Political turmoil and parliamentary response – the constitutional crisis in Bolivia 2019

ABSTRACT

In recent times, many political theorists have warned on the many signs around the world of democratic backsliding, experienced not only in emerging democracies but also in established ones. One of the areas of concern is the aggrandisement of the executive at the expense of parliaments, which erodes not only checks and balances but also the credibility and legitimacy of state institutions. Analysts are also concerned with damaging effects of political polarisation on democracy. Despite these challenges, parliaments are still seen as safeguard mechanisms during times of crises and have the potential to serve as another democratic line of defence. The severe political crisis in Bolivia in 2019 provides an example to study this role of parliament. Protests and intense social unrest erupted in response to a questionable electoral process in which President Evo Morales attempted to run for office disregarding constitutional term limits. This crisis, however, was also the result of a longstanding process of institutional capture were parliament played a key role supporting the efforts of the executive to extend its control to the rest of the state, aggravated by high levels of polarisation. Following the resignation of higher authorities including the President, the Bolivian state was practically paralysed and parliament became the centre of political negotiations, aimed at restoring constitutional order. After the initial shock, Bolivia’s Plurinational Assembly was eventually able to fulfil its constitutional role with the appointment of an interim president. This article describes salient elements of the role of parliament prior and during the crisis, highlighting some of the personalistic elements of politics in this country. It focuses on the parliamentary response to the crisis and the lessons learned, underlining that despite adversity parliaments can help restore order and provide much needed democratic continuity in times of uncertainty.

KEYWORDS:

• Political crisis
• democratic backsliding
• parliamentary roles
• parliamentary monitoring
• presidential transition
• Latin America
• Andean politics
• Bolivia

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 For a simple but insightful discussion see Nicholas Hopkinson, Parliamentary Democracy: Is There a Perfect Model? (Routledge Revivals 2021. Original work published 2001).

2 Two interesting works are Alastair Stark, ‘Legislatures: Help or Hindrance in Achieving Successful Crisis Management?’ (2011) 30 Policy and Society 115–27; Arjen Boin and others, The Politics of Crisis Management: Understanding Public Leadership When It Matters Most (Cambridge University Press 2005).

3 Stark (n 2).

4 For a relevant discussion on political polarisation and democratic crises see Adam Przeworski, Crises of Democracy (Cambridge University Press 2019).

5 Juan J. Linz, ‘Democracy, Presidential or Parliamentary: Does It Make a Difference?’ in Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela (eds), The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspectives (John Hopkins University Press 1994) 3–87; cited by Patricio Navia, Rodrigo Osorio and Pablo Toro Monroy ‘Where is Linz’s Gridlock? Salvador Allende and the Success of Presidential Bills in Chile, 1958–1973’ (2023) The Journal of Legislative Studies, DOI:10.1080/13572334.2022.2164825.

6 For extensive discussions and additional sources see Linz (n 5) and Navia, Osorio and Toro (n 5).

7 In this case, they revisited the highly cited case of Allende and his difficult relationship with the Chilean parliament in the early 1970s. They compared legislative success (number of bills submitted and passed) between several presidencies and conclude that although Allende faced strong opposition for key bills, the Chilean congress remained operational and still able to legislate even few days before the 1973 Coup by Pinochet.

8 Oren Gross and Fionnuala Nı’ Aola´in, Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice (Cambridge University Press 2006).

9 Stark (n 2).

10 John Ferejohn and Pasquale Pasquino,‘The Law of the Exception: A Typology of Emergency Powers’ (2004) International Journal of Constitutional Law 210–39.

11 David Judge, The Parliamentary State (Sage 1993).

12 Among others see Przeworski (n 4).

13 Nancy Bermeo, ‘On Democratic Backsliding’ (2016) 27 Journal of Democracy 5–19.

14 Andreas Schedler, ‘Rethinking Political Polarization’ (2023) 138 Political Science Quarterly 335–60.

15 For a comprehensive discussion on political polarisation see Schedler (n 14); Nolan McCarty, Polarization: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford University Press 2019); Jennifer McCoy, Tahmina Rahman and Murat Somer ‘Polarization and the Global Crisis of Democracy: Common Patterns, Dynamics, and Pernicious Consequences for Democratic Polities’ (2018) 62 American Behavioural Scientist 16–42; among others.

