Elite cohesion and resilience of the Russian regions: the case of Belgorod Oblast

ABSTRACT

What accounts for the ability of regional elites to respond to the challenges posed by the Russian war against Ukraine? This study argues that elite cohesion elevates the ability of subnational elites to cope and adapt to crises. It employs social network analysis of a novel biographical data set of elites’ connections in Belgorod Oblast, the border region that has been severely affected by the war. The analysis reveals that the war has made a relatively minor impact on the structure of the elite network as it has retained its original characteristics. Furthermore, it shows that the outsider governor has not only managed to strengthen his own position among the elites but also to reinforce elite cohesion. By bringing together different elite groups, the governor has enhanced their ability to perform under substantial stress. These findings advance our understanding of the sources of resilience in personalist autocracies.

KEYWORDS:

• Authoritarian resilience
• Russia
• Belgorod Oblast
• elite networks

Introduction

Following the start of the Russian war against Ukraine in February 2022, the Russian economy, as well as its political system, has demonstrated a considerable level of resilience (Kortunov 2023). Moreover, the war has not provoked any imbalances in center – region relations, with most of the Russian regions eventually being able to adapt to the new situation (Busygina and Filippov 2023a; Zubarevich 2023). Such resilience is puzzling taking into account the unfavorable structural preconditions as well as the nature of the Russian political regime. The former include the complex multi-level structure of the country, its giant size, and huge disparities among the regions (Busygina and Filippov 2023b, 3). The latter refers to the personalist character of the political regime in Russia (Frye 2021; Gel’man 2022). While authoritarian regimes worldwide “have proven to be astonishingly resilient” to various crises (Libman 2022, 29), personalist regimes may struggle to effectively respond to a range of internal and external shocks. This is because institutions that constrain personalist rulers and their inner circle are self-enforcing and primarily informal (Busygina and Filippov 2023a). Such “weak institutionalization” (Baturo and Elkink 2021) makes personalist regimes more vulnerable to various shocks because of the absence of sufficient in-built mechanisms for effective governance and management during the periods of crises. Furthermore, as dictators in personalist autocracies have less access to accurate information, they face higher risks of miscalculations (Kendall-Taylor, Frantz, and Wright 2017, 11).

Following the return to the presidency of Vladimir Putin in 2012, the regime in Russia has become increasingly personalist (Remington et al. 2021). The Russian leadership could not have avoided making wrong decisions, provoking various crises in the country (Libman 2022, 36). The war in Ukraine, started by the Kremlin in February 2022, represents another self-produced external shock that has had a profound impact on the existing status quo. To explain the regime’s resilience in the face of this crisis, this study focuses on its territorial dimension. In particular, it investigates what accounts for the ability of regional elites to respond to the challenges posed by the war against Ukraine.

This study argues that elite cohesion elevates the ability of subnational elites to cope and adapt to crises. The previous literature suggests that cohesion among governing elites plays a crucial role in the ability of authoritarian regimes to withstand challenges and remain stable. Elite cohesion decreases internal conflicts and power struggles, enhancing the ability of elites to efficiently implement decisions (Reuter and Szakonyi 2019; Sinkkonen 2021; Svolik 2012). This is even more the case for personalist autocracies, considering the weakness of formal institutions there (Baturo and Elkink 2021). In multi-level personalist autocracies, it is the regional elites who directly handle emerging issues in times of shocks and crisis (Yakovlev et al. 2020). This paper aims to demonstrate further that cohesive elites can effectively address challenges arising from various shocks and adapt to their consequences.

The present paper studies the case of Belgorod Oblast for the two main reasons. First, this region has been severely affected by the war due to its proximity to the border with Ukraine. While the war seemingly may be absent in the eastern Russian regions, it is real for Belgorod Oblast. Its population has become accustomed to the frequent sounds of nearby explosions. On 30 December 2023, as a result of a large-scale shelling of the regional capital, 25 people were killed and more than 100 were injured (Openbelgorod.ru 2024). In March 2024, as the presidential elections approached, the cross-border strikes intensified, with rockets and drones continuously targeting the region, causing deaths and damage (The Moscow Times 2024). These circumstances present greater challenges for the elites in Belgorod Oblast than in other regions; they have had to promptly respond to multiple emergencies while maintaining stability. Second, the region witnessed a change in governors in 2020 that affected the cohesion of regional elites. A new outsider governor, Vyacheslav Gladkov, was appointed by the Presidential Administration in November 2020. He replaced a long-serving incumbent, Evgeny Savchenko, who had been in office for 27 years. Gladkov, having no prior connection to the region, initiated massive elite reshuffles, replacing key members of the incumbent’s team (Bel.ru 2022a). These changes likely undermined elite cohesion, as the new appointees had fewer connections with each other and with the governor. Therefore, it is worth investigating to what extent elite cohesion has been restored under the new incumbent.

