Gaza’s Subterranean Warfare: Palestinian Resistance Tunnels vs. Israel’s Military Strategy

Abstract

Actors with limited military capabilities resort to tunnel warfare to counterbalance military and technological disparities with the larger army. From the 1970s onward, tunnels have been used remarkably by non-state actors and liberation movements. Over the last two decades, Israel has set the destruction of the tunnels of the Palestinian armed groups as a primary goal of its massive wars in the Gaza Strip. At the same time, Palestinian armed groups have strategically harnessed the subterranean realm, rendering it an operational tool and developing a tunnel system. This study explores the subterranean warfare in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, exploring the historical evolution of the Gaza tunnels, their effectiveness, types, and military uses. It also scrutinizes the Israeli military strategy toward these tunnels, examining the techniques employed for detection and destruction of these tunnels, along with their inherent limitations.

“The more efficient the destructive capacity of the Israeli Air Force has become, the deeper the resistance has had to retreat below ground.”

- Eyal Weizman.¹

In January 2016, Ismail Haniyeh, the senior political leader of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), declared that the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas, had dug tunnels that were “double that of the Vietnam tunnels” in length.² This information was reiterated by Yahya Sinwar, the leader of the movement in Gaza, in 2021, following the Battle of Saif al-Quds (Sword of Jerusalem) (10–21 May 2021): “The tunnels we have in the Gaza Strip exceed 500 kilometers”,³ considering that the Gaza Strip occupies only 365 square kilometers.

The enigma surrounding the tunnel network in the Gaza Strip is not solely attributed to their covert nature but is also embedded in their role in the psychological warfare against Israel. Israeli sources have acknowledged the existence of a formidable network of tunnels in Gaza. Prior to the 2023–2024 Gaza war, the number of tunnels was estimated to be 1,300, spanning a total length of 500 kilometers. After the war, Israeli estimates the tunnels to stretch between 560–725 kilometers.⁴ The depth of these tunnels is estimated to range between 20–30 meters underground, some even reaching depths of 40–50 meters, or, according to some estimates, 70–80 meters,⁵ especially after the Israeli army discovered a cross-border tunnel from the Gaza Strip stretching 800 meters into Israel at a depth of 70 meters (equivalent to a 30-floor building).⁶

Regardless of their size, Palestinian armed groups, notably the Qassam Brigades and Al-Quds Brigades (the military wing of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Palestine), successfully developed an advanced tunnel network over the past decade. This intricate network extends both within Gaza and beyond its borders, fundamentally transforming the dynamics of the battlefield by strategically leveraging the underground space as a crucial operational tool.

In twenty-first century wars, most armies do not prefer to conduct ground operations due to their exorbitant cost, which increases in difficult geographical conditions, be they natural or manmade, or in urban warfare scenarios, which poses particular difficulties by impeding the army’s free movement, complicating the detection of the enemy’s defenses, and hindering the secure concentration of troops.

In this context, tunnels have emerged in the 2023–2024 Gaza war as a paramount challenge since the Israeli army declared its intention to launch a ground operation, setting its goal as to dismantle the rule of Hamas and neutralize its military capabilities, particularly after these tunnels have proven to be effective in the Israeli incursion during Operation Protective Edge (8 July-26 August 2014). The Israeli army has realized that aerial bombardment alone is insufficient and that a ground intervention is necessary to address the tunnels.

This paper explores the subterranean warfare in the Gaza Strip between Palestinian armed groups and the Israeli army, and the extent to which tunnels are effective in confronting the Israeli bombardment. The paper adopts the conceptual framework of subterranean warfare and asymmetric warfare, leveraging open-source intelligence, notably gleaned from Israeli sources. First, it underpins an overview of subterranean warfare in asymmetric contexts. It then provides a historical panorama of tunnels in the Gaza Strip, their evolution, types, and effectiveness, with a focus on the evolution of military tunnels. It finally presents the Israeli military strategy toward these tunnels, the techniques used to identify, destroy, or neutralize⁷ them, and the limitations of these techniques.

Subterranean Warfare in an Asymmetric Context

The strategic deployment of tunnels in warfare is not a new tactic. The Assyrians, Greeks, and Romans all dug tunnels to infiltrate besieged cities. In more recent history, tunnel warfare emerged as a pivotal combat strategy during the American Civil War (1861–1865) and trench battles of the First World War (1914–1918), particularly notable on the French front. The art of tunneling continued to evolve, finding prominence in the tactics of the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam (Viet Cong) during the Vietnam War (1955–1975). More contemporarily, Ukrainians exhibited a resilient employment of tunnels in their combat against Russian forces in Azovstal and Mariupol in 2022.⁸ Viewed within this historical continuum, the tunnels in Gaza had existed historically in as far as 332 BCE. During this ancient era, the city “withstood Alexander the Great for four months until he managed to open it when his soldiers dug tunnels beneath its walls to overcome the city’s tunnels dug by its inhabitants to reinforce their fortifications during the siege”.⁹

Over the past century, subterranean warfare evolved from a tactic used to evade potential enemies to an effective means of confronting superior air power.¹⁰ The development of the North Korean People’s Army’s underground faculties since June 1950 during the Fatherland Liberation War, to counter the United Nations’ air superiority, provides a notable example. It later evolved into a strategy employed across all military facilities, including missile launchers, weapons storage tunnels, and offensive tunnels extending into South Korea.¹¹ With the beginning of the third millennium, tunnel warfare has become a military tactic associated with asymmetric warfare and non-state actors (such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and ISIS), particularly with the escalation of states’ military and air superiority. The underground sphere provides space to avoid prolonged direct confrontations with stronger armies. Instead, it focuses on depleting their forces and undermining their superiority. It also allows for shifting the battle into the territory of the enemy through underground infiltrations, as observed in Hamas and Hezbollah wars with Israel.¹²

The importance of tunnels and underground spaces has risen in today’s conflicts, particularly in the Middle East, owing to the increasing shift of warfare into urban centers and civilian areas, often involving both conventional armies and non-state actors. Examples include the Zhawar Kili tunnel network in Afghanistan, dating back to the 1980s, which comprised 70 interconnected tunnels that housed tanks, artillery, anti-aircraft guns, explosives, and ammunition, and only discovered by the United States months after the events of September 11. Additionally, Al-Qaeda’s underground hideouts in the mountains of Northern Mali served as training centers and ammunition storage.¹³ The role of tunnels was also evident in the 2006 Lebanon War when Hezbollah abducted two Israeli soldiers through a cross-border tunnel, which later prompted the Israeli army to launch Operation Northern Shield in December 2018 to detect and destroy Hezbollah’s tunnels, resulting in the discovery of six sophisticated cross-border tunnels.¹⁴ Lastly, the tunnels constructed by ISIS in Iraq played a crucial role in the Battle of Mosul (2016–2017), as well as the cross-border tunnels between Syria and Iraq that were used for smuggling weapons and fighters.¹⁵

While tunnel tactics are employed by both conventional armies and non-state actors, this utilization varies in terms of usage and purpose. In symmetrical contexts, tunnels and underground spaces are generally used as storage facilities for weapons and equipment. They may also serve as one of the battle fronts, although not necessarily decisive in achieving victory. In asymmetrical contexts, tunnels are fundamental for the smaller party, serving as a space for combat, shelter, and storage.

Actors with limited military capabilities resort to subterranean warfare for four main reasons. First, it serves as a counterbalance against the overwhelming military and technological superiority of the larger army, significantly enhancing the prospects of safeguarding fighters from surface attacks, such as artillery shelling and aerial assaults. Secondly, the presence of tunnels obstructs the progress of infantry forces, compelling them to proceed with caution and within imposed limitations. Third, tunnels offer a range of tactical advantages, including the facilitation of surprise attacks, effective counter-siege measures, unhindered movement for actors with limited military capabilities, secure withdrawal from battlegrounds, the execution of attacks and infiltration operations behind enemy lines, and a formidable challenge to the principle of early warning that is launched when deterrence measures prove insufficient in preventing potential threats, thus disrupting the conventional sequence of military response. Fourth, tunnels provide protection for armaments and supply installations, serving as operational spaces for military command and control centers, and restrict the adversary’s ability to gather intelligence about the weaponry and military capabilities concealed underground.¹⁶ Additionally, tunnels could be used as sites for manufacturing, military training, and importing supplies through cross-border tunnels.

Yet not all armies possess military doctrines that effectively address operations in a subterranean environment, which may comprise tunnels, urban and natural cavities (i.e. basements and caves), and underground facilities.¹⁷ For instance, some articles have already highlighted that innovations in underground facilities pose a significant challenge to American forces due to the difficulty in locating underground facilities and the reliance of American capabilities on precision-strike weapons to confront them, with limited options available for ground forces.¹⁸

Therefore, modern tunnel warfare appears to be dually asymmetric. On the one hand, conventional armies enjoy military and air superiority, yet lack the experience and adequate means to deal with underground risks. On the other hand, smaller, less-equipped parties without air force succeed in shifting the battleground in their favor through tunnel tactics. However, they are unable to defeat the larger party outright, but rather work toward exhausting it and reducing its maneuverability. This presents us with a complex scenario: tunnel warfare in an asymmetric context.

“Most wars in their own way are asymmetric, in that enemies usually try to exploit their opponents’ vulnerabilities to gain advantages”.¹⁹ The concept of Asymmetric Wafare, which first appeared in American documents in 1995, refers to asymmetric confrontations between varying forces, for instance, aerial against ground, or ground against naval.²⁰

Asymmetric warfare is best understood as a strategy or tactic employed in conflict,²¹ utilized by the weaker party to raise the level of risk and cost for the stronger party, thus preventing it from intervening militarily, forcing it to withdraw due to significant losses, or compelling it to change its policy.²² In the case of Gaza, an essential characteristic of asymmetric warfare is added: it is an endless war in which it is difficult to determine the victor and the vanquished. In previous rounds of comprehensive wars between 2008–2021, Hamas and Israel claimed victory equally, with Hamas remaining in control of Gaza internally and Israel maintaining external control. Neither side was able to destroy the other or prevent future attacks.²³ While it is difficult to determine the beginning of each round of the conflict due to the ongoing nature of the war, it is clear that Israel responds more to Hamas provocations than vice versa.²⁴ Not every Israeli escalation led to an outbreak of conflict, but every action undertaken by Hamas triggered a comprehensive war.