16 Bermeo (n 13).

17 Bermeo (n 13).

18 Francesco Bromo, Paolo Gambacciani and Marco Improta ‘Governments and Parliaments in a State of Emergency: What Can We Learn From the COVID-19 Pandemic?’ (2024) The Journal of Legislative Studies, https://doi.org/10.1080/13572334.2024.2313310.

19 Sven T. Siefken and others, ‘Parliaments in the Pandemic: First Findings from a Comparative Research Collaboration [English Version]’ (2021) 52 Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 878–94.

20 For a recent discussion on this topic, including comments on institutional trust and mistrust see Mahir Tokath, ‘Impeachment as Last Resort to Safeguard Democracy? Removing the Head of Government in Different Institutional Settings’ (2023) Politische Vierteljahresschrift (Online First, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11615-023-00488-w).

21 Anibal Pérez-Liñán, ‘Democratization and Constitutional Crises in Presidential Regimes: Toward Congressional Supremacy?’ (2005) 38 Comparative Political Studies 51–74.

22 For an analysis on Latin America see Gabriel L. Negretto, Making Constitutions: Presidents, Parties, and Institutional Choice in Latin America (Cambridge University Press 2013).

23 From this point onwards the terms ‘ALP’ and ‘parliament’ will be used interchangeably as synonyms for Bolivia’s legislative bicameral body.

24 See Martin Mendoza-Botelho, ‘Bolivia’s Proceso de Cambio: Adjusting the Ideological Paradigm from Social to Economic’ [‘Bolivia’s Change Process: Adjusting the Ideological Paradigm from Social to Economic’] (2019) 25 Bolivian Studies Journal https://doi.org/10.5195/bsj.2019.205

25 For a comprehensive and recent discussion on polarisation in Bolivia, see Jan Souverein, Christina Stolte and Ana Lucia Velasco Unzueta, Polarización política y social en Bolivia. Apuntes para afrontar uno de los desafíos más grandes para la democracia boliviana [Political and social polarisation in Bolivia. Hand notes to face one of the greatest challenges for Bolivian democracy] (Proyecto Unámonos. Imprenta Estigma 2023).

26 Josue Cortez Saravia, Diego Peñaranda Molina y Daniela Valdivia Heredia, ‘Índice multidimensional de polarización política: una medición utilizando nueva evidencia en Bolivia’ [Political polarisation multidimensional index: a measurement using new evidence in Bolivia] of in Souverein, Stolte and Velasco Unzueta (n 25).

27 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI Country Report — Bolivia 2022 (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2022).

28 ‘Vicepresidente sobre el 21 F. Hay polarización pero no empate catastrófico’ [‘There is polarisation but not catastrophic draw’] (Agencia de Noticias Fides, 28 February 2019) <https://www.noticiasfides.com/nacional/politica/vicepresidente-sobre-el-21f-34hay-polarizacion-pero-no-hay-empate-catastrofico-34-385998> accessed 15 February 2024.

29 Anatoly Kurmanaev and Cesar Del Castillo, ‘How an Unknown Female Senator Came to Replace the Bolivian President Evo Morales’ (The New York Times, 24 November 2019). <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/24/world/americas/how-an-unknown-female-senator-came-to-replace-the-bolivian-president-evo-morales.html> accessed 8 August 2023.

30 Bermeo (n 13).

31 ‘Recorrido Político de Adriana Salvatierra y Víctor Borda’ [‘Political path of Adriana Salvatierra and Víctor Borda’] (Los Tiempos, 18 January 2019) <https://www.lostiempos.com/actualidad/pais/20190118/recorrido-politico-adriana-salvatierra-victor-borda> accessed 8 August 2023.

