Social justice as well-being: a radical rethinking of social work and social policy

ABSTRACT

This paper aims to develop a concept of social justice specifically applicable to social welfare policy. The theories of justice of Rawls, Sen, and Sandel are critically discussed. Then, a concept of social justice as well-being is suggested, and two lines of moral argument underpinning the concept are explained. Central to the concept is the notion that the social welfare system must provide equal opportunities for all the people so that they can meet their basic needs. The concept of social justice provides a normative framework for guiding the policy practice of social workers and may assist in the building of more just societies in both Hong Kong and Macao in China.

摘要

本文旨在建构一套适用于社会福利政策的社会正义概念。论文首先回顾及讨论罗尔斯、森和桑德尔的正义理论，之后提出 “作为福祉的社会正义”概念，以及解释其背后的两方面道德理据。“作为福祉的社会正义”概念是指，社会福利体系应为所有民众提供平等机会以满足其基本需要。这套理念为社会工作者提供一个指导其政策实践的规范性架构，亦有助在中国香港及澳门更为正义的社会建设。

KEYWORDS:

• Social justice
• social welfare
• well-being
• equal opportunity
• Hong Kong
• Macao

Introduction

Policy practice is one of the professional services in social work (Hare 2004), and it mainly consists of policy research and advocacy in the domain of social welfare. At the time of political democratisation in Hong Kong in the 1980s, a group of social workers actively advocated for social welfare development and promoted the interests of disadvantaged groups (Chow 2008). Social justice is one of the core values of social work (Chigangaidze et al. 2023; Hare 2004), and in the 21st century, international and regional professional organisations of social work actively advocate for “green social work”, with the underlying concept of social (environmental) justice (Dominelli and Ku 2017). Social work practices at different levels are founded on a set of professional values, and a normative framework of social justice must be established to guide social policy research and advocacy. However, social justice remains a contested concept. Several philosophers, who can be divided into two groups, have proposed different theories or definitions for social justice. The first group proposes “universalist” theories or principles of social justice. Examples of these theories or principles include John Rawls’ (1999) theory of justice as fairness, Amartya Sen’s (2009) capability approach to justice and Gerald Cohen’s (1989) conception of egalitarian justice. The second group of philosophers is critical of the theoretical relevance and applicability of these universalist theories, and they instead propose various “context-dependent” concepts or principles of social justice. For example, Walzer (1983, 6) argues that no one principle of distributive justice exists for all types of social goods in a society. Rather, “different social goods ought to be distributed for different reasons”, which are defined by the social meaning of the goods in specific historical and cultural contexts. Miller’s (1976) early version of justice principles comprised the principles of rights, desert and needs. He later suggested an alternative set of justice principles founded on the concepts of needs, desert and equality (Miller 1999). Schmidtz (2006) describes that the concept of justice comprises four key elements: desert, reciprocity, equality and need.

Social work scholars tend to propose all-embracing definitions for social justice. In the Social Work Dictionary, social justice is defined as “an ideal condition in which all members of a society have the same rights, protections, opportunities, obligations and social benefits”. Moreover, social justice “entails advocacy to confront discrimination, oppression and institutional inequities” (Finn and Jacobson 2008). Craig (2002, 671–672) views social justice as “a framework of political objectives, pursued through social, economic, environmental and political policies”. These objectives are founded on a set of social values: fairness and equality of outcomes and treatment; the human dignity, equal worth and self-esteem of all persons; basic needs; abating social inequalities; and the participation of all groups of people, particularly the most disadvantaged groups. Reisch (2014) summarises the values underlying a social justice approach to the development of social policy: the equal worth of all persons, the equal right to meet basic needs, an even distribution of opportunities and life chances, the abatement or elimination of unjustified social inequalities and the strengthening of people’s capacities.

Two problems related to social work practice and knowledge emerge from the divergence of the concept of social justice. First, when social workers have different understandings of social justice, they adopt different frameworks for policy research and advocacy of their macro practices, thus making it difficult to compare and integrate their research results or policy recommendations. Second, in the social welfare literature, policy analyses are commonly based on other scholars’ theories or concepts of justice. In the literature, a thorough discussion of the concept of social justice that is relevant to social welfare policy from a social work perspective is yet to be conducted. Given that social justice has different meanings and implications depending on the social context (Miller 2009; Schmidtz 2006), social workers must have a concept of justice that is relevant to their professional policy practice. Therefore, this paper aims to develop a concept of social justice specifically applicable to the study of social welfare policy and provide a strong ethical justification for the concept. The concept of social justice is mainly useful in the context of developed societies because they have sufficient economic resources to provide a high level of social protection for their people. This paper also discusses some major policy issues in Hong Kong and Macao within the framework of social justice.

