European radical left foreign policy after the invasion of Ukraine: shifts in assertiveness towards Russia

ABSTRACT

The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has prompted a closer examination of parties’ attitudes towards the Putin regime. While research has examined the connections of the EU's far-right with Russia, less attention has been given to the stances of Radical Left Parties (RLPs). We close this gap by analysing Roll Call Votes (RCVs) in the European Parliament. Our findings indicate that RLPs displayed the lowest levels of assertiveness towards Russia before 2022, being even less assertive than other Eurosceptic groups. RLPs significantly increased their assertiveness after the invasion, bringing them closer to the EP mainstream. However, some divergence in assertiveness towards Russia existed within the RLPs before 2022 and remains relevant after the invasion, with the Traditional/Communist parties standing closer to Russia than radical New Left/Democratic Socialist parties.

KEYWORDS:

• Russia
• European Union
• Radical Left Parties
• 2022 invasion of Ukraine
• foreign policy

Introduction

The 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine has had far-reaching and significant repercussions on European politics, rekindling concerns about Russia’s role as a security threat to the eastern part of the European Union (EU). In 2024, German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius warned about the possibility of Vladimir Putin attacking a NATO member in this region within the next five to eight years (Camut 2024). These developments prompt a thorough reevaluation of the European security framework, placing European political parties previously holding amicable positions toward Russia under closer scrutiny. In the wake of the invasion, the equivocal statements from leaders of Radical Left Parties (RLPs) regarding issues such as war responsibility, the imposition of sanctions against Russia, and the supply of weapons to Ukraine have generated doubts about their reliability and their willingness to support a unified response from the EU.

The public stances of representatives from the radical left have demonstrated a broad spectrum of policy positions within European RLPs. Certain Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), such as Clare Daly from Ireland, a member of the Left (GUE/NGL) European Parliament (EP) party group, were even labelled as promoters of Russian propaganda by Ukraine’s security service (Irish Times 2022).¹ Conversely, the Finnish radical left party Vasemmistoliitto (Left Alliance), while part of a Social Democrat-led coalition government, shifted its position to favour Finland's NATO membership in response to the invasion. This decision underscored the significance of geopolitics and security concerns in the context of recent Russian aggression.

While there has been some research on the stances of radical right parties towards the Putin regime both before and after the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine (Holesch and Zagórski 2023; Krekó et al. 2015; Polyakova 2014; Umland 2017), and some studies have examined both far-right and radical left perspectives simultaneously (Braghiroli 2015; Golosov 2020), or focused on the cohesion and divisions of the EP (Chueri and Törnberg 2024), there remains a noticeable gap in in-depth and systematic analysis of the RLPs’ views on Russia and the impact of the Ukraine invasion on their positions.

Illuminating the radical left wing of EU politics is crucial for a comprehensive understanding of the EU, party politics, and foreign policy stances. The growing prominence of RLPs in EU structures, as evidenced by their recent participation in coalition governments in countries such as Spain, Greece, Finland, and Slovenia (Gomez and Ramiro 2022), makes our study particularly pertinent, especially given the sometimes vague or ambivalent stances of RLPs towards Putin’s Russia. The RLPs have solidified their presence in the EP, securing 39 seats in the 2019 elections. They form an EP group with Eurosceptic views (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008), which has also displayed a certain affinity for Russia, either by legitimizing Kremlin policies or disseminating Putin’s narrative (Chryssogelos 2021; Golosov 2020).

The RLPs have advocated for an alternative foreign policy approach, often critiquing the Western world and portraying Russia as a benign power (Rohac, Gyori, and Zgut 2017), challenging European military interventions (Rathbun 2004; Wagner, Herranz-Surralles, and Kaarbo 2017), and aiming to reduce US and NATO influence in the EU (March 2012), thus aligning with Russia’s foreign policy objectives (Chryssogelos 2010). However, as Keith and March (2023, 756) argue, despite this increased relevance, there are not sufficient systematic analyses on RLPs’ ‘foreign policies including opposition to NATO, criticism of US foreign policy and support for the Russian government’, a policy domain precisely in which RLPs distinguish themselves from other party groupings.

By analyzing these parties’ foreign policy positions, our work adds to the emerging literature that bridges comparative party politics with foreign policy analysis (Hofmann and Martill 2021). We follow Schuster and Maier’s guide of ‘bring parties in’ (2006, 237) by exploring the importance of parties’ deep ideological identities in shaping parties’ foreign policy stances (see Hildebrandt et al. 2013; Hofmann 2013; 2017; Martill 2019; Williams 2014). Despite growing interest in this area, as noted by Raunio and Wagner (2020), there remains a scarcity of research on parties’ foreign policy positions beyond their EU orientations. In line with Hofmann and Martill’s (2021) call for more research on non-mainstream parties’ foreign policy positions, our study seeks to fill this critical void, offering a nuanced understanding of how ideological underpinnings shape the foreign policy approaches of RLPs.

This article addresses these gaps by studying RLPs’ positions towards Russia before and after the external shock caused by the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, analyzing Roll Call Votes (RCVs) of MEPs, spanning from July 2019 to June 2022. By analyzing RCV votes, we follow a well-established research tradition (Chiru and Stoian 2019; Hix and Lord 1997) that enables us to move beyond the often-ambiguous statements made by politicians and instead evaluate their actions in the form of votes. Given our research interest, we first focus on assessing the positions of The Left party group in the EP and comparing them with other EP party groups (EPGs). Additionally, we closely examine the positions of individual RLPs toward Russia and explore whether these positions changed following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Recognizing that RLPs vary in their ideological traditionalism and their attachment to communism, anti-imperialism, and pacifism, we also investigate whether the invasion resulted in greater divergence in the RLPs’ positions towards Russia after the invasion, primarily between two types of RLPs: Traditional/Communist and radical New Left/Democratic Socialist parties.

Our findings reveal that, before the invasion, RLPs held positions towards Russia that were more accommodating than those of other Eurosceptic groups like the far-right or the non-inscrits. This already points towards how parties’ ideological background strongly affects their foreign policy positions (Hofmann and Martill 2021). Following the invasion of February 2022, the Left EP Group experienced the most significant shift among all EPGs, nearly tripling their level of assertiveness. This increase in assertiveness also led to a slight rise in heterogeneity among the positions held by various RLPs regarding Russia.

This heterogeneity is not patternless. Our analysis indicates that while an external shock, such as a full-scale war, contributes to changes in foreign policy positions, ideological identities affect this impact. The diversity of RLPs’ foreign policy positions following the 2022 Russian invasion is related systematically to the parties’ different ideological identities. In contrast to the New Left/Democratic Socialist RLPs which showcased a higher degree of assertiveness both before and, particularly, after the invasion, nearly all Traditional/Communist RLPs fell into the ‘less assertive’ category even after February 2022. The influence of ideology is a complex one.