32 This section is based on various sources: personal interviews (some of them confidential), media analysis and journalistic accounts. Not only is this a relatively recent case but one in which a lot of controversy exists around events, thus the state of research and academic literature on this particular topic (legislative response) is limited and oftentimes contradictory. There are, however, several relevant accounts on Bolivia’s 2019 crisis that validate some of the ideas presented in this article (not cited in detail for reasons of space): Luis Claros and Vladimir Díaz Cuellar (eds), Crisis Política en Bolivia 2019-2020 [Political Crisis in Bolivia] (Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung y Plural Editores 2022); Linda Farthing and Thomas Becker, Coup: A Story of Violence and Resistance in Bolivia (Haymarket Books 2021); ‘Towards Freedom’s Bolivia reader: Voices on the political and social crisis following the October 2019 elections in Bolivia’ (Toward Freedom, 15 January 2020) <http://towardfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Toward-Freedoms-Bolivia-Reader.pdf> accessed 14 August 2023; William Añez Herrera, La Revolución de las Pititas en Bolivia. Empoderamiento y caída de Evo Morales [The Short-Strings (Pititas) Revolution in Bolivia. Social empowerment and the fall of Evo Morales] (Grupo Editorial Kipus 2021); Wolff, Jonas, ‘The Turbulent End of an Era in Bolivia: Contested Elections, the Ouster of Evo Morales, and the Beginning of a Transition Towards an Uncertain Future’ (2020) 40 Revista de Ciencia Política (Santiago) 163–86.

33 This was the date in which the referendum took place, 21 February 2016.

34 ‘Bolivia dice “no” en referendo a otra reelección de Evo Morales’ [‘Bolivia says “no” to another re-election of Evo Morales’] (British Broadcasting Coorporation (BBC), 23 February 2016) <https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2016/02/160223_bolivia_evo_morales_referendo_resultado_ep> accessed 15 August 2023.

35 TCP members are pre-selected by the ALP with at least 2/3 of the votes and later on elected by the public in departmental elections. Although the final selection seems to be done by the citizenry, in practice parliament not only controls the process through pre-selection but also provides much needed political backing, thus elected members reflect the same voting patterns of the dominant political force in that department.

36 Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, Ley No. 018 del 16 de Junio 2010. Ley del Órgano Electoral Plurinacional. [Law of the Plurinational Electoral Organ]

37 ‘Hitos que causaron la debacle en la credibilidad del TCP’ [‘Milestones that caused debacle in the credibility of the TCP’] (Noticias Fides, 20 September 2019) <https://www.noticiasfides.com/nacional/politica/elecciones-2019-los-15-hitos-que-causaron-la-debacle-en-la-credibilidad-del-tse-400957> accessed 25 July 2023.

38 Rubén Ariñez La Razón, ‘La presidenta del TSE renuncia preocupada por la institucionalidad del Órgano Electoral; quedan 5 vocales’ [‘President of TSE resigns worried for the institutionality of the Electoral Organ; 5 members stay] (22 October 2018) <https://www.la-razon.com/lr-article/la-presidenta-del-tse-renuncia-preocupada-por-la-institucionalidad-del-organo-electoral-quedan-5-vocales> accessed 10 August 2023.

39 Personal interviews with scholars and off-duty journalists. La Paz, June 15-25 2023.

40 The results at that point gave Morales a lead of 45.28% of the votes over his stronger rival Carlos Mesa of Comunidad Ciudadana (Citizen’s Community, acronym CC) with 38,16%, thus signalling the insufficient 10% lead that Morales needed to avoid a second round. See Página Siete by Juan Pérez Munguía. ‘Después de tres años, aún no hay una expliación sobre suspensión del TREP’ [‘After three years, there is still not explanation about the stoppage of TREP’] (October 18, 2022) <https://www.paginasiete.bo/nacional/despues-de-tres-anos-aun-no-hay-una-explicacion-sobre-suspension-del-trep-XC4675707#google_vignette> accessed 1 August 2023.