When discussing key social welfare issues or policies, the Hong Kong government and some social sectors usually hold different views of the concept of social justice. In the case of the proposal of “universal old-age pension”, social work scholars and social welfare community members generally took the view that the pension scheme would contribute to the promotion of “fairness and justice” (Hong Kong Scholars 2015). By contrast, the then Chief Secretary for Administration, Carrie Lam, contended that the implementation of the pension scheme would be antithetical to the principle of justice because the younger generation would have to pay more taxes (Ming Pao 2015). Her view was that a just policy would involve allocating public resources to the elderly with the greatest financial needs. Ultimately, the Hong Kong government rejected the idea of the universal pension scheme. Yu (2021, 107) explains that the failure of the scheme is attributed to the lack of “a tradition of nor concepts of wealth redistribution, equality, fairness and justice” in the society. A question worth exploring is whether the government’s rejection of the scheme constitutes a violation of the norms of social justice.

The discussion of Hong Kong’s public housing policy involves two issues of justice. The first is whether the problem of “inadequate housing” violates the norms of social justice. According to official statistics, approximately 100,000 households are living in “ripped rooms” in Hong Kong. The average waiting time for public rental housing for low-income families is more than five years on average. Most agree that Hong Kong has a serious housing problem. What conclusion can be obtained if this problem is analysed from a social justice perspective? The second issue is related to the moral foundation of the provision of public rental housing and the subsidised home ownership scheme (HOS). Can these two types of housing provisions promote social justice in Hong Kong society? Yung (2008, 89) argues that a just public housing policy should “provide equal opportunity for all those with the same non-self-satisfiable housing need to be allocated public rental housing”. Mok and Lee (2013) suggest that the HOS is related to two notions of justice. The first is the principle of desert, with HOS flats regarded as a reward for the efforts made by the recipients. The second notion is related to the need for protection; this means that the scheme assists vulnerable members of society to accumulate assets to secure a decent living.

Compared with that in Hong Kong, the debate about the meaning of social justice seems less vigorous in Macao. In social welfare, the Macao government views social justice as safeguarding the needs of vulnerable groups. For example, the Priority Scheme of Nursery Places for Vulnerable Families is understood to be a childcare policy in line with the norms of social justice. Furthermore, the Macao government and the leaders of various social sectors do not have a disagreement about the concept of justice when discussing important policy issues. Social workers and the leaders of social service organisations generally do not take the view that justice is necessarily connected with the provision of universal social benefits.

This paper consists of four main sections. The first section provides a critical review of the theories of Rawls, Sen and Sandel. The theories of the first two philosophers have dominated the discussion and debate on social justice for years. Sandel’s approach, which addresses the weaknesses of the two theories, has gained increasing attention in academia (and politics) in recent decades. The second section suggests a concept of social justice founded on the concept of well-being, presents two lines of the moral argument for the idea of social justice as well-being and outlines two principles derived from the concept. The third section discusses the key policy issues in Hong Kong and Macao by using the framework of social justice. In the concluding section, three major strengths of the concept of social justice are explained.

Justice as fairness

Rawls (1999, 10–11) develops a theory of justice as fairness, with a moral basis of contractualism. He envisages a purely hypothetical scenario – “the original position”, in which every member of a society does not know their class position or social status and has no understanding of their talents, intelligence, strength, or moral values, as if they were behind a “veil of ignorance”. Under these circumstances, all the members are highly likely to choose distributive principles of important social goods that are most beneficial to all of them and that can safeguard the interests of everyone. These principles, which are considered justice principles, are based on fair agreements reached by all the members of a society. Rawls (2005) explains that his theory relies on a political concept of justice that is used to guide the operation of a “well-ordered” society.

Rawls (2005, 5–6) suggests two principles of justice related to the distribution of basic rights, liberties, and opportunities and the realisation of equality by the basic institutions of a just society. The first principle requires that “each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all”. The fair value of “equal political liberties” is guaranteed in the scheme. The second principle suggests two conditions under which different types of social and economic inequalities are morally justified. First, “they are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity”. This is known as the principle of fair equality of opportunity. Second, “they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society”. This is known as the difference principle.