We have structured our contribution into six sections. Following this introduction, we delve into the analytical framework, highlighting the rising importance of RLPs in the EP, explaining elements in the RLPs’ trajectory that might shape their positions towards Russia and adding recent impressionistic evidence of how these parties reacted to the Russian invasions of Ukraine in 2014 and 2022. Based on this, we develop four hypotheses. We then proceed to describe the data and methodology employed in our study. Moving forward, we present the key empirical findings about roll-call voting patterns, focusing on assertiveness towards Russia before and after the invasion. In the conclusion, we summarize the major implications of our findings for EU and global politics towards Russia, all the while proposing potential avenues for future research.

Analytical framework

The radical-left in the EU

Who are the RLPs and what should we expect regarding their foreign-policy positions? RLPs have experienced a notable resurgence in the twenty-first century after a period of general weakening during the 1990s (Damiani 2020; Gomez and Ramiro 2022). The 2008 Great Recession significantly contributed to this revival, empowering RLPs and increasing their influence within EU structures, including the Council. Notable instances include the Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza) in Greece holding a senior position in Greece's government between 2015 and 2019, Podemos (We Can) serving as junior partners in Spain's government from 2020 to 2023, and the Finnish Left Alliance (Vas) acting as a junior partner in Sanna Marin's coalition governments from 2019 to 2023. Additionally, the Bloco de Esquerda (the Left Bloc) in Portugal, alongside another significant Portuguese RLP, the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), provided parliamentary support for the Social Democrat government through a confidence and supply agreement from 2015 to 2019.

While some RLPs may not directly participate in government, they remain significant players in their respective countries and have secured representation in the EP through a relatively successful combination of policy stances in the two-dimensional European political space (Gomez and Ramiro 2022; Krause 2020). RLPs have been part of the EP since its inaugural elections in 1979. However, the radical left as a cohesive EP group gained visibility in 1995 with the formation of the United Left/Nordic Green Left group, which changed its name in 2021 to The Left in the European Parliament – GUE/NGL.

RLPs are generally categorized as Eurosceptic parties, with most falling into the soft Eurosceptic category, and only the most traditional Communist parties showing positions closer to the hard Euroscepticism end (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008). While some argue that nationalism is the shared foundation of right-wing and left-wing Euroscepticism (Halikiopoulou, Nanou, and Vasilopoulou 2012), these parties also share, to some degree, certain foreign-policy positions. In the past, the radical-left GUE – NGL group and the Eurosceptic Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) group have exhibited favourable voting positions towards Moscow (Braghiroli 2015). Furthermore, both groups share concerns regarding NATO and its allied partners (Börzel and Hartlapp 2022).² However, most of the time, they exhibit differences. The mostly soft Eurosceptic stance of GUE/NGL is not only characterized by a critical evaluation of neoliberalism both as an ideology and as a policy paradigm (Brack 2018), RLPs also embrace progressive politics, including gender issues (Kantola and Rolandsen Agustín 2019) or energy and climate policy (Buzogány and Ćetković 2021).

Considering its cooperation patterns, GUE/NGL places less emphasis on maintaining a unified group stance as it lacks formal rules. Significant internal differences exist among its delegations due to the group's confederal nature, where members prioritize their interests over the group's collective stance, allowing for more freedom during votes (Elomäki, Gaweda, and Berthet 2022). In this vein, geopolitical and ideological disparities were identified as a key factor contributing to divergent positions within the group, with notable differences on various issues, e.g. between Nordic left parties and the Portuguese Communists (Elomäki, Gaweda, and Berthet 2022).

In general, members of the Left Group in the EP and contemporary RLPs are diverse even if they belong to the same party family.³ RLPs can be classified into categories such as Conservative Communist, Reform Communist, Democratic Socialist, and Revolutionary Extreme Left⁴ (Keith, March, and Escalona 2023). The Greek (KKE) and Portuguese Communist (PCP) parties are Conservative Communist parties, while the Cypriot AKEL and the Spanish Communists (PCE) are seen as Reform Communist parties. Democratic Socialists include Germany's Die Linke, Portugal's Bloco (BE), Greece's Syriza, and major Scandinavian RLPs. A simpler and partially overlapping distinction is that between Traditional/Communist and New Left RLPs (Gomez, Morales, and Ramiro 2016), which will be central to this analysis. According to this distinction, the Traditional/Communist group consists of Conservative Communist and Reform Communist parties, while the New Left RLP group includes all the Democratic Socialist parties.

The foreign policy positions of radical left parties

The literature analyzing the foreign policy positions of parties and groups of parties is still under development beyond the US context and the study of specific policy issues, such as the EU (as suggested by Alden and Aran 2017, 80–82; Raunio and Wagner 2020, 515–516). The study of the role of parties in foreign policy has been somewhat limited, with reasons for this oversight being varied and significant. These range from the academic division into separate subfields, which leaves some areas unexplored, to the focus on different types of political actors by communities in international relations and foreign policy analysis. Additionally, comparative and party politics scholars have often directed their attention to other policy areas (Raunio and Wagner 2020). Although numerous works and entire schools of thought in international relations and foreign policy analysis have concentrated on describing and explaining the behaviour and stances of states, a comparable development in analyzing parties’ positions has not occurred (Alden and Aran 2017).

While a wealth of analyses has focused on the influence of factors like power relations, national interests, geopolitics, public opinion, governments’ political orientations, and other domestic elements in shaping the foreign policies of states and governments (Schuster and Maier 2006), the study of parties’ policy positions very often prioritizes the role of ideology. Research has consistently found that a party's ideology and party family are the strongest predictors of its policy stances (Hix 1999; Hooghe and Marks 2018; Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002; Marks et al. 2006; Marks and Wilson 2000). Hofmann (2013:, 204–209) and Martill (2019:, 157) contend that not only parties do matter in security and defence policies, but that parties’ ideologies are a key variable in shaping parties’ policy positions (see also Wagner 2020). This is further supported by Otjes, van der Veer, and Wagner (2023, 1811), who find that votes on foreign policy in the EP align with ideological stances. The influence of ideology becomes even more significant when examining radical, non-mainstream, strongly ideologically and policy-driven parties, primarily in opposition, such as the RLPs.

