https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7639-0007
ABSTRACT
The drug trade has garnered significant attention as a critical funding source for various terrorist organisations. This systematic review summarises the existing empirical knowledge about the Taliban and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia’s (FARC) involvement, and profit from the drug trade, and methods of estimating drug trade revenue. Thirty-one studies were identified. Twenty-three about the Taliban, seven about the FARC, and one about both groups. Estimates of annual profit varied from US$19 to US$500 million for the Taliban and US$140 to US$3.5 billion for the FARC. Fourteen of the twenty-four studies about the Taliban provided an estimate and merely six studies discussed the methods used to generate those estimates. Among the eight studies about the FARC, four provided an estimate but one described the method employed. Studies used a variety of information sources. The review shows the need for caution regarding existing estimates and a more methodologically rigorous analysis of linkages.
1. Introduction
There has been longstanding attention to the nexus between terrorism and the drug trade, particularly the extent to which terrorist organisations profit from and are sustained by the drug trade (Paoli et al., Citation2022). This issue is becoming more important post-August 2021 when the Taliban gained control in Afghanistan - the world’s largest producer of opium. High-level policy debates have arisen about how this may impact the international drug trade and organised crime more broadly (The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], Citation2022). Concern over the transnational threat of the crime-terror nexus and its challenge to global peace and security have been reflected in the United Nations Security Councils’ resolutions as early as the 1990s and increasingly since the 9/11 attack in the United States (UNODC, Citation2001). For example, in Afghanistan, where over 80% of the world’s opium has been produced, many have argued that the opiate trade revenue has helped the Taliban to survive for over two decades (Freeman, Citation2011; Peters, Citation2009; SIGAR, Citation2018; UNODC, Citation2009, Citation2017a; UNSMT, Citation2015).
Freeman (Citation2011) classified terrorist organisations’ income sources into the following four categories: 1) state sponsorship; 2) revenue derived from licit activities and businesses; 3) income from organised crime and illegal activities; and 4) donations from individuals and institutions supporting a terrorist cause for political, economic, or religious interests. Freeman notes that while state sponsorship was a significant funding source for terrorist groups during the Cold War, it was substituted by organised crime by the end of the War. He further notes that revenues from the drug trade, kidnapping, extortion, and illegal exploitation of natural resources, among others, have helped several terrorist organisations to survive.
Extant literature suggests that the drug trade has been a significant source of income for several terrorist groups in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America (UNODC, Citation2017a). Herein we focus on two terrorist organisations – the Taliban and the FARC – connected with the illicit drug trade.
1.1. The Taliban
The Taliban is a far-right Islamic fundamentalist group that emerged in 1994 amid the chaos of civil war following the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan. A majority ethnic PashtunFootnote1 (Sakhi, Citation2022), the Taliban ruled over 90% of Afghanistan from 1996 until late 2001, when it was overthrown by the coalition forces led by the United States. However, a few years later, the Taliban reorganised forces and launched an insurgency against the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and international forces stationed in the country. Following a series of events including but not limited to the United States-Taliban peace agreement (signed 29 February 2020 in Doha, Qatar), withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan, and flight of the Afghan president (Mohammad Ashraf Ghani), the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan collapsed on 15 August 2021, and the Taliban took control of Afghanistan under the leadership of their supreme leader, Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada (Andisha, Citation2022).
1.2. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was a far-left terrorist group that emerged in 1964 in the aftermath of the civil war (1948–1957) in Colombia known as La Violencia (Norman, Citation2018), which began following the assassination of Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, the leader of the Liberal Party in 1948 (Otis, Citation2014). FARC was the military wing of the Colombian Communist Party that supported redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor (The Institute for Economics & Peace, Citation2022).
During the nearly six decades of insurgency, several peace attempts were made between the Colombian government and FARC. In November 2016, a peace deal ratified by the Colombian Congress formally ended the decades-long violence (National Government of Colombia & FARC-EP, Citation2016). Section four of the Peace deal discusses solutions to the illicit drugs problem, noting that decades of conflicts and instability resulted in poverty, marginalisation, economic and social inequality, increased illicit drug cultivation, and production and fuelled organised crime and violence. The Agreement further highlights that FARC has agreed to cooperate with the Colombian government in addressing the supply and demand side of the drug problem (National Government of Colombia & FARC-EP, Citation2016).
While FARC has been de-listed from the United Nations designated terrorist group list, there remain questions about the progress with the implementation of the peace deal (The Institute for Economics & Peace, Citation2022).
1.3. Systematic review objectives
This systematic literature review was conducted to map and summarise empirical knowledge about the Taliban and FARC’s involvement and profit from the drug trade and methods used to estimate drug trade revenue over the 1964–2021 period. The review further aimed to understand what percentage of the Taliban and FARC incomes were derived from the drug trade and identify the similarities and differences regarding the nature of involvement, profitability, and estimation methods between studies and terrorist groups. The implications for research and policymakers will also be discussed.
2. Methods
The review used an inclusion criterion of empirical studies (qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods) published between 1964 and 2021 in English language. Studies using secondary data analysis and unpublished studies from reputed sources over the same period were also included.
