A ‘New Gambia’? Managing political crisis and change in an African small state

ABSTRACT

The Gambia has experienced three significant political crises in its history: the attempted coup of 1981, the successful coup of 1994, and the latest events in 2016–2017 when President Yahya Jammeh, having exercised semi-authoritarian power since 1994, was defeated at the ballot box but refused to step down until he was finally forced to do so. Using academic, media, social media and interview material, this article examines all three processes and their aftermaths, in particular the latter, through the lens of ‘small state’ politics. The article demonstrates that the small size of the population, elite, and landmass indeed matters in driving Gambian political processes. In 2023, several post-2017 processes, including constitutional change, transitional justice and elections, are playing out within the confines of the small state. This article then assesses to what extent a ‘New Gambia’, to use current President Adama Barrow's phrase, has emerged.

KEYWORDS:

• The Gambia
• small state
• elite circulation
• personalism

Introduction

Remarkably, on 1 December 2016, The Gambian President Yahya Jammeh was defeated at the ballot box. His tenure began with a military coup in 1994 and continued in a semi-authoritarian style which included human rights abuses and arbitrary rule as well as regular if not entirely fair elections. His initial acquiescence to the 2016 result and his subsequent volte face then presented The Gambia with a stern political test, which only ended over 50 days later when Jammeh finally went into exile within a process that included political protests, strikes, the defection of key government and military personnel, the political intervention of West African leaders, and the military intervention, under Senegalese leadership of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The elections and the subsequent need to reconstruct the state and fractured societal relations in the wake of the Jammeh regime and the electoral stand-off have been The Gambia's largest political crisis, even beyond the country's two previous national traumas: the failed coup d’état of 1981 and the successful 1994 coup which brought Jammeh to power.

One might see the 2016–2017 crisis, indeed all three crises, and the ensuing problems as not particularly out of the ordinary in Africa. Semi-authoritarianism, and its attendant issues and breakdowns, has recently been or is present in various forms in the nearby states of Guinea, Mali, Mauritania and Burkina Faso. However, The Gambia is different in one interesting aspect: it is a small state. It is a country which only recently crossed the 2 million population mark and did not reach 1 million until the 1990s. This puts the country in the category of the six smallest mainland African countries in terms of population, whilst also being the smallest mainland African country in terms of area. The structural conditions of The Gambia mean that it faces and addresses problems within a small populace and even smaller elite and a tiny geographical space.

It is the latter conditions and their effects on managing political crises, in particular in the post-Jammeh era, that this article will interrogate. Small state theories have not been put to the test in The Gambia and it is the intention here, first, to assess whether the elements of small state theory apply and, second, to investigate to what extent they matter in formulating a better understanding of Gambian politics. The new president in 2017, Adama Barrow, promised a ‘New Gambia’ and this article also considers to what extent this may be the case.

The article is underpinned by personal experience of the two authors, secondary research, and five semi-structured interviews with key contemporary actors. Gambian politics and small state studies are not endowed with huge academic literatures, so material has also been collected from interdisciplinary academic sources, grey literature, journalistic accounts, and social media.

The small state in theory

Three decades ago, Jeff Richards (1990) asked a question: are micro-states ‘a specific form of polity’? Crucially, he concluded in the affirmative that these states should be analysed differently to larger states and gave several reasons for doing so. However, his criteria for a micro-state were a population of less than 1 million and a land area of less than 1,000 sqm, and The Gambia, with a population of 2 million and a land area of 3,650 sqm, is too large.¹ Hence, this article instead uses the term ‘small state’, but will use arguments made about micro-states to assess the slightly larger but still small state of The Gambia.

Qualitative work on the specifics of the politics of small and micro-states remains underdeveloped but some has since been undertaken (Veenendaal, 2013). Considerations can be broken down into elite roles, personalised politics, conformity, and conflict and consensus. First, Richards (1990, pp. 41–42) notes the smallness of ‘the established elite’ and hence ‘an overlapping and coincidence of roles’, ‘many roles played by relatively few individuals’, and ‘opportunities for upward mobility [that] are limited and more easily monitored’ (see also Wolf, 2011). For Erk and Veenendaal (2014, p. 140): ‘Almost all inhabitants are neighbors, friends, colleagues, schoolmates, or actual kin by blood or marriage. People know each other through multiple-role relationships.’ Corbett notes ‘the centrality of family and kin to political dynamics’ in his study of Pacific Islands (2015, p. 51).