Although Rawls’ theory of justice is widely accepted as a profound and well-grounded moral theory, several criticisms have been made of the theory. Rawls (2005, xxviii) holds that “[the theory] does not specifically address the moral topics on which those doctrines divide” when discussing justice related to the basic structure of a well-ordered society. Sandel (1994, 1772), however, argues that it is not persuasive to examine the matter of justice “without reference to our purpose and ends” and that Rawls’ notion of justice neglects the significance of the discussion of the conception of “the good”. He also raises a difficult question: if everyone neglects the discussion of the nature and purposes of the good life behind the veil of ignorance, what is the moral basis for a rational person to make judgements on the issue of justice (Sandel 1994, 1768)? Rawls allows for greater reward for the naturally talented in accordance with the difference principle, but Cohen (2008) criticises this stance, arguing that incentive inequality should not exist in a just society. Those with natural talent are free to demand greater reward for greater contribution, but they may also elect to accept a smaller reward and still benefit the community; this latter situation demonstrates that the claim for greater reward is not morally justified but is rather contingent on the will of the talented. Sen (2009) contends that Rawls’ approach of “transcendental institutionalism” is not useful when comparing and distinguishing between the conditions of justice and injustice in the real world.

Nevertheless, Rawls’ theory of justice provides a substantial normative framework for discussing and evaluating welfare policies in the literature on social policy. For example, a common proposition is that in all societies, the state should provide universal education and equally eliminate inequality in educational opportunities by the principle of fair equality of opportunity. Furthermore, the difference principle requires the provision of adequate social protection for vulnerable groups in all societies globally. In the field of education, Burroughs (2016) proposes a notion of “republican educational opportunity” that is derived from Rawls’ justice principles. He advocates that the government should provide universal basic education and ensure equal access to education for all social classes. Daniel (2001, 2007) proposes a health policy that is founded on Rawls’ principle of fair equality of opportunity. The policy is primarily aimed at establishing a system of universal healthcare and reducing inequalities in the major social determinants of health. Applying Rawls’ framework of justice, Fritz and Cox (2020) develop an ideal health system founded on some ethical principles: “equity of access”, “the difference principle”, and “the just savings principle”. Some researchers have applied the difference principle to devise a just public housing policy and to evaluate the pros and cons of housing policies in various societies (Taylor 2018; Yung 2008); other scholars have advocated for a home ownership scheme that is founded on Rawls’ idea of “property-owning democracy” (Lee 2018; Mok and Lee 2013). In the area of social security, Schaller (1998) argues that the difference principle offers a moral justification for the provision of a social minimum. Birnbaum (2010) asserts that Rawls’ theory provides a strong moral justification for universal basic income. Drawing on Rawls’ idea of justice, Barrientos (2016) argues for the establishment of a comprehensive social assistance system for deprived groups in developing countries.

It is argued that Rawls’ theory of justice is not useful for developing a normative framework for social welfare policies. First, Rawls’ theory is primarily concerned with the issue of “procedural justice” rather than distributive justice. That is, Rawls’ intention is to construct an ideal basic structure of a society in which the principles of justice, which have been agreed upon by all the members of the society, are applied to “determine the appropriate distribution of the benefits and burdens of social life” (Rawls 1999, 47). Given that the basic structure is at the core of the discussion of justice, Rawls (2001, 54) perceives distributive justice solely “as a case of pure background procedural justice” and asserts that “when everyone follows the publicly recognised rules of cooperation, the particular distribution that results is acceptable as just[,] whatever that distribution turns out to be”. Rawls evaluates the distribution of income and wealth only from the perspective of procedural justice rather than distributive justice. A critic thus would argue that when social workers examine social welfare policies in terms of justice, they cannot neglect the distributive outcomes of the policies that impact people’s well-being.

Second, a critic would argue that for Rawls’ justice principle, the moral concern of social welfare provisions is about their (positive) effects on social cooperation among people and the stability of the basic social structure rather than the well-being of people . In Rawls’ words, “the difference principle is essentially a principle of reciprocity”, which is deemed to be “the most effectively designed scheme of cooperation” that is used to strengthen the basic structure of a just society (Rawls 2001, 63–64). Because of the emphasis on social cooperation from the perspective of contractualism, Rawls has deep reservations about the provision of social protection for unemployed people who are unwilling to work, a position which has attracted strong criticism (Banerjee 2005).

