Human Service Organizations, Disruptive Extreme Events, and Organizational Resilience: An Introduction to the Special Issue on Human Service Organizations in Times of the COVID-19

This special issue aims to offer an international perspective on the implications of the COVID-19 pandemic on human service organizations (HSOs). COVID-19 broke into our lives in March 2020, when the World Health Organization (WHO) declared it a pandemic. The first days following the outbreak were characterized by great confusion, as most nations were caught unprepared by the intensity and speed of the pandemic’s spread and its lethal outcomes. Each country adopted a policy in keeping with its socio-political characteristics and commonly held professional views. The vast majority initiated preventive activities – including social distancing, promoting personal hygiene, and prescribing masks – and/or imposed severe restrictions – including general closures to prevent free movement, free assembly, and free commerce. Industries were suspended, plants were closed, and employees were forced to be furloughed or retire.¹

The immediate welfare outcomes of the pandemic included an increase in unemployment and poverty rates, particularly among young adults and women, and harm to populations at risk, such as the elderly who suffered from physical isolation which exacerbated their loneliness. Moreover, it became difficult to provide the elderly with the services they needed due to employee absence from workplaces, as well as a significant decrease in the number of available volunteers, who feared infection. Other populations depending on various care services, whether in the community or out-of-home institutions, also suffered from the absence of caregivers and the inaccessibility of services. The health and financial crises caused by COVID-19 were met not only by unprepared governments but also by civil society organizations that had never faced such challenges. The financial resilience of these organizations, their social solidarity, and their ability to protect democratic values threatened by government policies were put to the test (Neely-Barnes et al., 2021). The manuscripts in this special issue are dedicated to the implications of the pandemic on various dimensions of HSOs’ organizational activities.

Like earthquakes, massive fires, or tsunamis, the COVID-19 virus can be seen as a disruptive extreme event catching ordinary organizations such as HSOs unprepared. An extreme event is defined as a “discrete episode or occurrence that may result in an extensive and intolerable magnitude of physical, psychological, or material consequences to […] organization members” (Hannah et al., 2009, p. 898, also cited in Choi et al., this issue),² especially in ordinary organizations that may suffer from “a lack of training and resources to respond to such extreme events” (ibid, p.901). Indeed, the COVID-19 pandemic caught HSOs by surprise, as they were unprepared to deal with the lethal outcomes for organizational members and the destructive outcomes for the organization itself. These outcomes affect HSOs and the physical and mental health of their service users – individuals and families alike. Sensemaking in crisis conditions is made more difficult because action that is instrumental to understanding the crisis often intensifies the crisis (Weick, 1988). Indeed, many HSOs had no plans for dealing with the health and economic consequences resulting from the pandemic (Neely-Barnes et al., 2021).

The loss of income for HSOs negatively affected their organizational resilience, which in turn threatened service provision for clients, until governments intervened and provided them with economic stimulus programs (Jang et al., 2023; Lam et al., this issue). Organizational resilience is the “Maintenance of positive adjustment under challenging conditions such that the organization emerges from those conditions strengthened and more powerful” (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007, p. 3418) as well as the ability of organizations to adapt to changing circumstances and continue serving their mission effectively (Young & Searing, 2022). Resilience includes an adaptation aspect that allows organizations to anticipate changes in their environments (Ortiz de Mandojana & Bansal, 2016), as well as to come out of crises stronger than before (Ceesay, 2023). Organizations achieve resilience through preparation, taking into account that preparation does not refer to a specific event but helps to develop capabilities and functions that are necessary to deal with any kind of unexpected event (Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2003). Resilience means to effectively respond to adverse events not only after adverse events, but before, during, and after as well (Williams et al., 2017). Organizations should adapt, transform, and learn after critical situations have occurred (de Oliveira Teixeira & Werther, 2013; Lengnick-Hall et al., 2011). Organizations should anticipate and recognize early signs of crisis and threats and respond quickly (Duchek, 2020; Van Breda, 2016). Most important for organizational resilience are two factors proposed by Young and Searing (2022): (1) adopting entrepreneurship initiatives and taking risks, and (2) developing and creating networks that support the organizations in times of crisis and disruptive extreme events. To be resilient, organizations also need to develop cost and income structures, skilled human capital, networks, technology, entrepreneurship, and advanced information systems (Geciene, 2020).

