Between regional cooperation and strategic reorganization: An examination of the change in perceptions in Japanese security policy

ABSTRACT

With Japan’s new connectivity initiative, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, alongside several previous doctrines, Tokyo has started to shift its regional security policy focus towards democratic states in the Asia-Pacific. Qualitative case studies on bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the Indo-Pacific assess these changes as reflecting a more proactive security policy initiated under the Abe administration (2012–2020). While Tokyo’s security policy towards Southeast Asia has certainly changed both qualitatively and quantitatively since 2012/2013, explaining this change by referring solely to Prime Minister Abe’s foreign policy agenda falls short. Rather, Japan’s new strategy is the result of a change in perceptions among executive officials in the foreign and defense ministries that had already been initiated in the 2000s. This study looks at this development and examines the role of the Prime Minister’s Office of Japan (Kantei), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and the Ministry of Defense (MOD) in initiating the change and assesses Japan’s Pacific strategy through an interview-based qualitative case study. Using the concept of “foreign policy analysis” and based on official publications and interviews with representatives of the MOD, the MOFA, and Kantei advisors, this study expands the qualitative aspect of existing research and shows that the origins of this new regionalism are found primarily in the changing perceptions of executive officials. It also points to the importance of analyzing administrative executives at the interface among Kantei, the MOFA, and the MOD, which can shed new light on the reasons behind Japan’s regional strategy shift.

KEYWORDS:

• Free and Open Indo-Pacific
• Japanese security policy
• foreign policy analysis
• Pacific strategy
• Abe Shinzo

Introduction

Japan’s proactive regional security policy in the Pacific has recently become a prominent field of analysis in political science research. Research on value-based foreign policy emphasizes Japan’s stronger networking in regional, multilateral institutions, which promote stability in East Asia through cooperation mechanisms and at the same time re-accentuate Tokyo’s foreign policy (Ashizawa 2003). During Prime Minister Abe Shinzō’s term of office (2012–2020), Japan’s alliance with the U.S.A. was also strengthened, security cooperation with Pacific states expanded (Australia) and new partnerships established (India, Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam) (Yuzawa 2018; 2021). At the heart of this new security policy is Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” doctrine, which Abe presented at the 6^th Tokyo International Conference on African Development on 27 August 2016, making him the first prime minister to develop a global security policy vision for Japan (MOFA 2016). During Abe’s term of office, this strategy was further developed and expanded in September 2021 to include initiatives such as the Japan Pacific Islands Defense Dialogue (JPIDD), which codifies security policy cooperation with Pacific states for the first time (MOD 2021a, 2021b).

Against this backdrop, Japan’s security policy has become the subject of recent research in Japanese studies and political science. Empirical analyses have pointed to the increased importance of Southeast Asia (especially Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam as well as the Pacific region) (Wallace 2013). Structural or neorealist analyses are based on the concept of hedging and interpret Tokyo’s proactive security cooperation as an attempt to counteract the growing influence of the Chinese regional hegemon while at the same time strengthening the multilateral defense network in the Pacific by expanding its own defense efforts and balancing out existing asymmetries (Koga 2018; Wallace 2018). However, structural analyses mainly evaluate this change quantitatively and avoid explaining political and administrative processes.

Institutionalists point to common norms that form the basis for rules-based cooperation with democracies such as Australia and India and for increased security policy action in multilateral institutions (Hatakeyama 2020). Such studies understand Abe’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Doctrine” as a cooperation strategy that seeks to strengthen norms-based cooperation with regional partners vis-à-vis China and at the same time establish an institutional forum in which legally binding principles such as freedom of navigation and free trade are guaranteed (He and Feng 2020; Jimbo 2018). China’s integration into regional institutions such as the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) would render Japan’s maritime security efforts superfluous and counterproductive, as they would destabilize the region (Ikenberry 2011; Shambaugh 2005; Smith 2009, 248).

However, both China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the ARF have so far done little to stabilize the region. For example, the ARF established a Code of Conduct between China and ASEAN in November 2002, which provides for the cooperative use of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, which are claimed by China and the Philippines. To date, however, this declaration has not been followed by a legally binding agreement – despite a ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague (PCA 2016). Because multilateral institutions are unable to enforce international norms, on the one hand, and fail to reduce tensions through cooperation in Asia, on the other hand, it is clear that institutionalism is unfit to explain Japan’s recent security policy changes.

These examples also reveal the problems of an analysis that is based on international relations theories. Therefore, this study doesn’t seek to contribute to a theoretical classification but rather tries to provide an empirical understanding of the processes that have led to the increased integration of Tokyo’s security doctrine in the Pacific region. It examines the origins of this regional reorientation and shows the role played by the various actors in the Prime Minister’s Office (Kantei), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the Ministry of Defense (MOD) in initiating political processes.

In order to understand the subsystemic logics of this change, our study applies the theoretical concept of “foreign policy analysis” (FPA), which deals with foreign policy decision-making processes. Bureaucratic and political decision-makers in foreign policy institutions (MOFA, MOD and Kantei) are considered as the unit of investigation and their role is analyzed by means of qualitative interviews and primary sources. The author’s interviews with representatives of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as Kantei advisors complement government publications and show that while recent security initiatives have codified Japan’s value-based foreign policy for the first time, their origins can be located in the changing perceptions of executive officials since the mid-2000s.