The wars in Gaza have made Israel “trapped in an asymmetrical conflict with increasingly intense violence, a reality in which Hamas manages to prove the ‘Paradox of Power’: Israel’s military strength becomes its weakness while Hamas’ military weakness becomes its strength.”²⁵

For Israel, destroying Gaza tunnels is seen as both an operational and strategic necessity to tilt the imbalance in its favor. However, the very existence of these tunnels presents a paradox with an unpredictable outcome. Israel cannot completely eradicate Hamas and its infrastructure (its declared target in every military operation), nor can Gaza tunnels decisively tip the battle in Hamas’s favor as much as they keep it alive. This perpetuates a state of ongoing conflict, “a tremendous waste: a war for nothing, civilian victims for nothing, but a deliberate violation of the laws of war.”²⁶

On the other hand, tunnels have become the primary battleground for Hamas. Their network consists of seven different types of integrated tunnels (Table 3), whereas tunnels in most previous cases were used only for logistical or specific combat purposes. Without the tunnels, Hamas would have lost all its military capabilities and combat prowess in the previous comprehensive wars (2008–2009, 2012, 2014, 2021). It wouldn’t have been able to compensate for the shortage of supplies through military manufacturing, overcome the siege by relying on underground covert passages, through which weapons, ammunition, vehicles, and manufacturing materials were smuggled into the Gaza Strip from Egypt, nor sustain fighting in the 2023–2024 Gaza war. So how did the tunnels evolve in Gaza? How did they transform from being shelters and smuggling channels into an integrated combat system?

The Gaza Tunnels from Drilling to Construction

Many societies that have relied on tunnels during wartime have also integrated them into daily activities, as is the case in Gaza,²⁷ where tunnels had existed even before Hamas turned them into both an economic tool to resist the Israeli siege,²⁸ and a military asset to counter the military superiority of the Israeli army. In this context, Mohammad Mahmoud Alaswad (1946–1972), known as Guevara of Gaza, a military leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, emerged as one of the early innovators of tunneling in Gaza in the early 1970s. He aimed to thwart Israel’s efforts to capture fighters maneuvering from one house to another through rudimentary tunnels.²⁹

It is also noteworthy that Palestinian fighters utilized tunnels early on, not only within Palestine but also outside of it. For example, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command built an underground camp in the Al Naʿamah Hills south of Beirut in the 1970s, which withstood Israeli strikes in December 1988 and prevented Israeli forces from accessing the hideout of its leader, Ahmed Jibril (1937–2021).³⁰

Border Tunnels and Booby-Trapped Tunnels: 1980–2014

While some assert that Hamas adopted the tunnel strategy from the Lebanese Hezbollah, which began using them in the mid-1990s, others, including Israeli analyses, believe that Gaza’s tunneling expertise extends as far back as 1960s, suggesting that Hamas is the one capable of transferring expertise rather than receiving it.³¹ Nevertheless, it is likely that both groups have not extensively shared their expertise due to the high level of secrecy surrounding tunnel engineering. If any exchange of experience occurred, it would likely have been minimal, focusing primarily on tunnel development rather than the digging, constructing, and locating.³²

The genesis of border tunnels between the Gaza Strip and Egypt can be traced back to the early 1980s, following the signing of the Egypt–Israel peace treaty of 1979, leading to Israel’s withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula in 1982. Consequently, the city of Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip was divided into Palestinian Rafah and Egyptian Rafah, necessitating permits for border crossings. To foster communication between separated families and overcome the border restrictions, people began digging rudimentary tunnels between houses on both sides, spanning tens of meters, and serving as vital conduits for the movement of people and goods. In 1983, Israel discovered the first cross-border tunnel between Gaza and Egypt, which was used to smuggle weapons.³³

In turn, Hamas has resorted to tunneling as a strategic approach since its inception in 1987. Notably, Mahmoud al-Mabhouh (1960–2010), one of the leaders of the Qassam Brigades, utilized tunnels to evade Israeli security forces, escaping to Egypt in September 1989.³⁴ The group’s tunnel-digging activity escalated in the mid-1990s after the Gaza Strip gained some form of self-governance following the Oslo Accords (1993). Up until the early 2000s, tunnels primarily served for the smuggling of people, goods, and weapons through Egypt, providing a source of income for many Palestinian families engaged in tunnel construction. The surge in tunnel smuggling prompted the Israeli army to launch multiple campaigns to destroy them,³⁵ claiming the successful elimination of approximately a hundred tunnels by June 2004.³⁶ Despite the relatively modest nature of these tunnels, and before Hamas assumed full control over the Gaza Strip, Israeli intelligence warnings as early as 2004 highlighted the imperative to recognize Hamas tunnels as a strategic threat. However, the eradication of tunnels proved elusive, and border tunnels with Egypt persisted until 2015.³⁷

From 2001 to 2005, amidst the unilateral disengagement and withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza, the use of booby-trapped tunnels by Palestinian armed groups gained prominence and became instrumental in targeting Israeli soldiers entrenched in Gaza. During this period, the Qassam Brigades orchestrated a series of operations, including:

• 26 September 2001: Planting and detonating a bomb within a 150-meter-long tunnel beneath the Israeli military base Termid, situated on the southern border of the Gaza Strip. This operation led to the injury of three Israeli soldiers.³⁸

• 17 December 2003: Blowing up an Israeli observation tower at the Haradon military base by means of a 200-meter-long booby-trapped tunnel. This operation led to the death and injury of several Israeli soldiers.³⁹

• 27 June 2004: Detonating a 495-meter-long booby-trapped tunnel using three high-explosive devices weighing 2000 kilograms at the Orhan (Mahfouza) military base north of Qarara in Gaza. This operation resulted in the death of seven soldiers and the injury of 20 others.⁴⁰

• 7 December 2004: Exploding a 1500-kilogram explosive device through a booby-trapped tunnel, which took four months to dig near the Karni crossing northeast of the Gaza Strip, as part of the Palestinian Operation Piercing Arrow. This operation led to the death of one Israeli soldier and the injury of three others.⁴¹

• 12 December 2004: Detonating a booby-trapped tunnel with a 1300-kilogram explosive device beneath the G.V.T military base near the Rafah border crossing with Egypt, as part of the Palestinian Operation Volcanoes of Rage, which also involved the infiltration of Palestinian fighters into the base through another 600-meter-long tunnel. This operation resulted in the death of five Israeli soldiers and the injury of six others,⁴² and marked the first incident that the Palestinian armed groups use offensive tunnels to infiltrate behind the enemy lines.

These operations, using rudimentary tunnels where fighters plant explosives by crawling into narrow tunnels, have entrenched a strategic conviction for Palestinian armed groups that subterranean warfare is the ideal way to confront the Israeli army that control the vital space above ground. This conviction manifests in Hamas’s narrative about the Israeli withdrawal in 2005, which they attribute to the security burden endured by the Israeli army and their inability to safeguard its military bases from the relentless Palestinian armed groups’ attacks in the Gaza Strip. Hamas portrays the disengagement as a form of liberation, not withdrawal, referring to the areas from which Israel withdrew as liberated zones (muḥarrarāt).

On 25 June 2006, Palestinian armed groups used offensive tunnels for the second time. The Qassam Brigades, in collaboration with Al-Nasser Salah al-Deen Brigades and the Army of Islam, orchestrated the notable Operation Vanishing Illusion, which targeted support and protection sites affiliated with the Israeli army on the eastern borders of Rafah. Palestinian fighters infiltrated from Gaza through an underground tunnel behind enemy lines, detonated a tank, destroyed an armored carrier, and partially damaged the Red Tower intelligence site. This operation resulted in the death of two Israeli soldiers, injuries to others, and the capture of soldier Gilad Shalit.⁴³

Israel responded to this operation by launching a series of military operations in the Gaza Strip collectively known as Summer Rains (June-August 2006)⁴⁴ to secure the release of the abducted soldier and destroy the tunnels. Israel, however, fell short of achieving these objectives, and military tunnels in Gaza continued to represent a strategic and security challenge for Israel, serving as a source of both military and political strength for Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups.

On the other side, the Qassam Brigades used defensive tunnels for the second time as passages to access and target the enemy during the Battle of Al-Furqan on 27 December 2008, a response to the Israeli Operation Cast Lead (27 December 2008–18 January 2009).⁴⁵ After the battle, the Qassam Brigades discerned the indispensable nature of operational tunnels for command, control, and mobility, things that become inherently challenging under constant surveillance reconnaissance aircrafts and amidst intense aerial bombardment.