The implications of COVID-19 for human service organizations

A crisis, or disruptive extreme event, is an opportunity to rethink the organizational mission, goals, structure, and working processes, the services provided, the human capital, and other aspects. A crisis is a precious resource-too precious for the organization to waste rather than to leverage to promote new agendas, search for new markets and target populations, change its purpose, and revamp programs some of which are unsuitable for the new reality, while others are no longer in demand. With its health and socio-economic aspects, COVID-19 has created an opportunity for HSOs to retrace their path, reexamine their activities, and include new ones. A review of the articles in this special issue highlights the implications of disruptive extreme events on human service organizations in the abovementioned areas, as presented below.

Economic resilience

Most organizations have experienced the pandemic as affecting their economic and financial resilience (Clifford et al., 2023). This was because governments did not meet their financial commitments to them due to their huge expenses in dealing with the pandemic. In addition, private donations were diverted from HSOs toward purchasing equipment for protecting populations at risk (the elderly, and people with physical and mental disabilities), hospitals, and nursing homes.

HSOs’ economic resilience was also due to a lack of appropriate organizational slack, which protects organizations during disruptive extreme events. Organizational slack refers to the resources available to the organizations above the resources necessary to achieve immediate organizational and financial goals. It means the presence of latent resources that can be activated, combined, and recombined in new situations as challenges arise (Wildavsky, 1991). Organizations allocate part of their resources as a buffer, also referred to as a shock absorber, to support the capacity of disruptiveness or to face challenges created by the external environment. Organizational slack allows the organization to adapt successfully to internal and external pressures (Sharfman et al., 1988).

Slack resources include human resources, technology, equipment, information, and financial resources. One of the key advantages of having some slack resources is that it allows the organization to experiment with new programs, options, and strategies. This may include research into new opportunities, to identify new areas and new markets, or expand the target population (Meyer & Leitner, 2018; Pan et al., 2016).

Despite the importance of organizational slack, it also has a downside, since allocating resources beyond those required for service provisions results in inefficiency and the accumulation of organizational “fat,” with an attendant increase in bureaucracy, which complicates work processes. Thus, organizations must carefully calculate the level of slack required. This is particularly true of HSOs that lack capital and assets of their own and are supported by the government and/or private funds (Hasenfeld, 2010); their budgets are limited, as are their possibilities to maintain slack. This becomes evident whenever an external crisis threatens their survival. An example is the Global Financial Crisis of 2008–9, which terminated the existence of many HSOs. This is also true for the COVID-19 crisis, in which smaller HSOs found it difficult to raise funds or obtain government grants (Bennett et al., this issue). Thus, HSOs who wish to survive must diversify their income sources and allocate some of their resources to that slack which will enable them to survive extreme events.

Studies have shown that in addition to slack, the organization’s size has had a significant positive effect on its resilience during COVID-19 (Meyer et al., this issue). Large organizations have a greater influence on policymakers, who therefore tend to support them in times of crisis (Schmid, 2021). They also meet the criteria for government grants, unlike smaller organizations. These results are supported by other studies that show that larger HSOs employ a wider variety of adaptive tactics during financial crises (Mosley et al., 2012), and enjoy a comparative advantage based on their size, resources, legitimacy, and stronger networks (Faulk et al., 2016).

Small nonprofits, however, were found to be more flexible and to have a better understanding of user needs, a more personal approach, and greater innovation, creativity, flexibility, and sensitivity (Bovaird, 2014, cited in Bennett et al., this issue). Small organizations were able to respond to a range of service users in different and distinctive ways. They better understood their clients, were more sensitive and person-centered, locally embedded, and informal, created a familial organizational culture, and responded rapidly and effectively to the pandemic (Bennett et al., this issue).

Work technologies

The impact of COVID-19 on the emergence of work technologies was strongly evident. Social distancing restrictions, resulting in the inability of professional HSO employees to serve their clients in person, and the significant drop in the number of volunteers were among the factors that accelerated the adoption of remote work technologies, particularly Zoom (see Shen et al., this issue). These technologies were adopted in all countries, and most articles in this special issue address them. They enabled the HSOs to maintain contact with their clients and among their employees (Glauser, 2020). In doing so, they minimized the negative impact of the pandemic by preventing more severe damage to service continuity.