2.1. Information sources
Both academic journals and grey literature that were available via open access, Google Scholar, or Flinders University institutional access were included in the review. Ten databases were searched as follows: ProQuest, EconLit, Google Scholar, CINCH Criminological database, JSTOR, Science Direct, Scopus, Web of Science, Taylor and Francis Online Library, and Wiley Online Library. To include the grey literature, the website of the following organisations were searched manually: the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the UNSC Al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Monitoring Teams, the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, the Global Witness, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), International Drug Policy Unit of the London School of Economics and Political Science, the European Union Police (Europol), the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the United States Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), the International Society for the Study of Drug Policy (ISSDP), InSight Crime and Wilson Center. Additionally, the reference list of studies selected for full-text review was manually reviewed, and relevant studies were subject to abstract and/or full-text review. Books and media articles were excluded from this review. Books were excluded due to their lack of ready access over the period analysed − 1964–2021 and risk of bias from including only those available online (see the study limitations section for additional details). Media articles were excluded (as is common in systematic reviews) due to their lack of reliability and lower quality of evidence about the variables of interest for the study (e.g. the extent of profit and methods of estimation).
2.2. Search strategy
The search strategy was developed to be systematic, capture all relevant studies and enable efficient screening of results. As such, a three-fold query structure was adopted to cover the main categories (terrorist group, income, and drug trade) and ensure that the terms were compatible with the relevant databases and platforms (see ). A Flinders University librarian validated the search terms.
Table 1. Search strategy.
2.3. Selection process
outlines the PRISMA search and selection process. The database search led to the identification of 15,614 peer-reviewed records (journal articles). Following removing duplicates (761) and ineligible records (7,696), 7,157 were exported to Covidence for title and abstract screening. 320 studies qualified for full-text review. Additionally, 534 records were identified via grey literature searches and 66 from the full-text reference search of included studies. This led to additional 165 studies that qualified for full-text review. Following inclusion and exclusion criteria, 31 studies qualified for data extraction.Footnote2 A quality assessment of all the full-text reviewed studies was undertaken using the Joanna Briggs Institute (JBI) critical appraisal “checklist for text and opinionFootnote3” and recorded in Microsoft Excel.
Figure 1. PRISMA flow diagram of systemic review search and screening process.
2.4. Data extraction
The following data variables were extracted and coded in a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet broken down by terrorist group:
Study title
Name(s) of authors
Author(s) origin
Year of publication
Type of publication: journal article, report
Study design
Methodology
Aims of the study
Study funding source
Study sample size
Data source(s)
Other data variables extracted included the nature and extent of the Taliban and FARC relationship with organised crime in general and opiate/cocaine trade in particular, details of revenue collection mechanism including taxation, methods of estimating the Taliban and FARC income from the drug trade, the nature of in-kind support provided to the Taliban and FARC as well as groups expenditure and financial system used to move money.
3. Results
Thirty-one studies were included in the review: 23 examined the Taliban-drug trade link, 7 the FARC-drug trade nexus, and 1 both (see ). Of the 24 studies about the Taliban, 3 (12.5%) were academic articles, 4 (16.5%) were independent reports, 2 (8.5%) were government reports, and 15 (62.5%) were United Nations (UN) reports, e.g. research conducted by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the United Nations Security Council Sanctions Monitoring Team (UNSMT). Of the eight studies about the FARC’s involvement in the drug trade, 6 (75%) were academic articles and 2 (25%) were reports produced by independent think tanks: 62.5% were based on secondary research and 37.5% were based on new empirical research.
Table 2. Studies included in the systematic review, by type of publication, data collection period, and study design.
3.1. The nature and extent of the Taliban and FARC’s involvement in the drug trade
3.1.1. The Taliban involvement in the drug trade
All 24 studies about the Taliban acknowledged that the Taliban had been involved in various stages of the drug trade since it emerged in 1994, when Afghanistan was already supplying over 50% of the global opium. The studies noted that Taliban’s involvement in the drug trade can be traced back to the 1980s, when some of the founding members fought alongside the Mujahideen against the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan (Peters, Citation2009). During this period, the opium economy was used to fund resistance efforts. Following the establishment of the Taliban movement in 1994, its leadership continued to rely on drug money as a major revenue source (Goodhand, Citation2005; Peters, Citation2009).
As outlined in , the 24 studies point to the Taliban having four key roles in the drug trade in Afghanistan: the imposition of tax on farmers and drug traffickers (87% of studies); provision of protection (45% of studies); direct involvement in drug trafficking (58% of studies); and brokerage – providing links to other organised crime groups (41% of studies).
Table 3. Summary findings about the Taliban’s involvement in the drug trade.
3.1.1.1. Imposition of taxation
The biggest role identified by the studies was taxation. Twenty-one studies noted that the Taliban taxed the drug trade in the areas under their control and influence. The Taliban reportedly did not have a structured and coordinated tax system in place, nor a centralised authority responsible for tax collection. Instead, taxes were imposed with fixed or variable rates by field commanders at various levels, such as village, district, and province (Mansfield, Citation2013; UNODC, Citation2009). Studies vary in important ways in their estimates about the extent and nature of the tax rate and when/how imposed (see section 3.2 for details).