In tandem with the persistent development and proliferation of military tunnels, particularly offensive ones,⁴⁶ the period spanning from 2007–2014 saw the extensive growth of smuggling tunnels, referred to as economic tunnels, along the Egyptian-Gazan border. Subsequently, these tunnels underwent institutionalization with the establishment of the Tunnels Authority under the Ministry of Interior and National Security in Gaza, which took charge of licensing, taxation, and oversight of tunnel activities. Post-2006, tunnels in Gaza expanded with the imposition of the Israeli siege, and were used to transfer essential goods, commodities, and food into Gaza. They were also involved in smuggling various types of weapons, ammunition, and military manufacturing materials. At its peak, the number of these tunnels was estimated at around 3000, with some extending to depths exceeding 25 meters. They varied in size and construction, ranging from those spacious enough for a car to pass through to narrower ones requiring individuals to crouch. Approximately 20,000 Palestinian workers and 10,000 Egyptian workers were employed to work in these tunnels,⁴⁷ which remained vital until the Egyptian authorities launched a military campaign to destroy them in 2014, following an Israeli request according to Israeli Minister of Infrastructure and Energy Yuval Steinitz.⁴⁸ The campaign involved flooding the tunnels with water, establishing a buffer zone along the Gaza-Egypt border (14 kilometers) through the construction of a 25-meter-deep concrete wall along the border, and a 20–30-meter-deep iron wall.⁴⁹ Furthermore, a presidential decree issued in April 2014 in Egypt imposed a life sentence for individuals caught engaging in tunnel-digging activities across the border.⁵⁰

Border tunnels with Egypt continued to exist albeit to a lesser extent. On the other hand, offensive tunnels extending from Gaza into Israel evolved into a more efficient and effective network than previously observed. The same evolution applies to tunnels within Gaza, now characterized as constituting a city beneath the city. These tunnels are no longer mere mud pits; they have rather acquired complex engineering processes, incorporating electric generators, communication systems, ventilation, living facilities, and logistical supply means, a transformation that notably transpired during the events of the 2014 war.

Combat and Operational Tunnels Systems: 2014–2023

In October 2013, the Israeli army announced its discovery of a subterranean tunnel measuring 18 meters in depth and stretching over 1.7 kilometers. It extended from the Gaza Strip into Israel near Kibbutz Ein HaShlosha (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Offensive tunnel scheme discovered by Israel near kibbutz ein HaShlosha in 2013.⁵¹

This tunnel captured the attention of Israeli officials due to its advanced construction. It boasted electricity, ample supplies for several months, and exhibited a level of sophistication surpassing the rudimentary tunnels previously encountered by Israel. In response, Israel decided to suspend the entry of construction materials into Gaza, claiming that they could be used for non-civilian purposes. However, Israel only realized the real threat posed by the tunnels when a combat group consisting of 13 members from the Qassam Brigades successfully carried out an infiltration operation through a tunnel extending into Israel on 17 July 2014. This operation prompted the Israeli army to initiate a ground offensive, Operation Protective Edge, with the primary objective of destroying the tunnels. However, these tunnels turned out to be the Achilles’ heel of the operation, ultimately leading to its failure.

During Operation Empty Field of Stalks and Straw, launched by the Qassam Brigades in response to the Israeli Operation Protective Edge on 7 July 2014, Palestinian armed groups executed six infiltration operations through tunnels into the borders of Israel. They engaged in clashes with Israeli forces in four of these incidents.⁵² One was the attack on the Sufa military base southeast of Gaza on 19 July 2014, during which the Qassam fighters infiltrated through an underground tunnel into the settlement of Ashkelon north of Gaza, conducted reconnaissance and sabotage activities on intelligence systems, scuffled with Israeli forces, and eventually withdrew. On the same day, 12 members of the Qassam Brigades successfully carried out a disembarkation through a tunnel into Al-Ahrash area behind the Abu Mutaibeq military base, resulting in the death of eight Israeli soldiers.⁵³ The following day, 20 July 2014, the Qassam Brigades managed to lure an Israeli military force attempting to advance east of the Tuffah neighborhood in Gaza into a minefield. The fighters detonated two military vehicles, killing 14 Israeli soldiers and capturing the soldier Shaul Aron through an internal tunnel.⁵⁴ Further, the Qassam Brigades executed disembarkation at the military base 16 east of Beit Hanoun through a 3-kilometer-long tunnel on 21 July 2014, resulting in the death of five Israeli soldiers.⁵⁵ Another disembarkation unfolded at the Nahal Oz military base east of Shejaiya on 28 July 2014, resulting in the death of ten Israeli soldiers.⁵⁶

With the end of the 2014 war, the effectiveness of operational tunnels became evident, underscoring the success of the Palestinian armed groups in mastering highly intricate construction tasks,⁵⁷ thereby unfolding the presence of an extensive “tunnel system”. The network of tunnels has evolved to include multiple entrances and exits, control rooms equipped with electricity, ventilation systems, internal communication networks, storage areas stocked with fuel and food sufficient for several months, as well as medical facilities. These tunnels are spacious, easily to navigate through, mostly constructed from concrete, and some even designed to accommodate motorcycles.⁵⁸ Moreover, tunnels have become more strategically secure. Iron gates now separate different sections of a single tunnel, serving the purpose of mitigating the shockwave in case one part of the tunnel is targeted.⁵⁹ These tunnels resemble an immobile underground train with multiple trailers. Various types of military tunnels have also emerged, showcasing a heightened level of sophistication and strategic planning.

In addition to the types of tunnels outlined in Table 1, booby-trapped tunnels existed and were commonly used before 2005 to plant explosives beneath Israeli military sites and bases. It is noteworthy that one tunnel can embody a hybrid nature, concurrently serving defensive, offensive, and logistical purposes as dictated by the prevailing circumstances. Additionally, certain tunnels are strategically engineered to adapt their purposes or act as substitutes for other tunnels that may have been exposed or demolished.

Table 1. Military tunnels in the Gaza Strip.⁶⁰

Type	Location	Description	Uses
Offensive	Border areas and cross-border	Hidden ambush with multiple exits	Executing infiltration operations and kidnapping soldiers
Defensive	Inside Gaza	Tens of exits divert from it	Confronting ground invasions and executing operations behind enemy lines
Missile Launcher	Inside Gaza	a pit with a movable steel cover contains a mortar and a missile launcher connected from the inside with another tunnel, enabling guidance, ammunition supplies, and maintenance	Firing rockets and ammunition when fighters are unable to navigate due to aerial bombing and oversight by reconnaissance planes
Internal Supply	Inside Gaza	Connected to offensive, defensive, and missile tunnels	Storing and transferring ammunition and supplies
External Supply	Cross-border	Extending from southern Gaza into Egypt	Smuggling weapons, ammunition, cars, and manufacturing materials into the Gaza Strip
Command and Control	Inside Gaza	Spacious chambers containing communication and living essentials	contains command centers to control military operations considered as shelters to command Palestinian armed fighters that are threatened of being assassinated during wars hiding enemy’s prisoners
Navigation	Inside Gaza	A short tunnel connecting nearby areas	Navigation of fighters between different areas during wars away from being detected

Border-crossing military tunnels comprise two types: external supply tunnels, which extend from southern Gaza Strip into Egypt and are used to smuggle weapons, ammunition, vehicles, and contraband manufacturing materials into the Gaza Strip, and offensive tunnels that extend to Israel, and are designed to enable armed groups to penetrate Israeli border defenses without detection, set ambushes for Israeli security forces, and attack military targets surprisingly and swiftly. Attacks are orchestrated by a small number of individuals, armed with light machine guns, rifles, hand grenades, and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). In some instances, attackers don camouflage uniforms resembling those worn by the Israeli army to confuse Israeli soldiers. Israeli forces have found in some discovered offensive tunnels items such as tight plastic handcuffs and tranquilizers, indicating preparations for capturing operations, as well as motorcycles that facilitates movement inside Israel during attacks.⁶¹

Internal military tunnels within the borders of the Gaza Strip encompass five types: defensive; missile launcher; internal supply; command and control; and navigation. These tunnels are strategically designed to establish communication channels and facilitate military operations during wartime, allowing armed fighters to move from one place to another without being detected by Israeli forces. The significance of defensive tunnels becomes particularly pronounced during ground incursions by the Israeli army into the Gaza Strip, as they enable Palestinian armed forces to curtail the maneuverability of the Israeli army by setting up ambushes for military vehicles and launching surprise attacks from unexpected places.⁶² Fighters, often affiliated with the Anti-Armor Unit in the Qassam Brigades and the Artillery Unit in the Quds Brigades, emerge from tunnels in open areas or within buildings, fire anti-tank shells at Israeli forces, and then retreat back into the same tunnel or another underground tunnel to evade a potential Israeli retaliation. These continuous hit-and-run operations were showcased in footage released by the military media of the Qassam Brigades during the October 7 attack.

The Israeli army believes that each Hamas brigade has its own tunnels. It categorizes the military tunnels in Gaza into three main types: offensive, defensive, and logistical. There are also the “strategic tunnels”, which are designated for senior Hamas officials and for holding prisoners, and are characterized by being deeper, more developed, and fortified. Additionally, there are the “tactical tunnels” that consist of several small tunnels connected to a main tunnel, allowing fighters to exit from various points in the battlefield. The Israeli army’s categories align with the Palestinian fighters’ classification of tunnels, which indicates the extent to which these tunnels are developed in terms of number and type.⁶³

Following the 2014 war, Israel recognized that tunnels had evolved into one of the most formidable weapons for Palestinian armed groups, particularly after they gained prominence in the Battle of Shejaiya and the infiltration operations behind enemy lines. An Israeli soldier who participated in the Battle of Shejaiya remarked: “It was like I was fighting ghosts. You don’t see them”.⁶⁴ Israeli soldiers involved in the ground campaign in Gaza during Operation Iron Swords (7 October 2023–) said that gunfire, tank targeting, and attacks on Israeli military vehicles mostly came from tunnel exits. They emphasized that the battlegrounds encompass thousands of tunnel exits, enabling Palestinian armed fighters to move for miles underground.⁶⁵

According to Israeli military estimates, the construction of an advanced tunnel with a length of three kilometers costs around three million US dollars and may require the removal of 9 tons of clay, the use of 1800 tons of concrete, and three years of labor.⁶⁶ If these estimates were accurate, coupled with the fact that the total length of the tunnel network exceeds 500 kilometers, then Gaza’s tunnels might have incurred a total cost of around half a billion dollars. This figure, modest in comparison to the billions of dollars spent by Israel on countering these tunnels, as detailed in the following section, makes this tactic an economically effective mean of defense, beside its impact in reducing the gap in armaments.