Therapeutic programs

Most organizations were required to revise their therapeutic service programs (Newby & Branyon, 2021). These revisions were required, among other things, due to the suspension of government contracts and the drop in private donations, at least in the first few months post-outbreak. As a result of the loss of income, existing programs were canceled, and others were revised to meet social distancing restrictions. In addition, new programs were developed to meet physical and mental health needs arising from the pandemic itself (Ma & Beaton, this issue).

In this area as well, the organization’s size affected the design of programs and their adjustment to clients’ changing needs. Large organizations with generous slacks adjusted their programs more effectively than did small organizations hard hit by the crisis. The lack of resources and a small or nonexistent slack made it difficult for the smaller HSOs to adjust. Moreover, deciding to cancel or revise programs or develop new ones was more complex in these organizations. Although they are characterized by a lack of administrative impediments and are therefore more flexible, and thus could be expected to adjust more quickly, it turned out that the decisive factor affecting their adaptation was their limited resources. Nevertheless, organizations that secured government grants did manage to create new client- and situation-adjusted programs (Lam et al., this issue).

Human capital

The pandemic affected the work of both employees and volunteers. First, some social workers and para-professionals experienced occupational insecurity in the form of job termination or forced leave of absence. Others became infected and could not come to work, or worked remotely from home. Many of those who were laid off did not return, whereas others retired (Ashcroft et al., 2022). The social workers who stayed on were required to identify fragile families and at-risk populations, work in collaboration with community leaders, provide remote psychosocial support, serve their clients and protect older adults, children, and families experiencing violent, neglect, and exploitation, and continue with their care routine (Bern-Klug & Beaulieu, 2020; Walter McCabe, 2020). The result of those human resources shifts was an increase in the caseload of therapeutic employees who faced complex economic, physical, and mental health issues resulting from the pandemic. The difficulties experienced by social workers led in many cases to stress, insomnia, alcohol and drug use, burnout, and the abandonment of the profession (Blake et al., 2020; Embregts et al., 2020; Stuijfzand et al., 2020).

Executives of HSOs also had to revise or cancel programs or offer new ones adjusted to the new needs arising following COVID-19. They were also required to collaborate with other organizations, provide closer supervision to their employees, protect their rights and well-being, and change work processes.

Volunteers’ work was affected as well. The number of those volunteering in formal organizations dropped significantly due to fear of infection, affecting the overall quality of services (Meier et al., 2023). Choi et al. (this issue) show that many were hesitant to return to in-person activities where they would be in close contact with others. Their work has changed from in-person to Zoom meetings (Pawlowski & Leppert, 2021, cited in Choi et al., this issue). Volunteer coordinators faced obstacles in reestablishing a volunteer base and keeping volunteers engaged and supported while navigating the health risks associated with the pandemic. By contrast, informal volunteering increased (Cnaan, Handy, et al., 2022; Cnaan, Meijs, et al., 2022).

Organizational structure

One of the major consequences of COVID-19 has been the restructuring of the organizational structure adjusted to the changes following the crisis. Formal structures and rigid working patterns are suitable for organizations operating in relatively stable and certain environments (Schmid, 2009). Many of the characteristics that contribute to the persistence of institutional forms during times of environmental stability and consistency – the reliance on rules, routines, processes, and hierarchies – contribute to the failure of these forms in times of crisis (Alvinius et al., 2010).

Formal, bureaucratic organizational structures are simply unsuitable. In times of crisis, organizations must simplify their structure, flatten it, and expand the managers’ span of control. They need to prioritize their tasks and delegate authority to those who can respond quickly to clients’ needs. While some argue that in a crisis, it is recommended to concentrate powers (Yang et al., 2021), others claim that powers need to be decentralized, productive communication across administrative levels be encouraged, and greater attention be devoted to those who are directly exposed to the changing needs (Alam & Haidar, this issue). The recommended organizational structure under these conditions must be flexible, not too hierarchic, and not burdened with red tape that obstructs organizational innovativeness (Schneiberg, 2007).

