Beyond the bilateral balance: moving toward a new framework for analysis of Chinese nuclear strategy

Abstract

This article expresses reservations about the conventional wisdom that the dyadic framework of the Sino-US nuclear balance adequately accounts for the nuclear choices of the People’s Republic of China. I argue that a possible new analytical approach – one that moves beyond dyadic parsimony – could yield a more thorough understanding of Chinese nuclear policy. In moving toward this novel framework for analysis, I not only consider neighboring nuclear states – Russia, and especially India – but I also provide a fresh rationale for the timing of China’s nuclear force modernization.

Keywords:

• Chinese nuclear strategy
• Sino-US nuclear balance
• Asian nuclear order

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Dr. Nikolai Sokov for his helpful comments and constructive criticism, as well as the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Nonproliferation for its encouragement and support.

Notes

1. In pointing to the vulnerability of the Chinese arsenal vis-à-vis “U.S. nuclear primacy,” some authors highlight the possibility of a nuclear arms race as Beijing seeks to improve its deterrent (e.g. Lieber & Press, 2006).

2. For arguments predicting major conflict with considerable potential for great-power war, see Roy (1994), Mearsheimer (2001, 2010), and Friedberg (2012). On peaceful rise, see Johnston (2003) and Zheng (2005).

3. For assessments attributing neighboring countries a marginal influence on China’s nuclear posture, see Fitzpatrick (2014, p. 76), Fravel and Medeiros (2010, p. 83).

4. For a detailed account of how unresolved territorial disputes and hegemonic rivalry between China and India continue to fuel deep security concerns in both countries, see Malik (1999, p. 34), Malik (2012, p. 347).

5. For the extent of India’s force modernization, see Gilboy and Heginbotham (2012, pp. 164–208, 2013, pp. 134–136).

6. For studies on the nuclear policy of China, India, Pakistan in relation to each other, see Malik (1999), Malik (2012), and Pant (2012).

7. For a discussion of China’s “new assertiveness” in the context of geopolitik nationalism, see Hughes (2011).

8. For a discussion of concerns that Russia and India share about China, see Malik (2012, pp. 367–368).

9. For a discussion of Russia’s preference for full Indian membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which would help Moscow to balance Beijing, see Lo (2008, p. 109).

10. For China’s reaction to India’s deployment of the BrahMos in the disputed Arunachal Pradesh region, see Times of India (2012). For an assessment of the strategic advantages New Delhi gains from the deployment of the BrahMos cruise missile in the disputed Arunachal Pradesh region, see Samanta (2011).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Maximilian Alexander Matthias Hoell

Maximilian Alexander Matthias Hoell is a PhD candidate in International Relations at University College London. He earned an MSc from the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science, and an undergraduate degree in Modern Languages (French and Spanish) from Somerville College, University of Oxford. His essay is the winner of the Fall 2014 International Affairs Forum Research Award Competition. He can be reached by email at [email protected].