The following section first introduces the theoretical concept, defines units of analysis and presents the research method. Subsequently, the development process of Japanese security policy in the Pacific is traced in an empirical case study. This study is subdivided into four chronologically delimited process analyses. The first stage investigates how Prime Minister Koizumi’s East Asian Community concept caused a gradual expansion of the US-Japan alliance (2002–2005). The second case study examines Japan’s changing perceptions toward China and Japan’s regional role in the Pacific among MOFA and MOD decision-makers during what could be called the transformation phase (2005–2009). The third section examines the factors of stagnation and friction under the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ, 2009–2012) governments. Finally, the developments under Prime Minister Abe (from 2012) are briefly discussed.

As numerous comprehensive analyses have already investigated Abe’s security policy, this study focuses on how the influence of Kantei, MOFA and MOD decision-makers created a high degree of receptivity for strategic reorientation even before 2012, so that subsequent policy initiatives met with a high degree of cohesion in the civil service. The study elucidates how precisely this cohesion of ministry-level policymakers and elected officials led to the implementation of Abe’s proactive strategies directed at Asia, while frictions between high-level bureaucracy and politicians hindered the implementation of conflicting Asia policies under the DPJ administration.

Research approach and method

This study applies a “foreign policy analysis” (FPA) approach, which is based on socio-psychological identity theory and discusses political processes using the example of decision-makers. Here, the analysis of the decision-making process itself is seen as part of the explanation and not merely as an empirical case study (Snyder et al. 2002). Therefore, FPA considers the actions of actors within government administrations that aim to realize certain projects (Carlsnaes 2002, 335). In this respect, FPA is a research method and differs from international relations theories. If one follows Graham Allison’s understanding of administrative politics, FPA explains the results of decisions in the policy process in which different actors with varying capacities of influence participate. The decision-making process is then characterized by the interaction between actors within the administrative apparatus and by the individuals or organizational units involved (Allison and Halperin 1972, 45–48). Primary sources make it possible to evaluate the thinking and actions of decision-makers in perspective and allow conclusions to be drawn about how changing security situations are perceived and influence defense policy change (Hollis and Smith 1991, 74).

FPA determines our focus of analysis (what we investigate). We choose Process Tracing (PT) as our qualitative research method (how something is investigated). PT helps to examine causal relationships by first describing the process using the case studies that have led to changes (Collier 2011, 823). Using causal inference, PT looks at these changes over a defined period of time and on the basis of specific moments and actors that make it possible to show the degree of change (Mahoney 2010, 127–128). Since Japan’s security strategy and level of integration in bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the Indo-Pacific varies periodically, these periods can be identified as series of specific moments. Accordingly, the study uses PT to demonstrate the outcome (“Japan establishes a new security strategy in the Pacific”) by analyzing the causal mechanism through crucial, classifiable moments and based on the actions of actors in MOFA, MOD and Kantei. The crucial point here is that PT not only considers the change from A to B, but especially the mechanism between outcome and result, and thus explains the actions that led to decisions in the transmission process along a causal process (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 18–19, 51–52).

This process analysis is based on a) publications by official government institutions, b) written primary sources and c) interviews with retired and active administrative decision-makers. Official publications are available in the form of Kantei bulletins and annual reports of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Gaikō Seisho) and the Ministry of Defense (Bōei Hakusho). Autobiographical writings by diplomats help with historical classification. Unofficial primary sources (WikiLeaks) are re-evaluated through autobiographical testimonies of former executive officers. This data is supplemented by interviews conducted by the author between 2018–2021 with executive officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the Deputy Director General (Shingikan) and Administrative Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (Jimujikan)), the Ministry of Defense (the permanent secretaries and administrative vice ministers of defense (Kokumu Daijin Bōeichō Chōkan, Bōeishō Shingikan and Jimujikan), as well as the Kantei (the Assistant to the Deputy Cabinet Secretary (Naikaku Kanbō Fukuchō Kanho) and the National Security Council (Kokka Anzen Hoshō Kyoku Jichō)).

Since MOFA’s diplomatic archive (Gaikōshiryōkan) normally publishes primary sources with a 30-year delay, the analysis of contemporary foreign policy is dependent on interview-based findings. Qualitative studies based on interviews and eyewitness accounts, however, are inevitably subject to the problem of the verifiability of statements and a potential selection bias. For this study, the selection of interview partners was deliberately not randomized. Nevertheless, there is a risk of selection bias, particularly in such studies where the availability of information and interview partners depends on their accessibility (Thies 2002, 356). Due to the difficult access to interview partners, political science and historical publications are often based on only three or four interviews (Beech 2011; Goldstein 2002; Natow 2020).

The selection of the decision-makers and interviewees analyzed was largely determined by two factors – their involvement in the process under investigation and their degree of accessibility. First, primary and secondary sources were examined to determine which government representatives were involved in the decisions in question. This information was compared and contextualized with autobiographical works, secondary literature and newspaper reports as well as archival and WikiLeaks sources. Those involved were then contacted and interviewed by the author. Some interviewees were contacted directly, others were met at university lecturers and symposia or had been introduced to the author.