The 2023–2024 Gaza war and the previous rounds of conflict, especially in 2014 and 2021, have demonstrated that the Israeli army lacks the means to halt Palestinian armed groups except through the complete destruction of tunnels. This cannot be achieved through aerial bombardment only; rather, it requires extensive, long-term military invasion involving the discovery, tracking, and destruction/neutralization of tunnel entrances/exits. This is a challenging process, especially that tunnel entrances may be booby-trapped, a factor that has resulted in casualties among Israeli forces, as evidenced in both the 2014 and 2023–2024 wars.⁶⁷ In light of these challenges, how does Israel plan its war against tunnels, and what military technologies does it use?

“Fighting Ghosts”: The Israeli Strategy against the Gazan Tunnels

The Israeli army claimed to have successfully destroyed hundreds of tunnels during Operation Cast Lead (2008–2009), including one hundred tunnels in a single day.⁶⁸ It reported the destruction of 140 tunnels dedicated to weapon transportation in Operation Pillar of Defense (14–21 November 2012)⁶⁹ and 32 tunnels during the Operation Protective Edge, including 14 tunnels penetrating into Israel.⁷⁰ The Israeli army further declared its discovery of an offensive tunnel extending into Israel in April 2016,⁷¹ the destruction of an offensive tunnel that extended from Gaza to a village nearby Kibbutz Kissufim in October 2017, the destruction of an advanced tunnel that extended from Khan Yunis in southern Gaza to Israel in December 2017, and the destruction of a 180-meter tunnel under the Kerem Shalom crossing in January 2018.⁷² In March 2018, the Israeli army alleged thwarting an attempt to renew an old tunnel toward the Kerem Shalom crossing, stating that it was the first time the Palestinian armed forces try to reuse an old tunnel by connecting it to a newly built one nearby.⁷³ In June 2018, Israel claimed to have destroyed an underwater offensive tunnel extending beyond the security buffer zone in northern Gaza.⁷⁴ Using sensors on the concrete border wall, the Israeli army claimed to have detected an offensive tunnel extending from Khan Yunis to Israel in October 2020.⁷⁵ During Operation Guardian of the Walls (10–21 May 2021), Israel asserted the destruction of 100 kilometers of tunnels.⁷⁶

However, these numbers do not specify the extent to which the destruction of these tunnels actually impacted the capabilities of Palestinian armed groups. On the other hand, the discovery and destruction of these tunnels have not added a tangible strategic advantage for the Israeli approach in countering tunnel threats. Israel continues to heavily rely on the technological aspect, which has not proven its operational efficacy. It is essential to note the absence of any neutral assessment or literature that scrutinizes the credibility of Israel’s claims, which sometimes appear geared toward showcasing its advanced technological systems in the “war on terror” market.

Despite these claims, Hamas affirmed that the 11-day 2021 war had only impacted 5% of the tunnels. More than two years later, the 2023–2024 Gaza war demonstrated the sustained effectiveness of the tunnels. The destruction of a single tunnel is a lengthy, complex process, while detonating its entrance or external parts leaves most of the tunnel intact. Consequently, tunnel units of Palestinian armed factions can dig bypass sections, allowing them to continue using the tunnel. This prompted Israel to formulate a military strategy, notably after Operation Protective Edge, which can be discerned through anti-tunnel projects, specialized units, and technologies that detect, destruct, and neutralize tunnels.

Tackling Tunnels: Israeli Projects and Units

In August 2014, the Israeli army unveiled the “Iron Digger”, designed as the ground counterpart to the air-defense Iron Dome system. Its primary mission is to detect any tunnelling operations through sensors that monitor excavations and voids underground, subsequently employing a new generation of robots to discover the inner structures of tunnels.⁷⁷ In early 2016, the Israeli Ministry of Defense launched the initial phase to counter offensive tunnels in the Gaza Strip, which involved a series of engineering labor named Operation South Flamboyance.⁷⁸ The billion-dollar project covered the entire Gaza border (65 kilometers) and comprised the construction of a “smart wall” in three stages that were completed in December 2021: the construction of an underground concrete barrier, the building of a six-meter-long wall, and the installation of surveillance systems and sensors both above and below ground.⁷⁹ In 2016, the Israeli army also established a technological laboratory for detecting and locating tunnels through field research that scans underground voids, through which it claimed to have successfully detected five tunnels.⁸⁰

In addition to projects aimed at countering tunnels, the Israeli Combat Engineering Corps incorporates specialized forces for tunnel warfare, notably the Yahalom Unit. Operating in the southern region of Israel, this unit engages in tunnel combat operations and fulfils various emergency roles. It specializes in detecting and destroying tunnels, demolishing and detonating buildings, handling explosives, preparing explosive devices and bombs, neutralizing explosive devices, and clearing complex minefields. Following the 2014 war, the Yahalom unit underwent reorganization, to incorporate two additional platoons. Therefore, the unit now comprises five platoons: two specialized in disposing explosive munitions, the Sayfan platoon specialized in dealing with unconventional weapons, the Yael platoon specialized in engineering reconnaissance, and the Samur platoon specialized in tunnel warfare.⁸¹ Since 2016, the size of the unit has gradually doubled from 400 to 900 expert fighters proficient in complex military engineering tasks.⁸² This expansion is a response to the challenges the Israeli army encountered during Operation Protective Edge, particularly the slow handling and destruction of discovered tunnels.⁸³ Therefore, the number of forces trained to address tunnels during the 2023–2024 Gaza war has doubled compared to 2014.

Within the Yahalom Unit, the Yael and Samur platoons play pivotal roles. The Yael platoon operates under the command of the Gaza Division and is tasked with identifying the locations of offensive tunnels, creating detailed maps, and destroying them. It is also responsible for integrating ground data with intelligence and technological information to formulate a unified operational plan. The Samur platoon focuses on combating weapon caches and tunnels, boasting expertise in underground combat. It is actively engaged in identifying and destroying tunnels, undergoing rigorous training on operations within tunnels, including training on communication and breathing systems.⁸⁴

Soldiers of the Samur platoon undergo training in controlling tunnel exploration robots, detonating explosive devices, and directing trained military dogs to detect explosives and attack fighters. The Roboteam company in Tel Aviv has developed robots that attack tunnels, including the small throwable reconnaissance robot IRIS Throwbot, a spy robot that is capable of navigating through tunnels and transmitting images using specialized sensors to detect objects and individuals. There are also robots capable of using sensors and specialized equipment to find and detonate explosive traps. These are more like ground vehicles resembling the self-driving vehicle used by the US Marine Corps known as Gladiator, which embeds sensors and a 7.62 mm caliber machine gun. The Israeli army also employs trained military dogs that belong to the Oketz Unit to sniff out explosives, locate tunnel entrances/exits, and attack armed individuals.⁸⁵

Recognizing the escalating threat posed by tunnels, the former Head of the Gaza Division, Yehuda Fox, decided in June 2018 to establish a specialized underground combat unit consisting of a laboratory and two platoons. The laboratory is known as “The Brain” and brings together experts from the Ministry of Defense, geologists, intelligence officers, and military and civilian advisors. The two platoons were established within the northern and the southern regional brigades of the Gaza Division, tasked with identifying the locations of offensive tunnels and destroying them, as well as coordinating intelligence information for field deployment. Each platoon is structured with two integral sections: the first section boasts an engineering reconnaissance force specializing in underground decryption, while the second section comprises fighters equipped with specialized techniques.⁸⁶

The 2023–2024 Gaza war has served as a rigorous test for Israeli initiatives aimed at countering tunnels, notably the smart wall. The defensive barrier was breached by Palestinian armed groups on 7 October 2023, including land, sea, and air infiltrations. Additionally, the smart wall failed to thwart offensive tunnels, as exemplified by the Israeli army’s announcement on 17 December 2023 regarding the discovery of an offensive tunnel belonging to the Qassam Brigades. This tunnel, the largest of its kind, extended from Jabalia to an area near the Erez crossing into Israel, boasting a length of 4 kilometers, a depth of 50 meters, and the capacity to accommodate cars.⁸⁷ The ground invasion also underscored the limited combat effectiveness of the Yahalom Unit, of which a large number of members were killed during the ground battles in Gaza, including the unit’s deputy commander, despite their specialization in tunnel warfare and the advanced training its soldiers receive.⁸⁸ The unit’s members heavily relies on robots and military dogs in dealing with the tunnels to avoid direct engagement with Palestinian fighters inside the tunnels. Notably, the unit resorted to controversial tactics, such as using Gazan youth as human shields by coercing them to wear explosives belt and GoPro cameras, wrapping a rope around their waist, and compelling them to enter the tunnels and detonate the explosive belt if the camera detects the presence of any fighters.⁸⁹

Detecting and Destroying Tunnels: Israeli Technology and Its Limitations

Techniques to Discover Tunnels

The discovery of tunnels poses a significant challenge for Israel, which employs various techniques for this purpose. This involves searching in suspicious areas and deploying cameras and robots to investigate these sites, shifting away from traditional intelligence that relied mainly on informants, who were deterred by Hamas over the past years through Al-Majd security apparatus. The Israeli Air Force also participates in monitoring tunnel-related activities using reconnaissance aircrafts to observe digging sites or trucks suspected of transporting clay or digging residues within the Gaza Strip. However, detecting tunnels remains a difficult task because their digging often begins in covered spaces (buildings, agricultural greenhouses, etc).⁹⁰ On the other hand, it is challenging to discover the exits of cross-border offensive tunnels leading into Israel, as the final few meters of these tunnels are dug shortly before execution. For this reason, Israel uses various techniques to uncover tunnels.

Ground-penetrating radar, geophones, controlled detonations, and seismic sensor devices (Table 2) aim to detect and locate tunnels. Conversely, the magenta hair technique is not used for tunnel detection but for mapping and understanding the structure after discovering one of its entrances. This involves deploying smoke grenades inside the tunnel and observing magenta smoke strands emerging from nearby buildings or entrances, aiding in identifying the network of tunnels connected to the discovered entrance.