Second, while some have noted that small societies are more likely to be democratic (Anckar, 2002), others have pointed to personalist politics lying not far beneath the democratic surface (Corbett & Veenendaal, 2018). Amalendu Misra (2004, p. 134), in his study of the Maldives, Bhutan and Nepal, notes that society ‘can be described as a large extended family where each individual is linked to the other through a network of bonds … a patrimonial model, where the state is caught in the trap of a “clientele effect”’. In a study of Palau, Seychelles, Saint Kitts & Nevis, and San Marino, Erk and Veenendaal (2014, p. 136) see a ‘prevalence of informal but strong patronage customs; traditional titleholders and powerbrokers who wield ample nonformal authority; and illiberal practices including intimidation and cronyism.’ Veenendaal (2020a) emphasises that this scenario can translate into either fragmentation or power concentration.

Third, there is not necessarily greater participation as might be expected, but instead there are ‘pressures towards conformity and homogeneity’ (Richards, 1990, p. 42; Baldacchino, 2012). Misra (2004, p. 134) notes that ‘society in small and micro-states is far more cohesive than in their larger counterparts’ and as a result, the citizenry ‘may find it hard to forge alternatives to challenge various forms of social control’. Richards (1990, p. 46) pointedly rehearses a Maltese saying: ‘Don't make an enemy of your neighbour’.

Finally, Richards (1990, pp. 42–43) observes the ‘paradox of consensus and conflict’, embodied by the depth of feeling in close friendships and enmities. Specifically, Dahl and Tufte (1973) assert the decreased likelihood of political conflict in small states, but when it emerges, it can be more personal, explosive, and polarising. Veenendaal (2020b) notes that informal dynamics in small societies can enhance cooperation and consensus but the toll on the quality of democracy can be heavy. Consensus can seemingly and paradoxically coexist with deep conflicts.

The history of The Gambia as a small state

The Gambia is a relatively small state, but crucially it is a post-colonial African state which has a much smaller elite than examples in Europe. However, a counterargument might suggest that several of these descriptions and outcomes apply to larger post-colonial African states as well. The elites in medium sized countries can also be small and incestuous, leading to personalised politics; degrees of conformity; and the ‘paradox of consensus and conflict’ (Schatzberg, 2001; Harris, 2020). Neo-patrimonialism, identity politics, weak states, colonial legacy, and the global system have been proffered as all-encompassing explanatory frameworks. However, it is the extent of the four relationships and processes in a small state that is under investigation here and the degree to which we can consider small state politics as somehow different. At the extremity, one would surely make a distinction between The Gambia and the oil-rich, extended elite, semi-militarised, identity-laden politics of Nigeria with its population around one hundred times the size. The question is whether Gambian political processes can be explained by small state politics.

The first of The Gambia's two significant political crises before 2016 was the Marxist-leaning, part-civilian, part-military attempted coup of 1981 which interrupted a stable democratic dispensation and forced President Dawda Jawara, the political leader since independence, to ask for the assistance of Senegalese troops. The coup failed but not before 500–1,000 Gambians had lost their lives. The management of the aftermath of the July 1981 attempted coup might be described as restrained strong-arm conservatism. Typical of Jawara, there was a reaction but not one that disturbed too much the now ruffled but previously mostly tolerant political environment. One coup leader, Pap Cheyassin Secka, was extradited from Senegal, handed the death penalty, had his sentence commuted, and was then released; while opposition leader and former Vice-president and Finance Minister, Sheriff M. Dibba, was arrested, but allowed to contest the 1982 presidential elections from his cell and later acquitted (Perfect, 2008). Dibba won just 28 per cent of the vote. Jawara won the next two presidential elections in a continuing mostly open political environment and remained in power for 13 years after the coup attempt.

Concerning the small elite, it is noticeable that after Dibba came second again to Jawara in the 1987 elections, he later became Speaker of the National Assembly in 2002 under Jammeh. Secka was appointed Attorney General by Jammeh in 2000. At the same time, the importance of personality and personalised politics focused on Jawara was pronounced up to and including the crisis and continued to be so for the rest of his term in office. One might already see Richards’ ‘paradox of consensus and conflict’ in Jawara's strong-arm conservatism and in particular in the manner that a coup leader was sentenced to death but then released. This reflects Jawara's seemingly long-held concern with balancing the small elite within the country and concentrating power, in order to preserve the political calm. One might also note the ‘pressures towards conformity and homogeneity’ in Dibba's acquiescence to contesting and losing the elections from the confines of his prison cell.