However, not all qualitative data collected from eyewitness interviews can be verified and the subjective accounts of the participants can lead to distortions. In order to increase the validity of the interview data, this study uses the principle of triangulation (Kezar 2008, 415; Merriam and Tisdell 2016). This means that the information collected from primary and secondary sources (autobiographical works, WikiLeaks, archive material, etc.) was analyzed and key actors identified. These key actors were then interviewed and their statements were “triangulated”, i.e. checked against additional data, using further archival documents and secondary literature as well as interviews with policymakers from the same subject areas and time periods. Furthermore, PT does not use the interview sample to make generalizations about a population. Rather, specific information is considered in order to examine a defined policy change in Japan in a specific period (2000s to 2012) in a defined area (Asia-Pacific region). The policy process is reconstructed based on the relationship between the variables using the interview data and archival material to shed light on blind spots in existing research. By reconstructing the decision-making process, the analysis intends to use the fact-specific insights obtained through interviews to explain the change in Japan’s Pacific strategy. However, the aim is not to derive broader generalizable statements based on the collected data. Instead we try to draw a sample that includes the most important actors who have participated in the political events in question (Tansey 2007, 771).

Posts in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense are often subject to rapid rotation. Some officials are often only in their posts for a few years or months before they are transferred. This fact is taken into account by considering the influence of key officials over longer periods of time. For example, Kohara Masahiro is examined both in his function as MOFA Director General and later as Consul General in Shanghai in the period 2005–2009. The influence of Saiki Akitaka is examined first during his tenure at Japan’s embassy in Washington, DC (2006–2008), then as Director General of MOFA’s Asia and Oceania Bureau (AOB, Ajia Taiheiyōshūkyoku) (2008–2011), and finally during the DPJ administrations (2009–2011). This is an attempt to highlight existing continuities.

The people interviewed for the study were contacted in different ways. Some contacts, such as with former Deputy Foreign Minister Yabunaka Mitoji, came about through attending academic events (for example at Ritsumeikan University, the Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) in Tokyo or at Doshisha University). Nakanishi Hiroshi (Kyoto University) and RIPS President Nishihara Masashi helped me to get in touch with other responsible persons. The officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense who were interviewed were helpful in making further contact with former and current security policy officials, thereby significantly expanding the interview sample. However, a certain selection bias cannot be ruled out, as some interviews depended not only on the availability of the interviewee, but also on the contact process with previous interviewees. An attempt was made to minimize the resulting bias by identifying decision-makers in primary and secondary sources in advance and asking interviewees to establish contact with these decision-makers.

Case studies

Case study 1: Establishment of a regional security policy (2002–2005)

After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the US government left it up to the Koizumi administration to decide how Japan would participate in the “war on terror.” Apart from an in-depth review of how the security of US bases in Japan could be increased, the State Department made no further demands (Asahi Shimbun 2005, 156–157). The leadership of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF, Jieitai), on the other hand, saw the counter-terrorism mission as an opportunity to overcome the “Gulf War trauma” and expand Japan’s role as an ally (Interview 2018a). Former Joint Chief of Staff Sakuma Makoto emphasizes that the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA, Bōeichō) has been drawing up plans for global security initiatives since the 1990s. Thus, the participation of the SDF in anti-piracy missions as part of the “war on terror,” in which units of the Maritime Security Force (MSDF, Kaijō Jieitai) were deployed to the Indian Ocean in 2002 and their operational area was outside Japan’s immediate neighboring region for the first time, was not a deviation from these plans. Essentially, this mission was based on operational outlines that had been drafted by the Joint Staff Office (Tōgō Bakuryōkanbu) for the deployment of the SDF in the Gulf War and were then used under Sakuma (Asahi Shimbun 2005, 80–81).

After the Cold War, the Joint Staff Office and SDF officers had begun to call for a new regional security strategy in view of a strengthening China (Sakuma 1996, 23–28). To this end, the JDA International Policy Planning Bureau (IPPB, Kokusai Seisaku Kyoku) had developed scenarios for closer maritime security cooperation in East Asia (Interview 2020e). While the IPPB drafted cooperation strategies with regional partners, there was often little support for this initiative on the US side (Interview 2018a). This was because the Clinton administration was concerned about the extent to which Japan’s ongoing recession could affect other markets in Asia and the bilateral alliance and thus lead to foreign policy unpredictability (US Department of the Treasury 1995).

Japan’s JDA was concerned about the extent to which China’s economic strengthening would change the regional hegemonic position of the People’s Republic of China and thus the balance of power in Asia. After President George W. Bush took office in January 2001, JDA representatives urged the State Department to develop a long-term China strategy in light of Beijing’s maritime military capabilities. Despite several warnings from the US Department of Defense, these concerns were not taken more seriously until the early 2000s (US Secretary of Defense 2002). In the 1990s, the US State Department under Warren Christopher had always emphasized that the US saw no danger of geostrategic change in Asia and rather relied on the stabilizing effects of China’s international integration (Interview 2018a; US Department of State 1996).

In fact, the reorientation of US security policy towards the Pacific was interrupted by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (Silove 2016). However, China’s growing strength had raised concerns among representatives of the Clinton administration. For example, Andrew Marshall, head of the US Department of Defense, had already warned of the geostrategic threat posed by Beijing in the mid-1990s. However, these warnings were only taken up by the later US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in his Defense Strategy Review developed in 2002 (Rumsfeld 2011, 305; US Secretary of Defense 2002). On the morning of 11 September 2001, Rumsfeld had asked Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Stephen Mackey to draw up a preliminary, official US Asia strategy. This was to focus on the Pacific and strengthen regional cooperation (US Government Printing Office 2005). This concept was ultimately developed further under President Obama into the “Pivot to Asia.” However, Rumsfeld’s memo remained unanswered after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and the strategic focus was shifted to Central Asia (Silove 2016).