Table 2. Techniques used by Israel to detect and locate tunnels.⁹¹

Technique	Limitation(s)
Radar for exploring the underground in limited depths	Deep tunnels remain undiscovered Ineffective with mixed grounds (sand, clay, rocks) Interrupted by walls or leftovers underground
Geophones to detect digging sounds	Ineffective with completed tunnels
Controlled detonation to generate echo (a technique used in the oil industry)	Ineffective because it is used in the oil industry to look up something deeper and more different
Traditional seismic sensor devices	Vibrations from road traffic and heavy agricultural equipment interfere with narrowband seismic techniques Only target tunnels that are 20–30 meters deep Ineffective with sand, which disperse digging sounds
Magenta Hair	Requires the pre-discovery of a tunnel exit Not practical if other tunnel exits are not open or nearby

The aforementioned techniques have been used by Israeli anti-tunnel projects such as Iron Mole and South Flamboyance, as well as by the Israeli army and specialized units within the Israeli Combat Engineering Corps, such as Yael and Samur platoons within the Yahalom Unit. However, these efforts have not yielded significant successes. Radars, geophones, and seismic sensor devices have not operated efficiently in detecting Gaza tunnels for six main reasons:

1. They primarily target incomplete tunnels or ones being dug in the meantime;

2. They focus on narrow and shallow tunnels, lacking the capacity to reach deeper or multi-layered tunnels;

3. They specifically target offensive tunnels, lacking the capacity to reach internal tunnels unless through extensive ground incursion operations;

4. The sandy nature of the ground in the Gaza Strip disperses drilling sounds and hinders the functioning of sensing devices, unlike the rocky ground in areas bordering Lebanon, where the task appears comparatively more feasible;

5. Detecting tunnels requires knowledge of their entrances or needs discovery using the aforementioned techniques or sound devices. However, discovering the tunnel entrance does not guarantee detecting its precise network, which may branch into multiple tunnels, with different entrances and exits;

6. The aforementioned techniques require ground troops capable of operating large (and not necessarily practical) devices in exposed areas. This makes them vulnerable to infiltrations, snipers, artillery shells, or booby-trapped ambushes.

Upon the identification of a tunnel and prior to its destruction or neutralization, Israeli military diggers and bulldozers serve three primary purposes: neutralize any booby-trapped tunnels or devices that may injure or kill soldiers; assist in mapping of the tunnel; and dig routes that enable the implementation of destruction methods, such as bombs or water. If tunnels are successfully discovered and located, the Israeli army then aims to render them non-repairable or diminish their effectiveness, particularly during times of war, using various techniques.

Techniques to Destroy and Neutralize Tunnels

Modern armies typically rely on punitive airstrikes to destroy tunnels, nullifying their effectiveness by destroying or blocking tunnel entrances. However, this tactical approach may face challenges, particularly in situations where there is a lack of intelligence regarding tunnel locations. The task becomes more complex when targeting densely populated urban areas, as is the case in Gaza, where Israeli airstrikes have caused immense destruction without inflicting significant damage to the Palestinian armed groups’s infrastructure. Despite that the Israeli army claimed to have targeted more than 11000–12000 targets inside Gaza⁹² in less than one month into the 2023–2024 Gaza war,⁹³ defensive tunnels in Gaza remain pivotal in the combat effectiveness of Hamas and other groups for the surprise element they add, alongside missile tunnels. This reaffirms that air force alone is insufficient to achieve Israel’s desired objectives, echoing patterns observed in previous conflicts from 2008 to 2021.

Since the 2008–2009 war, Israel has deployed a variety of techniques in its comprehensive wars in the Gaza Strip to destroy or neutralize tunnels (Table 3). These techniques are largely imported from the United States and can be categorized into aerial and ground-based techniques. Aerial techniques encompass targeting suspected locations with heavy bombs, most notably the Bunker Busters and Thermobaric Bombs. Ground-based techniques include tunnel destruction through Kinetic Drilling, flooding tunnels with explosive liquid Emulsa, water, or cement, and tunnel neutralization with Sponge Bombs. These techniques are complemented by the use of diggers and bulldozers to assist in the removal of explosives.

Table 3. Techniques used by Israel to destroy/ neutralize tunnels.¹⁰⁰

Technique	Limitation(s)
Bunker Busters	Ineffective with tunnels that exceed 30 meters in depth. Destroys parts of the tunnel vertically, which does not necessarily neutralize the tunnel, especially those with multiple routes and exits
Thermobaric Bomb	Considered as an internationally-banned weapon Not suitable to use under the water or in bad weather conditions Its effectiveness decreases when thrown from a high height
Kinetic Drilling	Difficult to adjust ammunition so that it explodes at the suitable depth The resulting debris complicates efforts to discover tunnels
“Emulsa” Explosives	Requires a great amount of jelly substance “Emulsa” Required ground forces to secure tunnels for a long period
Water Dumping	Ineffective with advanced concrete tunnels Requires a large amount of water Requires a great deal of time
Sponge Bomb	Does not destroy the tunnels but blocks its exit Ineffective with tunnels of multiple entrances and exits Accompanied with risks.

Bunker Busters are highly potent bombs designed to penetrate deep into the ground and capable of breaching even the most robust defensive fortifications, whether made of metal-reinforced concrete or pure metal—materials Israel expects to find in tunnel structures. There are two types of these bombs: one features a single explosive head and a fuse that delays explosion to prevent premature detonation upon impact, enabling the bomb to penetrate deeply before exploding. The second type carries two bombs; the first is a small one that aims to create a hole, enabling the main bomb to penetrate and cause maximum destruction.⁹⁴ Among the bombs used by Israel is the GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb, weighing 129 kilograms and capable of penetrating one meter of concrete. Another is the GBU-28 weighing 2300 kilograms, capable of penetrating up to 30 meters of fortifications. The unguided MK-84 bomb can penetrate 3 meters of concrete and 11 meters into the ground. The United States first used MK-84 against tunnels during the Vietnam War. Israel used the MK-84 in the 2014 and 2021 wars, revealing its greater potential for causing indiscriminate civilian casualties rather than effectively destroy tunnels.⁹⁵

The Thermobaric Bomb possesses a circular blast radius of approximately 300 meters. It consists of a solid fuel charge and two explosive charges, relying on the oxygen present in the surroundings, unlike traditional explosives that involve an oxidizer-fuel mixture. Upon reaching their target, the first explosive charge opens, dispersing the fuel mixture in the form of a cloud that infiltrates loosely closed entrances or defenses. Subsequently, the second charge detonates within the cloud, generating a fireball and two massive shockwaves that create a negative pressure, depleting oxygen at the explosion site. This mechanism enhances the Thermobaric Bomb’s capacity to disrupt and collapse even the foundations of the targeted building or tunnel, compared to traditional bombs that only destroy the external part of the target. This type of bomb can result in the suffocation and/or burning of individuals inside the tunnel or the explosion area by depleting oxygen and generating high temperatures. However, its reliance on the oxygen in the surroundings makes it unsuitable for underwater, high altitude, and adverse weather conditions where low oxygen levels necessary for the thermal reaction may be lacking.⁹⁶

Kinetic Drilling involves the deployment of Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM), which include fuses that delay explosions at regular intervals along the tunnel to ensure its complete destruction. However, experience has exposed challenges in precisely adjusting the munitions to explode at the correct depth. Additionally, the resulting debris hinders tunnels’ detection and locating. In a similar vein, jelly explosives, such as Emulsa, are used. Nevertheless, destroying a medium-sized tunnel requires flooding it with 9–11 tons of this substance and securing it for an extended period.⁹⁷ The same applies to the use of cement or water to flood tunnels. Further, water is ineffective in destroying advanced concrete tunnels.

In an operation dubbed “Sea of Atlantis”, the Israeli military has completed the installation of massive seawater pumping stations near Al-Shati Camp and in other regions in the Gaza Strip, including Khan Yunis, in mid-November 2023. These pumps can transfer thousands of cubic meters of water per hour to the tunnels. The process of dumping seawater into the tunnels have commenced on 13 December 2023, and is expected to require around one million cubic meters of seawater, according to Israeli estimates.⁹⁸ This approach is believed to compel underground fighters to evacuate and contaminate both groundwater and soil. However, it may not be effective in destroying advanced concrete tunnels.

Contrary to previous techniques, Sponge Bomb does not destroy tunnels but rather attempts to neutralize the threat they pose to ground troops. This non-explosive bomb is composed of chemicals separated by a barrier that dissolves upon activation. The chemicals amalgamate to form a solid, sponge-like substance, effectively sealing tunnel entrances in a manner challenging to undo. For this technique to be effective, locating all tunnel openings is imperative—an arduous task, particularly with defensive tunnels with multiple entrances, both inside and outside buildings. The use of Sponge Bomb is accompanied with the risks, as incidents of impaired visibility have been reported among Israeli soldiers using this technique.⁹⁹

In addition to tunnel destruction or neutralization techniques, the Israeli army uses other means targeted at individuals inside the tunnels. This is because the Israeli military protocol prohibits regular ground forces from entering tunnels to avoid being killed or captured. Among these techniques are military dogs, robots, oxygen deprivation, the use of chemical weapons such as nerve agents, which immobilize individuals for a period of time, the prolonged siege, and the continuation of the war. Israel believes that the latter two may force Hamas leaders and fighters to come to the surface when their supplies and the necessary fuel for underground generators providing light and ventilation run out.

Limitations of Israeli Techniques

While the discovery of tunnels remains a primary challenge for the Israeli strategy, the subsequent process of destroying or neutralizing them proves to be equally formidable. Bunker Busters and Thermobaric Bombs have the greatest efficacy among other techniques. However, their efficacy diminishes in Gaza, where multi-layered and varying-depth tunnels are located in areas of high urban density and a small space not exceeding 365 square kilometers. This dynamic complicates the use of aerial bombardment on buildings, hindering both tunnel discovery and destruction and transforming piles of rubble into an additional barrier. In contrast, interconnected operational tunnels beneath urban areas provide the Palestinian armed groups with the ability to move and carry out defensive attacks against military vehicles and invading forces using sniper rifles, hand grenades, explosive devices, and armor-piercing shells.