The RLPs’ ideological background or identity has decisively framed their international policy positions to the point of generating one of the elements that precisely distinguish the contemporary radical-left party family from other party groupings (Calossi 2016; Chiocchetti 2017; March 2012; March and Mudde 2005). This distinction is linked to the origins and trajectory of the contemporary radical-left party family and the policy positions on international affairs associated with them. The Communist parties emerged from a split in the Socialist movement following the Russian Revolution in 1917. Subsequently, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) sponsored other Communist parties, including those in Western Europe. The Soviet Union's pivotal success was its triumph over Nazi Germany in World War II, a victory celebrated as an ‘anti-fascist victory’ since 1946. The Soviet Union maintained a strong emphasis on anti-fascism in its state ideology, making it appealing mainly to communist parties and movements with a strong anti-fascist component.

Until the 1950s, Western Communists demonstrated a high degree of ideological, organizational, and symbolic alignment with the plans of the Soviet leadership. This alignment was characterized by a pronounced anti-US imperialism stance and a rejection of the emerging NATO structures. Since 1956, some Western Communist parties began to distance themselves from Moscow, including in certain foreign policy aspects, revealing varying degrees of approval or acceptance of the European Economic Community or NATO (Lange 1981).

Particularly in the 1980s, and more distinctly after the breakdown of the Soviet Bloc from 1989 to 1991, most Communist parties evolved by distancing themselves from the Soviet Union and Soviet-style socialism. Anti-U.S. imperialism evolved into staunch opposition to the U.S., and discussions about military alliances gave rise to anti-Euroatlanticism, with an emphasis on multilateral structures. Most Western Communists embraced democracy, advocating for political reforms and the adoption of inclusive participatory democracy. Conversely, factions that remained sceptical of liberal democracy, eschewing compromises with mainstream political forces and maintaining a strict anti-capitalist stance, became largely marginal (March 2008).

The historical connection to Russian politics persisted for some parties even after the Cold War. The reasons why RLPs have been drawn to Russian foreign policies often involve ideologically opposite and irreconcilable connotations. There is a nostalgic connection to the Soviet Union and a perception of Russia as its natural successor, coupled with adherence to key radical-left foreign policy principles, such as anti-imperialism and multilateralism. Moreover, other ideological principles like anti-fascism continued to be important, even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Russia’s transformation into a conservative state. Some RLPs are drawn to the anti-fascist rhetoric used by Russian leaders (Umland 2005), despite these leaders’ conservative and nationalist agendas fundamentally conflicting with far-left ideologies.

In its diversity, the contemporary RLPs family results from political commonalities shared by some remaining Traditional Communists (such as, for example, the Portuguese PCP), some former Communist parties (such as the Finnish Vas), and new RLPs (such as the Spanish Podemos or La France insoumise). All of them are characterized by a distinct internationalist foreign policy approach that defines and distinguishes them. Central to this approach are three crucial components: their interpretations of pacifism, anti-militarism, and multilateralism. Like the Communist parties in the past, contemporary RLPs exhibit opposition to the Euro-Atlantic security establishments, notably NATO, and tend to oppose any initiatives perceived as contributing to militarization, such as defence expenditure, or bolstering imperialistic agendas (Escalona, Keith, and March 2023). This stance is intrinsically tied to their deeply rooted opposition to the US foreign policies and initiatives that tend towards a perceived Western hegemony. RLPs thus frequently levy criticism against the EU’s foreign, defence, and security strategies, vehemently rejecting the notion of a ‘militarized Europe’.⁵ Their perspective stems from the belief that current EU policies in these domains perpetuate an EU subservient to American interests and hegemony, effectively positioning it as a subordinate entity to NATO.

Thus, opposition to U.S. foreign policy, along with the associated versions of anti-imperialism, anti-Euroatlantic hegemony, and multilateralism, constitutes key elements of the radical-left foreign policy positions. These, along with anti-fascism, form an integral part of the party family identity. Beyond this, RLPs, however, exhibit some level of diversity, particularly in their stances on their countries’ participation in or withdrawal from NATO. While more traditional Communist parties suggest the outright dissolution of NATO, others advocate for the organisation's transformation and its goals (as seen with Die Linke) or propose a gradual withdrawal from the alliance (as seen with the French RLPs). Still, others, like the Dutch SP, adopt a strategy that treats the existence of NATO as almost a non-issue (Keith 2016). Additionally, parties such as Finnish Vas changed their stand on Finland's membership in NATO exactly due to the Russian 2022 invasion.

RLPs reactions to the Russian invasions of Ukraine in 2014 and 2022

When in early 2014, the Putin regime invaded the Crimean Peninsula and started operating with separatists in parts of Eastern Ukraine, most RLPs closely aligned themselves with the Russian narrative, which put the responsibility on NATO expansion, perceived US imperialism, and the EU´s hunger for additional markets (Arel and Driscoll 2023). Parties like Germany's Die Linke, the Communist parties of Spain, France, Greece, Portugal, and Spain's Podemos adopted tempered and nuanced interpretations of the annexation of Crimea and the Russian invasion in 2014. They emphasized Kyiv’s responsibility, sometimes criticizing sanctions against Russia, and frequently employed ‘whataboutism’ to critique the Western reaction to Russia’s aggression rather than outright condemning the Russian invasion (Bouma 2016; Escalona, Keith, and March 2023).⁶

The EU-Ukraine approachment also faced challenges, as Syriza, AKEL, Die Linke, and Podemos opposed fully implementing the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with Ukraine (Wesslau 2016). While exhibiting differences in tone and not explicitly endorsing Russian actions, except for the notably pro-Moscow Czech KSCM (Handl and Goffin 2016), many RLPs refrained from issuing a clear condemnation of the Russian intervention. In this context, the official statement of the Party of the European Left arrived somewhat late, in July 2014, articulating an equidistant position that condemned Putin’s aggression while attributing part of the responsibility to the West.⁷ Notably, there were divergences within this stance; for example, the Finnish Vas displayed the least attenuating view of Russian behaviour in Ukraine.

Shortly before the 2022 invasion, radical left groups once again promoted a distinct narrative from mainstream EU parties. Recalling the narrative expressed during the 2014 crisis and war, they accused the West of meddling in Russia's internal affairs and revived the fascist/anti-fascist dichotomy through increasingly anti-Ukrainian government rhetoric, portraying Ukraine as a Western proxy. Simultaneously, RLPs downplayed the imminent threat of invasion and even mocked their governments for what they perceived as fearmongering (Braghiroli 2023).

The first reaction of GUE/NGL to the 2022 full-scale invasion in the EP was stronger than in 2014, even if the reactions maintained some elements of ambiguity.⁸ On the one hand, the radical left was more supportive of Ukraine and less influenced by the Kremlin's narrative than in 2014, by not fully embracing Moscow's ‘anti-fascist’ narrative. In their initial collective response to Russia's aggression, the group unequivocally censured Putin's government for transgressing international law. At the same time, however, following their pacifistic stance, they rejected the notion of providing military aid to Ukraine and called upon both the EU and NATO to exercise restraint in their declarations and activities to avoid undermining prospects for meaningful dialogue (The Left 2023).

