When You Can’t Afford to Miss: Likelihood of Success and Discrimination in Cyberwarfare

Abstract

Offense dominance in cyberspace is taken by many as a given. However, this is not a consensus position, with several scholars arguing that cyberattacks that produce meaningful kinetic effects on their prescribed targets are enormously costly and painstakingly slow. This poses an issue at the nexus of Just War Theory’s likelihood of success and discrimination doctrines. Initiating (or escalating) a conflict should only occur if the initiator has a reasonable likelihood of success. That success may be made more likely by overlooking the requirement that weapons be able to discriminate between targets and non-targets, especially under circumstances in which time is of the essence. Furthermore, even if non-target systems are not destroyed, their infection can facilitate the discovery of a cyberweapon, inspiring copycat weapons and attacks.

Keywords:

• just war
• likelihood of success
• cyberwar
• internet security

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Adam Knight

Adam Knight (PhD, Rutgers University) is an assistant professor in Notre Dame of Maryland University’s Department of History and Political Science. His research focuses on irregular warfare and has published articles on rebel governance’s relationship with post-war democratic transition, the conceptual underpinning and historical continuity of gray zone operations, and the performance of financial institutions amidst civil conflicts.