The effectiveness of these bombs is further compromised by the tunnel’s structure, particularly in the case of logistical tunnels (command and control, internal supply, and navigation). These tunnels are dug at considerable depths to evade detection and targeting. Further, most parts of these tunnels, except for subsidiary rooms, feature a narrow construction pattern with an average width of one meter and an average height of two meters. This combat design is achieved by aligning concrete walls and arches using concrete molds, rendering them more resilient and challenging to breach. Kinetic Drilling, “Emulsa” explosives, or water dumping appear impractical because there are different types of tunnels that vary in size, depth, construction materials, and location. Each tunnel demands a distinct approach if, in the first place, Israel succeeds in locating it. Additionally, inherent limitations are associated with each of these techniques.

On the other hand, the efficacy of Israeli technologies in detecting or destroying tunnels is diminished due to the continuous military and operational development of the Palestinian armed groups, which have not only learned from past war experiences but also have benefited from the techniques used in civilian tunnels (sewage systems, mine tunnels, and transportation tunnels) worldwide. In this context, the Israeli army announced on 16 January 2024 its discovery of a tunnel that is 9 meters deep and hundreds of meters long. The tunnel had crossed the Gaza Valley, connecting the southern and northern parts of the Gaza Strip. This indicates that Hamas has learned from previous war experiences particularly the 2008–2009 and 2014 wars, during which Israel executed division plans that cut the Strip into two parts. More importantly, this incident reveals the advanced level of tunnel engineering and reinforcement, especially under a watercourse and in clayey conditions.¹⁰¹

Additionally, Palestinian armed groups leverage the Israeli army’s open-source intelligence¹⁰² to inform their defensive measures. The tunnel network has become extensive and intricate, considering the risks associated with detection and destruction techniques. Osama Hamdan, member of Hamas’s politburo, said: “The tunnels were built by well-trained and educated engineers who considered all possible attacks from the occupation, including pumping water”.¹⁰³ This includes placing a pit at tunnel entrances to prevent the leakage of liquid explosives or water. Moreover, ventilation openings are incorporated inside the tunnel to eliminate toxic gases. Safe rooms are constructed alongside the tunnel routes for the protection of fighters. The tunnels are segmented with iron doors that impede gas leakage, disrupt explosion waves, and hinder pursuit by Israeli forces or the use of robots and military dogs.¹⁰⁴ Furthermore, tunnels are equipped with essential life necessities such as food, water, power generators, and ventilation systems, enabling Palestinian fighters to endure prolonged warfare and siege conditions.

The prominent assumption in the analysis of asymmetric and hybrid warfare is the substantial gap in readiness and armament in favor of the larger party. It is presumed that actors with limited military capabilities must bridge this gap through innovation and the use of cost-effective tools to attain their goals while simultaneously imposing financial and symbolic burdens on the larger adversary. In this context, it is noteworthy the inflated cost associated with Israeli techniques in comparison to the minimal cost of tunnel construction on one hand, and the slow pace of tunnel detection operations in comparison to the Palestinian armed group’s evolving ability to compensate for and re-fortify tunnels that have been neutralized on the other hand.

As demonstrated in the 2023–2024 Gaza war, it appears that the Israeli military strategy is shifting toward neutralizing or obstructing tunnels through airstrikes or the deployment of Sponge Bombs. However, these endeavors have not succeeded, even in northern Gaza, where Israel has managed to gain control over certain areas, and where Palestinian fighters are using each tunnel repeatedly, including those that the Israeli army has officially announced as destroyed. On 3 December 2023, the Israeli army reported its discovery of 800 tunnel entrances, and that it destroyed and neutralized 500 of them.¹⁰⁵

Conclusion

The Gaza war has recorded an alarming toll of unparalleled casualties, destruction, and a staggering number of Israeli airstrikes, marking an unprecedent in the Palestinian history. Strategically, the dynamics of asymmetric warfare between a conventional army and an armed movement typically do not result in the defeat of the regular army. Instead, its purpose is to pose continuous security challenges that compel the army to either negotiate or seek political resolutions. In this context, the Palestinian armed groups in Gaza have effectively used tunnels as an operational tool in wars, overcoming the challenges posed by Gaza’s small geography, the enduring siege, and the lack of an air force on one hand, and the Israeli army’s military, intelligence, and surveillance superiority on the other. The Palestinian armed groups have moved the battle to areas where they have a performance superiority. This has compelled the Israeli military to change its strategic approach into engaging in ground warfare instead of relying solely on airstrikes, which have been favored since the 1982 Beirut war. On a micro-level, the Israeli army has eventually allowed its soldiers to enter the tunnels and engage in combat when the war entered its fourth month despite the unprecedented number of casualties among the soldiers, and although previous military instructions prohibited Israeli soldiers from entering tunnels and to rely instead on military dogs and robots. This decision was made based on Israeli intelligence’s belief that captives and Hamas leaders are still present inside the tunnels.¹⁰⁶

Tunnels have become a primary target in Israeli wars on the Gaza Strip since the 2014 war, during which the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that the goal of the ground operation was to destroy the tunnels,¹⁰⁷ a goal that was reasserted during the 2021 conflict. However, tunnels remain resistant to detection and complete destruction despite that Israel had conducted seven military operations over the past nine years.¹⁰⁸ This raises doubts about Israel’s ability to destroy the Palestinian armed infrastructure. About 4 months into the war, American and Israeli officials indicated that 80% of Hamas tunnels remained intact despite the extensive Israeli efforts and operations, as well as the various technologies used to destroy them.¹⁰⁹

The covert nature of tunnels makes military planning challenging, as it is difficult to determine the exact area from which the threat emanates, or to define the intended target or the time required to destroy it. This informational gap renders the destruction of tunnels an unattainable objective unless Israel eliminates any threat emerging from both above and beneath the ground.

The tunnel warfare in Gaza offers several theoretical lessons. On the military level, it becomes evident that Israel’s excessive reliance on technology hinders the achievement of its military objectives, whether in detecting or in destroying tunnels. Investment in traditional intelligence remains less costly and more effective, while ground forces are essential for urban combat. Second, Israel seems to have underestimated the strength of Hamas fighters by stating the elimination of Hamas as its overarching strategic goal, and therefore Israel has not been seen yet as a victor of the war. This tells that asymmetric warfare does not include an endgame, particularly in settler-colonial settings and prolonged conflicts, because the smaller party will always seek to re-build its forces.

On the other hand, in the Gazan war case, where there is a heavy armored actor enjoying sovereignty over ground, air, and sea borders, as well as a small, resource-limited actor, military power does not solely determine the outcome of war. Rather, it is the military tactics, which Hamas successfully innovated in Gaza, that enhanced its combat effectiveness and rendered the battlefield unpredictable for its adversary.

Second, the state of perpetual warfare, particularly in a colonial context, makes civilian life militarized in a general sense, including the underground domain. While tunnels have been used in comparative contexts (such as Vietnam, Syria, and Ukraine) for dual purposes—sheltering and protecting civilians and storing weapons while maintaining combat capabilities—internal tunnels in Gaza have been solely utilized for military purposes and concealing enemy captives. This turned the entire city—from main streets to bedrooms—into a battleground, with no safe haven.

While Israel was only able to discover and destroy a limited number of tunnels in Gaza during the 2023–2024 war, compared to figures indicating that they stretched to more than 500 kilometers, it seems clear that Israel succeeded in achieving a parallel goal, that is paralyzing Hamas from the ability to rebuild its military infrastructure, especially tunnels, through plans aimed at imposing direct control and oversight over the Gaza Strip, establishing a buffer zone, dividing the Gaza Strip militarily and security-wise into northern and southern halves, and controlling any building materials that may enter the Strip as part of the reconstruction process to prevent using them for non-civilian purposes, similar to what Israel did at the end of 2013.

Will Israel find a light at the end of the Gaza tunnel? The answer is still very much in doubt, as the ongoing war shows. Israel does not find a light at the end of every tunnel it discovers in Gaza, but it rather finds another tunnel. Israel strategically relies on aerial bombardment, predominantly using Bunker Busters and Thermobaric Bombs, with the aim of maximizing tunnel destruction. However, these strikes only contribute to the destruction of shallow-depth tunnels and blockage of some others, whether in exposed areas or inside buildings. Yet, they do not assist in mapping the entire network of Gazan tunnels but may hinder the discovery or destruction techniques due to the scattered debris, acting as an additional fortification for the tunnels. This is compounded by the considerable cost in the war’s economy and the associated public opinion concerns in Israel. Furthermore, more than a hundred prisoners are held within the tunnels, about 60 of them reportedly killed during Israeli airstrikes. Without asserting full ground control over the Gaza Strip, Israel will be unable to eliminate this strategic threat. All tunnel detection and locating techniques require feet on the ground for extended periods, pointing toward the likelihood of a protracted conflict not only on the surface but also beneath it.

Acknowledgements

I would like to extend my gratitude to Abdou Moussa and Yara Nassar for their constructive comments and help in revising the article. Open Access funding provided by the Qatar National Library.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 Eyal Weizman, Hollow Land: Israel’s Architecture of Occupation (London: Verso, 2012), 253.

2 Rami Amichay and Nidal Al-Mughrabi, “Israelis Near Gaza Fear Hamas is Tunnelling Beneath Them,” Reuters, February 1, 2016, https://tinyurl.com/ywfrehbm

3 Tzvi Joffre, “Hamas’s Sinwar: We Have 500 km of Tunnels in Gaza, Only 5% Were Damaged,” The Jerusalem Post, May 27, 2021, https://tinyurl.com/yd9nwz2b

4 “Gaza Tunnels Stretch At Least 350 Miles, Far Longer than Past Estimate – Report,” The Times of Israel, January 16, 2024, http://tinyurl.com/cb8rv7r6

5 See: Jonathan Saul and Stephen Farrell, “The Hamas Tunnel City Beneath Gaza - A HIDDEN FRONTLINE FOR ISRAEL,” Reuters, October 27, 2023, https://tinyurl.com/2c8x8djb

6 “230 Feet Down: Elite IDF UNIT REVEALS DEEPEST HAMAS TUNNEL EVER FOUND,” The Times of Israel, April 2, 2022, https://tinyurl.com/yuwj4jvh

7 “Destroy” means dismantling the tunnel entirely in an irreparable manner, including its exit/entry points. Whereas “Neutralize” is making the tunnel unusable for a few days/weeks during the battle mostly, by destroying or blocking its openings, or dismantling parts of it.