Even a cursory observation of the responses of leading RLPs politicians reveals notable shifts in their positions regarding Russia, although some maintained ambivalent positions and notable diversity. The distinct reactions of the Finnish Vas stand out. Vas, despite internal divisions, shifted its prior position, endorsed Finland's membership in NATO, and took an assertive stand against Russia. In France, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the leader of La France insoumise (LFI), who had asserted since 2014 that NATO provoked Russia by deploying defensive systems and missiles in Poland, made a dramatic turnaround. He vehemently denounced the invasion as a stark display of ‘pure violence’ and urged France to convene a meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (Ciulla and Drouet 2022). In Germany, Sahra Wagenknecht of Die Linke initially dismissed the idea of an imminent Russian invasion but later condemned Russia's aggressive actions. She remained neutral on the topic of sanctions against Russia initially but later intensified her rhetoric, accusing the German government of inflicting a ‘social and economic catastrophe’ through sanctions (taz 2022). Alexis Tsipras, former Greek Prime Minister and head of Syriza, denounced Russia's war on Ukraine as unjustifiable. While not considering Russia an ally of Greece, Tsipras acknowledged its historical ties with Greece and regional influence. He called for proactive European initiatives and diplomatic solutions as the conflict progressed (Sideris 2022). In Spain, Unidas Podemos, comprising Podemos and the United Left, expressed views that differed from the position of the Social Democrat-led government of which they were part, rejected sending weapons to Ukraine, criticized economic sanctions, and attributed conflict responsibility to Western powers (Heller 2022).

Hypotheses

The previous examination underscores the potentially significant impact of party ideology on foreign policy positions. Based on the weight of ideological identity on defense and security policies, RLPs’ classic foreign policy positions and recent anecdotal evidence of reactions to the first Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and the full-scale attack in 2022, we anticipate that a systematic examination of RLPs’ positions towards Russia and the impact of the 2022 invasion will confirm the following four hypotheses. While especially Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 might sound quite intuitive, it must be noted that no systematic evidence on votes (as opposed to words/rhetoric) has been presented in the literature for the period post-2019. Consequently, we deem pertinent to put them to an empirical test.

Therefore, considering the multilateralism and anti-Euroatlantic orientation of RLPs’ foreign policy positions, we expect that:

H1 - In European Parliament votes regarding assertiveness towards Russia, RLPs are likely to be among the less assertive groups before the Russian full-scale invasion.

The anecdotal evidence of changes in the foreign policy of RLPs, such as the case with Finland's Vas, or at least the shifts in tone among some RLP leaders, leads us to anticipate that the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine represents an external shock of such magnitude that it could significantly alter the RLPs’ assertiveness towards Russia (Calca and Gross 2019; Gordell and Volgy 2022; Hermann 1990; Müller and Strøm 1999; Thompson and Volgy 2023). We posit that this external shock might impact the RLPs’ positions because it intersects with an area – foreign policy – that is central to the ideological identity of these parties. This is precisely an aspect in which RLPs distinguish themselves from other party groupings. Furthermore, as Raunio and Wagner (2020:, 517) rightly observe, the growing salience of the sociocultural dimension of political conflict in European societies is increasingly blurring the lines between foreign security and domestic policies. This shift elevates the importance of foreign policy, suggesting that these international policies are becoming a more sensitive area for parties (also see Zürn 2014, 65). Consequently, this is an area where RLPs are particularly likely to respond to a shock. Therefore, the 2022 Russian invasion, as a significant shock, has likely influenced core RLP stances, potentially leading to a re-evaluation of their positions. Accordingly, we expect that:

H2 – In the aftermath of the 2022 full-scale invasion, RLPs will demonstrate a more assertive voting pattern towards Russia in the European Parliament than they did prior to the invasion.

After the full-scale invasion, RLPs condemned the Russian aggression, yet significant differences have surfaced in their stances on issues such as sanctions, war responsibility, and military aid to Ukraine. The external shock might modify previous policy consensus but have varying impacts, given the different situations in which parties find themselves when an external shock occurs, their distinct national contexts, and the parties’ inherent diversity (Calca and Gross 2019; for the case of far-right parties and Russian 2022 invasion of Ukraine see Wondreys 2023). Therefore, in a more systematic analysis of these parties’ voting in the EP, we anticipate that:

H3 – Following the full-scale invasion, the assertiveness of RLPs towards Russia has become more varied than it was prior to the invasion.

However, the increased heterogeneity among RLPs’ positions towards Russia should not be expected to be random. In this regard, it is needed to consider the ideological complexity of parties when analyzing their foreign policy positions (Hofmann and Martill 2021).⁹ Party ideologies are not unidimensional, and previous analyses of parties’ security policies have demonstrated that the diversity of their policy stances cannot be captured by a single dimension (Hofmann 2013, 206). Although RLPs may share basic ideological and foreign policy orientations, they also exhibit differences in their Euroscepticism and positions towards NATO. Similar to the case of Euroscepticism, where traditional Communist parties tend to adopt a hard Eurosceptic stance, we expect the RLPs’ degree of ideological traditionalism to have an impact on their positions towards Russia, and to shape the effect of the external shock caused by the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Therefore, we anticipate Traditional/Communist parties, on the one hand, and New Left/Democratic Socialist parties, on the other hand, will differ in this regard. Consequently, we expect to find that:

H4 – The impact of the invasion on RLPs’ assertiveness towards Russia is associated with their ideological traditionalism. Traditional/Communist RLPs are expected to demonstrate less assertiveness compared to New Left/Democratic Socialist RLPs following the invasion.

Data and method

In the EU, political parties, including RLPs, exhibit distinct foreign policy preferences (Angelucci and Isernia 2020; Hofmann 2013; Raunio and Wagner 2020; Serrano 2013). Although RLPs gain increasing relevance within EU structures, their representation at the levels of the Council and the Commission levels is still in its nascent stages and fluctuating. Consequently, it is more compelling to analyze the partisan tendencies within the European Parliament (EP), where RLPs have a more visible and permanent presence. Extensive analysis has been conducted on voting within the EP. Scholarly research has primarily focused on analyzing roll-call voting data to identify various dimensions of voting behaviour, such as a left-right dimension (Hix and Lord 1997; Marks and Steenbergen 2002) and an EU integration dimension (Roger, Otjes, and van der Veer 2017), which gradually shape the voting patterns of MEPs. The extent to which MEPs align with the preferences of their EP Party Groups or their national parties (Chiru and Stoian 2019) is a topic of debate, although studies on EP party groups generally find a relatively high level of unity among them (Hix and Høyland 2013).