The paper employs social network analysis that has been used for the analysis of elite connections in personalist autocracies both at the national and subnational levels (Baturo and Elkink 2016; Garifullina, Kazantcev, and Yakovlev 2020; Melnikov 2023a, 2023b). The analysis relies on a novel data set of elites’ connections in Belgorod Oblast. It examines the structure and cohesion of the elite network before and after the start of the war. The analysis reveals that the war has had a relatively minor impact on the structure of the regional elite network, which has retained its original characteristics. Furthermore, it shows that the outsider governor has not only managed to strengthen his own position among the elites but also to reinforce elite cohesion. These results suggest that the outsider governor has been able to consolidate the elites, who have come together in order to respond to the challenges provoked by the war. These findings challenge a widespread perception that personalist autocracies are less resilient in the face of multiple crises because they lack functional institutional mechanisms for effective governance and management. In fact, the reliance on informal institutions makes personalist regimes more flexible and allows them to promptly adapt in the face of diverse shocks. These findings contribute to the literature (Nathan 2003; Sinkkonen 2021) by advancing our understanding of the sources of resilience in personalist autocracies.

The paper is structured as follows. The next section defines elite cohesion as a source of resilience in personalist autocracies. The third section provides some background about the case of Belgorod Oblast. The fourth section describes the methodology and data. The fifth section presents and discusses the results. The final section concludes.

Explaining authoritarian resilience with elite cohesion

Following Paustyan and Busygina (2024), this study similarly defines authoritarian resilience as the capacity of the regime to effectively cope with various disruptions, adapt to challenges, and eventually transform. Based on their ability to respond to various shocks and crises, personalist autocracies are situated between military juntas and single-party regimes (Nathan 2003; Sinkkonen 2021, 1175). Personalism generally implies the accumulation of substantial powers by the ruler (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018). Despite the presence of parties, parliaments, and influential militaries, the key decisions over personnel and policy are made by one person (Frye 2021, 39). Personalist regimes may struggle to promptly respond to crises because they lack institutions that function autonomously from the ruler (Geddes 1999). Furthermore, as such rulers are highly likely to make mistakes, lacking access to accurate information (Kendall-Taylor, Frantz, and Wright 2017), their ability to navigate through a crisis is limited.

However, personalist autocracies have recently shown much higher resilience than that predicted by experts (Luhnow and Forero 2023). This is puzzling because they lack institutional mechanisms that facilitate effective governance during periods of shocks. This study argues that elite cohesion elevates the ability of personalist regimes to address challenges provoked by various shocks and crises. It builds on previous literature by pointing out that personalism entails not only a high level of power concentration by the ruler but also concerns the nature of power relations within the elite, as well as institutional and non-institutional features of the regime, dominating practices, and shared norms (Baturo and Elkink 2021). By staying in office for many years, personalist rulers manage to build extensive patronage networks of friends, ex-colleagues, business partners, and family members. Such informal networks gradually increase their power and control, undermining the importance of formal institutions (Baturo and Elkink 2021, 12).

Informal patronage networks fulfill important functions in personalist regimes. They affect the process of decision-making, as well as the distribution of resources (Paustyan 2022). The distribution of rents via such networks allows the autocrat to strengthen his inner circle, rewarding the most loyal elite members. In fact, personalist regimes, more than other types of regimes, are dependent on international aid and natural resource extraction that generate “unearned” income (Fails 2020). These rents are vital for personalist rulers, who use them to co-opt “regime insiders, leaders of the opposition, and/or security forces” (Fails 2020, 772). For example, studying the case of personalist Equatorial Guinea, Sá and Rodrigues Sanches (2021, 79) document that the allocation of oil revenues serves to countervail opposition within the regime, reward cooperation, and secure international recognition.

Furthermore, informal patronage networks in multi-level personalist autocracies help to resolve the coordination problem between different tiers of government in the absence of formal structures. Informal ties help to coordinate interests between federal and regional actors by fostering mutual trust and increasing the value of long-term cooperation. When formal mechanisms are weak, personal connections represent an alternative channel for the ruler to mobilize regional elites to complete challenging governing tasks during times of crises (Jiang 2018, 983). These informal channels provide more rapid responses during crises compared to formal bureaucratic structures. Furthermore, as in a large country, the ruler needs to effectively control the entire territory (Busygina and Filippov 2023a), and patronage networks allow him to effectively monitor compliance among the elites. These networks make the system of center – region relations more adaptive and flexible, which is important for governing a large country in times of crises (see the article by Busygina 2024 in this issue).