3.1.1.2. Provision of protection
Twelve studies indicated that the Taliban protected opium poppy farmers and drug trafficking networks operating within Afghanistan. Another five studies noted that the Taliban protected opiate manufacturing labs in the areas under their control, and in return the opium poppy growing farmers, drug trafficking networks, and lab owners provided taxation, cash, and in-kind support to the Taliban. For example, Peters (Citation2009) notes that drug traffickers paid the Taliban a fee for the drug consignment that passed through the Taliban-controlled-zones. Additionally, when the former Afghan counternotices forces, known as ‘Force 333’ raided drug labs, the Taliban intervened to protect the labs. Similarly, when the Afghan police attempted to eradicate farmer’s opium poppy cultivation, the Taliban protected the poppy fields and fought against the eradication forces (UNODC, Citation2009). According to UNODC estimates, in 2009 the Taliban earned around US$70 million in protection money from drug traffickers (UNODC, Citation2011a).
3.1.1.3. Direct involvement in drug and precursor trafficking
Thirteen studies report that the Taliban has direct involvement in drug trafficking. Direct involvement can take multiple forms: trafficking of drugs or precursors within Afghanistan (9% of studies); export of drugs to international markets (12% of studies); procurement of chemicals (8% of studies); or being part of the leadership team in drug trafficking networks (12% of studies). For example, in 2005, the Iranian anti-narcotics forces spotted several Taliban fighters among the drug trafficking convoys along the Afghanistan–Iran border, aiding the international export of heroin (Labrousse, Citation2005). The UNODC research findings suggest that the Taliban were also involved in procuring and trafficking Acetic Anhydride from Asia and Europe to Afghanistan (UNODC, Citation2011a). Acetic anhydride has been the key required chemical for heroin production but one that is not legally produced in Afghanistan (UNODC, Citation2018a).
3.1.1.4. Brokerage
Another role identified was that of brokerage mentioned in nine studies whereby the Taliban connect drug traffickers with other organised crime groups, facilitate the trafficking of drugs in the areas under their control and work closely with drug trafficking networks within and outside of Afghanistan. For example, Rashid (Citation2001) notes how the Taliban have link with organised crime groups in Iran, Pakistan, Central Asia, and the Chechen Republic, which traffickers use to aid export. Drug traffickers also broker access to other goods and services as required. For example, UNODC (Citation2011a) found that drug traffickers provided guns, food, shelter, and vehicles to the Taliban when requested.
3.1.1.5. Moderators
The review indicated several factors that can moderate these relationships. Of note, the Taliban’s involvement in drug trafficking differed from one province to another and depended on the Taliban’s level and extent of control, opium poppy cultivation and production, and the geographical location of a province (UNODC, Citation2011a), and the taxation system (Mansfield, Citation2021; UNODC, Citation2021). For example, in 2017 the UNODC World Drug Report mentioned that between 26% and 85% of the area under opium cultivation was under the Taliban control (UNODC, Citation2017a).
3.1.2. The FARC’s involvement in the drug trade
Eight studies examined the FARC’s involvement in the drug trade (see ). All the included studies about the FARC were conducted during the period prior to the National Government of Colombia, & FARC-EP (Citation2016). The studies concur that from the early 1980s, FARC started to be involved in the cocaine trade in various ways and means. Like the Taliban, FARC had four distinct roles in the drug trade: taxation (100% of studies), protection (87.5% of studies), direct involvement in drug cultivation and trafficking (62.5% of studies), and brokerage (62.5% of studies). A number of studies e.g. Norman (Citation2018) note that the FARC was originally opposed to involvement in the cocaine trade because it was considered counter revolutionary or a capitalist phenomenon e.g. (Labrousse, Citation2005). However, this changed in 1982 when the FARC leadership permitted the use of cocaine economy as a source of revenue to expand insurgency, and by the 1990s or early 2000s, 6 studies noted FARC had established institutions that oversaw drug production and trafficking and regulated the illicit cocaine market in (at least some) of the areas under the group’s control.
Table 4. Summary findings on the FARC’s involvement in the drug trade.
3.1.2.1. Taxation
All eight studies showed that FARC imposed taxes on coca cultivation, cocaine production, and trafficking. For example, research by Norman (Citation2018) based on interviews with demobilised FARC combatants, community leaders, and academics showed that FARC established dedicated institutions (fronts) to regulate the cocaine market in Colombia and control the prices and the trade to maximise its income from the drug trade. By the early 1990s, around 20% of FARC’s combatants were protecting the cocaine trade in the coca cultivation areas under its control, and the revenue derived from the cocaine trade was utilised to acquire equipment and build the military capacity of FARC. Eventually, this played a crucial role in the expansion of the insurgency and gaining territorial control. Moreover, Suarez (Citation2000) notes that through the comprehensive taxation system established in the areas under its control, FARC taxed up to 80% of the cocaine production in Colombia. Taxes were levied at every stage of the production, including the raw materials required for production of cocaine.