Utilizing data sourced from Vote Watch EU (2022), we have constructed an ‘assertiveness towards Russia’ index, building upon the methodology outlined by Hix et al. (2022). This index is based on a comprehensive collection of Roll Call Votes (RCVs) from July 2019 to June 2022. Our dataset includes over 13,000 votes, encompassing final resolutions and individual votes on paragraphs and amendments, incorporating split votes where pertinent. Our selection process specifically focused on votes relevant to assertiveness towards Russia (see Table A3 in the Online Appendix for the full list of votes considered).

In our analytical framework, a pivotal demarcation is made between votes cast before and after the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. We define Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as an external shock that affects all actors’ behaviour with measurable effects (Calca and Gross 2019; Thompson and Volgy 2023). We have meticulously curated our selection of votes to include only those that exhibit unequivocal policy orientations either in favour of or against an assertive approach towards Russia. Consequently, our final compilation consists of 304 distinct votes, of which 270 signify an assertive stance in favour, while 34 reflect a contrary position.

Before the invasion, among the assertive votes in favour, the primary focus areas pertained to the human rights landscape within Russia, particularly centred around the case of Aleksei Navalny. Additionally, the situation in Belarus after elections and the migration crisis at the Poland/Belarus border, the EU's Association Agreement with Ukraine, the trajectory of political relations between the EU and Russia, concerns regarding foreign interference in democratic processes within the EU, and responses to Russia's aggressive actions against Ukraine constitute notable themes. The votes against are primarily amendments proposed precisely by The Left EP group, particularly by the Irish MEPs Clare Daly and Mick Wallace, in which sanctions against Russia and the EU’s interference in third countries (Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine) are criticized based on the principle of non-interference. After the invasion, on top of the resolution and amendments condemning the Russian aggression against Ukraine, votes on sanctions, Russian interference in democratic processes in the EU, and other security and economic issues affected by the war are included.

To create this index, votes in favour (or against, where relevant) were coded as 1 (assertiveness towards Russia), and votes against, abstentions, and not voting were coded as 0 (full support for Russia), leaving aside those MEPs who were absent. We argue that not voting or abstaining might be considered at least as non-assertiveness towards Russia. However, we also perform a robustness check by recording the votes differently, considering only votes in favour vs. against (or vice versa), leaving aside all other categories (abstention, absent, did not vote, see Tables A1–A2 in the Online Appendix).¹⁰

Findings

The assertiveness scores for different EP groups and the Non-inscrits (NI) both before and after the invasion, as well as the overall scores, are displayed in Table 1. Here, on a scale of 0–1, 0 represents full support for Russia, while 1 signifies full assertiveness towards Moscow. Before the invasion, The Left group, which includes most of the RLPs, had the lowest score of 0.184, indicating the lowest level of assertiveness towards Russia and confirming Hypothesis 1. While it was expected that the Left group was notably distant from other mainstream groups, such as the European People’s Party (EPP) or the Socialists and Democrats group (S&D), scoring 0.906 and 0.733 before the invasion, it was also a good step behind the assertiveness levels of other Eurosceptic actors, which were considered to be amiable towards Russian policies. For instance, the far-right Identity and Democracy (I&D) group, consisting of parties such as the Italian League/Lega (25 MEPs), the French National Rally (19 MEPs), and Alternative for Germany (9 MEPs), demonstrated a higher assertiveness score of 0.364. Additionally, the NI-Group, comprising various political parties ranging from the far-right (e.g. Hungarian Fidesz with 12 MEPs, French Reconquest with 3 MEPs, and Dutch Forum for Democracy with 1 MEP) to the radical left (e.g. KKE, the Communist Party of Greece with 2 MEPs), exhibited a significantly higher level of assertiveness, with a score of 0.342, compared to the Left group.

Table 1. Assertiveness towards Russia before and after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Political groups of the EP (EP Roll Call Votes, July 2019 – June 2022).

EPG	All		Before Invasion		After Invasion		Diff. After-Before
	Mean	Std.	Mean	Std.	Mean	Std.	Mean	Std.
EPP	0.880	0.104	0.906	0.120	0.829	0.132	−0.077***	0.012
REG	0.816	0.043	0.854	0.048	0.747	0.064	−0.107***	0.016
ECR	0.803	0.160	0.850	0.202	0.714	0.145	−0.137***	−0.058
Greens/EFA	0.779	0.075	0.788	0.073	0.763	0.097	−0.025**	0.024
S&D	0.754	0.139	0.733	0.177	0.786	0.119	0.053***	−0.058
NI	0.401	0.256	0.342	0.262	0.514	0.300	0.172***	0.038
I&D	0.398	0.314	0.364	0.350	0.465	0.269	0.101***	−0.080
The Left	0.294	0.136	0.184	0.146	0.502	0.155	0.318***	0.009
Total	0.722	0.241	0.722	0.284	0.721	0.198	−0.002	−0.086

Source: Own elaboration based on Vote Watch EU (2022). Notes: Means and Std. Dev. of the Index of assertiveness (0 = full compliance; 1 = full assertiveness towards Russia); Votes in favour (or against, where relevant) are coded as 1 = assertiveness, and votes against (or in favour, where relevant) together with abstentions and not voting are coded as 0. All active MEPs of particular EPGs and the Non-inscrits (NI) considered. Paired t-test significance: *0.05, **0.01, ***0.001.

The Russian full-scale invasion in 2022 significantly changed the voting behaviour of the Left group towards more assertive positions, validating Hypothesis 2. The Left group witnessed a rise of 0.318 points, reaching 0.502 points after the invasion. With that, it moved closer to the average level of assertiveness towards Russia, which stood at 0.721, although the mean of assertiveness remained practically unchanged. The Left group still distinguished itself from other left-wing and progressive groups, such as the Socialist & Democrats with 0.786 or the Greens/European Free Alliance (Green/EFA) with 0.763 in this foreign policy issue. However, within Eurosceptic groups, the Left group (0.502) surpassed the I&D (0.465) in terms of assertiveness towards Russia and approached the level of the NI Group (0.514).