41 One of the primary duties of this country-membership organisation is precisely electoral monitoring.

42 Júlia Ledur and Feilding Cage. ‘Bolivia: Seis semanas de disturbios’ [‘Bolivia: Six weeks of turmoil’] (Reuter, 2 December 2019) <https://www.reuters.com/graphics/BOLIVIA-ELECTION/0100B3352B2/index.html> accessed 3 July 2023.

43 ‘Informe de la OEA sobre concluye que hubo “manipulación y parcialidad” en los comicios del 20 de octubre’ [OAS Report concludes that there was ‘manipulation and partiality’ in the October 20th election’] (British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 5 December 2019) <https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-50666779> accessed 15 July 2023; Organization of American States ‘Análisis de Integridad Electoral. Elecciones Generales en el Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia’ [‘Analysis of Electoral Integrity. General Elections in the Plurinational State of Bolivia’] (20 October 2019) <https://www.slideshare.net/weberbol/oea-informe-preliminar-de-la-auditoria-bolivia2019> accessed 4 August 2023.

44 ‘Las Fuerzas Armadas sugieren a Evo Morales que renuncie para permitir la pacificación de Bolivia’ [‘Armed Forces suggest Evo Morales that he should resign to allow pacification in Bolivia’] (British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 10 November 2019) <https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-50365697> accessed 20 May 2023.

45 ‘Borda presenta renuncia irrevocable al cargo de presidente de la Cámara de Diputados’ [‘Borda presents his irrevocable resignation to the position of president of the Chamber of Deputies’] (Opinión, 10 November 2019) <https://www.opinion.com.bo/articulo/pais/borda-presenta-renuncia-irrevocable-cargo-presidente-camara-diputados/20191110095643736361.html≥ accessed 20 May 2023.

46 The timing and validity of Rivero’s resignation is still under discussion and is part of the legal process denominated ‘Caso Golpe de Estado I’ [‘Case Coup d’état I’] that was started by the current administration of President Arce Catacora. The main objective of this process is to investigate the participation of individuals in the ousting of President Morales in what the state prosecution defines as an unconstitutional and illegal seizure of power. See ‘Susana Rivero dice que renunció el 14/11/2019, pero su carta dice 10/11’ [Susana Rivero says she quitted on 14/11/2019, but her letter says 10/11’] (Los Tiempos, 19 June 2021) <https://www.lostiempos.com/actualidad/pais/20210619/susana-rivero-dice-que-renuncio-14112019-pero-su-carta-dice-1011> accessed 8 July 2023.

47 ‘Medinaceli en su renuncia: 'Creía fervientemente que la OEA nos limpiaría la cara frente a los detractores'‘ [Medinaceli on his resignation: ‘I firmly believed that the OAS was going to clean our face in front of our detractors’] (Brújula Digital, 14 July 2021) <https://brujuladigital.net/politica/medinaceli-en-su-renuncia-creia-fervientemente-que-la-oea-nos-limpiaria-la-cara-frente-a-los-detractores> accessed 15 August 2023.

48 ‘Lo último sobre la renuncia de Evo Morales a la presidencia y la crisis en Bolivia’ [‘The latest on the resignation of Evo Morales to the presidency and the crisis in Bolivia’] (Cable News Network (CNN), 11 November 2019) <https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2019/11/11/lo-ultimo-sobre-la-renuncia-de-evo-morales-a-la-presidencia-y-la-crisis-en-bolivia/ > accessed 25 August 2023; ‘Quienes fueron los últimos ministros de Evo Morales’ [‘Who were the last ministers of Evo Morales’] (Los Tiempos, 15 November 2019) <https://www.lostiempos.com/actualidad/pais/20191115/quienes-fueron-ultimos-ministros-evo-morales> accessed 25 August 2023.