In multi-level personalist autocracies, elite networks function in the regions as well. They emerge around a regional executive (a governor), who plays a central role in politics at the subnational level (Reuter and Turovsky 2022). Governors gradually build a loyal team that remains stable over time (Sharafutdinova and Steinbuks 2017). Staying in office, incumbents constantly seek to strengthen their own networks, suppressing rival groups (Ross, Turovsky, and Sukhova 2022). Eventually, they succeed in establishing “incumbent control,” receiving support from the largest elite coalition and not being challenged by any other elite coalition (Garifullina, Kazantcev, and Yakovlev 2020, 479). Schedler and Hoffmann (2016, 95) suggest that there are no any challenges to the incumbent in a cohesive elite network. However, Garifullina, Kazantcev, and Yakovlev (2020, 479) argue that it is not only the absence of challenges to the incumbent from other elite groups but also the extent of interconnectedness among elite members with each other and with the incumbent that define elite cohesion. As a result, in a cohesive elite network, (1) there are no challengers to the incumbent, and (2) everyone is connected to one another and to the incumbent.

Cohesive elites are able to achieve important regional outcomes. First, they form a basis for so-called political machines that mobilize voters on behalf of the regime (Hale 2003). They collect votes by distributing resources to individuals who participate in the electoral process and define the actual electoral outcome (Golosov 2014; Hertel-Fernandez 2016; Saikkonen 2017; Shkel 2021). Second, cohesive elites are essential for the implementation of good policies in the region. Consolidation and unity among the elites facilitate effective communication, and thus allow them to avoid conflict. As a result, cohesive elites are able to reach their developmental goals more effectively (Gradetsky and Skorobogaty 2015; Starodubtsev 2018). Finally, the presence of a cohesive elite network strengthens the ability of elites to cope with external shocks (Yakovlev et al. 2020). Elite cohesion minimizes internal conflicts and power struggles, facilitating the ability of regional elites to implement decisions (Reuter and Szakonyi 2019; Sinkkonen 2021; Svolik 2012). Cohesive elites are also bound by loyalty to the incumbent, which ensures their commitment to collective action and crisis response efforts. Personal loyalty fosters trust within the elite network, minimizing the risk of defection or internal sabotage during critical moments. As a result, cohesive elites effectively manage various emergencies that arise during the crisis.

The impact of the war on Belgorod Oblast

This study investigates the ability of elites in Belgorod Oblast to respond to the challenges provoked by the Russian war against Ukraine. This region is selected because it has been the most affected by the war so far, given its proximity to the border with Ukraine. The distance from the regional capital to the Ukrainian border is around 40 kilometers. The distance between Belgorod and Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second biggest city, is around 70 kilometers (Hopkins 2022). Following the start of the war in February 2022, a high (yellow) level of terrorist threat was introduced throughout the region. Companies in the regional capital, Belgorod, and border areas switched their employees to remote work. Schools, colleges, and universities extended remote learning. In October 2022, a state of emergency was declared in 12 localities that were systematically subjected to cross-border shelling (TASS 2022). In December 2022, the authorities announced the creation in the region of the so-called “territorial self-defense forces,” comprising around 3,000 individuals who, due to their health conditions or age, cannot be mobilized but possess combat experience. They are provided with sets of uniforms for different seasons, bulletproof vests, helmets, first aid kits, medical bags, sleeping bags, and backpacks. They assist security services in maintaining order in the region and patrolling critical infrastructure (Kaidalova 2023).

The intensification of shelling in the summer of 2023 provoked massive evacuations of inhabitants of Shebekino, a border town with around 40,000 residents located about 7 kilometers from the Ukrainian border (Reuters 2023). The governor, Vyacheslav Gladkov, urged residents to collaborate with authorities and evacuate from the area to temporary accommodation centers. He also pointed out that “over 4,000 individuals” from border areas were residing in regional centers of temporary accommodation (The Moscow Times 2023). Additionally, more than 600 children were escorted to summer camps in Kaluga and Yaroslavl’ oblasts (Interfax 2023b). As of June 2023, 47 sites of temporary accommodation hosted more than 6,000 people (Vedomosti 2023). From temporary accommodation centers, people were either accommodated in dormitories of universities and colleges or directed to other regions. In some settlements, where a state of emergency has been declared, not all residents want to evacuate. To those who still reside in border areas, volunteers bring food, medicine, and take away the sick (Baeva 2023).

As the presidential elections approached in March 2024, the shelling of the region intensified, with rockets and drones targeting the regional capital multiple times a day (The Moscow Times 2024). The strikes caused deaths of civilians, as well as destruction of residential and commercial infrastructure. During two weeks of shelling, 24 people were killed and 152 were injured (Rossiiskaya Gazeta 2024). Shopping centers were closed and almost all courier services suspended their operations. The regional government decided to temporarily evacuate around 9,000 children to other regions. Furthermore, residents of the Grayvoronsky city district, situated at the border, were relocated to safer places. There was no electricity and some villages were left without gas (Bel.ru 2024a). The emergency services were unable to start repairing the damaged infrastructure due to safety concerns.