Capability approach

Sen (2009) doubts the value of primary goods mentioned in Rawls’ theory of justice and critiques his methodology. Because primary goods do not have value in themselves, possession of such goods does not fully reflect a person’s well-being or level of welfare. Addressing the weaknesses of Rawls’ theory, Sen develops a capability approach (CA) to justice founded on the idea of freedom, which is considered both a principal goal of development and an essential element of people’s agency. Sen (1999, 19) defines the concept of “agency” as “someone who acts and brings about change, and whose achievements can be judged in terms of her own values and objectives”. For the CA, the term “capability” refers to “the substantive freedom to achieve alternative functioning combinations” (Sen 1999, 75). These functional combinations, which are constitutive of the well-being of people, include a range of activities and lifestyle choices, such as obtaining adequate nutrition, being in good health, and being happy (Sen 1995). Substantive freedom is “the freedom that a person actually has to do this or be that – things that he or she may value doing or being” (Sen 2009, 231–232). Similarly, Nussbaum (2000, 5) defines capabilities as “what people are actually do and to be – in a way informed by an intuitive idea of a life worthy of the dignity of the human being”. The CA is distinguished from Rawls’ theory by the notion that the well-being of people is determined by their capabilities or substantive freedom rather than by the possession of primary goods and social resources.

From a moral perspective, Sen argues that the possession of capabilities is related to social justice, especially for comparing social inequalities in different societies. However, he does not explicitly explain what types of capabilities (or functions) are the major elements of justice. Nussbaum (2000, 78–79; 2003, 41–42) addresses this theoretical problem by suggesting a list of “central human capabilities” that include “life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; other species; play; and control over one’s environment”. She asserts that these ten capabilities are “central requirements of a life with dignity” and that they provide “a minimum account of social justice” (Nussbaum 2003, 40).

The CA has been widely used to guide policy research in various fields of social welfare (Yerkes, Javornik, and Kurowska 2019). Bonvin and Laruffa (2019, 34) argue that the CA provides “a more adequate normative orientation” for developing European education policies. José et al. (2019, 56–57) propose a framework for policy and practice with respect to active ageing, with a focus on the capabilities of older people “to achieve the doings and beings they value”. Lewis and Giullari (2005) apply the key concepts of the CA to study family care policies and related gender issues in the European Union, and Kurowska and Javornik (2019) compare the childcare policies of European countries by applying the CA. Using the CA framework, Strenio (2020) examines policies supportive of the victims of intimate partner violence. In summary, the CA provides normative reference points that guide the implementation of social policies and form a theoretical basis for policy evaluations. The approach seems to be useful for “the identification of the ultimate values and goals of social policies” that are related to the provision of resources for people to expand their “real opportunities to achieve doings and beings which they have reason to value” (Yerkes, Javornik, and Kurowska 2019, 12).

Although Sen has addressed the gaps in Rawls’ theory, his CA of justice has also drawn criticisms targeting its theoretical basis and applicability.¹ Stewart and Deneulin (2002) argue that the CA relies on an individualist account of the well-being and social activities of people, a view that regards individuals merely as “atoms” who group purely for instrumental reasons; this view undermines the values and moral meanings of social norms and cultural practices in human society. Robeyns (2003, 64) criticises the CA by asserting that it is “a framework of thought, a normative tool, but it is not [a] fully specified theory” of justice. In other words, the approach has not addressed a range of important normative questions, especially those related to human nature and society. Sen (2009, ix–xii) acknowledges that his approach is intended to provide “the basis for practical reasoning” to explore “ways of judging how to reduce injustice and advance justice”. The CA is only considered an analytical framework that is based on a “realisation-focused understanding of justice” (Sen 2009, 10). Powers and Faden (2006, 37) contend that the concept of “functionings” is more useful than the concept of “capabilities” because the central concern of morality should be “certain desirable states” or “what we can be” rather than “the language of functioning”. This critique is best exemplified by the case of vulnerable children. The primary responsibility of society is to guarantee that children are in good health and not just to secure their capability to maintain health. Thus, a state of good health is more appropriate as the criterion of social justice. Furthermore, measuring capabilities accurately is a challenge in applying the CA. It is difficult for researchers to measure the levels of capabilities directly or to select the pertinent indicators in practice. For example, the capability of “life” (the state of being alive) can be measured with the indicator “survival rate to age 65” which refers to the percentage of a cohort of newborns that would survive to 65 years old. However, the survival rate only reflects the functioning of that group of people rather than their capability of “life”. A critical question is how many people would “choose” not to live to 65 years old among those who would not otherwise be able to live to that age? That is, those disinterested in healthy lifestyles or interested in extreme risk-taking would confound the results of such an indicator. Regarding cognitive capability (i.e. senses, imagination and thought), identifying direct and accurate indicators is more difficult, as this capability requires a wider range of measurement.

