at: https://vazrazhdane.bg/novini/818-deklaraciia-na-pg-na-vazrajdane-po-povod-na-voenniia-konflikt, accessed 1 February 2023.
26 ‘Die Schweiz muss neutrale Vermittlerin bleiben: Jetzt erst recht; keine Mitgliedschaft im UNO-Sicherheitsrat!’, Swiss People’s Party, 24 February 2022, available at: https://www.svp.ch/news/artikel/medienmitteilungen/die-schweiz-muss-neutrale-vermittlerin-bleiben-jetzt-erst-recht-keine-mitgliedschaft-im-uno-sicherheitsrat/, accessed 12 March 2024.
27 ‘Niet onze oorlog: Maak een einde aan het conflict in Oekraïne’, Forum for Democracy, 20 June 2022, available at: https://fvd.nl/nieuws/niet-onze-oorlog-maak-een-einde-aan-het-conflict-in-oekraine, accessed 12 March 2024.
28 ‘Vyhlásenie k udalostiam na Ukrajine’, People’s Party Our Slovakia, 1 March 2022, available at: http://kotlebovci.sk/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/noviny-marec-2022.pdf, accessed 12 March 2024.
29 ‘Izjava Levice ob vojni v Ukrajini’, Levica, 24 February 2022, available at: https://www.levica.si/vojna-ukrajina-rusija/, accessed 13 March 2024.
30 ‘Ukraine: non à la guerre’, Workers’ Party of Belgium, 24 February 2022, available at: https://www.ptb.be/actualites/ukraine-non-la-guerre, accessed 13 March 2024.
31 ‘Ukraine–Krise: Waffen niederlegen und zurück an den Verhandlungstisch!’, Freedom Party of Austria, 24 February 2022, available at: https://www.fpoe.at/artikel/ukraine-krise-waffen-niederlegen-und-zurueck-an-den-verhandlungstisch/, accessed 13 March 2024.
32 ‘Nein zum Krieg, gegen alle imperialistischen Staaten, für Frieden und Freundschaft unter den Völkern!’, Swiss Party of Labour, 22 March 2022, available at: https://pda.ch/2022/03/nein-zum-krieg-gegen-alle-imperialistischen-staaten-fuer-frieden-und-freundschaft-unter-den-voelkern/, accessed 13 March 2024.
33 ‘Izjava o Ukrajini’, Workers’ Front, 25 February 2022, available at: https://www.radnickafronta.hr/hr/t/tekstovi/clanci/533/izjava-o-ukrajini/, accessed 13 March 2024.
34 ‘SV fordømmer det russiske angrepet på Ukraina’, Socialist Left Party, 24 February 2022, available at: https://www.sv.no/blog/2022/02/24/sv-fordommer-det-russiske-angrepet-pa-ukraina/, accessed 13 March 2024.
35 ‘Ucraina, Lollobrigida: Nostra ferma condanna a Putin, draghi subito in aula’, Brothers of Italy, 24 February 2022, available at: https://www.fratelli-italia.it/2022/02/24/ucraina-lollobrigida-nostra-ferma-condanna-a-putin-draghi-subito-in-aula/, accessed 13 March 2024.
36 ‘EKRE kongressi avaldus: Kaitskem Eesti rahvusriiki!’, Conservative People’s Party of Estonia, 9 April 2022, available at: https://ekre.ee/ekre-kongressi-avaldus-kaitskem-eesti-rahvusriiki/, accessed 13 March 2024.
37 See, ‘Stop krigen’, Rødt, 11 March 2022, available at: https://roedt.no/stopp-krigen, accessed 13 March 2024.
38 See, ‘Die Waffen nieder! Nein zum Krieg, nein zum Völkerrechtsbruch durch Russland, für Deeskalation und Abrüstung’, Linke, 25 February 2022, available at: https://www.die-linke.de/themen/frieden/ukraine-krieg, accessed 13 March 2024.
39 See, ‘Deklaratsiya na PG na Vazrazhdane po povod na voenniya konflikt’, Vazrazhdane, 1 March 2022, available at: https://vazrazhdane.bg/novini/818-deklaraciia-na-pg-na-vazrajdane-po-povod-na-voenniia-konflikt, accessed 1 February 2023.
40 See, ‘La délégation du Rassemblement National soutient la résolution du Parlement européen sur l’agression russe en Ukraine’, Rassemblement National, 1 March 2022, available at: https://rassemblementnational.fr/communiques/la-delegation-du-rassemblement-national-soutient-la-resolution-du-parlement-europeen-sur-lagression-russe-en-ukraine, accessed 13 March 2024.
41 The number of theoretically possible groups is 33 · 24 = 432 with seven variables (or 32 · 25 = 288 if variable 1 is treated as a dichotomy). Thirty-three of these groups have empirical instances. If variables 2.1 and 2.2 (–1 if one or both variables score –1) and 2.3 and 2.4 (1 if one or both variables score 1) are merged, the number of theoretically possible groups is still 33 · 22 = 108 (or 32 · 23 = 72 if variable 1 is treated as a dichotomy), with 24 being empirically observed.
42 There is no consensus on the minimum number of observations, variables and clusters in cluster analysis. One recommendation (Dolnicar et al. Citation2014, p. 298) is to include at least 2d observations (that is, cases) while another suggestion (Dolnicar et al. Citation2014, p. 298) says at least 10 · d · k observations (with d being the number of variables and k the number of clusters). A third suggestion is to include a minimum of 70 · d observations (Dolnicar et al. Citation2014, p. 302).
43 While relevant indicators show that the (statistically) optimal number of clusters may be somewhat above five, detailed case- and cluster-based examinations of solutions with between four and ten clusters provide best support for a solution consisting of five, six or seven clusters (for solutions with four and six–ten clusters, see Tables A8–A13 in the online Appendix). All the seven solutions are computed on five variables by merging 2.1 and 2.2 (–1 if either or both variables score –1) into 2.5, and 2.3 and 2.4 (1 if either or both variables score 1) into 2.6. The clusterings are performed in R (package ‘cluster’), using the Partitioning Around Medoids (PAM) algorithm, with Manhattan distance and standardised variables.
44 See Gill (Citation2021) for an overview.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Andreas Fagerholm
Andreas Fagerholm, Faculty of Social Sciences, Business and Economics, and Law, Åbo Akademi University, Rantakatu 2, Vaasa 65100, Finland. Email: [email protected]