Table 2 presents the results for 20 RLPs from 12 countries, comprising 40 MEPs, allowing for a more nuanced analysis. The parties shown in Table 2 are slightly different from The Left group shown in Table 1, which, however, changes the assertiveness means only slightly.¹¹ When examining the range of assertiveness among the parties before the invasion the means varied from 0.012 (the Greek Communist of KKE) to 0.642 (the Danish Enhedslisten, Enh). After the invasion, the gap widened to a small degree. Enh remained the most assertive with a score of 0.752, while the Portuguese PCP outperformed KKE as the least assertive (0.105 and 0.138, respectively), indicating a substantial variance within the Portuguese radical left (with Bloco de Esquerda scoring 0.605). The dispersion of the votes among the RLPs has increased from 0.130 to 0.167. Thus, although the differences are not that substantial, we find partial evidence to support Hypothesis 3, which suggests that the positions of RLPs in terms of assertiveness towards Russia diverged more after the invasion.¹²

Table 2. Assertiveness towards Russia before and after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine among The Left parties and the Communist Party of Greece, EP Roll Call Votes, July 2019 – June 2022.

Party	Country	MEPs	Overall		Before Invasion		After Invasion		Difference Before-After
			Mean	Std.	Mean	Std.	Mean	Std.	Mean	Std.
Enhedslisten, Enh	DK	1	0.680	0.000	0.642	0.000	0.752	0.000	0.111	0.000
Independent	IE	1	0.337	0.000	0.129	0.000	0.733	0.000	0.604	0.000
Vasemmistoliitto, Vas	FI	1	0.552	0.000	0.468	0.000	0.714	0.000	0.247	0.000
Sinn Féin, SF	IE	1	0.350	0.000	0.190	0.000	0.648	0.000	0.458	0.000
Bloco de Esquerda, BE	PT	2	0.324	0.000	0.177	0.004	0.605	0.007	0.428*	0.003
Vänsterpartiet, V	SE	1	0.503	0.000	0.453	0.000	0.600	0.000	0.147	0.000
Syriza, Syr	GR	6	0.290	0.025	0.140	0.004	0.578	0.073	0.438***	0.069
Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy, KSCM	CZ	1	0.229	0.000	0.050	0.000	0.571	0.000	0.522	0.000
La France Insoumise, LFI	FR	5	0.366	0.021	0.273	0.009	0.545	0.066	0.272***	0.057
Gauche républicaine et socialiste, GRS	FR	1	0.366	0.000	0.274	0.000	0.543	0.000	0.269	0.000
Die Linke, DL	DE	5	0.255	0.041	0.135	0.053	0.484	0.045	0.348***	−0.007
Podemos; Pods	ES	2	0.258	0.000	0.144	0.000	0.476	0.000	0.332	0.000
EH Bildu, EH-B	ES	1	0.209	0.000	0.075	0.000	0.467	0.000	0.392	0.000
Anticapitalistas, Anticapi	ES	1	0.252	0.000	0.144	0.000	0.457	0.000	0.313	0.000
Parti du Travail de Belgique, PTB	BE	1	0.216	0.000	0.100	0.000	0.438	0.000	0.339	0.000
Independents for change	IE	2	0.167	0.018	0.065	0.000	0.362	0.054	0.297	0.054
Izquierda Unida (PCE, IU)	ES	2	0.168	0.016	0.092	0.004	0.314	0.040	0.222	0.037
Anorthotikó Kómma Ergazómenou Laoú, AKEL	CY	2	0.141	0.018	0.065	0.007	0.286	0.040	0.221	0.033
Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas, KKE	GR	2	0.056	0.000	0.012	0.004	0.138	0.007	0.126*	0.003
Partido Comunista Português, PCP	PT	2	0.060	0.006	0.025	0.007	0.105	0.000	0.080*	−0.007
Traditional/Communist RLPs		9	0.131	0.008	0.049	0.004	0.283	0.017	0.234**	0.013
New Left/Democratic Socialist RLPs		31	0.342	0.007	0.227	0.005	0.560	0.016	0.333***	0.012
Total		40	0.272	0.130	0.164	0.130	0.478	0.167	0.314***	0.037

Source: Own elaboration based on Vote Watch EU (2022). Notes: Means and Std. Dev. of the Index of assertiveness (0 = full compliance; 1 = full assertiveness towards Russia); Votes in favour (or against, where relevant) are coded as 1 = assertiveness, and votes against (or in favour, where relevant) together with abstentions and not voting are coded as 0. Paired t-test significance (only for parties with more than 1 MEP and some variation between the votes of their MEPs (e.g. Podemos has none): *0.05, **0.01, ***0.001. The Traditional/Communist RLPs are in italics.

Using a different measure, with a threshold of 0.5 where parties above 0.5 are considered ‘more assertive’, and those below 0.5 are considered ‘less assertive’, we can observe how these changes unfolded and how divided the RLPs became on this issue. Before the invasion, low levels of assertiveness towards Russia were a distinguishing foreign policy stance for the radical left, with 19 parties classified as ‘less assertive’ and only one party, the Danish Enhedslisten, labelled as ‘more assertive.’ This picture transformed after the invasion, with 10 parties crossing the assertiveness threshold. Following the Russian attack of 2022, the stance on Russia became more ambivalent and diverse within the radical left (Figure 1). The ‘more assertive’ group now includes not only the Danish Enhedslisten but also one Irish independent MEP, the Finnish Vas, Irish Sinn Fein, the Portuguese Bloco de Esquerda, the Swedish Vänsterpartiet, the Greek Syriza, the Czech KSCM, the French LFI, and GRS. Meanwhile, 10 parties remained below the assertiveness threshold, including the German Die Linke, Spanish Podemos, EH Bildu, and Anticapitalistas, the Belgian PTB, the Irish Independents for change, and most of the Traditional/Communist parties such as the Spanish PCE/IU, AKEL from Cyprus, KKE from Greece, and the Portuguese PCP. It should be added, that 11 of these 20 parties fall within a corridor of assertiveness levels ranging from 0.4–0.61, revealing the prevalence of median positions towards Russia within these parties since the full-scale 2022 invasion.

Figure 1. Assertiveness towards Russia before and after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine among the RLPs, EP Roll Call Votes, July 2019 – June 2022. Source: Own elaboration based on Vote Watch EU (2022). Notes: Means of the index of assertiveness from Table 1 (0 = full compliance; 1 = full assertiveness towards Russia); Votes in favour (or against, where relevant) are coded as 1 = assertiveness, and votes against (or in favour, where relevant) together with abstentions and not voting are coded as 0.

