Perception of a “Color Revolution” in China under the Xi Jinping Regime and National Security Implications—Close interconnection between domestic politics and diplomacy—

Abstract

The Xi Jinping regime in China has been implementing various policies that prioritize the concept of “national security,” and highlight concerns about the perceived threat of a Color Revolution. The concept of “national security” has been elevated to a policy philosophy of “holistic” or “comprehensive” security. This comprehensive security means that “security” is related to all areas, including the economy, culture, and the environment, and that security takes precedence over other factors such as the economy, culture, and the environment. Diplomacy is no exception, and the policy philosophy is to treat diplomacy and security together, where security takes precedence over diplomacy. The emphasis on the logic of national security also influenced its Hong Kong policy and its policy of governing the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Furthermore, it led to the strengthening of domestic management of foreigners and international NGOs. Moreover, this domestic logic of “national security” has had a strong influence on foreign policy. For example, the domestically propagated discourse on the “color revolution” directly influenced the US-China summit meeting, where the topic of discussion was whether the US was planning to overthrow the CCP regime or not. In China, diplomacy and domestic politics appear to be rapidly becoming one and the same.

Notes

1 This article is based on Shin Kawashima’s “Soto e to shimideru naibu no ronri: Chūgoku no ‘kara¯ kakumei’ ninshiki to kokka no anzen [The Internal Logic Seeping Outward: Understanding China’s Perception of ‘Color Revolutions’ and National Security],” in Yurashia no jigazo: ‘shinreisen’ ron no shikaku [Self Portrait of Eurasia: ‘New Cold War’ Theory’s Blind Spot], PHP Institute, Inc., 2023, edited by Shin Kawashima, et al. with additions and corrections (Japanese).

2 In China, the term “境内 (jingnei) [within the boundaries]” refers to areas where provinces and autonomous regions are located inside the borders of Mainland China, excluding Hong Kong and Macau, while Hong Kong and Macau are referred to as “境外 (jingwai) outside the boundaries.” The term “domestic” includes Hong Kong and Macau.

3 Shinji Yamaguchi, “Chugoku shu kinpei seiken no ideorogi wo meguru toso: wahei enhen, kara kakumei e no taiko to kokusaiteki wagoken [The Struggle over Ideology in the Xi Jinping Regime in China: Opposition to the Peace Change and Color Revolution and the International Right to Speak]” (in Japanese), ROLES Report, No. 17, 2022, https://roles.rcast.u-tokyo.ac.jp/uploads/publication/file/32/publication.pdf; Kazuko Kojima, “Shu kinpei seiken no mezasu shakai tochi to sekai chitsujo [Xi Jinping Regime’s Goal of Social Governance and World Order]” (in Japanese), FY2019 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Diplomacy and Security Research Project, “China’s Foreign Policy and Other Countries’ Policies toward China,” The Japan Institute of International Affairs, March 2020; Kazuko Kojima, “Shu kinpei seikenka no seiji: shukenka to sono imi [Politics under the Xi Jinping regime: Concentration of Power and Its Meaning]” (in Japanese), Ministry of Finance of Japan, Policy Research Institute, Financial Review (No. 138, August 2019).

4 On July 1, 2015, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, abbreviated as the NPC Standing Committee / the NPCSC passed Article 14 of the National Security Law of the People’s Republic of China to stipulate the National Security Education Day. In addition, posters and videos regarding this day were used in China to spread the awareness to the public. “Le suo bing du yu e you guan, xi ji duo guo suo yao shu jin [Ransomware virus linked to Russia, hits multiple countries for ransoms],” FeelCN.com website, May 15, 2017. Accessed October 1, 2022. https://www.feelcn.com/article/44951.html (Chinese); “Beiyue jiandie baoguang, ceng duoci qiequ guojia jimi, yu tao bolan bei bu, zuizhong xiachang ruhe [Espionage Scandal Unfolds: NATO Spies Caught Stealing State Secrets, Attempting Escape in Poland, Ends in Arrest],” NetEase website, September 8, 2022, https://www.163.com/dy/article/HGOJHMA30549M98D.html (Chinese).

5 His argument can be found in a book entitled Xi jinping tan zhiguolizheng [Xi Jinping: The Governance of China] published by Foreign Languages Press in 2014, p. 415.

6 “Dangwei zhongxinzu lilun xuexi cailiao erlingyiwu nian di shi qi [The Theoretical Learning materials of the Center Group of the Party Group No. 10, 2015],” Publicity Department of Hefei Normal University, August 26, 2015, https://news.hfnu.edu.cn/info/1004/3483.htm (Chinese).

7 Dongshui Yin and Xiaoguang Guo, “The Role of International NGOs in the Development of Democracy in Rural China: An Empirical Study,” The China Nonprofit Review, vol. 8-2, 2016.

8 “Xi jinping zhuchi zhaokai wangluo anquan he xinxihua gongzuo zuotanhui [Xi Jinping Gives Speech at the Cybersecurity and Informatization Work Conference],” CPCnews, April 20, 2016, http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0420/c64094-28289000.html?0kyr4 (Chinese).

9 Zuo Peng, “Quanmian tigao xin xingshi xia zongjiao gongzuo shuiping [Comprehensively improve the level of religious work in the new situation],” Xuanjiangjia wang website, August 12, 2016, http://www.71.cn/2016/0812/904624.shtml?from=groupmessage (Chinese).