Methodology and data

To map the elite network in Belgorod Oblast, this study employs social network analysis (SNA), which is suitable for conceptualizing and measuring complex social relationships (Scott 2012). It represents an effective tool for the analysis of contexts where personal ties are important (Osei and Wigmore-Shepherd 2022). Furthermore, it has been already used for the analysis of elite connections in the Russian regions (Garifullina, Kazantcev, and Yakovlev 2020; Melnikov 2023a, 2023b). To capture links between political elites in Belgorod Oblast, I follow a “structured approach,” which suggests the use of publicly available data and assumes factions based on shared individual characteristics (Keller 2016). In her analysis, Keller (2016) demonstrates that neither having the same origin nor graduating from the same university is important for shaping elite competition and coalition formation. Instead, it is the co-working experience that “most strongly and consistently captures the informal relationships among the Chinese political elites” (Keller 2016, 37).

Scholars working on Russia find that the strongest ties among the elite are those based on shared educational and professional experience as well as formal subordination in the past (Baturo and Elkink, 2016; Garifullina, Kazantcev, and Yakovlev 2020; Melnikov 2023a, 2023b). Building on these studies, I similarly consider shared professional experience as a relevant link between two individuals. This measure, however, does not capture ties that have been formed in the process of subordination between different state bodies as well as informal personal connections (Melnikov 2023a, 2023b). At the same time, while being imprecise, it would be unlikely to lead to any systematic bias (Keller 2016, 21). In his recent analysis of regional elite networks, Melnikov (2023b) validates detected co-working ties using expert surveys. He notes that neither the final network structure nor its interpretation differs significantly from the result obtained using the co-working ties only (Melnikov 2023b, 38). Therefore, this measure is appropriate to capture existing connections among the elites.

Data

In the data set, I included the governor, the members of the regional government (vice-governors and regional ministers), the mayor of the regional capital, as well as other heads of municipalities. The heads of municipalities also were included, as they are directly responsible for addressing emergency situations on the ground. I made a list of officials taking these positions as of January – February 2022 (to capture the regional elite network prior to the start of the war) and as of January – February 2024 (to trace changes in the regional elite network). Following Gladkov’s election as governor in September 2021, he initiated changes in the structure of the regional government that came into force in January 2022. As a result, this institutional reform had made an impact on the regional elite network even before the start of the war, as some individuals left the government while others changed their positions.

To collect the data, I used the official website of Belgorod Oblast’s government, the Declarator database by Transparency International – Russia, as well as the Integrum data set that provides access to local newspapers. The final list includes 44 elite members in 2022 and 45 in 2024. In total, it covers 56 individuals, which implies that there is an overlap between the two groups. I also collected biographical data about each individual, including the date and place of birth, education, as well as work experience (positions, organizations, and years the positions were taken). At the final step, I manually constructed a data set of elites’ connections that have been assessed based on their professional background. For elites in 2022, professional ties were evaluated based on their work experience prior to the appointment of Gladkov as governor in November 2020. For elites in 2024, I considered the professional experience prior to 2022, including also newly formed ties following Gladkov’s appointment.

Previous studies assign a connection (an edge) between two individuals (nodes) based on their shared educational and professional experience in the past (Garifullina, Kazantcev, and Yakovlev 2020; Melnikov 2023a, 2023b). I assigned a tie only in the latter case, namely, if two persons worked together at the same institution during the same period of time. I did not consider connections based on a common educational background, because with the appointment of Gladkov, the share of outsiders in the government has been rising. For this group of appointees, it is not meaningful to assess a shared educational experience as they share professional ties only. Establishing connections between individuals working within the regional government, I adopted a more nuanced approach. I defined individuals as connected if they worked together in the same department or later ministry. Additionally, I identified ties among department heads and vice governors, given their regular interactions. Since it is also plausible that the governor appoints individuals he trusts as ministers or vice governors, I assigned links between ministers, vice governors, and the governor.

Assessing elite cohesion in Belgorod Oblast

The elite network in 2022

The ex-governor of Belgorod Oblast, Evgeny Savchenko, had set a remarkable record among Russian regional executives, having stayed in office for 27 years. He was initially appointed as governor by President Boris Yeltsin in 1993 and was serving his seventh consecutive term when he resigned in September 2020. Staying in office for almost three decades, Savchenko was able to build a loyal team that remained stable over time. As of September 2020, several key officials had occupied their positions for many years. For example, Vladimir Borovik had been running the regional department of finance and budget since 1998. Valery Shamaev had been leading the regional department of property and land relations since 2004. Oleg Abramov had been in charge of the department of economic development since 2012. In turn, Nikolay Davydov and Sergey Kanischev had been serving as heads of municipalities for the longest periods, since 2003 and 2009, respectively.