To test Hypothesis 4, we calculated the means of changes in assertiveness for the Traditional/Communist Left and the New Left/Democratic Socialist RLPs (see Table 2). Both categories of RLPs have seen their index of assertiveness increase after the invasion, with the change being more pronounced for the latter (differences of 0.234 and 0.333, respectively). However, while the New Left/Democratic Socialist RLPs have adopted a median position of 0.560, the Traditional/Communist Left remains non-assertive after February 2022 (mean of 0.283). Above all, the PCP and KKE have consistently maintained a lower level of assertiveness before and after the invasion. Also, the Cypriot AKEL and the Spanish IU/PCE remain non-assertive, although their shift towards less accommodative positions towards Russia is slightly more pronounced. The only exception in this group is the Traditional/Communist Czech KSCM, which shifted its position quite radically (from 0.050–0.571). RLPs associated with a more innovative approach to left-wing radicalism (New Left or Democratic Socialist parties RLPs) show a more assertive position towards Russia and, in fact, some of these parties, mostly from the Nordic countries, have similar levels of assertiveness as most of the mainstream EP Groups after the invasion. Overall, this confirms Hypothesis 4: Traditional/Communist RLPs show less assertiveness than New Left/Democratic Socialist RLPs even after the invasion.

Altogether, these findings indicate a profound shift in the stances of RLP towards Russia following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Each of these parties has demonstrated an increased assertiveness against Russia; averaging a greater increase than members of other EPGs. However, the degree to which this external shock influenced RLPs varied. Traditional/Communist RLPs have been the most aligned with Russian interests before the invasion and remain so today (with the notable exception of the Czech KSCM, which adopted a more median position). In contrast, New Left/Democratic Socialist RLPs have generally moved to median positions, albeit with notable differences among them. For instance, the Nordic Enhedslisten, Vasemmistoliitto and the Vänsterpartiet were already more assertive prior to the aggression, and therefore, post-invasion, they adopted quite assertive positions with only moderate change.

Conversely, the Irish Independents for change, Belgium’s PTB, and Spain’s Anticapitalistas, EH Bildu, and Podemos, even after an average increase of around 0.3 on a 0–1 scale, remain below mean assertiveness due to their quite compliant stances before the invasion. Hence, the resulting divergence in the overall shift away from compliance to more assertiveness towards Russia among RLPs seems to be driven by a complex interplay of ideology and geopolitics.¹³

Discussion

The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine has brought increased scrutiny to Eurosceptic parties and to parties with benevolent positions towards Russia. However, there has been a notable absence of systematic analysis of the European radical left's positions, despite their heightened relevance. To bridge this gap and enhance academic understanding beyond mere anecdotal evidence, we analyzed the voting behaviour of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from 2019 to 2022. We formulated four hypotheses to examine the radical left's foreign policy stance towards Russia in the context of the 2022 invasion.

Our findings reveal a significant shift in the radical left's assertiveness levels towards Russia. Before the invasion, RLPs maintained their distinct foreign policy approach, marked by anti-NATO, anti-imperialist, anti-Euroatlantic, and multilateralist stances, indicative of a more amicable orientation towards the Putin regime, even compared to the far-right. However, the 2022 Russian invasion prompted a profound transformation in their foreign policy stance regarding Moscow. The issue of Russia became ambivalent for the radical left group, leading to a loss of a common denominator. The varying levels of ideological traditionalism among RLPs help to explain the divergence in positions towards Russia. Traditional/Communist RLPs consistently demonstrated lower levels of assertiveness towards Russia. In contrast, New Left/Democratic Socialist RLPs showcased a higher degree of assertiveness both before and, particularly, after the invasion. Significantly, after the invasion, most Nordic RLPs exhibited assertiveness levels comparable to mainstream EP Groups. This underscores that while ideology is a significant factor, different ideological inclinations within the same party family also play a crucial role.

Our study confirms that the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine acted as an external shock, significantly impacting the parties’ policy positions. For European RLPs, the 2022 Russian invasion was a pivotal moment, affecting a key aspect of their foreign policy identity – particularly, their predominantly considerate positions towards Russia. External shocks can influence parties’ stances, including in foreign policy, even when they are not in government (on this see Calca and Gross 2019).

Further investigation is imperative to comprehensively grasp the intricate implications of the shift within RLPs in response to the Russian invasion. Our research has so far concentrated on the initial voting outcomes after the Russian invasion. It is vital to explore whether the RLPs might revert to their previous positions due to potential war fatigue effects in the ensuing years. Delving into these patterns could yield important insights into the long-term impact of such geopolitical events on party stances.

The significance of geopolitics deserves attention. Our findings indicate that before the 2022 invasion, Nordic RLPs – from Denmark, Finland, and Sweden – were among the most assertive toward Russia, a stance they maintained post-invasion. Notable shifts in assertiveness after the invasion were observed in parties from countries closer to Russia, such as Finland's Vas and the Czech KSCM. However, the increased assertiveness against Russia by RLPs in countries not directly threatened by Russia, such as those in France, Portugal, and Greece, challenges the presumed strength of geopolitical factors in shaping RLPs’ positions.

Assessing the factors associated with parties’ foreign policy positions becomes more complex when considering the divergent trajectories of the Finnish and Swedish RLPs. Both were among the most assertive against Russia before the 2022 invasion, to a very similar degree. Post-invasion, their assertiveness increased, with the Finnish Vas showing greater intensity than the Swedish Vänsterpartiet. The former even backed Finland's NATO application, while the latter continued to oppose Sweden’s NATO membership. This divergence suggests that the impact of geopolitics on parties’ foreign policy stances should be considered in conjunction with other factors, such as incumbency.

The role of parties as governing or opposition players (Schuster and Maier 2006) affects their foreign policy stances. However, our findings suggest that incumbency alone does not uniformly explain RLPs’ positions. During the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, RLPs in Spain and Finland were part of Social Democrat-led coalition governments. In Finland, Vas aligned with the rest of the governing parties – and the vast majority of Finnish parties – by significantly increasing their assertiveness towards Russia, even altering their traditional opposition to NATO membership. Conversely, in Spain, both Podemos and United Left criticized military aid to Ukraine and the sanctions against Russia. While they did increase their assertiveness towards the Putin regime, they were not among the most assertive parties, despite being part of a Spanish government that adopted a clear pro-Ukraine stance. Notably, the Spanish United Left and the Spanish Communists demonstrated moderate assertiveness against the 2022 Russian aggression, despite their involvement in the government and holding ministerial roles. This was a stance that aligns with other traditional Communist parties committed to classic ideological principles, including anti-US and anti-fascist rhetoric. In these cases, ideological identity appears to play a more significant role in shaping foreign policy stances than other domestic factors.

While analyzing roll-call votes provides valuable insights, it may not fully explain the range of diverse positions that emerged after the invasion. Therefore, a deeper investigation into the unexpected shifts in voting patterns could be highly informative. This could involve scrutinizing the content of MEPs’ speeches or conducting targeted interviews with the involved MEPs, potentially revealing nuanced motivations and perspectives. Following the invasion in 2022, the prospects for establishing shared future security policies within the EU, involving the participation of some RLPs, appear more promising. However, the diversity of their positions and the complex ideological motives behind them suggest that a degree of caution is warranted.