3.1.2.2. Direct involvement in trafficking
Seven studies mentioned that FARC protected coca cultivation, cocaine production and trade in the areas under its control, whilst five studies indicated that FARC was directly involved in cocaine production as well as in trafficking. Otis (Citation2014) reveals that FARC was initially involved in taxing and protection, but they increased involvement in other aspects of the drug trade following the break-up of the Medellin and Cali cartels. Specifically, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, FARC used the 16,000-square-mile safe heaven agreed with Colombian government in southern Colombia to grow coca and establish links with international drug traffickers like the Mexico’s Tijuana Cartel and Brazilian smugglers and supply drugs to major international drug cartels. Similarly, Labrousse (Citation2005) noted that by the 1990s, FARC eliminated middlemen, and deployed its own intermediaries to collect coca paste and opium from farms, sell them to traffickers and at times operate their own coca refiners. Research by Felbab-Brown (Citation2009, Citation2012) and Phelan (Citation2021) indicated that through these roles FARC was able to have a substantive impact on the coca trade including setting prices and determining the customers allowed to purchase coca paste. Finally, InSight Crime research (McDermott, Citation2013) concurs that FARC was involved in all aspects of the drug trade (taxing, cocaine production, domestic trafficking and trafficking to international drug cartels) albeit it notes that it was several fronts of FARC, including but not limited to 10th, 16th, 29th, 30th, 33rd, 48th, and 57th that assumed the drug trafficking roles.
3.1.2.3. Brokerage
Five studies highlighted that FARC had formed alliances with domestic and international drug trafficking networks and partnered with major drug cartels. Cook (Citation2011) notes that FARC assumed the role of an intermediary between drug traders and farmers and had alliances with international drug trafficking networks. The group provided protection to farmers and traders and collected taxes in return. Otis (Citation2014) notes that some FARC units moved cocaine to pick-up points in neighbouring Venezuela, Panama and Ecuador as well as vessels and submarines for delivery, whilst Felbab-Brown notes that by the 2000s FARC was selling its coca paste and cocaine to both Colombian and Mexican drug trafficking cartels (Felbab-Brown, Citation2009).
3.1.2.4. Moderators
Two studies mentioned that FARC’s role in the cocaine trade varied from one area to another. For instance, in some areas, the group only collected taxes from farmers and traffickers and protected the cocaine production labs, while in other areas, it was directly involved in the cultivation and production of cocaine.
In summary, the review shows that both the Taliban and FARC have four key roles in the drug trade in their respective country: tax, protection, trafficking drugs, and brokerage. They show the nature of the relationship can change over time, e.g. from one of pure taxation to protection to direct involvement in drug trafficking. They also show several moderators of this relationship including geography and the actions of other organised crime groups and that some fronts or groups can be more involved than others. Few studies focus on all these roles, which means they may overstate some roles and omit other important aspects of the drug-terrorism nexus.
3.2. Methods of estimating the Taliban and FARC’s income from the drug trade
3.2.1. The Taliban
The estimated annual revenue generated by the Taliban from the drug trade varies widely between studies, ranging from US$19 million (Mansfield, Citation2021) to US$500 million (Peters, Citation2009). Out of the 24 studies, 14 (58%) provide Taliban’s revenue estimates from the drug trade. Eight studies do not discuss the method utilised to derive the estimates while the remaining six studies describe the method. These estimates vary between studies and from year to year due to a range of factors, including the tax rate applied, levels of opium cultivation and production, drug prices, data and information sources, and methods of estimations (see ).
Table 5. Estimates of the Taliban and FARC annual revenue from the drug trade, 1995–2021.
3.2.1.1. Tax rate
Tax rates play a crucial role in estimating the revenue, but there exist disagreements regarding the specific tax rates employed in studies. Some studies utilised a fixed estimate of 10% Ushr tax as indicated by UNODC (Citation2009), Peters (Citation2009), and UNSMT (Citation2014). Conversely, others employed a variable tax rate that ranged from 1% to 30%, as noted by UNODC (Citation2018a) and UNODC (Citation2021). Mansfield’s (Citation2021) analysis incorporates a tax rate ranging from 0.2% to 2.50% of the opiate price. This tax rate was derived from several years of extensive data collection by the author, which involved conducting over 16,000 in-depth interviews in Afghanistan. The author emphasises the presence of negotiations in tax collections, provincial variations in tax rates, and payments made in cash and kind. Recent field research conducted by Amiri and Jackson (Citation2022) in Afghanistan corroborated these findings, showing that in Helmand province in 2020, the Taliban imposed taxes based on land. For instance, they found the Taliban collected 1,600 Afghani per jeribFootnote4 of land cultivated with poppy or 2 sairFootnote5 of opium per jerib but that in certain provinces, impoverished farmers were exempt from tax payments, whereas influential landowners could negotiate their tax rate.
3.2.1.2. Opium production and price
Opium production and price are other essential data variables in estimating the Taliban’s revenue. Historical data on opium poppy cultivation and production in Afghanistan are limited (UNODC, Citation2001). Since the mid-1990s, UNODC has been the singular entity undertaking comprehensive surveys aimed at estimating the annual opium cultivation and production in the country (UNODC, Citation2022a), and made the data publicly available, as shown by .
Opium prices exhibit year-to-year fluctuations influenced by factors such as the cultivation and harvest seasons or other times of the year, geographical location, and whether the opium is fresh or dry. Additionally, prices also differ at farmgate and at trader’s level. The extent to which price fluctuations have been considered in the existing estimations is unclear; however, the included studies have reported varying prices even for studies conducted within the same year. For example, in 2008 UNDOC (Citation2009) reported the price of dry opium to be US$95/kg while Peters (Citation2009) reported it at US$70/kg.