49 One of the hypothesis (currently under scrutiny as part of a larger judicial process related to the events of 2019) argues that the mass resignation was part of a larger plan to link the protests with an allegedly coup d’éta staged by internal and external political agents, thus forcing a full shutdown of government functions. This situation will give the ALP the possibility to reconvene, reject Morales’ resignation and reinstitute him in power with emergency powers, thus extending his mandate in a constitutional way until new elections could be called. For a short discussion see: Fabrice Lehoucq, ‘Bolivia’s Citizen Revolt’ (2020) 31 Journal of Democracy 130–44; Mauricio Diaz Saravia. ‘Morales condena declaraciones ‘falaces’ de dos diputados sobre petición de su renuncia en 2019’ [‘Morales condemns ‘fallacious’ statements from two congressmen on the petition for his resignation in 2019’] (La Razón, 7 July 2023) <https://www.la-razon.com/nacional/2023/07/07/morales-condena-declaraciones-falaces-de-dos-diputados-sobre-peticion-de-su-renuncia-en-2019> accessed 25 July 2023.

50 The constitution is ambiguous in this issue because the vice-presidencies in senate and the lower chamber are not made explicit in the constitutional text as viable options for presidential succession.

51 ‘Nueve momentos: Carlos Mesa fue el factor clave de la sucesión de Jeanine Áñez’ [‘Nine moments: Carlos Mesa was the key factor in the succession of Jeanine Áñez] (La Razón, 14 June, 2021) <https://www.la-razon.com/nacional/2021/06/14/nueve-momentos-carlos-mesa-fue-el-factor-clave-de-la-sucesion-de-jeanine-anez/> accessed 1 February 2024.

52 ‘Tribunal Constitucional de Bolivia avala a Jeanine Áñez como presidente interina’ [Bolivia’s Constitutional Tribunal endorses Jeanine Áñez as interim president’] (El Universo, 12 November 2019) <https://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/2019/11/12/nota/7601600/tribunal-constitucional-bolivia-avala-jeanine-anez-como-presidenta/> accessed 1 August 2023.

53 At the time of publication, the TCP was backtracking its 2019 ruling, which currently is under revision as part of a larger judicial process against Añez and key collaborators. See ‘TCP ratifica que sucesión de Áñez fue inconstitucional’ [‘TCP ratifies that the succession of Áñez was unconstitutional’] (El Diario, 16 October 2021) <https://www.eldiario.net/portal/2021/10/16/tcp-ratifica-que-sucesion-de-anez-fue-inconstitucional/> accessed 10 August 2023.

54 ‘Mónica Eva Copa, del MAS, es juramentada presidenta del Senado de Bolivia’ [Mónica Eva Copa, from MAS, is sworn as Bolivia’s Senate president’] (Telesur, 14 November 2019) <https://www.telesurtv.net/news/bolivia-camara-senadores-restituir-directivas-parlamento-20191114-0035.html> accessed 8 August 2023.

55 ‘Eva Copa, la conciliadora del MAS que facilitó las nuevas elecciones’ [Eva Copa, the MAS conciliatory figure who facilitated the new elections’] (Correo del Sur, 1 December 2019) <https://correodelsur.com/panorama/20191201_eva-copa-la-conciliadora-del-mas-que-facilito-las-nuevas-elecciones.html> accessed 1 August 2023.

56 Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, Ley No. 1266 del 24 de Noviembre 2019. Ley de Régimen Excepcional y Transitorio para la Realización de Elecciones Generales. [Law of Exceptional and Transient Regime to carry Out General Elections]

57 This analysis is restricted to the November 2019 crisis, however, it is important to mention that President Añez defaulted her initial constitutional commitment to held elections after 90 days. Her overstay in power responded to a combination of issues, including technical (the OPE being able to organise new elections in a short period), contextual (the arrival of COVID-19) and political (her own ambitions to extend her stay in power by defaulting her promise of not running for office). These issues are mentioned because once again (and shortly after a serious crisis) parliament became the centre of negotiations, facing again an executive with intentions of overstepping its constitutional mandate.

58 Hopkinson (n 1).

59 Przeworski (n 4); Schedler (n 14); McCarty (n 15).

60 Souverein, Stolte and Velasco Unzueta (n 25) and Cortez, Peñaranda and Valdivia (n 26).

61 Gross and Nı´ Aola´in (n 8).