While the US concentrated on Afghanistan and Iraq, the JDA attempted to expand the basis for security cooperation with regional partners. In July 2001, Foreign Minister Tanaka Makiko, daughter of former Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei, began to be accompanied to ASEAN+Japan summits by uniformed JDA advisors, which was intended to strengthen coordination between MOFA and JDA. However, JDA representatives complained that MOFA diplomats had no real interest in coordinating security policy issues (Interview 2020b). MOFA regarded the JDA primarily as an executive “subordinate authority” for political strategies that were developed in the Kantei and MOFA (Interview 2020a). In addition, Tanaka had been facing public criticism since the beginning of 2001 for not being decisive enough in curbing the ongoing corruption in MOFA. It became apparent that Prime Minister Koizumi’s administrative reform was difficult to implement in MOFA; the MOFA bureaucracy evaded any influence by the cabinet and increasingly passed on the content of Tanaka’s confidential talks with foreign representatives to the media. The aim of the MOFA bureaucrats was to portray Tanaka as pro-Chinese and to undermine her foreign policy integrity (Yomiuri Shimbun 2001, 178–192; Uchiyama 2007, 113). These attempts at sabotage ultimately led to Tanaka’s resignation in January 2002 and the appointment of Kawaguchi Yoriko, a former MOFA bureaucrat, as foreign minister (Yakushiji 2003, 87–103).

In 2003, Deputy Defense Minister Masuda Kohei, together with Assistant Deputy Cabinet Secretary Yachi Shotarō, successfully convinced Philippine and Vietnamese government officials of the necessity to implement joint maritime security cooperation. Manila and Hanoi were open to cooperation due to an increased threat perception regarding China’s proactive naval strategy (Interview 2020b). Yachi had recognized the possibility of a proactive regional policy very early on in the expansion of the US-Japanese alliance by including Southeast Asian states and later tried to expand this cooperation into a balancing strategy against China (WikiLeaks 2006). Through Yachi’s influence on Masuda, the idea of Japan’s Asia-Pacific strategy was now also increasingly discussed in the JDA (Interview 2020b; 2020c; 2020e; Pugliese and Wallace 2020, 103).

In the following years, the JDA began to draw up the first more concrete blueprints for Japan’s maritime strategy in the Pacific. For example, in 2003, Vice Admiral Kaneda Hideaki emphasized the need to focus on the Indo-Asia (Indo-Pacific) region to counter China’s maritime presence. In addition, the JDA Maritime Staff Office had developed concerns about a diminished US presence in the Pacific and drafted scenarios on how Japan could independently reform its regional position (Interview 2018e; Kaneda 2003; Takei 2008). Admiral Takei Tomohisa, later a member of Abe’s National Security Council (NSC), emphasized that it was necessary for Japan’s security to control the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs). He advocated that Japan’s position vis-à-vis China should be strengthened through maritime security cooperation with like-minded partners, i.e. value-based democracies (Takei 2008, 8–12). To this end, Takei developed an “engagement” strategy aimed at strengthening Japan’s regional position by expanding the capacity of Indonesian, Philippine and Vietnamese naval units and establishing a cooperation strategy with Southeast Asia, India and Pacific states through joint naval maneuvers (Joint Operations/Joint Exercises) (Interview 2018a; 2018b; 2018f; 2018c; 2018e; Takei 2008). Takei thus acted as an important input provider to the Joint Staff Office and was responsible for the concretization and operationalization of Japan’s strategy in the Pacific (Takei 2008, 16–23). Based on these considerations, JDA and MOFA increasingly recognized the need to expand Japan’s strategic focus further into Southwest and Southeast Asia (Interview 2018a; 2020a; 2020e; 2020c).

This case study illustrates that Japan’s regional strategic change was pushed very early on by influential bureaucrats in the JDA, but remained underdeveloped due to Washington’s lack of reception. In the following years, however, these efforts did not disappear, but were further developed in the MOD and by Yachi. High-ranking MSDF officers and MOFA diplomats such as Kanehara Nobukatsu further conceptualized these naval strategies for the Asia-Pacific and implemented them in their advisory role in the NSC from 2012 (Interview 2020a).

The continuity of political, military and bureaucratic decision-makers from the early 2000s to the Abe administration (2012–2020) shows that while the implementation of the Pacific strategy was ultimately realized by Abe, the need for regional strategic adjustment was evaluated early on at the ministerial level.

Case study 2: Japan’s strategic reorientation (2005–2008)

In its 2005 annual report, the National Institute of Defense Studies (NIDS), a MOD-affiliated think tank, concluded that China’s regional security strategy is changing dramatically. The report refers to Beijing’s attempts to exploit gas reserves in the Pacific and assesses the associated security risk of territorial violations by the Chinese People’s Liberation Navy (PLN) as the most urgent task area for Japan’s MSDF. The territorial violations by nuclear-powered PLN submarines in particular prompted the Koizumi administration to expand the MSDF’s naval maneuvers locally in order to monitor the movements of Chinese units (NIDS 2005, 96–97). In addition to territorial violations, MOFA, and especially Vice Foreign Minister Yachi, were concerned that China was able to use both bilateral agreements and targeted maneuvers to increase pressure on Southeast Asian states and dissuade them from establishing far-reaching maritime cooperation agreements with Japan (WikiLeaks 04.03.2005).