Another challenge is the operationalisation of the CA for examining the issue of social justice in the field of social welfare. For example, both the Swedish national health service system and the “state-based mixed model” in Hong Kong and Macao ensure high levels of health outcomes (Lai 2016), indicating that the people in these societies have a high capability to maintain their health. Thus, if Nussbaum’s concept of the CA is applied, these healthcare systems would be deemed to perform satisfactorily in promoting justice. The problem, however, is that the indicators of the accessibility and effectiveness of public and subsidised healthcare can reflect only the functioning of “bodily health” rather than the capability to maintain health.

Justice as common good

As a communitarian philosopher, Sandel (2009, 260–261) argues that the discussion of justice involves interpreting certain moral values and reasoning regarding the concept of the common good. In his words, justice is about “the right way to distribute things” and “the right way to value things”. Therefore, the idea of justice is closely related to understanding a range of values, namely honour, virtue, pride and recognition. Sandel identifies three basic features of a just society. First, the society has appropriate means to foster a “strong sense of community” and cultivate civic virtue that encompasses “concern of the whole”, a “sense of mutual responsibility”, and a spirit of solidarity. Second, society enforces the “moral limits of markets” to protect nonmarket norms from being dominated by “market-oriented” values and reasoning. Thus, social institutions must have a set of guidelines to prevent market forces from overcoming traditional moral values. Otherwise, it is highly likely that market-oriented social practices would corrupt traditional social values or norms such as altruism, civic responsibility and social solidarity. Third, the government is committed to reducing inequality in terms of wealth and income, which is corrosive to civic virtue. A substantial gap between the rich and poor inevitably results in the social classes inhabiting different and segregated worlds, with significant gaps in access to education, healthcare and housing. The resulting social divisions eventually undermine social solidarity and erode the sense of community of the people (Sandel 2009, 263–267). As a corollary to this argument, social justice requires the redistribution of wealth and income and the reduction of social inequality (Etzioni 2017).

Sandel’s notion of social justice is not as complete a theory as the theory of justice as fairness or the CA. Consequently Sandel’s notion is less frequently used in analysing or evaluating social welfare policy; a notable exception is the notion of Dubois (2015), who argues for compulsory social insurance. His main argument centres on protecting personal identity, and he relies on the concept of a person developed by Sandel and other communitarian philosophers. Nevertheless, despite being relatively overlooked in the field, Sandel’s notion provides two insights relevant to the discussion of social policy. First, given that justice involves the right way to understand moral values and the tasks to be done to foster them in the community, a justice framework for social policy analysis should account for the effects of policy on moral values. Second, understanding people’s basic needs from a broader perspective is crucial. A range of individual basic needs, such as health, is closely related to society’s collective needs. For example, a satisfactory level of mental health is maintained through a network of meaningful social relationships that provide people with trust, acceptance, care and support. The civic virtue that Sandel mentions is a type of collective need. Therefore, a just social policy is essential to addressing the collective needs of society, and at the very least, the policy should not have a negative impact on social relations.

Despite these insights, Sandel’s notion of justice has some limitations. First, it does not outline a hierarchy of moral values that must be promoted in a just society; moreover, when two moral values conflict, how can this be resolved? Sandel seems not to have considered these issues in depth in his approach to justice. Second, because Sandel’s notion is based on the moral arguments of communitarianism, in his discourse on justice, less attention is paid to people’s basic needs at the individual level. Suppose a social welfare institution can fully address collective needs, such as promoting altruism and social solidarity, but cannot secure the basic needs of some disadvantaged groups (e.g. racial minorities). In that case, social justice cannot be considered to be achieved.

Social justice as well-being

Everyone deserves well-being

In the discussion of justice theory, Miller’s (1999, 25–30) concept of “the circumstances of social justice” implies that the application of justice principles depends upon the “modes of human relationships” and the types of social institutions. The principle of need should thus be applied within solidaristic communities, and distribution according to deserts should be the principle of justice used in instrumental associations. The principle of equality should be applied in citizenship associations involving the relationship between the state and citizens. Schmidtz (2006) describes justice theory as a map. Insofar as people use different maps to reach different destinations, a justice theory is only useful in achieving a particular end in a specific context. In summary, applying theories of justice or justice principles depends on the circumstances – what sort of justice issues are being addressed. By adopting this “context-dependent” understanding of justice, this paper develops a concept of social justice that is useful for discussing and examining social welfare policy.