A new outsider governor, Vyacheslav Gladkov, appointed in November 2020, had no prior connection to the region. Facing the challenge of building his own dominant coalition, he started reshuffling local elites. Several members of Savchenko’s team lost their positions after a public scandal, while others resigned or were arrested facing corruption charges (Bel.ru 2022a). Instead, Gladkov promoted local cadres as well as appointed people with whom he worked in the past. Gladkov, born in Penza Oblast, served as a mayor of the small “closed” town of Zarechny between 2009 and 2016. In the following four years, he worked in the governments of Sevastopol’ and Stavropol’ Krai. In September 2021, Gladkov was elected governor of Belgorod Oblast with a 78.79% vote (Interfax-Russia 2021b). Following his election, he initiated the restructuring of the entire regional government, commencing in January 2022. According to the new structure, the government included 11 vice-governors and 15 ministers (Stariyoskol.bezformata 2022). However, only 9 vice-governors were appointed in January – February out of 11 positions available. Furthermore, three vice- governors (Miroshnikov, Borovik, and Zainullin) simultaneously held positions as ministers.

The analysis of the elite network in 2022 includes 44 individuals: 22 regional officials and 22 heads of municipalities. ¹Their average age is around 48 years. There are only 3 females among municipal heads and 6 in the regional government. Furthermore, while all heads of municipalities are local (they were born and studied in the region), there were 14 locals in the regional government. Since 2021, the governor has brought “competent outsiders” from Moscow and other regions, who had no prior connection to Belgorod Oblast before their appointment. For example, Ivan Budlov, who was appointed in November 2021 as the head of the regional administration, had previously served in the General Prosecutor’s Office of the Russian Federation in Moscow (Interfax-Russia 2021a). Andrey Milekhin became the minister of education in February 2022. He previously worked at the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation in Moscow (Mir Belogorya 2022). Evgeny Khromov assumed the position of the minister of economic development and industry in 2022, having worked in the region since August 2021 (Bel.ru 2022b). Moreover, Gladkov appointed as vice governors and ministers some of his former colleagues (Bazarov, Gladsky, Zainullin, and Tarantova), with whom he had worked in the governments of Sevastopol’ and Stavropol’ Krai.

The turnover of officials at the regional level was higher than at the local level, as indicated by the length of their tenure. While the average tenure of the heads of municipalities is around five and a half years, the average tenure of the members of the regional government is less than two years. In fact, in January 2022, only three vice-governors (Schedrina, Borovik, and Polezhaev) and one minister (Miroshnikov) from Savchenko’s team retained their positions. At the same time, Gladkov also promoted to the positions of vice-governors and ministers a group of locals who worked at lower-level positions (Batanova, Medvedeva, Evtushenko, Botvinev and others).

Figure 1 shows the regional elite network in 2022. Its basic characteristics are the following. The number of nodes is 44. The number of edges or connections between individuals is 49. There are 10 isolates, which are nodes not connected to any other nodes in the network. The network density, which shows the proportion of present ties to the maximum possible ties in a network, is 0.05. The average degree, indicating the average number of connections that one node has, is 2.23. The average path length is 2.96. It denotes the average number of steps it takes from one node to reach any other node in the network. Finally, the network diameter, which shows the longest path from one node to the furthest node in the network, is 6. Figure 1 displays the individuals taking their positions in the regional government in pink and the heads of municipalities in green. It shows that the former group is more embedded than the latter, as 7 out of 10 isolates are municipal heads. Two other isolates are Budlov and Milekhin, “competent outsiders,” who had worked in Moscow prior to their appointment in the region. Finally, Ikonnikov, the minister of health care, is another isolate. He worked as the head of the regional hospital before being appointed as a minister.

Figure 1. Network of elites in Belgorod Oblast, 2022. Notes: Layout: Force Atlas 2. The size of nodes indicates their degree – the number of connections that they have. The individuals working in the regional government are in pink; the heads of municipalities are in green.

The graph also shows that some individuals working at the local level have connections with those working at the regional level. In fact, more than half of all heads of municipalities (13 out of 22) either worked in the regional government or in the administration of Belgorod. As for other individuals working in the regional government, there is a clear distinction between members of Savchenko’s team (Schedrina, Polezhaev, and Borovik) and the governor together with other outsiders (Gladsky, Khromov, Bazarov, Zainullin, and Tarantova). This distinction is based on their degree – the number of connections that they have. Schedrina, Polezhaev, and Borovik have more connections than anyone else in the network (seven, seven, and five, respectively). Based on “betweenness centrality,” they similarly represent ultimate leaders.² It is a common proxy for informal power, as it captures the strategic position of individuals within the network (Keller 2016, 16).