At that time, the Director General of the MOFA China-Mongolia Office, Izumi Hiroyasu, welcomed a strategy to strengthen ASEAN as a regional mediating organization, in which Japan was to play a key role (WikiLeaks 2005). China’s blockade policy within ASEAN had led to frustration in the MOFA AOB since 2004, as its efficiency as a regional institution was severely impaired. AOB Director General Sasae Ken’ichirō (2005–2007), as well as his later successor Saiki Akitaka (2008–2011), therefore pushed for Japan to establish new, bilateral security cooperation with regional partners such as the Philippines and Indonesia (Interview 2019, 2020e). Sasae also placed a special focus on India, which he regarded as a key partner in the region, to secure the SLOCs (Tuke 2011, 244–246). These efforts led JDA Director Ōno Yoshinori to agree with Manila in May 2005 on the introduction of regular diplomatic meetings between the Ministry of Defense and Navy officers (Interview 2020d; Przystup 2008).

Alarmed by Beijing’s naval cooperation with Cambodia, Laos and Burma, Sasae tried to convince the US Department of Defense of the need for an increased US presence in the Pacific. In April 2006, Sasae warned the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Christopher R. Hill, that China’s new southern diplomacy aimed to use Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) funds intended for Beijing to implement Sino-Southeast Asian security partnerships (Tuke 2011, 244–246; WikiLeaks 2006). In order to redefine Japan’s strategic positioning as a democratic middle power in the Pacific vis-à-vis an expanding Chinese sphere of influence, Saiki proposed closer cooperation with India and the Philippines. At the same time, this strategy was intended to reduce Tokyo’s dependence on energy commodity imports (Saiki 2008; Tuke 2011, 133). The closer coordination of MSDF units with India and Southeast Asian democracies was intended to secure the sea routes for raw material supplies and remove them from Beijing’s influence (Interview 2019).

Together with Kanehara, Minister of the Japanese Embassy in Washington, Saiki advocated the development of a new “grand strategy” in which Japan should establish itself as a democratic security guarantor in the Pacific by proactively spreading democratic and universal values. Based on the US-Japan alliance, this strategy was to promote the spread of universal values (democracy, human rights, free market economy) and a norm-based foreign policy (Interview 2019; Kanehara 2005, 2007).

Hence, when Foreign Minister Asō Tarō announced Japan’s new “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” doctrine based on universal values on 30 November 2006, he institutionalized previous attempts by MOFA officials to establish a Pacific-oriented foreign policy (MOFA 2006; Tanaka 2009, 162–169). At the heart of this new doctrine was the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, which was signed on 13 March 2007, and made Japan Australia’s second most important security partner after the United States (MOFA 2007b).

In his speech to the Indian parliament on 22 August 2007, Abe emphasized the commonality of the fundamental values of freedom, democracy and human rights and declared that he would push for the establishment of a strategic partnership between the two countries (MOFA 2007a). His concept of the “Confluence of the Two Seas” was largely based on the geopolitical thinking of Karl Haushofer, who provided the ideological foundations for Abe’s strategy with his definition of the “Great Ocean” or “Indo-Pacific Ocean” as a “living space”. By connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans, this approach aimed to control the sea routes in the region by expanding the maritime security capacities (capacity building) of Southeast Asian states (Haushofer 1928, 281–282). In addition to the strategic implications for Japan’s regional role, this concept primarily represents a balancing strategy vis-à-vis China (Interview 2020a).

At the Asia-Pacific Economic Community (APEC) meeting in Canberra on 8 September 2007, Abe discussed this concept for the first time with President Bush and Australian Prime Minister John Howard. At the same time, Kanehara consulted with Indian and Australian government representatives at an informal breakfast meeting. The core of the discussion was the future coordination of security cooperation between these four Pacific democracies (Australia, India, Japan and the US). Yachi, Kanehara and Saiki, who were all prominent advocates of the Indo-Pacific strategy, tried to convince the Australian government of the need to win India as a partner (Interview 2020a). While Kanehara established contact with the Pacific states and evaluated a common ideological basis, it was above all Yachi and Saiki who drafted the strategic foundations for the Indo-Pacific strategy at MOFA. In particular, the later focus on India had already been favored by Saiki for several years (Pugliese and Wallace 2020; Tuke 2011).

After Abe announced his resignation just four weeks later, on 26 September 2007, Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo initiated a pro-China foreign policy and ended Abe’s multilateral defense strategy in the Pacific. Fukuda dismissed Foreign Minister Aso and protected MOFA officials who had been critical of Abe’s “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” strategy (Hosoya 2011). Kanehara, who had seen the “Arc of Freedom” concept as the basis for Japan’s geopolitical strategy, then officially suspended further deliberations and laid aside the strategy paper. Yet, he hoped to be able to take up the idea again in the future (Interview 2020a). In the months that followed, Kanehara and Yachi became important advocates of the regional cooperation strategy with “like-minded” partners, i.e. democracies, in the Asia-Pacific region. For example, Yachi emphasized to the commander of the US Pacific Fleet, John Goodman, that Japan considered the expansion of security cooperation with Southeast Asian democracies, such as the Philippines, to be intrinsic to countering China’s ongoing military build-up (WikiLeaks 2007).