The meaning of justice involves a fundamental but difficult question: What is due to people? As Schmidtz (2006, 13) asserts, “If we are not discussing what people are due, then we are not discussing justice”. As stated by Sandel (2009, 19), “to ask whether a society is just is to ask how it distributes the things we prize”; furthermore, a just society “gives each person his or her due”. Miller (1999, 11) argues that social justice is concerned with how “social institutions and practices [work] together” to distribute “advantages and disadvantages” to individuals in a society. In other words, social justice is mainly concerned with the distributive outcomes of social resources. Given the central role of distributive effects, we can posit that a major criterion of social justice is whether social institutions have given every member of society what they deserve. By contrast, the principle of social justice is violated when a member cannot acquire what they deserve from social institutions. In addition, no one should be subjected to cruel or harmful treatment, such as discrimination or family violence. Thus, injustice manifests in instances of sexism or racism resulting from the inadequate social protection provided by legal and social welfare institutions.

Regarding the domain of social welfare, this paper contends that everyone deserves a state of well-being.² This denotes the idea of “social justice as well-being”. Accordingly, the central question of social justice is whether the well-being of every member of society is secured through a range of social welfare provisions. Powers and Faden (2006, 16) propose a notion of social justice that is founded on the concept of well-being. They identify six core dimensions of justice that essentially constitute a decent life. More significantly, they define justice as securing “a sufficient level of each dimension for each individual”. Promoting well-being is one of the core missions of social work (Hare 2004), and the idea of justice as well-being is perfectly consistent with the goals social workers strive to achieve in all societies. If well-being is regarded as a good condition of life, a sufficient level of satisfaction of basic needs is required. This understanding relates the idea of justice to the basic functions of social welfare policy. A man cannot achieve a state of well-being when he lives in poverty in old age, resides in inadequate housing, or has unmet medical needs.

Well-being is closely related to the satisfaction of basic needs. As the concept of basic needs has been thoroughly discussed in the literature on social policy and for brevity, this paper will not explore this topic in detail. Plant, Lesser and Taylor-Gooby (1980) identify two types of basic needs, namely physical survival and autonomy, and Doyal and Gough (1991) recommend a two-tier framework consisting of basic needs and “intermediate needs”. According to Nussbaum (2000, 5), central human capabilities is essential conditions for the pursuit of a truly human life, which is a life that is “worthy of the dignity of the human being”. The functioning of these capabilities are also human basic needs. In sum, the four dimensions of basic needs are closely connected to the basic function of social welfare policy; these dimensions are specifically (1) physical and mental health, (2) cognitive competence and reasoning, (3) personal autonomy, and (4) meaningful and intimate social relationships.

The concept of social justice as well-being is unique in two aspects. First, it is a non-ideal theory grounded in the real world and concerned with the actual condition of people; the essential element in judgements concerning the justice of certain circumstances is thus the actual effect on real people. This concept is more useful than ideal theories (e.g. transcendental institutionalism) in discussing justice and social policy. Second, the concept of justice as well-being provides more space for operationalising policy research by expanding the horizons of potential indicators. Researchers can readily identify a set of criteria or relevant indicators to evaluate the levels of well-being or the satisfaction of basic needs. In addition, it is relatively easy to conduct comparative studies on the condition of social justice across societies in terms of the level of well-being.

Arguments concerning human rights and citizenship

The concept of justice as well-being can be supported by two lines of argument. The first argument is based on the notion that a state of well-being is a type of human right and an element of citizenship. Marshall (1950) argues that social rights have become a key element of citizenship in the British context, and the fulfilment of a wide range of basic needs as a type of human right or citizenship has been officially acknowledged in several important conventions. Article 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization … of the economic, social and cultural rights”. Article 25 stipulates that “everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services”. In the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 9 recognises “the right of everyone to social security, including social insurance”. Article 12 recognises “the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health”, and Article 13 recognises “the right of everyone to education”. Thus, social security, healthcare, education, and adequate housing are basic rights of every person in every country. In addition, some covenants protect disadvantaged groups against treatment that is detrimental to their well-being, such as discrimination or social exclusion. Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women explicitly requires all states “to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination against women”. Article 5 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities calls for state interventions to “prohibit all discrimination on the basis of disability and guarantee to persons with disabilities equal and effective legal protection against discrimination on all grounds”. When it is the right of everyone to fully satisfy their basic needs and be protected against harmful treatment, then a state of well-being is what everyone deserves.

Arguments concerning the recognition of self-respect

The second line of moral argument concerns the idea of self-respect. Dillon (2018) defines self-respect as “a sense of worth” or “due respect for oneself”. The concept often refers to “a form of self-regard” closely connected to a moral relation of the person to themself that involves an appreciation of their intrinsic worth. Rawls (1999, 386) views self-respect as a type of primary good, describing it as “a person’s sense of his own value, his secure conviction that his conception of his good, his plan of life, is worth carrying out”. His conviction is that the basic structure of every society should secure the equal distribution of such an important primary good. Darwall (1995) proposes the concept of “recognition self-respect”, in which every person has a right to expect other people to recognise their intrinsic worth as a person sincerely; every person should receive this type of recognition from others. In short, the core of self-respect is the appreciation of the intrinsic worth of a person. From a moral perspective, everyone is equally entitled to have a sufficient level of self-respect, which is generally accepted as a vital component of a good life – every person deserves the acquisition of self-respect. However, social institutions in a society are highly unlikely to distribute self-respect (Doppelt 2009).