10 “Xinjiang de fankong, qu jiduanhua douzheng yu renquan baozhang [The Fight Against Terrorism and Extremism and Human Rights Protection in Xinjiang],” National Ethnic Affairs Commission of the People’s Republic of China website, Retrieved March 19, 2019, https://www.neac.gov.cn/seac/xwzx/201903/1132851.shtml (PDF) (Chinese).

11 Yao Zhisheng, “Xianggang guojia anquanfa shi hu guojia anquan bao xianggang heping anding zhi fa [Hong Kong’s national security law is a measure to protect national security and maintain peace in Hong Kong], Tongyi luntan [Reunification Forum], April 2020 issue, 2020.

12 “Wang Yi: Shitu gaizao dianfu zhongguo shi ‘bukeneng wancheng de renwu,’ zhihui zhuangshang nanqiang [Trying to reform and subvert China is an impossible task, it’s just hitting a wall],” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China website, December 19, 2020, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/wjbzhd/202012/t20201219_361874.shtml (Chinese).

13 “Deputy Secretary Sherman’s Visit to the People’s Republic of China,” US Department of State, July 26, 2021, https://www.state.gov/deputy-secretary-shermans-visit-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/

14 “2021 nian 7 yue 26 ri waijiaobu fayanren Zhao Lijian zhuchi lixing jizhehui”[Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian’s Regular Press Conference on July 26, 2021],” Spokesperson Regular Press Conference of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” July 26, 2021, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/202107/t20210726_9171315.shtml (Chinese).

15 “Xi jinping tong meiguo zongtong baideng zai balidao juxing huiwu [President Xi Jinping Meets with US President Joe Biden in Bali],” CPCnews, November 15, 2022, http://cpc.people.com.cn/BIG5/n1/2022/1115/c64094-32566115.html (Chinese). However, the US government’s announcement does not include the same content. “Readout of President Joe Biden’s Meeting with President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China,” the White House, November 14, 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/11/14/readout-of-president-joe-bidens-meeting-with-president-xi-jinping-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china/

16 “Zhu riben dashi kong xuanyou zai rizhong xiehui fabiao ‘jinian bangjiao zhengchanghua wushi zhounian, sikao heping yu fazhan shidai zhuti’ yanjiang [Ambassador Kong Hyeonyu Address at the Japan-China Society on the 50th Anniversary of the Normalization of Diplomatic Relations and the Theme of the Era of Peace and Development],” June 1, 2022, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Japan website, http://jp.china-embassy.gov.cn/jpn/tpxw/202206/t20220615_10703708.htm) (Japanese). http://jp.china-embassy.gov.cn/chn/sgkxnew/202206/t20220601_10697509.htm (Chinese)

17 However, it was Ohira Masayoshi who delivered a speech entitled “Japan-China Relations Toward the New Century: Seeking Depth and Expansion” on September 7, 1979, in Beijing’s Political Consultative Reception Hall, which was broadcast nationwide in China on television and radio. In the speech, he stated, “Between Japan and China, which have different systems and different ways of doing things, conscious efforts for mutual understanding are even more strictly required.” (“Ohira sori daijin no chugoku homon no sai no seikyoreido ni okeru kokai enzetsu [Public Address at the Political Consultative Reception Hall on the Occasion of Prime Minister Ohira’s Visit to China],” September 7, 1979, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan website, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/1980/s55-shiryou-10208.htm (Japanese). Therefore, at a reception held on September 29, 2022 to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China, Foreign Minister Hayashi Yoshimasa also stated, “Because ‘Japan and China have different systems and different ways of doing things,’ ‘conscious efforts for mutual understanding are even more strictly required.’” (“Nicchu kokko seijoka 50-shunen kinen resepushon ni okeru Hayashi gaimudaijin aisatsu [Greeting by Foreign Minister Hayashi at the Reception to Commemorate the 50th Anniversary of the Normalization of Diplomatic Relations between Japan and China]”), September 29, 2022, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan website, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/a_o/c_m1/cn/page1_001338.html (Japanese). If the Chinese side is trying to make an issue of the fact that Japan nowadays has a different system than in the past, Minister Hayashi’s speech seems to have avoided the Chinese side’s intentions.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Kawashima Shin

Kawashima Shin is Professor, Department of International Relations, the Graduate School of Arts & Sciences, the University of Tokyo. Previously he was associate professor at Hokkaido University (1998-2006) and the University of Tokyo (2006-2015). He earned academic degrees at the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies (B.A.1992) and the University of Tokyo (Oriental history, M.A., 1994 and Ph. D., 2000). Other posts include Senior Fellow in the National Security Agency (2014-2018), and an associate member of the Science Council of Japan (2014 to present).

He was engaged in education and research at Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica (Taipei), Beijing Center for Japanese Studies, Peking University, National Chengchi University (Taipei), and Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. His research covers Chinese/Taiwanese diplomatic history and the contemporary international relations in East Asia. He has authored and edited several books and numerous articles, notably Formation of Chinese Modern Diplomacy (Nagoya University Press, 2004, awarded the Suntory Academic Prize), and China in the 21st Century (Chuokoron-shinsha, 2016). He joined NPI as a Senior Fellow in 2010 and serves as Executive Director of Research at NPI since 2022.