Wholly different to events in 1981, the July 1994 coup was successful and, initially at least, bloodless. Relatively popular, the coup fed on perceptions of government economic mismanagement and corruption, and soldiers’ dissatisfaction. It came at a time when coups in Africa were significantly decreasing in number, but provoked little international reaction, even from Senegal this time. The 29-year-old Jammeh and his new Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC) proceeded in a manner typical of young military coupists. The government was dissolved and its members arrested, the constitution abolished, and political activity shut down. However, after a failed counter-coup and an unsuccessful leadership bid by two other AFPRC members following disagreements over transition, Jammeh acquiesced to elections and won the 1996 presidential election with the help of a ban on most pre-coup political parties and politicians, control of the media and access to state resources, but also through some effective campaigning and a divided opposition (Perfect, 2008).

It is the 22 years of the Jammeh era that provoked the 2016 crisis and created legacies for the post-Jammeh dispensation. Having established himself in power and his political party, the Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC), in the new National Assembly, Jammeh embarked on a number of popular policy initiatives, in areas such as education and infrastructure, but the architecture of a semi-authoritarian state clearly emerged.

Jammeh's tendency towards arbitrary statements and actions grew over time. In 2007 he announced he had invented a herbal ‘cure’ for HIV/AIDS which was then given to patients. There were ‘witch-hunts’ conducted in rural areas and governmental offices where many, particularly older people, were kidnapped, beaten, forced to drink hallucinogenic liquids, and confess (Turkewitz, November 12, 2019). Further, Jammeh stated categorically in 2011 that ‘If I have to rule this country for one billion years, I will, if Allah says so’ (BBC, December 12, 2011). In 2013, it was announced that The Gambia would leave the Commonwealth and the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Perfect, 2014) and in 2015, the country was renamed the Islamic Republic of The Gambia.

Alongside, there were further shifts towards coercion. The ‘Junglers’ were set up as Jammeh's militia to mete out intimidation of opposition and the media. Protesting students were killed in 2000, the editor of The Point newspaper, Deyda Hydara, was murdered in 2004, and over 50 migrants from other West African countries disappeared in 2005 (Saine & Ceesay, 2013). He was described as ‘a master of manipulation of Islamic symbols’ in what is usually seen as a state with outstanding religious tolerance (Darboe, 2004, p. 73); and accused of favouring his ethnic Jola people whilst insulting and threatening Mandinkas in the run-up to the 2016 election, thereby provoking an accusation of ‘vitriolic rhetoric’ from the United Nations (UN), and testing the hitherto relatively robust ethnic fabric of the country (UN News, June 10, 2016).

Jammeh and the APRC also won the three sets of elections following the 1996 polls, although in an increasingly problematic political environment. Both president and party managed to win each of the elections assisted by a curious mixture of patronage, developmental policies, anti-neocolonial rhetoric, fear, muzzling of the press, and an opposition which remained fractious and disunited. For example, Jammeh won the 2011 presidential elections with 73 per cent of the vote and the main opposition then boycotted the 2012 National Assembly elections, as it had also done in 2002 (Saine & Ceesay, 2013).

One might conclude that the ‘paradox of consensus and conflict’ broke down during the Jammeh era. Many suffered under his increasingly arbitrary and coercive rule and conflict rather than consensus seemed to be the order of the day. ‘Pressure towards conformity and homogeneity’ appears to have emerged from fear. Jammeh was certainly making enemies of his neighbours and even extended this to Senegal. The importance of personality and personalised politics and power concentration with occasional spikes of fragmentation were apparent even in Jawara's time, but Jammeh's era broke with the small state thesis in several ways. One might note at this point, however, that the events of 1994 led to a considerable change of personnel at the very top. There was some overlap, as noted above in the cases of Dibba and Secka, but also more immediately with BB Darboe, who was Vice-president in 1981 and Finance Minister either side of the 1994 coup (Waan, January 28, 2019), and indeed co-optation of many opposition figures such as Lamin Waa Juwara and Ganyi Touray, who was in the PPP and a founder of the UDP. However, Jammeh and most of his cohort were military and decidedly not of the established elite, potentially explaining some of the change in modus operandi.

The Gambia as a contemporary small state

A crisis emerged in 2016, as Jammeh's power base began to slowly unravel. Jammeh's stranger pronouncements had alienated some Gambians and Western donors; the shift towards a more fundamental version of Islam disturbed the minority Christians but also many Muslims; the ethnic rhetoric had a similar result with the Mandinkas and others; the relations with Senegal were tense as Jammeh was seen as supporting his co-ethnic Dioulas in their rebellion in the Casamance in southern Senegal; and the level of emigration and its visibility at home and abroad was seen as an embarrassment. Emigration was also to the advantage of the opposition as the increasing diaspora sustained a campaign to hold Jammeh to account. A critical narrative was broadcast through online radio and social media; and the diaspora provided financial backing to the opposition (Jaw, 2017).