As a result, Yachi and MOFA diplomats from the Counter-Terrorism Division identified the Philippines as a key partner and suggested that Manila be included in the trilateral security talks with Canberra and Washington. According to the head of the Counter-Terrorism Division, Shimizu Fumio, the overlaps between Manila’s threat perceptions and Beijing’s territorial disputes in the South China Sea promised much room for cooperation (WikiLeaks 2008b). Although the fight against terrorism and piracy established new cooperation mechanisms, MOFA and MOD diplomats hoped to further intensify cooperation with Manila, mainly to counter Beijing’s growing influence (Interview 2019).

To this end, Deputy Defense Minister Masuda Kohei negotiated with Malaysian and Philippine government representatives on 22 January 2008 about intensified maritime security cooperation (Przystup 2008). At this meeting, Malaysia signaled its interest in expanding maritime security cooperation with Japan, but expressed concerns about possible repercussions for its economic relations with China. Masuda suggested that Japan could gradually expand cooperation in the form of naval maneuvers following aid payments for the modernization of the Malaysian navy (Interview 2020b). These consultations resulted in the signing of the Japan Grant Assistance to Malaysia for Maritime Security Agreement, which provided for the joint securing of the Strait of Malacca (Interview 2020b; MOFA 2008).

In addition, the appointment of Saiki as MOFA AOB Director General in January 2008 contributed significantly to the intensification of regional security cooperation. Saiki pushed for the expansion of Japan’s security policy network with Pacific nations in order to maintain the regional status quo and stop the expansion of the Chinese sphere of influence. In view of Japan’s historical responsibility, Tokyo was to promote democratic values and establish a regional counter-model to China. To this end, Saiki focused on cooperation with the Philippines and securing the SLOCs (Interview 2019).

Due to constitutional restrictions under Article 9, which prohibits Japan from pursuing a proactive military doctrine and restricts defense cooperation with foreign countries, Saiki proposed coordinating Japan’s closer cooperation with Manila through the US Homeland Security Department (WikiLeaks 2008a). Saiki had already spoken out in favor of cooperation with regional naval and coast guard units in his function as deputy head of the Japanese embassy in Washington (2006–2008). At the time, he had argued that Manila – in comparison to other Southeast Asian states – was more open to deeper security cooperation due to a shared threat perception (Interview 2019; Saiki 2008). The International Policy Division of the Japanese Ministry of Defense came to a similar conclusion in 2008. For example, the division had ruled out cooperation with Cambodia and Laos, which would have required the exchange of more sensitive information, due to their political proximity to China. Cooperation with Manila, on the other hand, was recommended (Interview 2020e).

Beijing’s newfound self-confidence, characterized by economic growth and growing nationalism, prompted the MOFA to push more forcefully for the establishment of regional security partnerships. This change was now also favored by those MOFA diplomats who had advocated a cooperative strategy with China in the past (Interview 2018d; Kohara 2005).

This change in perception between 2005–2006 can also be observed in other government institutions. In 2006, JDA Director Nukaga Fukushirō classified Beijing, alongside North Korea, as a concrete threat. The National Defense Program Guidelines (Bōei Taikō) described China as “worrisome” and the East Asian Strategic Review of the JDA-affiliated NIDS wrote extensively about Beijing’s destabilization of East Asia (Kantei 2004; NIDS 2006, 91–122). Alarmed by China’s nationalism on display at the 2008 Summer Olympics and Beijing’s assertive claims of ownership over the disputed Senkaku/Diàoyú Islands, the new MOFA Deputy Director General, Kohara Masahiro, urged the US Department of Defense to counter Beijing’s aggression. He called for balancing the emerging imbalance in East Asia by increasing US presence and involving Japan more closely in US regional security coordination. Their changed threat perceptions towards the new security architecture prompted a group of MOFA AOB diplomats to expand the bilateral security network to include Southeast Asian democracies (Interview 2018e, 2018f, 2018d; WikiLeaks 2009c).

Overall, the period 2005–2008 is characterized by a gradually shifting perception among executive officials regarding Japan’s role in the Pacific. This has accelerated both the expansion of the bilateral alliance and the diversification of Japan’s regional security cooperation. The efforts of elite diplomats indicate that perceptions were initially changing in Kantei, JDA/MOD and MOFA. This was not externally induced, but rather it grew internally. The actions of MOFA and MOD career diplomats show that China’s more aggressive foreign policy, on the one hand, and the threat perception of Japan, which was little received by Washington, on the other, had led to a rethinking of Japan’s security options. This “general” change of perception in MOFA and MOD was driven by visionary diplomats (such as Kanehara, Kohara, Saiki, Sasae, Yachi), who laid the foundation for the implementation of a new Indo-Pacific strategy.

The concluding third case study examines how the beginnings of this strategic change were continued at the official level and ultimately transformed into a political doctrine. It is important to note that this case study is not intended to refute the hypothesis that Prime Minister Abe was responsible for Japan’s new orientation in the Indo-Pacific region. Rather, it shows that this strategy was successfully implemented during Abe’s term of office from 2012–2020 in particular because it was received by a bureaucratic leadership level that had already favored this change a decade earlier.

Case study 3: From stagnation and friction to strategic coordination (2009–2012)

The DPJ’s election victory and the inauguration of Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio in September 2009 brought fundamental changes to Japan’s foreign policy orientation and the coordination between MOFA, Kantei and the Prime Minister. Two major changes were Hatoyama’s foreign policy concept of the East Asian Community and the emerging frictions between MOFA, MOD and Kantei bureaucrats on the one hand and elected DPJ officials on the other. This section examines the extent to which Hatoyama’s strategy changed the focus on the Pacific region, which had intensified by 2008, and the role of bureaucrats in ensuring foreign policy continuity.