8 For a historical overview of underground warfare, see: Matthew Leonard, Beneath the Killing Fields: Exploring the Subterranean Landscapes of the Western Front (South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword Archaeology, 2016), ch. 1.

9 Jean-Pierre Filiu, Gaza: A History, John King (trans.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 7.

10 Donald M. Heilig, “Subterranean Warfare: A Counter to US Airpower,” Research Report, Air Command and Staff College, Air University, 2000, v.

11 Allen D. Reece, “A historical analysis of tunnel warfare and the contemporary perspective,” Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College, Kansas, 1997, 21–31.

12 Eran Zohar, “Non-State-Actors and the Subterranean Dimension,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 21, no. 4 (2022): 115–7, 133.

13 Daphné Richemond-Barak, Underground Warfare (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), xi.

14 Christina Steenkamp, “The Impact of Tunnels on Conflicts in the Middle East,” International Affairs 98, no. 2 (2022): 697, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiab230

15 On ISIS’s use of tunnel tactics in Iraq, see: Omar Ashour, How ISIS Fights: Military Tactics in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Egypt (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2021), 57–64.

16 Daphné Richemond-Barak and Stefan Voiculescu-Holvad, “The Rise of Tunnel Warfare as a Tactical, Operational, and Strategic Issue,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (2023): 6, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2023.2244191

17 See: Joshua S. Bowes et al., “The Enemy Below: Preparing Ground Forces for Subterranean Warfare,” Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, California (2013).

18 Michael Alexander, “The Growing Importance of Subterranean Warfare and the Integration of General-Purpose Forces in Subterranean Operations,” in Strategic Latency Unleashed the Role of Technology in a Revisionist Global Order and the Implications for Special Operations Forces, eds. Zachary S. Davis et al. (Livermore: Center for Global Security Research, 2021), 486–7.

19 Patrick Porter, “Review Essay: Shadow Wars: Asymmetric Warfare in the Past and Future,” Security Dialogue 37, no. 4 (2006): 552.

20 David L. Buffaloe, “Defining Asymmetric Warfare,” The Land Warfare Papers, no. 58, Institute of Land Warfare (September 2006): 3.

21 David L. Grange, “Asymmetric Warfare: Old Method, New Concern,” National Strategy Forum Review 9 (Winter, 2000): 1.

22 Franklin B. Miles, “Asymmetric Warfare: An Historical Perspective,” Strategy Research Project, US Army War College (17 March 1999), 4.

23 See: Anthony H. Cordesman, “The ‘Gaza War’: A Strategic Analysis,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (2 February 2009): 67–70.

24 Thomas Zeitzoff, “The Microdynamics of Reciprocity in an Asymmetric Conflict: Hamas, Israel, and the 2008-2009 Gaza Conflict,” (2009). https://doi.org/10.57912/23844603.v1

25 Kobi Michael and Ilana Kwartin, “Considering Operation Protective Edge: Can Declaration of War Be Part of a Strategy to Offset the Asymmetry of the Israeli-Hamas Conflict in the Gaza Strip?,” Military and Strategic Affair 7, no. 1 (2015): 101.

26 Camille Mansour, “Reflections on the War on Gaza,” Journal of Palestine Studies 38, no. 4 (2009): 95.

27 Steenkamp, “The impact of tunnels on conflicts in the Middle East”: 692.

28 Mahmoud Hamed al-Aila, “Resisting the Israeli Siege of Gaza through Economic Tunnels: Solutions from Underground,” [in Arabic] (Master’s diss., Center for Conflict and Humanitarian Studies, Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, 2020), 3.

29 Toufic Haddad, “Insurgent Infrastructure: Tunnels of the Gaza Strip,” Middle East-Topics & Arguments 10 (2018): 74–5.

30 Zohar, “Non-State-Actors and the Subterranean Dimension”: 140–1.

31 See for example: Elhanan Miller, “Hamas, Hezbollah and the Tunnels: Who’s Inspiring Whom?,” The Times of Israel, August 4, 2014, https://tinyurl.com/dzfhbmxh

32 It is noteworthy that, given the advanced level of Hamas’s tunnels, some believe that neither Iran nor Hezbollah trained Hamas how to dig tunnels, and instead it was North Korea. See: Arthur Herman, “Notes from the Underground,” Foreign Affairs, no. 26 (2014): 147.

33 Al-Aila, “Resisting the Israeli Siege of Gaza through Economic Tunnels,” 73.

34 Daniel Rubenstein, “Hamas’ Tunnel Network: A Massacre in the Making,” in The Gaza War 2014: The War Israel Did Not Want and the Disaster It Averted, ed. Hirsh Goodman and Dore Gold (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2015), 120–1.

35 Most prominent is Operation Ranibow (13-24 May 2004). See: Doron Almog, “Tunnel-Vision in Gaza,” Middle East Quarterly 11, no. 3 (2004): 3–11.

36 Yiftah S. Shapir and Gal Perel, “Subterranean Warfare: A New-Old Challenge,” in The Lessons of Operation Protective Edge, ed. Anat Kurz and Shlomo Brom (Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, 2014), 52.

37 Raphael D. Marcus, “Learning ‘Under Fire’: Israel’s Improvised Military Adaptation to Hamas Tunnel Warfare,” Journal of Strategic Studies 42, no. 3-4 (2019): 347, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2017.1307744

38 “Bombing ‘Termid’ Military Base” [in Arabic] Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, https://tinyurl.com/5n7ru6jc

39 “Bombing ‘Haradon’ Military Base” [in Arabic] Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, https://tinyurl.com/fvsczucw

40 “Jihadist Operation ‘Mahfouza’” [in Arabic] Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, https://tinyurl.com/4r8a5tw6

41 “Jihadist Operation ‘Volcanoes of Rage’” [in Arabic] Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, https://tinyurl.com/5fvbay77

42 Ibid.

43 “Qualitative Operation ‘Vanishing Illusion’ – Capturing Soldier Gilad Shalit” [in Arabic], Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, http://tinyurl.com/3bd489ev

44 It involves four sub-operations: Sword of Gilad (5 July 2006); Grasshopper (9 July 2006–15 August 2006); Samson’s Pillars (26–28 July 2006); and Locked Kindergarten (27–31 August 2006). See: Majd Abuamer and Wadee Alarabeed, “The Israeli War on Palestinian Islamic Jihad: Unity of the Arenas Battle and its Strategic Implications,” Strategic Papers, no. 6, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, September 19, 2022, 6-7, .https://tinyurl.com/5n8jw7nb

45 “Battle of Al-Furqan” [in Arabic], Al-Midan, no. 4 (December 2017), 50.

46 For instance, the IDF announced its discovery of a large tunnel near Kibbutz Nirim in November 2012, and another large tunnel near Kibbutz Nir Oz southern of the Gaza Strip in January 2013. Michal Shmulovich, “Large Terror Tunnel from Gaza Discovered Near Kibbutz,” The Times of Israel, January 15, 2013, https://tinyurl.com/mr2b2ycj

47 For detailed research on commercial tunnels in the Gaza Strip, see: Nicolas Pelham, “Gaza’s Tunnel Phenomenon: The Unintended Dynamics of Israel’s Siege,” Journal of Palestine Studies 41, no. 4 (2012): 6–31, https://doi.org/10.1525/jps.2012.XLI.4.6

48 “Egypt Flooded Hamas Tunnels at Israel’s Request, Minister says,” The Times of Israel, February 6, 2016, https://tinyurl.com/57ymp92c

49 See: Shaul Shay, “Egypt’s War Against the Tunnels between Sinai and Gaza Strip,” IPS Publications, IDC Herzliya (January 2016), 1–5.

50 “Egypt Imposes Life Jail Penalty for Cross-Border Tunnel Use,” Reuters, April 12, 2015, https://tinyurl.com/4jr7cr44

51 Raphael S. Cohen et al., From Cast Lead to Protective Edge: Lessons from Israel’s Wars in Gaza (Santa Monica: RAND, 2017), 77.

52 Jeffrey White, “The Combat Performance of Hamas in the Gaza War of 2014,” CTC Sentinel 7, no. 9 (2014), 10-11.

53 “Breaking into ‘Abu Mutaibeq’ military base” [in Arabic], Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, https://tinyurl.com/ycku5rw6

54 “Operation Empty Field of Stalks and Straw” [in Arabic], Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, https://tinyurl.com/3xxsa3vp

55 “In video… the way to base ‘16’ and the last moments” [in Arabic], Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, https://tinyurl.com/ycyafmn2

56 “Jihadist Operation ‘Nahal Oz’” [in Arabic], Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, https://tinyurl.com/4bb7e76v

57 Nicole J. Watkins and Alena M. James, “Digging into Israel: The Sophisticated Tunneling Network of Hamas,” Journal of Strategic Security 9, no. 1 (2016): 102–3.