Finally, Jammeh made what in hindsight was a strategic political error. Harassing the opposition had previously worked in his favour, but in 2016, the incarcerations and the death in custody of one of the opposition led to more demonstrations. Further, and unexpectedly, the opposition united around one candidate. Barrow was a relatively unknown official within the United Democratic Party (UDP) whose leader, Ousainou Darboe, was in prison. Much was made of Barrow's relatively quiet and largely apolitical past in his work including as a shop security guard in the UK. Perhaps Jammeh underestimated his rival. No doubt, the opposition almost entirely united behind his candidacy (Hultin et al., 2017; Kora & Darboe, 2017).

The December elections gave Barrow victory over Jammeh by three percentage points. Jammeh conceded, but within days reversed his decision and claimed that the election was fraudulent. In the meantime, there emerged significant organised protest in the country, grouped around the #GambiaHasDecided’ slogan in what became known as the ‘Impasse’. A shutdown and stay-at-home proved an effective method. Members of the government and security apparatus began to show signs of disloyalty. Internationally, and in line with a more robust pro-democracy global and African discourse, Jammeh found himself at the centre of diplomatic attention, including visits made by fellow West African presidents.

The climax was reached on the day that Barrow should have been sworn in as the new president, 19 January 2017, when diplomacy would be backed by ECOWAS military action. Jammeh ignored previous ECOWAS deadlines, but under severe pressure, finally left The Gambia on 21 January for exile in Equatorial Guinea. The Gambian military, on orders from its own Chief of Defence Staff, welcomed the ECOWAS troops, who crossed the border and secured State House in anticipation of Barrow's return from Dakar (Perfect, 2017).

Unsurprisingly it was considered that an overhaul of state institutions and an attempt to address the past were urgently required. This was to be Barrow's ‘New Gambia’. In the next section, there will be a particular focus on the Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission (TRRC), the Constitutional Review Commission (CRC), Security Sector Reform (SSR), and the involvement of the Barrow government in legislative elections and party politics. These four areas highlight the key tensions of this new era within a small state setting.

The TRRC began proceedings by theme in January 2019. The commission heard nearly 400 testimonies from victims and alleged perpetrators, including those in the diaspora, as well as expert witnesses. It endeavoured to ‘create an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human rights from July 1994 to January 2017, in order to promote healing and reconciliation, respond to the needs of the victims, address impunity, and prevent a repetition’ (TRRC website). Some notable events were beamed live on television and the internet including: the testimonies of two deputy leaders of the AFPRC, Edward Singhateh and Sana Sabally, who both confessed to direct responsibility for killings; confessions in the killing of the 56 migrants; the model Toufah recounting her alleged rape by Jammeh; testimony on the ‘witch hunts’; the Jungler, Malick Jatta, admitting that they acted on Jammeh's direction to torture or kill, including the case of the death of Hydara; and the appearance of former State House Imam, Abdoulie Fatty, and former Vice-president, Isatou Njie Saidy.

Testimonies were received in different ways. For instance, Sabally's testimony was generally given more credence than Singhateh's, and Imam Fatty was considered by many as evasive whilst rejecting other testimonies (Jeffang, February 17, 2020). Further, Jammeh remained in exile but remained popular in parts of the country and the APRC saw the TRRC as fundamentally anti-Jola and a witch hunt against Jammeh (AFP, January 16, 2020; Nyassi, interview, February 20, 2020). These problems were recognised by the TRRC head, Baba Jallow, which was promising but nevertheless remained a thorny issue (Jallow, interview, February 11, 2020).

The number and types of people who have testified is indeed impressive. However, two events are important to cite which speak against blanket conformity. The first case involved the appearance in June 2019 of a former military junta member, Yankuba Touray, who refused to testify after being subpoenaed. Answering few questions, Touray invoked his constitutional immunity, to which a Supreme Court ruling subsequently said he was not entitled (Jawo, January 27, 2021). The Lead Counsel adopted a quasi-judicial approach to questioning his witnesses (Jaw, 2019), and provoked an angry mob that accused Touray of disrespect. Hastily and under pressure, Touray was charged and arraigned in court for the murder of Ousman Koro Ceesay, Finance Minister under the military junta.

The second event involved the carrot-and-stick approach adopted by the justice ministry to persuade alleged perpetrators to testify before the commission. Prior to their appearance before the commission and their subsequent release, the Minister of Justice complained that they did not know what to do with the nine Junglers in detention (John, October 10, 2018). Omar Jallow, who confirmed participation in the execution of more than 48 people, was however released with three other members on the basis that they ‘cooperated’ with the commission. Conformity with the TRRC is thus strong but not complete.