3.2.1.3. Data sources
The studies relied on a range of data and information sources, including interviews with poppy growing farmers, village headmen, drug traffickers, and other key informants who had direct or indirect involvement in the drug trade. Additionally, insights were gathered from law enforcement experts and government officials. Other relevant data that fed into estimates were government reports and satellite imagery data. For example, the UN Sanction Monitoring Team have relied on information from various sources, including UN member states, interviews with law enforcement and intelligence experts, field visits to Afghanistan, and secondary information from relevant UN agencies like UNODC and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). Mansfield (Citation2021) has conducted interviews with a significant number of key informants across multiple provinces who have had direct or indirect involvement in the drug trade, including poppy-growing farmers, drug traffickers, Taliban officials as well as government experts and policymakers. Mansfield’s wide-ranging interviews led to a lower tax rate as well as lower estimates of revenue figures. As shown below, it is not unreasonable to expect that the data sources may also affect the estimates.
As previously indicated, there exists substantial disparity in the estimations of the Taliban’s annual revenue derived from the drug trade across different studies, particularly once all of the factors above (estimated tax rate, year of study, methods) are combined. For example, in 2009, UNODC (Citation2011a) estimated that the Taliban earned US$155 million from the drug trade. The study conducted interviews with several key informants in multiple provinces of Afghanistan and used information and data reported by Member States to UNODC through the Annual Report Questionnaire (ARQFootnote6) on the price and quantity of drug seizures. They concluded that revenue was generated from various sources: US$70 million from protecting the flow of 275 tons of heroin from Afghanistan to Iran and Pakistan and US$600- US$1200 per month from taxing 300–500 heroin production labs, which amounted to an additional US$2–US$7 million in profits from heroin end-product production. The Taliban also taxed around 90% of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan at a rate of 5%–10%, earning an estimated US$22–US$44 million from poppy cultivation taxation, some of which may have been shared with local Mullahs (Islamic clergies). The report also estimates that around 1,200 tons of raw opium were trafficked to Iran in 2009, with a total market value of US$450 million. Around 10% of this amount (US$45 million) was paid as tax to the Taliban, which led them to conclude the total Taliban revenue from the drug trade was between US$140- US$170 million (average US$155) in 2009. The study reported the price of fresh opium at US$48/kg and dry opium at US$72/kg during the harvest season in 2009.
Peters (Citation2009) estimated the Taliban’s annual revenue from the drug trade between US$400 – US$500 million in 2009. Based on interviews conducted with over 300 key informants including farmers, drug traders, law enforcement and intelligence experts as well as diplomatic officials and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and secondary data from UNODC opium cultivation survey, the study used a 10% tax that the Taliban was deemed to have imposed on opium cultivation, protection of heroin labs and trafficking of opiates. The report notes that the Taliban earned around US$250 million from protecting the drug shipments and US$125 million from the heroin production labs that produced more than 500 metric tons of heroin and morphine base. The study reported price of 1 kg dry opium at US$70 in 2008.
One final study of note is that from Mansfield, which in 2020 estimated that the Taliban’s annual revenue from taxing the opiate trade was approximately US$19 million (Mansfield, Citation2021). The author based his calculations on the taxes that the Taliban had collected, which ranged between 0.2% and 2.5% of the opiate prices. Drawing on 25 years of fieldwork in Afghanistan and 16,000 in-depth interviews conducted with key informants involved directly and indirectly in the drug trade, including farmers, drug traffickers, Taliban officials, government experts, and policymakers, Mansfield findings show that the Taliban taxation system varied across Afghanistan. For instance, in certain villages, taxation practices involved negotiations between the Taliban, farmers, and drug traffickers rather than implementing a fixed rate. According to Mansfield (Citation2021), the farmgate price of 1 kg of fresh opium was US$37 in 2020.
3.2.2. The FARC
Out of the eight identified studies, five provided estimates of FARC’s revenue from the cocaine trade, with only one study briefly describing the method (see ). The FARC’s annual revenue from the drug trade was reported at between US$140 million (Suarez, Citation2000) and US$ 3.5 billion (Otis, Citation2014). According to Suarez (Citation2000), FARC imposed a tax on farmers and drug traffickers known as gramaje or grammage which was equal to 10% of the price of product and up to 80% of cocaine production was taxed by the FARC in 1999–2000. According to Labrousse (Citation2005), FARC levied a tax of 7% to 10% on the sales of farmer’s coca harvests and an additional tax of the same rate was applied when farmers produced coca paste and cocaine. FARC also collected a tax of 8% on the drug traders. However, none of the articles described the data sources used to derive the estimates. Research by InSight Crime (McDermott, Citation2013) estimated FARC’s revenue at over US$ 200 million, derived from an average annual production of 300 tons of cocaine in Colombia. The estimation considered that about 60% of the coca fields were under FARC’s control, leading to the group’s involvement in the production of 180 tons of cocaine. InSight Crime further factored in the nature of the drug trade involvement and the different revenues that can be generated for domestic versus international trade: If the FARC simply charged taxes on the coca base required to produce those 180 tons, it would earn US$45 million. If the FARC sold 180 tons of cocaine within Colombia, it would earn about US$500 million. If the FARC exported 180 tons to Central America, it would earn US$1.8 billion. The FARC is involved in a mix of these activities (McDermott, Citation2013, p. 19), hence the estimate of US$200 million.