Despite the presence of isolates, locals working in the regional government, together with the majority of municipal heads, form a unified and coherent group that had previously worked together before taking their current positions. They stand separately from the group of “outsiders” led by the governor (who has four ties). At the same time, it is striking that the appointed outsiders (with the exception of Tarantova) are connected not just with the governor but also with each other. For example, Gladkov worked with Bazarov, Gladsky, and Zainullin in the government of Sevastopol’ in 2017. However, Bazarov and Gladsky appear to have known each other for many years, as they worked together in the government of Surgut city, Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug in 2005. Moreover, Khromov, who was appointed as the minister of economic development and industry, similarly worked with Bazarov and Gladsky in Surgut. The presence of multiple connections among them makes the group of outsiders highly cohesive, as they are connected to each other and to the governor. In 2022, locals and outsiders were not connected, as professional ties were assessed based on shared work experience as of 2020, prior to Gladkov’s appointment as governor of Belgorod Oblast.

The elite network in 2024

The analysis of the network in 2024 includes 45 individuals: 23 members of the regional government³ and 22 heads of municipalities. Their average age is around 50 years. It is consistent with the previous result, taking into account that the data are captured two years later. There are 8 females in the regional government and 5 among municipal heads. There are 15 locals working in the regional government. All heads of municipalities are local, with the exception of the mayor of Belgorod (Valentin Demidov), who is the governor’s former colleague. The average tenure of individuals working in the regional government is still approximately two years, while the average tenure of municipal heads is around five years. These numbers suggest that turnover of officials continued between 2022 and 2024. All members of Savchenko’s team (Borovik, Polezhaev, Miroshnikov, as well as Schedrina) working in the regional government had left their positions by December 2023. Vladimir Borovik retired; he had been leading the regional ministry of finance since 1998. Konstantin Polezhaev is currently under house arrest while his case is being investigated. Evgeny Miroshnikov supposedly obtained the position of vice president of the Rostelecom company in Moscow. Yulia Schedrina has voluntarily resigned. Furthermore, two outsiders appointed before the start of the war, Ivan Budlov and Evgeny Khromov, resigned and left the region. To replace them, the governor made several new appointments. Elena Dolmanova, who has been working at the regional administration for more than 10 years, was promoted to the position of its head. Several locals (Chetverikov, Gusev, and Kireeva) were appointed as ministers. Finally, Natalia Sharapova, who worked with Gladkov in the government of Zarechny city, took the position of the new minister of finance. Sergey Dovgalyuk and Dmitry Prokopov, with backgrounds in security services, were appointed vice-governors.

Furthermore, five heads of municipalities left their positions. Three of them (Sergachev, Pertsev, and Davydov) resigned, while two others (Tarasenko and Ivanov) are currently under arrest facing corruption charges. Anton Ivanov was appointed as a mayor already by Gladkov in 2021. Following his dismissal, the governor appointed his former colleague, Valentin Demidov. In addition, four new locals (Samoilova, Rudenko, Schepin, and Pereverzev) were promoted to the position of municipal heads. At the same time, the head of the Shebekino district (Zhdanov) as well as the heads of other municipalities that have been severely affected by shelling still retain their positions.

Figure 2 displays the regional elite network as of January – February 2024. Despite high turnover, the network characteristics remain quite similar. Table 1 shows that the number of nodes is 45, with the number of edges being 50. This is quite interesting, as individuals with the highest number of connections have left the network. On the other hand, this network captures professional ties two years later than the previous network, meaning that those individuals who stayed in the network have managed to build more connections. As in the previous network, there are 10 isolates. The network density also remains the same—0.05. The average degree and the average path length are 2.22 and 3.20, respectively. The network diameter is 7.

Figure 2. Network of elites in Belgorod Oblast, 2024. Notes: Layout: Force Atlas 2. The size of nodes indicates the number of ties that they have. The individuals working in the regional government are shown in pink; the heads of municipalities are displayed in green.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the regional elite networks.

	2022	2024
Nodes	44	45
Links	49	50
Isolates	10	10
Network density	0.05	0.05
Average degree	2.23	2.22
Average path length	2.96	3.20
Network diameter	6	7

Figure 2 exhibits the individuals working in the regional government in pink and the heads of municipalities in green. It suggests that the outsiders have become more embedded in the regional elite network over time. Furthermore, the governor has been able to double his ties. In fact, Gladkov and his deputy (Bazarov) have 8 connections, which is the highest in the network. In turn, a local minister of social protection of population and labor, Elena Batanova, has 7 ties. At the same time, her betweenness centrality is more than twice as high as that of Gladkov and Bazarov. In fact, she is among a few individuals in the network who are well-connected to both locals and outsiders.