The TRRC released its final report in December 2021 and, in contrast to many truth and reconciliation commissions, recommended dozens of prosecutions. Six months later, the government announced that it would proceed with almost all the recommendations in the report (Saho, May 31, 2022). This process is currently playing out.

To what extent can we see the problems of the small elite, personality politics, conflict and consensus, and conformity and homogeneity? First, how does one navigate this undertaking when it is your ‘neighbour’ who is involved? The conflicting background of some of the TRRC personnel has been observed, such as the former Director of Research who was part of a diaspora group that attacked State House in December 2014 with the goal of overthrowing Jammeh (Darboe, June 11, 2019), an example repeatedly used by APRC to denigrate the process (Bah, September 11, 2018). Second, does not this whole process revolve around personalities? The discourse of the TRRC has sometimes looked more like a personality contest (What's On Gambia, October 14, 2019). For instance, the appearance of Singhateh was cited as mere bravado between him and the Lead Counsel, Essa Faal, while the interests of the victims were ignored (Jaw, 2019). Faal went on to unsuccessfully contested the 2021 presidential election and was accused by Barrow of using the TRRC for political gains (Fatu Network, December 2, 2021). Similarly, victims frowned on the reconciliation meeting organised by the TRRC between Sabally and Singhateh (Manneh, February 23, 2019).

Richards suggests that the small society and elite would find a way which involved some consensus and some conflict. Baba Jallow attributed the impressive turnout partly to an opportunity for perpetrators to confess or have revenge on Jammeh, but also because ‘everyone knows everyone else’ and so people felt ‘impelled’ to appear (Jallow, interview, June 15, 2023). On the other hand, the report suggested a somewhat belligerent tone concerning perpetrators and shifts towards retributive justice and we may be observing a continuation of more conflictual and fragmentary politics potentially with ethnic overtones, or at least the shedding of some of Jammeh's temporarily introduced new elite. The report did allow for some amnesties and rejected only eight of the 25 who applied, although the government rejected the commission's amnesty recommendation for Sabally.

The CRC was established in June 2018 and functioned to ‘draft a new Constitution for the Republic of The Gambia’ (CRC website). In the process of constructing the new constitution, however, conflicting interests and stumbling blocks emerged. In September 2020, National Assembly members loyal to President Barrow with support of the APRC voted down the constitution in its second reading. The main bone of contention was whether Barrow's first term should count in a maximum total of two. Efforts to revive the failed draft have been made, including under the leadership of former Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan, but so far to no avail.

In the process, other issues also proved contentious. Police powers became a significant issue at the start of 2020 when several demonstrations took place and others were banned, more of which below. The particular problem of religion and secularism in a country that is around 95 per cent Muslim brought lively debate before and after the rejection. The term ‘secular’ was omitted in the draft, since it had been illegally inserted in the 1997 constitution in the early 2000s, but there were also specific guarantees to strengthen rights, including freedom of religious expression, and the National Assembly was to be barred from passing laws to declare a state religion.

In what ways can small state concerns be seen, or not seen, in action here? First, a constitution tailor-made to transition The Gambia became far more about personalities (Jaw, September 24, 2020). Second and most pertinent here, is consensus and conflict. The agreements and disagreements at party level show some evidence of compromise in the body politic of The Gambia, as does the omission of the word ‘secular’ and the simultaneous promotion of religious freedom. However, particularly after Jammeh's shift to a more fundamental version of Islam (whilst maintaining some ‘traditional’ practices), religion has become an issue and the outcome had potential to further divide Muslims and Christians in a country revered for its co-existence and secular nature. To a large extent, this debate and the debate around ethnic politics are both part and parcel of the narratives that emerged post-Jammeh (Coutright, March 21, 2018). The continuing derogatory ethnic language at elections threatens The Gambia's social cohesion, although political mobilisation on ethnic grounds remains marginal (Hultin & Sommerfelt, 2020). The endeavour to effectively seek three terms also threatens consensus and leans towards conflict. These concerns were then overtaken by the rejection of the constitution by the National Assembly leading to considerable uncertainty.

In stark comparison to the TRRC which made considerable and timely headway on its objectives and the CRC which faltered at the last hurdle, SSR became mired in practicalities and politics. Supported by an International Advisory Group including the UN, African Union, ECOWAS and the European Union (EU) and headed by the newly established Office of National Security, the programme was launched in August 2017 but had made only partial progress by the time of writing. The EU ambassador in The Gambia openly criticised the process arguing that without strong political will, SSR will fail (Sowe, August 28, 2019). Although there has been recognisable progress in the production of a National Security Policy, a National Security Strategy, a Defence Policy, and an SSR Strategy, SSR has not delivered resizing and has remained a tight security affair with little civil society participation.