Social institutions, however, can provide the social bases on which people’s self-respect is effectively cultivated and strengthened. A person’s sense of their own worth or self-respect is socially constructed (Dillon 2013), and this observation implies that the construction of self-respect is influenced by cumulative experiences in the daily life of a person and their ongoing interactions with social groups and social institutions. Well-being thus forms an essential basis for the development of self-respect. For example, a man aged 80 years, entitled to free healthcare, receives costly medical treatment for his coronary heart disease in a public hospital. His experience of receiving unconditional medical treatment plays an important role in strengthening his awareness and appreciation of his own worth as a person. This scenario is highly common in Hong Kong’s and Macao’s public healthcare systems. To conclude, the argument that every person deserves well-being relies on the notion that well-being is the key to the recognition of self-respect.

Principles of social justice

The concept of social justice as well-being encompasses two basic principles concerning social welfare institutions. The first principle requires the social welfare system in a society to guarantee that every citizen has equal opportunities to obtain a sufficient level of well-being. Under this principle, the social welfare system must provide equal opportunities for all citizens to meet their basic needs. The principle is based on two key concepts: equality and opportunity. The central role of equality in examining justice is evident in the theories of Rawls, Sen, Sandel and Cohen. Given that social welfare policy involves the relationship between the state and citizens, Miller (1999) argues that the principle of equality is appropriate for governing the distribution of social resources. Moreover, equality is the underlying value of moral arguments concerning human rights and citizenship and the recognition of self-respect noted in the preceding sections. Hence, equality is at the core of the first principle of justice. The moral significance of the concept of opportunity is supported by Sen’s notion of freedom, which is defined as the capability of people to do what they value doing or to choose the type of life that significantly contributes to their well-being; freedom implies the opportunity to choose. As freedom is of central moral importance, a healthy person should be able to choose the level of their well-being. However, it is not necessary for the social welfare system to provide the same level of well-being for all. Rather, the primary goal of social welfare policy is to give every person the same opportunity to acquire a socially acceptable level of well-being. Under these circumstances, everyone is guaranteed to have the capability to decide the threshold at which they deem their basic needs to be satisfied. At present, free basic education is universally provided in Macao. In reality, approximately 9% of all eligible students do not receive free education; despite being entitled to free education, they choose to study in nonsubsidised private schools. Nevertheless, the education policy in Macao has satisfied the first principle of justice.

The second principle of justice is that social welfare policy should foster a spirit of altruism in the community and promote reciprocity among social groups. As explained in the earlier text, in addition to meeting basic needs at the individual level, the well-being of people depends on a network of meaningful social relationships. In particular, Chan and Bowpitt (2005) argue that interpersonal mutuality is one of the cornerstones of the dignity of people. Schmidtz (2006, 11) asserts that a deeper concern of justice is “to free us to focus less on self-defence and more on mutual advantage and on opportunities to make the world a better place”. Social welfare policy must address the collective needs as well as diminish social divisions and different forms of social inequality in society. Thus, the second principle of justice is realised through the provision of universal education, healthcare (or health insurance), and long-term care services, among others, in society.

Social justice and social policies in the context of Hong Kong and Macao

This section provides a critical discussion of policy issues related to old-age pension, public housing, and healthcare in Hong Kong and Macao in light of the concept of social justice as well-being. The universal pension scheme is a just policy, as it secures the economic security of all older people in Hong Kong. However, although the pension scheme will provide economic protection, some argue it will also increase class inequality against the background that the Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF) scheme has been implemented for years. The Secretary for Labour and Welfare contended that the “grassroots” elderly would not benefit the most from the pension scheme. Nevertheless, the pension would be the icing on the cake for elderly people from the upper-middle class (Law 2016). Therefore, it is not persuasive to equate the pension scheme to an advancement of social justice despite the major shortcomings of the current system for financial protection in old age. Suppose the Old Age Living Allowance (OALA) provides a basic level of financial protection for an overwhelming majority of older people (from lower- and middle-class backgrounds), and the MPF (or other occupational retirement schemes) secures the retirement protection of the upper-middle class. In that case, this arrangement can ensure that all elder people have equal opportunity to acquire basic economic security. Two conditions must also be met: (1) the benefit level of the OALA is sufficient to satisfy all types of basic needs (i.e. benefits set to exceed the poverty threshold) and (2) the criteria for the allowance are tailored to be largely inclusive while excluding income- and asset-rich elder people and minimising the effect on social divisions.