Article 52 of the DPJ’s political manifesto for the 2009 lower house election described the establishment of an “East Asian community” (Higashi Ajia Kyōdōtai) as a counter-proposal to “failed US globalization” and “US dominance in East Asia” (Hatoyama 2009a). With the strategy of fraternal solidarity (yu’ai) and in opposition to the US-centric Yoshida Doctrine, which had been Japan’s foreign policy strategy under LDP governments for decades, a new Asia strategy was conceived by Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirano Hirofumi (Hatoyama 2009b; Hirano 2009; Interview 2018c, 2018e).

The main problem, however, was that Hatoyama had not presented MOFA with a clear strategy for Japan’s new regionalism, which led to resentment among diplomats. Vice Foreign Minister Tanaka Hitoshi, for example, was convinced that there was no need for a new regional strategy, as Prime Minister Koizumi had already laid the foundation for Japan’s further integration into the East Asian community at the ASEAN-Japan Summit in 2003 (Interview 2018c). This concept, which Tanaka was instrumental in drafting, envisaged the deepening of ASEAN-Japan relations into an ASEAN + 3 system (with China and South Korea), while at the same time expanding the bilateral alliance.

Hatoyama’s new focus on the Asian community at the expense of the U.S.-Japan alliance met with strong resistance from MOFA Director General Saiki. Along with other MOFA officials, Saiki was frustrated overall by Hatoyama’s unclear foreign policy strategy, as it did not allow for anticipation and officials were faced with new policies on a daily basis. Despite Hatoyama’s promise to return policy leadership from officials back to the level of elected representatives (seiji shūdō), there was little “sophisticated leadership” in his policies. The bureaucratic MOFA leadership assessed the strategy as a “hastily drafted strategy that lacked any substance” and therefore met with great resistance (Interview 2019).

The mistrust of MOFA diplomats was reinforced when Foreign Minister Okada Katsuya insisted that the US would not play an active role in the new “East Asian Community” strategy and suggested that Japan could merely act as a “liaison” between the community and Washington (Hirano 2009). Moreover, Okada’s instruction to Vice Foreign Minister Yabunaka Mitoji to publish unredacted documents relating to the negotiations on the 1960 US-Japan Security Treaty (Anpo Jōyaku) had already caused displeasure at MOFA. Yabunaka had criticized that this would install a “glass ceiling which could reveal sensitive processes of foreign policy negotiations to the public” (Interview 2018b).

MOFA diplomats were also shocked by the Hatoyama government’s lack of knowledge of foreign policy. For example, Vice Foreign Minister Tanaka was summoned to the Kantei by Hatoyama to explain the Status of Forces Agreement, which allowed the US to use military bases in Japan (Interview 2018c). As Hatoyama’s “East Asian Community” strategy threatened a rapprochement with China and a departure from Japan’s Pacific strategy initiated between 2005–2008, the AOB in particular tried to convince the DPJ administration of the need to continue the “balancing strategy” against China in coordination with the US (Wikileaks 2009b).

One exception was the Deputy Director General of the AOB, Kohara, who supported – in principle – Hatoyama’s new strategy. Kohara had drafted the “New Commitment to Asia” concept, which Hatoyama presented at the first ASEAN-US Leaders’ Meeting in Singapore on 15 November 2009. Some MOFA AOB diplomats, including Kohara and Tanaka, had previously argued that Japan needed to counter China’s growth with a revitalization of East Asia, which should massively limit Beijing’s regional influence (Interview 2018b; Kohara 2005, 143–206; Tanaka 2005, 13).

Washington, on the other hand, was concerned about the extent to which Hatoyama’s new strategy would affect the bilateral alliance. To allay these concerns with State Department officials, such as Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell, the head of MOFA’s Office of Foreign Affairs (Sōgō Gaikō Seisaku Kyoku), Bessho Kōrō, and Deputy Foreign Minister Yabunaka communicated directly with Washington two months after Hatoyama’s election victory. Bessho and Yabunaka assured Campbell that Japan would continue its alliance commitments, especially in the Indian Ocean, and that Hatoyama’s election would have no effect on the alliance (WikiLeaks 2009a). Yabunaka was convinced anyway that Hatoyama’s time in power was only a short episode and that the DPJ would soon be elected into the opposition. MOFA bureaucrats often used unofficial communication channels with the State Department in order to reassure Japan’s unwavering commitment to the bilateral alliance (Interview 2018b; Magosaki 2012, 130–132).

As a result, after Hatoyama’s resignation in June 2010, MOFA diplomats quickly re-established political coordination with the State Department and a certain level of normality was restored in bilateral relations under Prime Ministers Kan Naoto and Noda Yoshihiko. Under Prime Minister Kan, the MOD began concrete talks on security cooperation with the Philippines and Vietnam and the expertise of MOFA diplomats was reintegrated into the foreign policy decision-making process (Interview 2018b; Magosaki 2012, 130–132).