In this context, Savino and Mandiberg (this issue) propose the term ephemeral, to refer to organizations innovated by citizens in response to disasters and flattening institutional forms. Ephemeral organizations fulfill “the direct and immediate satisfaction of a local and visible need” (Lanzara, 1983, pp. 76, cited in Savino & Mandiberg, this issue). In such organizations, roles, routines, and authorities tend to be more contextually determined and less dependent on a predetermined “chain of command.” External shocks seem to shake loose organizations’ reliance on rigid adherence to institutional sources of legitimacy. Instead, we need more agile structures that respond effectively to dramatic changes in their environments.

Beyond the restructuring of specific organizations, crises are also an opportunity to initiate strategic change by forming cross-sector partnerships or mergers of organizations experiencing financial uncertainty (Almog-Bar et al., this issue). Mergers enable the creation of value by leveraging the relative strengths of the two merging organizations, having found it difficult to achieve their aims on their own. Mergers require a restructuring of the merging organizations and a standardization of working processes. Economies of scale enable the merged entity to cope with the new challenges arising from extreme events.

Social media

The increased use of online services also meant greater use of social media. Utilization of social media enabled HSOs to keep in touch with target audiences and supporters (Hoang et al., this issue), and deliver information and knowledge to the target audience with minimal risk. Social media also enabled the creation of support groups for coping with COVID-19 and served as a platform for social gatherings, forming new communities, and helping people to find new jobs. It offered free vocational courses in various areas, whether in job-searching skills or professional enrichment and served as part of the marketing channels of services designed for various target audiences. Finally, social media was also used to recruit new volunteers, to compensate for volunteers who have left due to their fear of infection, and to raise funds for protective equipment, medicines, and other items essential for combatting COVID-19 in HSOs.

Conclusions and future directions

The articles in this Special Issue indicate that HSOs cannot afford to be complacent and let themselves be carried away with the comfort and peace afforded by routine. Just like individuals, families, and communities, organizations cannot rest on their laurels and cherish the moment, because it easily bounds to change. They cannot keep doing what has been done (successfully) before or become the prisoners of their conceptions in the face of a dynamic and surprising reality.

HSOs that seek to survive a major crisis must adapt to the changes in their environment. Indeed, over the years, various organizations have developed different strategies to adapt to crises and mitigate harm in their environments. Conversely, they have not invested enough resources in preparedness strategies for extreme events that can cause heavy damage to the organization, its employees, and its clients. Such disruptive extreme events can occur suddenly to the surprise of the organizations, which may remain powerless in the face of their severe consequences (Christianson & Barton, 2021; Sarkar & Clegg, 2021).

COVID-19 was such a disruptive extreme event. It affected millions who lost their lives or were injured physically and mentally. Families broke up, and people lost their jobs. Organizations experienced a financial crisis that affected their resilience – including both business and nonprofit organizations.

The work style of many executives in HSOs resembles what Mintzberg (1973, p. 35) has described as “proficient superficiality” (cited in Schmid et al., 1991): prioritizing solutions for short-term ad-hoc problems while they arise, rather than preventing them ahead of time. Managers tend to focus their efforts on achieving short-term results since the visibility of their success means more than achieving long-term organizational goals. They do not develop long-term thinking and prefer avoiding crises rather than facing them. Catchphrases expressing this placatory approach include “we’ll cross the bridge when we get there,” “trust me on this one,” and “it’s going to be fine.” Together with their excessive confidence, such managers tend to be arrogant, proud, or inconsiderate, and organizations led by such managers are less resilient to respond effectively to disruptive extreme events.

The main lessons from the COVID-19 crisis are that HSOs must be structurally and economically prepared in good times and be ready for bad times. They must direct resources to build up slack that would inoculate them against disruptive extreme events that occur from time to time, and surprise them each time anew. Organizational slack is a buffer against the repercussions of such events. In addition, organizations need not only to build up their resilience but also to manage it. This means they must construct organizational and professional mechanisms for addressing problems derived from emergencies (McManus et al., 2008). These mechanisms must include potential scenarios of the crisis and its repercussions, as well as detailed ways and measures for dealing with the problems. Organizations must have formal “scriptures” – written and constantly updated procedures on how to act in emergencies (Hillmann et al., 2018). Without such a sound basis, organizations react with chaos and confusion when a crisis occurs and lose the ability to act effectively in the face of extreme events. To cope successfully with these events, managers must constantly learn about their external environments, identify risks and anticipate threats, and search for new opportunities for action while designing structures and processes in line with the crisis reality imposed upon them (de Oliveira Teixeira & Werther, 2013). Organizations coping with a crisis must also network, collaborate, or partner with other organizations that can provide mutual support (Pitowsky-Nave, this issue).