Regarding housing policy, a large number of low-income families face housing problems or reside in inadequate housing in Hong Kong. The circumstances of these families violate the principle of social justice as well-being. The essence of a just housing policy is the adequate provision of public rental housing to individuals and families who face housing problems. Thus, the government must ensure equal opportunity for all people to obtain a socially acceptable standard of living. The HOS is not closely related to the idea of justice, as the social demand for this public housing is not grounded in basic (housing) needs. Rather, the policy can actually be justified by moral considerations such as promoting asset accumulation or maintaining social stability. From the perspective of social justice as well-being, the provision of public housing should be based on the principles of need and equality rather than on desert. Moreover, a just housing policy should include the following: (1) the criteria for public rental housing are set roughly equivalent to that of the HOS, (2) both types of public housing provide more or less the same standard of living, and (3) the availability of rental housing units is approximately comparable to that of subsidised-sale flats. The latter two conditions ensure equal opportunity for access to “adequate housing” for the residents of these two types of public housing.

Regarding health policy, the concept of social justice requires a range of health services of appropriate quality to be made universally accessible to everyone in society, regardless of their economic or social background. In principle, based on the state-based mixed model, Hong Kong’s and Macao’s healthcare systems are compatible with the notion of social justice as well-being. However, the contribution of their health policies to the advancement of social justice, to some extent, has been undermined due to the long waiting periods for some types of medical examinations or treatments. Furthermore, the coronavirus pandemic negatively affected Hong Kong and Macao in different ways over the past three years. Based on the experiences of COVID-19 pandemic management and control in the two regions, a just public health policy consists of two primary forms of interventions: (1) the provision of appropriate treatments for all people infected with COVID-19 and (2) the implementation of a set of prevention and control measures that reduce the effect of social inequalities (class, age and gender) related to the risk of COVID-19. Such a policy entails a high level of government intervention in providing personal protective equipment (e.g. face masks) and COVID-19 vaccines and tests. The Macao government previously provided universally low-priced face masks, free COVID-19 tests and vaccines, and free medication for treating mild COVID-19 symptoms. Together, these measures were relatively effective in reducing the social disparity in the risk of COVID-19 in the society.

Conclusion

This paper proposed a concept of social justice as well-being underpinned by moral arguments regarding human rights and citizenship and the recognition of self-respect. This notion of social justice, which is relevant to and useful in the research and advocacy of social welfare policy, has three strengths. First, its core concepts (well-being and basic needs) are related to the real lives of people, and more importantly, they are easily understood and discussed by people with different social backgrounds. This forms a basis for a social consensus among various social sectors in discussing key policy issues. The author also contends that most members of the Hong Kong and Macao societies would desire for the well-being of everyone to be effectively secured; social welfare policy aims to achieve such a situation. Second, the notion of justice as well-being emphasises promoting social justice through various means. The first principle of justice, which requires equal opportunity for all to have a sufficient level of well-being, can be realised through different policy models or strategies in different social contexts. In the case of health policy, the universal health service in Sweden and the universal health insurance in Taiwan are effective in addressing the healthcare needs of their populations; hence, these can be considered just health policies.

The third strength relates to the mission of social work. The concept of social justice as well-being defines the moral significance of various types of social work practice; social work interventions at various levels contribute to the advancement of social justice. Apart from policy research and advocacy at the macro level, the micro practice of social workers (such as casework or empowerment practice), generally aimed at promoting clients’ well-being, also plays an important role in advancing social justice. Thus, the concept of social justice as well-being offers a normative framework for guiding the micro-to-macro practices of social work. Finally, this normative framework can help social workers build more just societies in both Hong Kong and Macao.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. Sen and Nussbaum have developed different versions of the CA, despite the fact that their approaches are founded on the same set of values and premises. This paper mainly focuses on Sen’s version, as he is the original exponent of the theory. Robeyns (2017) has discussed and critically examined their approaches in detail.

2. In this paper, the meaning of “well-being” is substantially different from the understanding of well-being in utilitarianism, where the term is defined in terms of subjective pleasure or happiness or the satisfaction of personal desires or preferences. By contrast, this paper argues that the concept is closely related to the satisfaction of a range of people’s basic needs.