Research by Otis (Citation2014) published by the Wilson Centre cites a range of estimates of the FARC revenue from the drug trade. Specifically, they note Colombia officials (former defence minister) estimated that FARC’s annual income from the drug trade was US$2.4-US$3.5 billion but that most local academic and independent scholars estimate the trade is worth much less. A Colombian academic expert – Professor Daniel Mejia - interviewed by Otis suggested that FARC’s income from the drug trade may have been worth US$2.4–US$3.5 billion in the height of drug production in Colombia, but that annual income had dropped to less than US$1 billion following substantial declines in coca cultivation and cocaine production. According to UNODC (Citation2022b), coca bush cultivation decreased from over 160,000 hectares in 2000 to less than 50,000 hectares in 2013. Other Colombian scholars like Vargas and Valencia concurred: noting the trade could be worth as little as US$150 million per year.
In summary, the Taliban’s annual revenue from the drug trade ranges from US$19 million to US$500 million. Factors like opium cultivation and production levels, drug prices, tax rates, data sources as well as methodologies employed contributed to the variations in estimates. The FARC’s annual profit from the cocaine trade is estimated to range from US$140 million to US$3.5 billion. There is less transparency of methods employed in generating these estimates but again time, size of the coca trade and data sources affect estimates, as does the amount of domestic versus international trade.
3.3. What percentage of the Taliban and FARC incomes are acquired from the illicit drug trade
One final objective of the systematic review was to examine the proportion of the Taliban and FARC’s income obtained from the drug trade. In order to understand this aspect, it is necessary to determine the annual budget of these groups as well as identify all their potential income sources. Most of the studies did not analyse all potential income sources of the Taliban and FARC.
Seven studies have estimated that the Taliban’s annual income from the drug trade ranged from 10% to 50% between 2000 and 2020. In comparison, four of the eight identified studies about the FARC estimated that between 40% and 60% of the FARC’s income was derived from the cocaine trade between 1999 and 2005. presents an overview of the proportion of revenue the Taliban and FARC generated from the drug trade.
Table 6. What percentage of the Taliban and FARC incomes are obtained from the illicit drug trade (opiate and cocaine).
4. Discussion and conclusion
This systematic review aimed to map and summarise the existing empirical knowledge about the Taliban and FARC involvement and profit from the drug trade, along with methods employed to estimate drug trade revenue. It further aimed to understand what percentage of the Taliban and FARC incomes were derived from the drug trade. The review findings indicate that:
First, both the Taliban and FARC are deemed to have four key roles in the drug trade: tax collection, provision of protection, drug trafficking, and brokerage. Through these four roles, each terrorist organisation is deemed to have aided the expansion of opium and coca cultivation in their respective country.
Second, studies suggest that both groups generated a significant portion (between 10% to 50% for the Taliban and 40% to 60% for the FARC) of their income from the drug trade ranging from US$19 million to US$500 million for the Taliban and US$140 million to US$3.5 billion for the FARC.
Third, the review brings to light significant variation in the methods used and transparency of existing estimates. It shows that many estimates of profits are provided without data sources, and it brings to light a number of key variables that can legitimately influence estimates.
4.1. What this adds to existing academic research
The review shows that despite the frequency of statements about the drug trade fuelling terrorism (UNODC, Citation2017a; UNSCR 1373 (Citation2001)), there is large variance between estimates of tax revenue and of the overall revenue derived. The extent of variance between estimates both for the Taliban and for the FARC is surprising. This presents a problem given that the tax rate is only one variable that can impact the profit derived. Various variables such as the size of opium or cocaine yield in any 1 year, the price at the farm gate as well as traders’ level, the cost of trafficking within a region, and choice of whether to sell internationally or domestically are all key variables in determining the overall income generated. Furthermore, the review highlights methodological inconsistencies across studies and the historic reliance upon an assumed or estimated tax rate. This in turn makes it hard to make meaningful statements about the nature of the link at the current time.
The review also brings to light similarities and differences between the two terrorist organisations and their nexus with the drug trade. On the one hand, it highlights the similar multiplicity of roles and ways in which each terrorist organisation benefits from involvement in the drug trade and also that terrorist organisations do not just act as ‘taxers’ but sometimes brokers or active participants in trading drugs. But a few key differences were also apparent. This includes firstly that the FARC established institutions (fronts) to manage the drug trade and collect taxes, whereas the Taliban’s involvement lacked a similar structured approach, with revenue being derived by the Taliban field/local commanders. This creates the potential for much greater variation in the tax rate and revenue pertaining to the Taliban. Another noteworthy distinction is that FARC originally opposed involvement in the drug trade, considering it counterrevolutionary. In contrast, the senior leadership of the Taliban has been linked to the drug trade since 1980s, preceding the establishment of the Taliban movement (1994). Additionally, the review shows that while FARC initially acted as an intermediary between drug traders and farmers, the group later shifted its focus and actively contested drug trafficking networks in an attempt to gain control over the cocaine trade. However, the Taliban have maintained close ties with the drug trafficking networks since its inception (Akbary & Goldbaum, Citation2022). Both factors matter as it shows that the nature of the drugs-terrorism nexus may vary in subtle or not so subtle ways in different parts of the globe and that the nature of the nexus can also vary over time even in one region.