Future research on party foreign policy positions should include a wide array of relevant factors. These encompass the roles of geopolitics and national security, as well as domestic influences such as public opinion, in addition to party-specific factors like incumbency, and the interplay between intraparty actors (Hofmann 2013). In addition, building on the work of Chryssogelos (2021) and the research agenda set by Raunio and Wagner (2020), an assessment of the parties’ impact on the foreign policy process would be highly valuable. In the case of RLPs, their heightened assertiveness towards Russia may have reduced the contentiousness surrounding this foreign policy issue. This heightened assertiveness could directly influence foreign policy processes in contexts where RLPs are part of the government, and indirectly impact shaping public opinion in scenarios where they are in opposition.

Similarly, considering the diversity of positions exhibited by the radical left beyond Europe, ranging from clear support for Ukraine by US Senator Bernie Sanders and Chile’s President Gabriel Boric to ambivalent positions by Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, or strong pro-Putin declarations by former Bolivia’s former President Evo Morales, a global in-depth analysis of this variation, of the black-box of parties’ decision-making, and of the factors accounting for this diversity would enhance our understanding of the dynamics explaining shifts in radical left parties’ foreign policy positions.

Acknowledgements

We express our sincere gratitude to Ben Martill and David Patton for their invaluable advice. We are also deeply thankful to Milada Vachudova and Grigore Pop-Eleches for their crucial guidance and for facilitating discussions about our paper with other participants at the panel, 'Central and East European Perspectives on Russia's War on Ukraine,' during the CES Conference in Reykjavik in June 2023. Additionally, we extend our appreciation to the four reviewers and the editors whose insights significantly enhanced the quality of our article.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the European Commission's Horizon Europe Programme for Research and Innovation, under the Grant Agreement number 101132483 (Project: BridgeGap).

Notes

1 In the written explanation of their vote on the B9-0123/2022 (Russian aggression against Ukraine) about EU actions in support of Ukraine, C. Daly and M. Wallace (Independents for change, Ireland) both stated that ‘I voted against the final resolution because it is a recipe for prolonging the war, and escalating the conflict, rather than a resolution which could assist in delivering peace’ (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/197731/CLARE_DALY/other-activities/written-explanations).

2 Both EP groups criticize these alliances for various reasons, with the GUE/NGL expressing disdain for attacks on fundamental rights by the USA or Israel. A second point of agreement among right-wing and left-wing Eurosceptics centers on the belief that the EU itself, through its austerity measures, may inadvertently contribute to human rights violations. Consequently, both groups argue that the EU should refrain from asserting its commitment to human rights in its foreign policy (Börzel and Hartlapp 2022).

3 The challenge with these classifications lies in the complexity to capture parties’ dynamism, as some parties can be difficult to categorize, exhibiting ambiguity or volatility in their positions.

4 Revolutionary Extreme Left parties are small, ideological extreme and electorally irrelevant groups such as Trotskyist, Maoist or Leninist parties.

5 https://left.eu/issues/publications/nato-eu-end-the-militarisation-of-europe/

6 There is not a proper systematic description of the RLP's reaction yet but some original documents belonging to several RLPs exposing this interpretation can be found here https://links.org.au/ukraine-positions-european-left. The position of the Greek KKE can be read here https://inter.kke.gr/en/articles/Statement-of-Press-Office-of-the-CC-of-the-KKE-on-the-Ukraine-and-the-referendum-in-the-Crimea. The reaction of the leader of Podemos can be found, among other sources, here https://www.elmundo.es/espana/2014/09/09/540f0faf22601d76308b4574.html.

7 The text can be read here https://links.org.au/european-left-party-ukraine-ukraine-no-more-war-no-more-fascism. Interestingly, the text discusses the threat of imperialism from both Western countries and Russia, as well as the threat of fascism, which is attributed to the Ukrainian radical right and extreme right separatist groups in Donbas. However, it is noted that within some factions of the RLP activists, the separatist republics in Donbas and their militias are regarded as anti-fascist entities (see, for example, https://links.org.au/ukraine-dominates-discussion-party-european-lefts-summer-university).

8 Some RLPs have notoriously presented the war as a proxy conflict between NATO/US and a subordinated EU, vs Russia. Spanish United Left MEP M. Pineda stated that there was an attempt by the EU of ‘maintaining Ukraine in the EU’s sphere of influence’ in the ‘context of the NATO and Russia conflict’ (Macro-financial assistance to Ukraine (C9-0028/2022) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/197828/MANU_PINEDA/other-activities/written-explanations). Clare Daly, MEP from the Irish Independents for change, has stated on several occasions that ‘ignoring the role played by the US and NATO in destabilising the area for the past decade, using Ukraine as a pawn in its battles with Russia, only serves to prevent an understanding of the measures necessary to secure peace’ (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/197731/CLARE_DALY/other-activities/written-explanations).

9 Geopolitics and countries' security postures (Schuster and Maier 2006) can also influence parties' positions. Our analysis, which focuses on RLPs that are largely absent from Eastern Europe – with the exception of the Czech Republic – makes it challenging to properly assess the impact of these factors. Furthermore, initial explorations do not seem to indicate any significant differences between Southern and North-Western Europe.

10 The results are robust to this specification. Once abstention, absenteeism and non-voting are left out of the scope of the analyses, the overall level of assertiveness is obviously somewhat higher. Nonetheless, there are no significant differences in the effects of measurement among parties. Hence, unlike some PRRPs – especially the Hungarian Fidesz, see, e.g. Holesch and Zagórski (2023) – RLPs seem not to use abstention, absenteeism or non-voting to hide their eventual compliance with Russia.

11 Compared to Table 1, which gave the results for The Left in the EP group, we had to exclude the Dutch Party for Animals (PvdD), which is not considered to be an RLP, and we added KKE (the Communist Party of Greece) from the Non-inscrits, which clearly is an RLP. Similar to Table 1, the average level of assertiveness within this radical left group is 0.272. Before February 2022, the mean assertiveness stood at 0.164. Also in this case it nearly tripled to 0.478 after the invasion, confirming the largest increase among all party families in the EP.

12 In his written explanation of the vote on The EU’s Foreign, Security and Defense Policy after the Russian Invasion of Ukraine (A9-0164/2022), Spanish United Left MEP M. Pineda acknowledged ‘the presence of various elements that divide the (Left) group, such as the sanctions or the transfer of weapons to Ukraine’ (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/197828/MANU_PINEDA/other-activities/written-explanations).

13 Incumbency might also influence the shifts in policy. However, as we comment in the discussion, it seems less relevant than the other mentioned factors.