With the inauguration of Prime Minister Noda on 2 September 2011, Japan’s Pacific security strategy was once again synchronized among the political and bureaucratic leaders in Kantei, MOFA and MOD. Noda’s decision in December 2011 to expand Japan’s capacity-building measures with ASEAN countries and to strengthen the role of the SDF in humanitarian operations (disaster relief) and anti-piracy missions met with broad approval in MOFA (Yuzawa 2018, 116). At the same time, MOFA and MOD efforts to promote the expansion of security cooperation in Southeast Asia were received in the Kantei. This was also due to the fact that China’s provocations were increasing and the conflict over the Senkaku Islands had intensified, while the US “pivot to Asia” announced by President Obama remained underdeveloped (Interview 2018b, 2020a).

This caused a loss of confidence in Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s US Pacific strategy (2009–2013) among Southeast Asian states and resulted in an intensification of regional partnerships with Japan (Interview 2020a). This newly created uncertainty led to the adoption of the Joint Declaration for Enhancing ASEAN-Japan Strategic Partnership for Prosperity (the so-called Bali Declaration) at the 17th Japan-ASEAN Summit in November 2011, which codified concrete defense cooperation between Japan and ASEAN as “military” for the first time (ASEAN 2021; Yuzawa 2018, 116). This codification laid the foundation for the provision of Japanese Coast Guard patrol boats to the Philippines through the use of ODA funds from the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA). This strategic use of ODA for the first time thus significantly expanded the original purpose of Japanese development aid. These measures were followed by the establishment of a capacity building division within the MOD and a “strategic partnership” with the Philippines, as well as the decision in March 2012 to transfer 12 patrol boats to Manila (Interview 2020c; Kantei 2011).

Implications of these developments for the expansion phase (from 2012)

These developments make it clear that when Abe Shinzō took office, a completely new Pacific strategy was by no means initiated in Japan. Rather, the bureaucratic foundations for implementing a regional security policy focus were already in place. When a new “Capacity Building Division” was set up in the MOD in 2012, with the aim of coordinating Japan’s cooperation measures with ASEAN states in the areas of humanitarian aid and anti-piracy, a directive was mainly implemented that had already been formally established with Noda’s decision to facilitate the principles of arms export. Moreover, the change in perceptions among executive officials in MOFA and MOD shows that Abe’s decision to implement maritime capacity building support to the Philippines in 2013 was a realization of an idea that had already been developed in MOD’s International Policy Division. The new influence of this division on capacity-building and confidence-building measures with Southeast Asian democracies had already been promoted in the ministries as the core of Japan’s new regional strategy (Interview 2018a, 2018b, 2018c, 2018d, 2018e, 2018f, 2020c, 2020e). Furthermore, Japan and the Philippines signed a 19-billion-yen loan in December 2013 for the use of Japanese coast guard equipment, which was finally delivered in August 2018 (Grønning 2021, 111).

Thus, the legal codification of security cooperation with Manila and other Pacific states, such as in the Pacific Island Defense Dialogue 2021, represents the institutionalization of long-standing efforts to diversify and geographically expand Japan’s regional strategy (MOD 2021a, 2021b). Overall, the research shows that the policy shaping of the Pacific strategy between 2012–2021 was the result of a process that was already favored by MOFA and MOD executives in the 2000s. Triggered by a heightened threat perception towards Beijing, this strategy was eventually pushed forward more aggressively.

The case study also illustrates that Abe’s turn to the Indo-Pacific and to a multilateral security strategy with democracies such as Australia and India from 2012 onwards was shared by a number of leading officials and was positively received in the MOFA, MOD and Kantei. Although Japan’s new Pacific strategy was politically realized by the Abe administration, the present analysis has clarified that a more independent regional strategy was already positively evaluated among Tokyo’s security policy officials since the 2000s.

Conclusion

This case study’s analytical focus on bureaucratic and political decision-makers illustrates the usefulness and necessity of both evaluating primary sources and employing political science methods that shed analytical light on administrative processes. However, it must be borne in mind that while selective access to interview partners and primary sources enables detailed analysis, it is also subject to a bias that is limited by geographical, temporal and financial research constraints.

The study shows that executive bureaucrats made significant attempts to influence Japan’s strategic realignment in the Pacific over the past 15–20 years. The MOFA AOB and the MOD IPPB as well as deputy foreign ministers and administrative defense ministers played a decisive role in this process. Hatoyama’s time in office also provides indications of how frictions between high-ranking diplomats and the political leadership prevented the implementation of strategies contrary to proactive foreign policy.

This study offers insight for various research in Japanese studies and political science. Future research should examine the influence of civil society actors and think tanks. In addition, further research that examines the reception of publications and statements by bureaucrats and diplomats in the socio-political discourse is necessary. Such studies would complement the focus on the bureaucratic-administrative change in perceptions and allow more precise conclusions to be drawn about the conditions that must be met for the change in perceptions within the foreign policy elite to be reflected in concrete legislative decisions.

Acknowledgement

This contribution was translated from the German. The German version was originally published as: Adebhar, David. 2022. Zwischen regionaler Kooperation und strategischer Neuordnung: Eine Untersuchung des Perzeptionswandels in der japanischen Sicherheitspolitik. In D. Chiavacci & I. Wieczorek (Eds.), Jahrbuch der Vereinigung für Sozialwissenschaftliche Japanforschung. (pp.194–219). München: Iudicium. The article was selected for the 2023 VSJF Prize for the best German social science publication on Japan by the German Association for Social Science Research on Japan. As the award-winning paper of this biennial prize, the publication of the English version of the article was kindly permitted by Iudicium Verlag for CJ.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).