The review also shows that there are surprisingly few academic studies on this topic. Most of the existing information come from non-academic sources. For example, out of 24 studies about the Taliban, only 3 were from academic sources. Given the sensitive nature of this topic, information on the crime-terror nexus is mostly gathered by law enforcement and intelligence agencies, which are often classified, and the existing information is generally reported by media and non-governmental organisations (Shaw, Citation2019; UNODC, Citation2017a). That said, this analysis also shows the need to supplement such studies with more independent and empirically derived estimates, as well as to involve local researchers who possess a deep understanding of the culture, traditions, and contexts
While this study examined the Taliban and the FARC, we suspect that similar insights may apply to other terrorist groups. For instance, Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, which protects cannabis and cocaine trafficking in North and West Africa, or Boko Haram in Nigeria and neighbouring countries, which facilitates trafficking of heroin and cocaine in the region (UNODC, Citation2017a). Analyses of the nature of the relationships and methods used are recommended in each instance.
4.2. Implications for research
This research brings to light a number of clear implications for research. First, the findings of this systematic review indicate that further investigation is necessary to better understand the connection between terrorism and the drug trade. Research on the crime-terror nexus is currently limited by both a lack of empirical evidence, scarcity of available data and lack of a clear method (see point below). This stymies the ability to meaningfully contribute to ongoing analyses such as the 2024 United Nations Mid Term Review of progress made in responding to the world drug problem on the increasing links between drug trafficking and terrorism (Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Citation2023). We see benefits here in expanding attention to this nexus: looking at factors including lesser studied aspects of the nexus such as brokerage roles and impacts of domestic and international factors, e.g. environmental conditions, conflict, regional and global demand for drugs, alternative development policies and convergence with organised crime groups on this nexus.
Second, the review shows the need for a more consistent methodology and set of indicators to include in future estimates of the income derived from the drug-terrorism nexus. For example, our review highlighted four key factors that are important to include. Based on the expert insights of the lead scholar (having analysed the Afghan drug market and Taliban involvement for over a decade) we highlight several other areas that may be important to include (see ). Although certain data is collected and published mainly by UNODC, reliable information about some aspects are either unavailable or subject to dispute. That said, at the very least we suggest that consistent reporting about the four key domains would improve the veracity of estimates going forward.
Table 7. Data required (and (un)available) to estimate the Taliban’s income from the drug trade.
Third, we see particular importance in building new and rigorous estimates about the Taliban and income derived from the opium trade now. This is for several reasons. Over the past two decades, opium poppy cultivation has risen in Afghanistan supplying around 80% of the world’s heroin demand. The Taliban have contributed to the sustainability of this supply source and have benefited from it. Moreover, following August 2021 and the Taliban gaining control in Afghanistan, there is a high level of concern across the globe about what will happen with the opiate and methamphetamine production in Afghanistan. In the initial year of the Taliban’s takeover and despite a proclaimed ban on opium poppy cultivation and trafficking, there was a concerning 30% surge in cultivation in 2022 compared to the preceding year (UNODC, Citation2022a). The latest UNODC survey reports a significant 95% reduction in opium cultivation and production, attributed to the strict implementation of the ban on opium cultivation by the Taliban (UNODC, Citation2023a). However, a growing domestic production and trade of methamphetamine (UNODC, Citation2022b, Citation2023c) adds yet another potential source of revenue and layer of complexity to the situation. Given all such reasons, this review highlights the need for fresh, independent, transparent, and comprehensive analyses of the Taliban’s nature of involvement in the drug trade following the regime change as well as profits derived.
Fourth, there is also a need for analyses of the impact of the 2016 Peace Agreement on the FARC-drug trade nexus. Following the Peace Agreement signed between the FARC and the Colombian government, coca bush cultivation in Colombia has seen an increase from 146,000 hectares in 2016 to over 200,000 hectares in 2021 (UNODC, Global Report on Cocaine, Citation2023). Reportedly, some of the FARC’s fronts that were involved in drug trafficking withdrew from the Peace Agreement and some members potentially joined criminal networks (Sala, Citation2019). Given none of the studies in this review examined the post Peace Agreement period, there is a need for fresh analysis of the impacts of the Peace Agreement on the cocaine market in Colombia and role of the dissident FARC members in the cocaine trade.