Security institutions are still governed by obsolete legislation dating back to colonial rule or the 1980s and few are in line with tenets of civilian democratic control. Recent protests against police brutality and the continued arrest of activists, journalist and academics critical of the government, such as Dr Ismaila Ceesay, are all reminiscent of, though not on the scale of, the immediate past (Kandeh, February 2, 2018). The Police Anti-Crime Unit was accused of human rights violations. In 2019, a riot erupted when a group of youths attacked the unit, accusing them of torturing to death a Sierra Leonean national (Camara, July 24, 2019). In July 2020, following further allegations of torture by a detainee, activists demanded the resignation of Commissioner Gorgui Mboob who was subsequently recommended for prosecution by the TRRC for his involvement in the incidents in 2000 when protesting students were killed (Bah, May 26, 2022). Further incidents are detailed below.

Specific issues revolved around the resizing of the military, in which the over-representation of Jolas is presented by many as a problematic element (Dwyer, 2017; Kinteh, interview, February 12, 2020). However, given that few Jolas reach the higher echelons, the ‘over-representation’ is not then so straightforward. It is probably a more problematic legacy of Jammeh that the military became generally bloated and promotions and demotions were dictated by loyalty and patronage (Dwyer, 2017). The oversized nature of The Gambia's military was evident in the 2019 recurrent budget where defence was allocated 7 per cent of the budget, exceeding allocations to many ministries including Agriculture (Gajigo, September 2, 2019). Young officers also see the reinstatement of senior officers that were away for decades as problematic (Shaban, March 5, 2017). The role of the Chief of Defence Staff, General Masaneh Kinteh, who had served in the same position under Jammeh, was questioned. He was dismissed for unspecified reasons in March 2020 and redeployed as Ambassador to China. Finally, the continued presence of the ECOWAS Mission in The Gambia (ECOMIG) and Senegalese troops, particularly in Barrow's bodyguard, raised questions of sovereignty (Jaw, October 20, 2018). It may, however, be the end of the presidency of Macky Sall in Senegal in 2024 which finally signals the end of ECOMIG.

How can the small state be seen to impact here? Recycling of the small elite is clearly visible in the position of the Chief of Staff; personality politics, fragmentation/concentration of power, and conformity is less of an issue. However, the foot-dragging is a sign of the fragility of the situation vis-à-vis the security services but may also be a sign that conflict and compromise are both in evidence. Compromise may be seen in the schemes for retaining numbers which have been proposed, including the farming of rice by soldiers (Kinteh, interview, February 12, 2020). Schemes for shedding soldiers have also emerged but they have so far come with few details and gained little traction. It should be also noted that a good number of soldiers are also voluntarily leaving, as some do not find the military attractive. A simpler, although contentious and temporary, solution is to delay and rely on Senegal and ECOMIG troops. The final re-structuring of the security services will be a good indication of how far compromise has been taken and how far conflict, again potentially with ethnic overtones, has been countenanced. It also raises the issue of what the security services are for, which is discussed in more detail below.

Finally, there is the politics of the new dispensation. Immediate decisive action was taken in the release of political prisoners, re-joining the Commonwealth and remaining in the ICC, and renaming and restraining the intelligence services. The coalition that defeated Jammeh, however, splintered irreparably and the process of splintering is worth sketching. In the National Assembly elections in 2017, the UDP took 31 of 53 seats, becoming the leading party in the National Assembly but under its own name and Darboe's leadership. The APRC won only five seats, all in the Foni districts which are predominantly Jola. Despite Barrow's original membership of UDP, which he renounced to stand as an independent at the head of the coalition in accordance with electoral law, in March 2019 Barrow fired the three UDP cabinet members including his political godfather, Darboe. In November 2019, the UDP expelled eight of its MPs for giving loyalty to Barrow over the party (Dwyer & Ceesay, December 12, 2019). Barrow registered his new party, the National People's Party (NPP) on the last day of 2019, clearly preparing for his bid for a second term (Gambiana, December 31, 2019). The coalition had thus died.

The coalition had also been stitched together with an agreement that whosoever headed the campaign and emerged as winner would only hold the presidency for three years, initiate democratic reforms, organise fresh elections, and not present him/herself as a candidate (Sillah, April 6, 2019). The primary goal was to end self-perpetuating rule as seen under Jawara and Jammeh. Barrow reneged on this agreement, citing the constitution which demands five years of a president as an overriding concern.