What’s in this special issue

In the following pages, we present the work of 32 researchers, bound in eleven manuscripts related to the topic of the Special Issue: HSOs in Times of Crisis during the COVID-19 pandemic. These manuscripts cover several countries representing diverse socio-political and economic systems from North America (USA), Europe (UK, Austria) Asia (Bangladesh, China), and the Middle East (Israel). Their subject matters and accompanying theories are also diverse, representing the wealth of potential and innovative angles for studying HSOs coping with extreme events. Most of the articles are based on empirical studies conducted during various phases of COVID-19.

In the first paper of this Special Issue, Michael Meyer, Reinhard Millner, Martin Mehrwald, and Paul Rameder view the COVID-19 pandemic as a test point for nonprofit-government welfare partnership of service delivery policy in Austria, particularly in Vienna. Using Salamon and Anheier’s social origins theory, and data collected from surveys and interviews with 106 nonprofit HSO executives, the authors assess the survival of this partnership even in times of crisis, but with the overall favoring of large organizations in this partnership, thus forwarding service delivery concentration in the sector from normal times to times of crisis.

Ellen Bennett, Chris Dayson, James Rees, Beth Patmore, and Chris Damm continue the first line of reasoning in this special issue, focusing on state-nonprofit relations in times of crisis. They investigate how smaller nonprofit human service organizations in England and Wales responded to the early part of the COVID-19 pandemic. Smaller nonprofits are typically first responders to urgent needs, hence their supplementary and complementary roles in times of crisis, and hence the authors’ call for greater attention to how these human service nonprofits and their relationship with government and larger nonprofits, can be shaped by fluidity, dynamic agendas, and willingness to change over time.

Another policy response to the difficulties facing HSOs was offered in the USA. The Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) was passed during the pandemic to assist small and medium-sized organizations using Federal funds. However, only a fraction of eligible nonprofits applied for and received loans from the Program. Marcus Lam, Jessica Word, and Nathan Grasse use a large dataset of loan data to investigate quantitatively who received the PPP loans, who did not, and why across different human service subfields and between for-profit and nonprofit organizations.

Noga Pitowsky-Nave argues that a strategic response to COVID-19 can move organizations from a “Crisis” mode to an “Opportunity” mode. Qualitatively analyzing interviews with 17 leaders of Israeli human service nonprofit organizations on the activities and responses to the crisis in these organizations, she finds that in addition to known challenges and difficulties, what drove service provision opportunities and successful adaptation in these HSOs were social innovation tools such as remote service technologies, cross-sector collaborations, and volunteer recruitment.

A fifth paper by Yinglin Ma and Erynn Beaton also focuses on organizational changes to human service programming in response to a crisis. Surveying HSOs in the state of Ohio USA in two waves, the authors examined the factors associated with HSOs’ tendency to engage in strategic change (adding or discontinuing programs, expanding service populations) made in response to environmental shifts (the COVID-19 pandemic). They found that decisions to add programs and services are driven by organizational characteristics, resources (size, financial stability, the receipt of new funding), and mission factors. In contrast, the addition of service populations was a less common response to the crisis.

In another assessment of organizational change, Michal Almog-Bar, Itay Greenspan, Hillel Schmid, and Ayelet Oreg focus on nonprofit mergers as another coping response that nonprofit HSOs could and should examine more frequently to strengthen their financial stability during internal or external crises. Using a survey methodology and interviews with senior managers and board members who have participated in a merger process, the authors present findings from Israel on three stages in the merging process of HSOs: Pre-merger (motives, barriers), the Merger process (decision-making, coping with conflicts, trust-building) and Post-merger (merger outcomes and their association with organizational culture and predetermined goals). Their findings point to a lack of proper preparation for mergers, ego struggles, and the need to socialize employees into the process.