During normal times, frequent turnover among officials can hinder the efficient operation of the bureaucracy because new personnel may lack expertise. Furthermore, it takes considerable time to establish trust and working relationships within a team. However, high turnover during times of crisis may ultimately help to form a team capable of working under strong pressure. Appointing former colleagues, the governor has brought together individuals whom he trusts and can rely on in difficult situations. In one of his interviews, Gladkov highlighted that he decided to appoint Valentin Demidov as a mayor of Belgorod in November 2022 because he had already worked with him “in sufficiently complex, critical situations” (Shevchenko, Khokhlova, and Belykh 2022). Furthermore, Natalya Sharapova, who worked with Gladkov in the government of Zarechny city, took over as the minister of finance in May 2023. With the start of the war, the region has become heavily dependent on federal financial inflows allocated from the center for the purposes related to “the special military operation.” It is likely that in such a situation, the governor needs a person who is not just competent in finances but also loyal to him personally (Reutov 2023). Overall, following considerable turnover over the last two years, the governor has managed to build a team that is able to perform under substantial stress. Furthermore, initiating reshuffles of local elites, the governor has been able to avoid conflicts. The experts point out that inter-elite conflicts in the situation of a “special military operation” could have led to catastrophic consequences for the region (Klub Regionov 2022).

Importantly, the elite network has become more cohesive as outsiders have gradually established more connections with locals. Within this network, the majority of officials are interconnected with each other and with the governor. In an interview to a local newspaper, Yury Klepikov, the speaker of the regional legislative assembly (who has been serving as its deputy since 1994), emphasized that Vyacheslav Gladkov is a leader whom all political forces and public figures in the region are willing to follow. Klepikov also noted that the new governor has become a consolidating figure in the region’s political landscape in a remarkably short period of time (Belgorodskaya Pravda 2022). Consequently, the governor has not only been able to strengthen his own position among various elite groups but also to unite them.

Discussion: managing the crisis at the local level

After “the partial mobilization” announced in September 2022, the regional authorities initiated an assistance package for the families of those mobilized, including a one-time payment of 100,000 rubles, a monthly payment of 3,000 rubles for children’s meals, and a one-time payment of 50,000 rubles for each child born into a family of mobilized individuals (Belgorodskaya Pravda 2022). The minister of finance, Natalya Sharapova, and the minister of the social protection of the population, Elena Batanova, closely monitor the distribution of these packages. The unfolding problems required not only financial assistance but also the personal involvement of the governor. For example, Gladkov regularly visits the units, where the mobilized from the region are sent for training. He has also initiated additional purchases of ammunition, equipment, and clothing for the mobilized, financed from the regional budget (Belgorodskaya Pravda 2022). Moreover, the governor closely interacts with the heads of municipalities who track the assistance to the families of the mobilized and those serving under contract in their localities. Meeting with them in September 2023, Gladkov emphasized that as mothers and wives of soldiers are left without male assistance, they need support in preparing for winter. He asked the heads of municipalities to visit all the families of servicemen personally and ensure they receive necessary assistance in household management, repairs, and other needs. The governor demanded them to conduct house-to-house visits to assess the living conditions of the families of the servicemen by 1 November 2023 (Shevchenko 2023). Regional officials at all levels oversee the implementation of support measures for the families of mobilized individuals and those serving under contract.

The regional authorities also had to deal with the damage of private residential areas, commercial property, and the critical infrastructure. As of December 2023, a total of 9,403 residential units had been damaged, of which 8,291 residential units had been already fully restored. In several localities no reconstruction was possible because of security considerations (Belnovosti 2023). The shelling of Belgorod between 30 December 2023 and 4 January 2024 caused additional damage to 573 apartments and 64 houses (Gladkov 2024b). It was qualified as a terrorist attack, with 25 being killed and 109 injured (Openbelgorod.ru 2024). The governor announced payments of three million rubles to the families of those killed and 200,000 to 500,000 rubles for the injured. The regional administration undertook all costs for funerals, including memorial services (Bel.ru 2024b). Funds for the complete restoration of damaged personal property, including compensation for damaged vehicles, were allocated both from the federal and regional budgets.

As of December 2023, more than 400 enterprises had suffered damage from the shelling. The regional government assigned 800 million rubles from its reserve fund to support regional businesses. However, these funds were still not enough, as approximately 10 billion rubles would be needed to fully complete the restoration (Interfax 2023a). In February 2024, the Russian government made a decision to allocate a subsidy of 4.2 billion rubles from the reserve fund to the region. These funds are planned to be directed towards compensating enterprises of Shebekino for losses incurred from the “events of summer 2023,” as well as to support small and medium-sized businesses and agricultural enterprises that were unable to cultivate fields because of shelling. These funds are also intended to cover housing construction for homeowners in the areas, where a state of emergency has been declared and the presence of civilians is prohibited because of security concerns (Kommersant 2024).

