Kaçak electricity: negotiating rights and privileges in the Ottoman Empire during the imperialist era

ABSTRACT

What are the political and economic relationships between public utilities, companies, states and people that contemporary societies inherited from the age of imperialism, when new energy infrastructures and technologies started spreading across the world? Through a historical-anthropological exploration of kaçak (informal/illicit/smuggled) electricity use and exchange during the late Ottoman Empire, this article analyzes how the relationships between companies, state and consumers were negotiated at the outset of electrification and how the moral economic discourses established in this era continues to influence the current nexus. By examining the terms of formal and informal access to electricity in the Ottoman Empire, first as a privilege for the few and then as a public good, I show how people living in the periphery during capitalist markets’ expansion to the Ottoman Empire related to electricity as a new commodity. Through examining kaçak use and exchange in the process of Ottoman electrification, I argue that the question of kaçak is a moral economic discourse on who is a citizen worthy or deserving of access to public utilities and infrastructure, extending to the relationship between economic privileges and political rights that is also at the center of the current global debates about neoliberalism and privatization.

KEYWORDS:

• Electricity
• public utility
• consumption
• imperialism
• Turkey

Acknowledgements

The funding for this research has been provided by the Social Science Research Council’s International Dissertation Research Fellowship and the Early Research Initiative Catalyst Grant at the Graduate Center, City University of New York. Mirjam Eva Lober and Sarah Ventura provided research assistance in Germany, Cansu Yapıcı and Abdullah Uğur provided research assistance in Turkey. I thank the anonymous reviewers, the special issue editor Emrah Yildiz and contributors, and Toygun Altıntaş for providing extensive comments and helping me clarify my argument.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 The practice of charging higher rates for poorer service in the global or national peripheries has precedent. See Montaño (2021) for widespread cases of consumer theft from the electricity company that had the monopoly in Mexico City in during the first two decades of the 20th century and similar accusations of exorbitant rates and poor service by the public.

2 For an overview of the genealogy of the moral economy concept and its relevance to understanding 21st century political-economic developments, see Edelman (2005).

3 Genç (2002) pinpoints ‘provisionism’ as one of the three main pillars of the Ottoman economic system.

4 For ‘concession hunting’ by European and American companies, see Shahvar (2002).

5 This document is from 17 January 1900. During this decade, up until the Young Turk revolution of 1908, the Sultan Abdul Hamid II was insistent that all special permits that provide exemptions to the electrical device ban go through his approval.

6 She clarifies that capitalism has emerged in non-capitalist societies, so this was not necessarily always a movement from West to East or North to South as we might think of now, but rather becomes so in the imperialist era.

7 In 1881, Yıldız Palace instructed the Ministry of Interior to send Emil Efendi, the Director of Telegraphy, to the first International Exposition of Electricity and the first International Congress of Electricians with the necessary tools and devices (BOA, Y.A.RES. 10/4; 8 March 1881; “Paris'te elektrik meselelerini müzakere için teşkil edecek kongreye ve açılacak elektrik sergisine Telgraf Müdürü Emin Efendi'nin alat ve edevat ile birlikte gönderilmesi"; Dersaadet). More imperial officers were sent to electricity expositions in Vienna in 1893 and Chicago in 1892 (BOA, İ.DH. 888/70678; 26 June 1883; “Viyana'da açılacak elektrik sergisine Saltanat-ı Seniyye'den de eşya ve edevat ile iki memur gönderilmesi ve masrafının ödenmesi”; Dersaadet; BOA, DH.MKT. 2016/117; 2 November 1892; Telgraf nezareti fabrikasında Şikago sergisine irsal edilerek bazı elektrik ve telgraf alet ve edevatı için ihtiyaç duyulan dört adet torna tezgahının esmanının tesviyesi”; Dersaadet).

8 I thank Mischa Suter for his comments encouraging me to think of permits and other paperwork in this story as translational devices.

9 ‘hatır ve gönüle bakılmayarak’ is the exact wording for not doing any favors based on previously established relationships.

10 The state’s mediating role between the public and electricity companies transformed once the privately owned public electricity infrastructure started operating in 1914. The new constitutional regime’s Ministry of Development, which took over the regulation of electricity from the Sultan and the Foreign Office, set tramway ticket prices and hourly KW tariffs for home and industry sales, gave permits for the elecrification of the tramway lines on certain routes, and gave visas to bring European skilled workers to train machine operators in the power station. For a few years during the occupation of Istanbul (1918–1923), while electricity use was growing and there was a concurrent wartime coal shortage, the Allied military took over this regulating function of the state. They made a growing series of decisions and interventions, like policing kaçak tramway users, instituting daylight savings hours to curb electricity usage and conserve coal, mediating the now electrified tramway workers’ strike, even helping produce and transport the coal itself on the Black sea to meet the growing demand in a newly electrified city (CADN, 36 PO1/366; 1920-1925; Constantinople).

11 In addition to makeshift wires attached to the existing infrastructure, which is usually associated with contemporary shantytown residents, kaçak electricity usage can also take the form of tampering with meters, which has especially been a favorite of apartments rented by groups of students in university cities from 1970s to this day.

12 Tramways charged by distance traveled and were divided into first and second class fares, with reduced fares for military personnel, students, and dependents. However, they might have still been too expensive to afford for most, especially during the war.

13 The locations for these photos are labeled as Şişhane Karakol, Soğukçeşme, and Ayasofya square; all of these stops still exist, although most of the tramway line was dismantled in 1966, and Istanbul’s current tramways became operational again in 1992, with some of the central lines and stops overlapping with the older network.

14 Arguably, while the exact institutions involved might have evolved, the relationship between state and subject via permits and privileges might go back further. An urban legend about 16th century architect Mimar Sinan that is often repeated tells a story of access to infrastructure that feels contemporary. In this tale, Süleyman the Magnificent asks Mimar Sinan to build a robust water infrastructure for Istanbul, which costs dearly. Because of this high price, the Sultan absolutely forbids anyone from bringing kaçak water to their private residence, declaring the water from the public fountains common property. However, he makes an exception to allow Mimar Sinan to bring water to his house, as a reward for his service. Some years later, while another sultan reigns and Mimar Sinan has reached 99 years old, he is summoned to the palace and accused of using kaçak water in his residence. He is asked to produce a ferman (royal decree) to prove his claim to this privilege, which he does not have. The royal council discusses Sinan’s predicament and decides that he should no longer have this privilege in return for his service, for it would be unfair to the others who have also served the empire (Ekovitrin 2021).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by Graduate Center; Social Science Research Council.