A crisis looks differently from the perspectives of various professionals working in HSOs, as reflected in the next two papers on human capital in human service organizations during and after a crisis. Md. Fakhrul Alam and Sharif Haider call to our attention the importance of first-line managers (FLMs) in HSOs. Drawing on Michael Lipsky’s theory of street-level bureaucracy, they examine how first-line managers working in Bangladesh’s multiple refugee camps for Rohingya refugees helped reduce the spread of infections and promote health and well-being during the COVID crisis. This was achieved through acts of awareness raising, resource mobilization, coordination and conflict management, and more, even when humanitarian assistance delivery was reduced due to lockdowns and restrictions. Utilizing networks and communication channels, FLMs ensured collaboration and cooperation in field-level service operation and management.

Daniel Choi, Anna Ferris, Tiana Marrese, Ram Cnaan, and Femida Handy investigate the challenges and implications of the COVID-19 pandemic in the eyes of volunteer coordinators and fundraisers in American HSOs. They point to obstacles such as keeping volunteers engaged and supported while navigating health risks among volunteer coordinators, and adjusting solicitation methods amid greater demand for accountability and transparency among fundraisers. These challenges required innovation and ad-hoc adjustments that should be carried out virtually or face-to-face as they discuss in their manuscript.

The next two papers concentrate on social media in HSOs during a crisis. First, Yongdong Shen, Biao Huang, and Jianxing Yu explore how digital platforms promote the roles of nonprofit HSOs during the COVID-19 pandemic in China. Based on interviews with government officials, HSO executives, and community residents in one province in China, they offer a framework separating between three types of platforms used by the HSOs and argue that government-sponsored digital platforms enhance the legitimacy of HSOs, business-sponsored digital platforms leverage private resources for HSOs, and nonprofit-sponsored digital platforms boost citizen trust for HSOs by making service operations easier to navigate.

Second, Thanh Thi Hoang explores in her paper, “Staying Connected while Staying Distant: Social Media Engagement of Food Banks in Texas (USA) in the Wake of the COVID-19 Pandemic,” the social media communication and the engagement with online audiences of human service nonprofits during the early phase of the COVID-19 pandemic. By analyzing tweets from 15 food banks in Texas, and relying on Lovejoy and Saxton’s hierarchy of engagement, she distinguishes between community-building content and informational content to show that informational content received greater engagement during the COVID-19 crisis.

Last but not least, Ryan Savino and James Mandiberg explore what happens to different organizational solutions to social problems during times of crisis once a crisis wanes. Specifically, they ask why a novel and promising organizational solution to unhoused people in NYC (USA) – that is the use of vacant hotel rooms – did not persist, while old institutional forms such as the traditional homeless shelter survived. They use the lens of institutional inertia theory to explain the challenges to the adoption of innovation in social services, even in response to external shocks.

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank the Co-Editors and the editorial board of the Journal for inviting us to serve as the guest editors for this Special Issue. The work on this SI was a great privilege for us, and we hope that the selected manuscripts make an important contribution to the theory, research, and practice of the management of HSOs. We owe a special debt of gratitude to Program Manager Amanda Mosby for her commitment and the ongoing effective and efficient management of the production of this Special Issue. Amanda was a beacon of knowledge and experience in effectively coordinating the manuscript processing, including the communications with authors, reviewers, and us as guest editors. Finally, we are thankful to all the contributing authors for enriching this SI with interesting and thought-provoking articles on the implications of COVID-19 for HSOs from an international perspective. We appreciate your patience throughout the long revision journeys, that have contributed to the quality of the final version of each manuscript. We hope readers will find interest in, and derive lessons from, the articles. We also hope that in the future, when new crises occur, their organizations will be better prepared and more resilient to manage the imminent consequences.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

¹ Some countries adopted less restrictive policies and avoided restrictions on social, economic, commercial, and educational activities. In retrospect, after several months in which the pandemic failed to subside, these countries – including Italy, Spain, Sweden, and the US – paid with high rates of morbidity and mortality.

² The pandemic may also be considered a catastrophe, a rare event (Bechky & Okhuysen, 2011; Starbuck, 2009), or an external shock (Savino & Mandiberg, this issue).