Out of this environment sprung the ‘Three Years Jotna’ or ‘Three Years is Enough’ movement. By the time the movement organised its first protest in December 2019, many onlookers accused the UDP of backing the movement as key members of the party became its public face (Manneh, November 11, 2019). Large demonstrations in January 2020 made headlines, in which 137 were arrested and many sustained injuries amidst accusations of heavy-handed policing. This was sufficient for any further demonstrations by the group to be banned by the authorities, calling it a ‘subversive, violent and illegal movement’ (AP, January 27, 2020). Members of the movement were arrested, released, and arrested again – a tactic employed under Jammeh.

Barrow went on to contest the December 2021 presidential elections, which registered an impressive 89 per cent turnout. Barrow won with a 53 per cent share of the votes and Darboe came second with 28 per cent. This was in some ways a vote for incumbency and stability and against Darboe who was labelled as old and the UDP as a Mandinka party (Perfect, 2022). Remarkably, in the legislative elections in April 2022, the NPP failed to secure a majority even with its two coalition parties. Equally, in the 2023 local government election, the party lost Banjul, Kanifing, Brikama and Mansakonko Councils to the UDP. These significant shifts in support occurred against the background of economic challenges, instability in the Fonis, the ECOMIG intervention, corruption, and criticism of incumbent leaders (Jaw, May 31, 2022).

It is worth tracking the protests. The ‘struggle’ was an informal network of Gambian political activists in the US and Europe who sustained more than two decades of activism against Jammeh through online media platforms (Lyles, August 8, 2014). However, following regime change and the exile of Jammeh, most of the formal diaspora organisations faded away and notable members began to join, or were already in, political parties. The #GambiaHasDecided movement as a local youth organisation during the Impasse and successfully rallied the nation to reject Jammeh's call for re-election. Today, though, the movement is registered as civil society organisation but is not very effective compared to its earlier activism.

In the post-Jammeh period, many other protest movements have sprung up ranging from civil society movements such as #OccupyWestfield and #OccupyBAC demanding efficient public service delivery in water and electricity and the Brikama market and health facility, respectively. The police quelled both protests and the Brikama event was violently suppressed (Jeffang, July 24, 2019). Feminist movements such as #IamToufa and #SurvivingMelville addressing sexual and gender-based violence emerged, and environmental movements have protested against Chinese fishmeal factories and Senegalese fishermen, the latter in March 2021 resulting in the torching of a factory and police station (Ansu, March 16, 2021). A protest in Faraba Banta in 2018 on land rights led to the deaths of three protesters involving the Police Intervention Unit (Touray, May 28, 2018). At the same time, criticism of Barrow is widespread and in the open, indicating a vibrant media and a level of public discussion which is not censored or even self-censored.

Regarding the small state thesis, the first area to assess is the extent of continuity among the political elite. Following on from the notion that Jammeh's political elite was differently oriented, questions are then raised on the degree of overlap of personnel in the Jammeh and Barrow regimes. Foreign Minister, Mamadou Tangara, and Finance Minister, Mambury Njie, held the same posts and many others in the Jammeh era. Nuha Touray, appointed Secretary General and Head of the Civil Service in 2020, was Cabinet secretary under Jammeh. Minister of Defence, Sheikh Omar Faye, was Gambian Ambassador to the US, and Minister of Interior, Yankuba Sonko, was Inspector General of Police in the Jammeh government. Seedy Njie was Information Minister during the Impasse and is now part of Barrow's NPP and Deputy Speaker of Parliament. The UDP is not immune with former Secretary General, Momodou Sabally, and former APRC MP, Suku Singhateh, joining its ranks. Remarkably, the veteran politician, Fatoumata Tambajang, served in all three regimes: she was Barrow's Vice-president, a Secretary of State in Jammeh's initial junta, and an advisor to Jawara.

The small state has immediate bearing here. At the time of the Impasse and the start of the new regime, some argued for a clean slate, but others insisted that the Jammeh state could not be simply dismantled as the institutional memory and expertise would be lost, the number of qualified people is in any case limited, and there is a need to compromise (Jaw, January 30, 2017). The small elite has clear repercussions, and the recycling in the Barrow regime is indeed considerable. There is also a clear continuation of personality politics in the guise of Barrow, first as a candidate who was not Jammeh and second in his personalisation of power, but equally in the political battles between Darboe and Barrow during the demise of the coalition and the constitution.

Beyond personnel is of course the attitude to governance, which is shown here in considerable flux. Political fragmentation alongside an unfulfilled desire for power concentration appears to be the order of the post-crisis dispensation. Further, a current debate in The Gambia concerns the relationship of government via the security services with the public. Critics see an unreformed sector which is still not constrained by the constitution and has unchanged methods from the Jammeh era, leading to the violence and banning orders noted above. This would then be a continuation of the prioritisation of state security rather than human security and the conflictual politics from the Jammeh regime.