58 Rubenstein, p. 126.

59 Ramy Ahmed, “The Tunnels of the Palestinian Resistance and their Impact on the Israeli Occupation” [in Arabic], Political Studies, Egyptian Institute for Political and Strategic Studies, February 25, 2020, 8–9, https://tinyurl.com/2yk3yzyp

60 Prepared by the researcher, based on videos published by the military media of the Palestinians armed groups, other news sources, and: Ahmed, “The Tunnels of the Palestinian Resistance and their Impact on the Israeli Occupation,” 9–10; Eado Hecht, “The Tunnels in Gaza,” Testimony before the UN Commission of Inquiry on the 2014 Gaza Conflict (February 2015), 8–16, https://tinyurl.com/5dye8xjk

61 White, “The Combat Performance of Hamas in the Gaza War of 2014,” 10-11.

62 Hecht, “The Tunnels in Gaza,” 27.

63 “Now Fighting Inside Gaza Tunnels, IDF Knows That Killing Hamas Leaders Won’t End Its Rule,” Haaretz, January 30, 2024, http://tinyurl.com/yatcnnsf

64 “‘Like Fighting Ghosts’: The Challenge the IDF Faces in Destroying Hamas’s Tunnels,” The Times of Israel, October 28, 2023, http://tinyurl.com/skcfy4n6

65 “The Tunnels War Heat Up… First Testimonies of Occupation Forces in Gaza” [in Arabic], Aljazeera, November 1, 2023, https://tinyurl.com/yc495rb9

66 “What’s the Worst Way to Spend 3M$? Ask Hamas,” Israel Defense Forces, July 2, 2015, https://tinyurl.com/yztay9bd

67 The most recent is the killing of Israeli officer and three soldiers by blast from a booby-trapped tunnel in Beit Hanoun on 11 November 2023. “IDF Says 5 Soldiers Killed in Gaza Strip, 4 by Blast from Booby-Trapped Tunnel,” Yedioth Ahronoth, November 11, 2023, https://tinyurl.com/5dz8f6zj

68 “Operation Cast Lead,” Israel Defense Forces, October 30, 2017, https://tinyurl.com/3w49w328

69 “Operation Pillar of Defense,” Israel Defense Forces, October 30, 2017, https://tinyurl.com/yc86ucra

70 “Operation Protective Edge,” Israel Defense Forces, October 30, 2017, https://tinyurl.com/bdhmm8aw

71 “Hamas Terror Tunnel Uncovered and Neutralized in Southern Israel,” Israel Defense Forces, October 30, 2017, https://tinyurl.com/5xkxpvyd

72 “The Gaza Tunnel Industry,” Israel Defense Forces, January 25, 2018, https://tinyurl.com/48k89yey

73 “IDF Thwarts Hamas Attempt to Renew Old Terror Tunnel,” Israel Defense Forces, March 18, 2018, https://tinyurl.com/4a4h4cww

74 Entsar Abu Jahal, “Israel Announces Destruction of Underwater Hamas Tunnel,” Al-Monitor, June 19, 2018, https://tinyurl.com/4czph9kz

75 “IDF Exposes Terror Tunnel,” Israel Defense Forces, December 21, 2021, https://tinyurl.com/4ebcmw2n

76 “Meet the Officers Responsible for the Counterterrorism Efforts Against the Hamas Underground Tunnel Network,” Israel Defense Forces, October 30, 2017, https://tinyurl.com/bde2y4f5

77 “Israel to Develop ‘Iron Spade’ to Counter Hamas,” Alarabiya, August 17, 2014, https://tinyurl.com/yckks25h

78 i.e., settlement in southern Palestine adjacent to the Gaza Strip.

79 “Israel Completes ‘Iron Wall’ Underground Gaza Barrier,” Aljazeera, December 7, 2021, https://tinyurl.com/4d7u2ydd

80 “Technological Laboratory for Tunnel Detection and Location,” Israel Defense Forces, April 15, 2018, https://tinyurl.com/ypk5sukw

81 Resembling the Tunnels Rats unit established by the US army during the Vietnam War and tasked with entering and battling in tunnels.

82 “Yahalom Unit,” Israel Defense Forces, December 28, 2021, https://tinyurl.com/4tr54t6t; “This is the IDF’s Plan to Combat Hamas Terror Tunnels,” Israel Defense Forces, November 27, 2016, https://tinyurl.com/3k7p9whj

83 Marcus, “Learning ‘under fire’,” 358–9.

84 Shapir and Perel, “Subterranean Warfare,” 55.

85 “Robots and attack dogs: What Israel brings to tunnel combat,” The National News, October 31, 2023, https://tinyurl.com/mrxv4ybj

86 Omer Dostri, “The Buildup of Forces for IDF Underground Warfare,” The Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, January 15, 2019, 4-5, https://tinyurl.com/53v8xw5h

87 Dov Lieber, “Israeli Military Reveals Tunnel It Says Hamas Built for Large-Scale Attack,” The Wall Street Journal, December 17, 2023, https://tinyurl.com/2b7xjskp

88 “IDF Announces Deaths of 2 Soldiers, Raising Gaza Ground Op Toll to 131,” The Times of Israel, December 19, 2023, https://tinyurl.com/3b4c933d

89 See: Abeer Ayyoub, “Israel-Palestine war: Palestinian Says Soldiers Sent Him into Hamas Tunnel Strapped with Bombs,” Middle East Aye, December 15, 2023, https://tinyurl.com/2jvcxpav

90 See: Hecht, “The Tunnels in Gaza.”.

91 Prepared by the author based on: Cohen et al., From Cast Lead to Protective Edge, 99-100; Ian Slesinger, “A cartography of the unknowable: Technology, territory and subterranean agencies in Israel’s management of the Gaza tunnels,” Geopolitics 25, no. 1 (2020), 33; Adam Goldman, Helene Cooper, and Justin Scheck, “Gaza’s Tunnels Loom Large for Israel’s Ground Forces,” The New York Times, October 28, 2023, https://tinyurl.com/yek5scf7

92 See: “‘The Gospel’: how Israel Uses AI to Select Bombing Targets in Gaza,” The Guardian, 1/12/2023, http://tinyurl.com/ysbzw57h (accessed January 29, 2024); “Israel Has Struck More Than 11,000 Terror Targets in Gaza,” FDD, 1/11/2023, accessed on 29/1/2024, at: http://tinyurl.com/4tn975yv; Geoff Brumfiel, “Israel is using an AI system to find targets in Gaza. Experts say it’s just the start,” NPR, 14/12/2023, accessed on 29/1/2024, at: .http://tinyurl.com/yy69ta65

93 It is worth noting that this number appears exaggerated and not in line with military standards. Any analyst who accepts this staggering number of targets either does not want to believe that the Israeli air force has completely lost its ethics, indiscriminately striking civilian homes as part of a genocidal plan or imagines that Hamas has this magnitude of combat capabilities. Israel itself does not have this number of military targets, which is, in a small region, a pure logistical nonsense and a diversion of technology away from its intended meaning and purpose. In the case of air force dominance and the supremacy of the larger party, targeting such a massive number of objectives becomes a cover for a genocidal act that cannot be justified by military effectiveness standards.

94 Urooba Jamal and Alex Gatopoulos, “‘Israel Doesn’t Care About Collateral Damage’: Bunker Busters Used in Gaza,” Aljazeera, October 9, 2023, https://tinyurl.com/yeuawxns

95 See, for example: “Fuelling Conflict: Foreign Arms Supplies to Israel/Gaza,” Amnesty International (February 2009), https://tinyurl.com/y5abz45y; Mohammed Omer, “Gaza Outraged at Israel’s Use of GBU-28 Missile,” Middle East Eye, February 12, 2015, https://tinyurl.com/bddmdk6v; “US Must Monitor Use of US Weapons in Gaza,” Amnesty International, https://tinyurl.com/5auskxsh

96 See: Anna E. Wildegger-Gaissmaier, “Aspects of Thermobaric Weaponry,” Military Technology 28, no. 6 (2004): 125–30.

97 Cohen et al., From Cast Lead to Protective Edge, 101.

98 Nancy A. Youssef, Warren P. Strobel, and Gordon Lubold, “Israel Weighs Plan to Flood Gaza Tunnels With Seawater,” The Wall Street Journal, December 4, 2023, https://tinyurl.com/5a933p4b; Nancy A. Youssef, Michael R. GordonFollow, and Dov Lieber, “Israel Begins Pumping Seawater Into Hamas’s Gaza Tunnels,” The Wall Street Journal, December 13, 2023, http://tinyurl.com/68s3heaz

99 Dominic Nicholls, “‘Sponge Bombs’ are Israel’s New Secret Weapon to Block Hamas tunnels,” The Telegraph, October 25, 2023, https://tinyurl.com/mstbkz98

100 Prepared by the author.

101 Emanuel Fabian, “IDF Reveals Another ‘Strategic’ Hamas Tunnel Under Gaza’s Main North-South Highway,” The Times of Israel, January 16, 2024, http://tinyurl.com/5dbnhyw8

102 See, for example: Netanel Flamer, “‘The Enemy Teaches Us How to Operate’: Palestinian Hamas Use of Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) in its Intelligence Warfare against Israel (1987–2012),” Intelligence and National Security (2023), 1171-1188.

103 “Hamas claims its tunnels built to resist flooding,” i24, December 15, 2023, http://tinyurl.com/2s4ynyjt

104 Ahmed, “The Tunnels of the Palestinian Resistance and their Impact on the Israeli Occupation,” 30-1.

105 “IDF says 800 tunnels discovered in Gaza op, 500 destroyed or sealed,” The Times of Israel, December 3, 2023, https://tinyurl.com/4eytpjst

106 “Now Fighting Inside Gaza Tunnels.”

107 “Netanyahu: Gaza Op Will Expand Until Quiet Guaranteed,” The Times of Israel, July 21, 2014, https://tinyurl.com/28snkjwd

108 They are: Protective Edge (8 July–26 August 2014); Magma of the Full Moon (3–6 May 2019); Dawn Cry (12–14 November 2019); Guardian of the Walls (10–21 May 2021); Breaking Dawn (5–7 August 2022); Shield and Arrow (9–13 May 2023), and Iron Swords (7 October 2023–).

109 Nancy A. Youssef and Jared Malsin, “Israel Struggles to Destroy Hamas’s Gaza Tunnel Network,” The Wall Street Journal, January 28, 2024, http://tinyurl.com/4bwrjdhd