4.3. Implications for policy
This study also raises several implications for policy. First, this review reinforces the importance of policymakers being wary of the existing estimates and assertions of the extent and size of the drugs-terrorism nexus. Second, this review reinforces that drugs-terrorism links are not just about revenue raising. Instead, it is also about expanding network and territorial control, protection of vulnerable groups (e.g. farmers), expanding military capacity, exerting control over the drug trade itself and solidifying a political power base. Third, the multiplicity of roles and ways that the Taliban and FARC are involved in the drug trade reinforces the deep connections that can occur and the difficulty of reducing involvement through simple solutions, e.g. seizures of drugs or arrest of drug traffickers. This is particularly as this study provides empirical evidence that aligns with previous scholarly research (Makarenko, Citation2004; Makarenko & Mesquita, Citation2014; Omelicheva & Markowitz, Citation2021; Phillips & Kamen, Citation2014) that suggest, state weakness in conflict and post-conflict settings serves as a catalyst for the emergence of the crime-terror nexus and provides opportunity for terrorists and organised crime groups to emerge and further flourish. This correlation is evident in the context of the Taliban insurgency in the 1990s as well as the post 9/11 of the US-led intervention in Afghanistan. During these periods, the weakness and lack of control of the legitimate Afghan republic government facilitated the deepening of ties between the Taliban and drug trafficking networks. A similar conclusion can also be made from the FARC linkages with the drug trade. Despite increased political stability in Colombia, greater government territorial control and improved military and law enforcement capacity compared to Afghanistan, FARC utilised control over coca cultivation and cocaine trade to consolidate its political power in the areas where coca cultivation took place, as noted by Otis (Citation2014). Indeed, it can also be concluded from the review findings that the convergence of the Taliban with organised crime led into creation of a hybrid entity. This hybrid entity exhibits both ideological and economical motivations simultaneously, leading up to the evolutionary convergence where one organisation transforms into the other. The findings also support the ‘black hole syndrome’ (Makarenko, Citation2004, p. 131) and (Phillips & Kamen, Citation2014) and ensure the organisation is much more difficult to stymie.
Fourth and finally, this review highlights the importance of considering innovative policy responses to reduce the drug-terrorism nexus and harms that can flow. Engagement with the sustainable development goals offers one viable avenue. For example, the sustainability of the opium ban in Afghanistan remains uncertain, raising questions about its potential socio-economic impact, in the absence of an alternative livelihood, on deprived rural communities who have relied (UNODC, Citation2022a) on opium economy as their primary livelihood for over two decades. It, moreover, raises the strong likelihood of an end to the ban and return to high opium production in the near future if alternate policy solutions are not found.
4.4. Study limitations
Similar to any research, a number of limitations are evident in this study.
First, the search for literature was conducted only in English language. But we note that some of the included texts do cite local researchers (see, for example, Otis, Citation2014 citing a range of local Colombian researchers) and that the findings are broadly consistent albeit somewhat more nuanced. This provides some level of surety about the analysis and estimates included. To expand the review, future research may consider conducting the search in Spanish (FARC), Persian/Dari, and Pashto (Taliban) languages. Second, the study primarily focused on journal articles and grey literature; consequently, books and media articles were excluded. That said, the findings from books published recently are consistent with those in this review. Notably, works by Leech (Citation2011) and Kline (Citation2020) about the FARC’s involvement and profit from the drug trade and research by Jones (Citation2008), Mercille (Citation2013) and Collins, Fazil, and Tennant, Citation2022 about the Taliban-drug trade nexus affirm the findings of this review.
4.5. Future research
During the research and review process for this study, several potential research questions/areas were identified that would benefit future research:
4.5.1. Taliban
How has the presence of international community in Afghanistan from 2002 to 2021 influenced the Taliban’s dependence on drug revenue?
How would sustainability of the ban on opium cultivation and drug trafficking impact the Taliban as an organisation as well as the Taliban’s local commanders and factions that have relied on the drug trade revenue for the last two decades?
How has the Taliban’s involvement and profit from the drug trade fluctuated across different periods, and what factors can account for these variations?
4.5.2. FARC
How has the Peace Agreement between FARC and the Colombian government as well as the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process affected FARC-drug trade linkages?
4.5.3. Both Taliban and FARC
How do the interconnected dynamics of state corruption and fragility influence narco-terrorism?
To sum up, this systematic review reinforces the key role of the terrorist groups FARC and Taliban in the drug trade but also the complexities in estimating profit and variations in involvement of terrorist groups in the drug trade. The predominance of non-academic estimates of revenue reinforces the need for caution regarding existing estimates and a more methodologically rigorous analysis of linkages. But given the critical role of drug trade revenue in funding these groups, we call for more transparency, methodological consistency, and increase empirical academic research on the crime-terror nexus.
Availability of data
The data for the systematic review will be provided upon request by contacting Hamid Azizi at: [email protected]
Disclosure statement
Hamid Azizi, a former United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) staff member, declares that he did not utilize any United Nations internal or privileged information to which he had access as a staff member for the research and preparation of this work. Any United Nations reports, and information used in this research were publicly accessible.
Additional information
Funding
Notes
1. Pashtun also spelled as Pashtoon or Pashton one of the several ethnic groups in Afghanistan.
2. Despite existing far longer than the Taliban, the number of sources qualified for full text review on the Taliban exceeded those of the FARC. The main reason for this could be that the search was conducted in English language only (see the study limitations section for additional details).
4. One jerib equals around half an acre.
5. Localised unit of measurement with variable equivalence to the metric system.
6. ‘The ARQ is a UNODC mandated data collection [tool] which gathers aggregate data and information on a wide range of subjects related to drugs, from demand (e.g. prevalence of drug use, figures on treatment, mortality) to supply (e.g, data on seizures, cultivation) and regulatory issues’, accessed on 21 June 2023 from: https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/arq.html
7. Mansfield, D. (Citation2017) Understanding control and influence: What opium poppy and tax reveal about the writ of the Afghan state, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit.
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