The governor regularly communicates with the population on social media. With the start of the war, his daily posts on Telegram have become an official source of information about the situation in the region. With over 450,000 subscribers as of April 2024, Gladkov’s channel ranks as the second most popular among all Russian governors, being surpassed only by Chechnya’s Ramzan Kadyrov (Klub Regionov 2024). The regional minister of public communication, Oksana Tarantova (another former colleague of Gladkov), manages the public activities of the governor. She has more than 20 years of experience in political consulting. In addition, Tarantova worked in the government of Stavropol’ Krai, where she was dealing with the dissemination of information during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic (Danilina 2020). With the start of the war, her experience has proven to be particularly useful for informing the population of Belgorod Oblast.

Even after the start of the war, regional officials tried to promote a sense of normality as cross-border shelling occurred relatively rarely. In July 2023, explosions occurred on the Crimean bridge that connects Krasnodar Krai with annexed Crimea. As a result of these explosions, a couple from Belgorod Oblast was killed, and their daughter was seriously injured and was hospitalized. According to media reports, they were traveling to Crimea for vacation with their relatives in two cars (B.B.C. News 2023). This episode suggests that even after more than one year of the war in Ukraine, some residents of Belgorod Oblast still considered Crimea as a suitable destination for their holidays. However, the large-scale shelling of Belgorod on 30 December 2023 that caused the deaths of 25 people and injuries of more than 100 raised numerous questions among residents (Openbelgorod.ru 2024). They wondered why no bomb shelters had been constructed, why the public alert system had not been effective enough, and why bus stops had not been reinforced to protect against shelling. Initiating the construction of bomb shelters in the region at the onset of the war would have likely sparked panic among the population. Therefore, authorities prioritized not preparing for such emergencies but instead sought to calm down the population and assure the residents of the region that the situation was under their full control.

As polling stations opened across Russia on 15 March 2024 for a three-day presidential election, shelling intensified, with rockets and drones targeting the regional capital. After casting his vote, the governor posted on his Telegram channel that “today and throughout the three days of voting, it is important for us to demonstrate our unity to the whole world” (Gladkov 2024a). Apparently, this appeal resonated with the residents who went to cast their votes under the sounds of sirens. Putin received 90.66% of the votes in the region, with a voter turnout of 87% (TASS 2024). These numbers indicate that Putin remains popular even in the region that is hit hardest by the war. However, they do not accurately reflect the level of popular support for the war. Frye et al. (2024) present new evidence suggesting that war fatigue has become a concern for the Kremlin, as there is genuine popular dissatisfaction with continuing the offensive, even among Putin’s own supporters. Apparently, war exhaustion is more widespread among residents of the border territories, as life there becomes increasingly unsafe (Safronova 2024). While the authorities try to create the impression that everything is under control, it becomes increasingly challenging for them to promote a sense of normality among the population and pretend that the armed forces will effectively manage the situation.

Conclusion

This paper argues that high cohesion ultimately elevates the ability of regional elites to respond to the challenges posed by the Russian war against Ukraine. It employs social network analysis of formal connections of elites in Belgorod Oblast before and after the start of the war. The analysis reveals that the war has had little effect on the structure of the regional elite network that has retained its original characteristics. Furthermore, it shows that the outsider governor has not only managed to strengthen his own position within the elite network but also to reinforce elite cohesion. By bringing together different elite groups, the governor has enhanced their ability to perform under substantial stress. These results suggest that elite cohesion is an important source of authoritarian resilience. While personalist autocracies lack working institutional mechanisms for effective governance and management in times of crises, the reliance on informal institutions makes them more flexible in response to various shocks. These findings contribute to the literature on the resilience of authoritarian regimes (Nathan 2003; Sinkkonen 2021), focusing specifically on personalist autocracies.

Ruling a large and diverse country during times of crisis, a personalist ruler faces the challenge of establishing effective control over the entire territory (Busygina and Filippov 2023a). This study has demonstrated that regional patrons who gain the support of local elites are better able to solve emerging problems on the ground. On the other hand, the previous literature shows that strong governors may establish “boundary control” in their provinces and to monopolize local power (Gibson 2012; Tolstrup and Souleimanov 2022). During normal times, the national ruler can restore central control by dismissing strong regional incumbents. However, during difficult times, the appointment of new governors is not an easy task for the ruler. At the moment, there are no signs that cohesive elites could challenge the national autocrat and act against the center. Undoubtedly, in such a case, elite cohesion would be threatening for the center and national resilience in general.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Irina Busygina, Guzel Garifullina, Nikita Khokhlov, Franziska Keller, Silke Adam, as well as participants of the colloquium at the Research Centre for East European Studies at the University of Bremen for their comments on earlier versions of this paper.

Supplementary Material

Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2024.2354940

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

The author would like to acknowledge funding by the University of Bremen.

Notes

1. See the online Appendix for the full descriptive statistics of the data set.

2. Betweenness centrality is “calculated by examining all possible pairs of individuals, determining which is the shortest connecting path between each of the pairs, and counting on how many such shortest paths each node sits” (Keller 2014, 12).

3. In April 2022, a new position of the minister of education was introduced in the regional government.