Finally, and conversely, is the politically active public, including the diaspora, and whether it has shifted away from mostly conformity or occasional reaction under previous regimes to the sort of effective civil action that mobilised against Jammeh before and during the Impasse. In colloquial parlance, the genie has been let out of the bottle. The #GambiaHasDecided movement, the ‘Three Years Jotna’ campaign, and many other rallies shows a civil society which will conform less and be disinclined towards homogeneity. It must be said though that involvement in any form of protest is not nearly at the levels of the Impasse.

In contrast, ‘Three Years Jotna’ was seen by many as a political movement that emerged from the UDP and the diaspora and wished to create fitna in the country (Fatou, September 28, 2019; Sahel Network, December 3, 2019). Fitna derives from Arabic but is commonly used by Gambians to denote chaos or problems. It is generally understood that creating fitna is not good for the individual, family, or society. It contrasts with the usage of the word in Senegal where it has the same meaning but is interpreted as being sometimes necessary. Given Senegal's long history of protest, perhaps this is not surprising. A comparison of the two civil societies made by a prominent Gambian activist-academic noted the Senegalese rail strike as far back as 1948 and the regular re-emergence of protests up to the present day, in comparison to the co-optation of Gambian unions and civil society by both Jawara and Jammeh (Jobarteh, interview, June 15, 2023). The key point here though is that beyond #GambiaHasDecided, many Gambians still see protests as fitna. Another Gambian term also borrowed from Arabic, maslah, or letting bygones be bygones, is deemed to be the right approach to deal with societal problems. It might be pointed out that The Gambia is a much smaller state than Senegal and is exhibiting the small state trait of managing conflict through homogeneity and consensus.

Conclusion

The article has shown that the small state thesis has traction. The lines of elite recycling remain dense and personalised politics through Jawara, Jammeh, Darboe and Barrow and into the TRRC and CRC is very pronounced. Pressures towards ‘conformity and homogeneity’ can be seen through the Jawara and Jammeh eras where protests have been rare and even now are subject to some societal disapproval, and where there is pressure to conform as in the TRRC. Power concentration is sometimes achieved and at other times not. Conflict and consensus vie for co-existence, not least in the reactions of government and society to the extreme political events of 1981, 1994 and 2016–2017 and the aftermaths, but also in the negotiations of the CRC and SSR.

At the same time, the Jammeh regime somewhat broke away from this mould in its turn towards the conflictual, in part because of the characteristics of its relatively new elite. While the latest transfer of power includes heavy elite recycling, there are other areas where friction with the small state thesis can be found. The TRRC wavers between retributive and restorative justice and struggles to maintain conformity, while the CRC and SSR processes have grappled with legacies of the Jammeh era and have so far had mixed results. Perhaps most important, the Impasse released societal forces which would not conform, and it remains to be seen how these may be shaped.

The usefulness of the small state thesis articulated here can be summarised: it applies strongly, but not always, to Gambian politics. Though the qualification needs to be added that these practices are evident to some extent in many larger African states, and likely elsewhere. Given this, it is argued here that the framework offers a very useful, if not the only, explanation for Gambian developments. There is indeed a ‘New Gambia’, but not how Barrow might imagine it or how his detractors might decry the idea. Instead, it is a country that has in some ways been changed societally and politically, not by Barrow, but by the legacy of Jammeh and the Impasse. However – and this is key – the history, specific traits, and limited personnel of a small state have not disappeared, and one should expect their influence to continue in a Gambia that has not been structurally transformed since 2017.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank our interviewees and our reviewers.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

David Harris

David Harris is Associate Professor in African Studies at the University of Bradford. He specialises in West African politics and international relations and is the author and often co-author of many articles on Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ghana, and The Gambia. He is also the author of the book, Sierra Leone: A Political History, which was published in 2020 in its second edition.

Sait Matty Jaw

Sait Matty Jaw is the co-founder and Executive Director of the Center for Research and Policy Development (CRPD), an independent, non-profit, and non-partisan social research, advocacy, learning, and capacity-building organisation committed to promoting inclusive democratic governance in The Gambia. Sait is also a lecturer in the Political Science Department at the University of The Gambia where he has been a faculty member since 2014 focusing on Gambian politics. His research interests cut across democracy, human security, transitional justice, migration, and natural resource governance. Sait is a blogger and political commentator and his articles have appeared in Africa Arguments and The Guardian. He frequently appears on local and international media as an expert on The Gambia. Al Jazeera, BBC, Guardian, and Washington Post have routinely quoted him among others.

Notes

1 The 3,650 figure is purely land area and does not count the River Gambia which would enlarge the total area to 4,127 sqm.