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ABSTRACT
The article reveals the pragmatic implications of Herman Cappelen’s account of ‘topics’ in his contribution to the conceptual engineering literature. I show that Cappelen’s introduction of the category of ‘topics’ serves the pragmatic goal of having a convenient handle to account for ‘continuity in revision’, and that his general insistence on ‘continuity’ is motivated morally and strategically. In asking what accounts for continuity, Cappelen’s ‘topics’ are not defined by content or any other fixed set of rules or criteria. Topics are metaphysically lightweight and defined pragmatically and as we go: speakers talk about the same topic when we (and they) attribute that they do. But why should we do that? Why should we aim for continuity and why should we think it is possible in general? I contrast Cappelen’s insistence on continuity with Rorty’s appeal for discontinuity, and trace both of their positions back to their respective moral background assumptions and their assumptions about what communication is (and is for) and, in turn, what philosophy is (and is about). Further, I question the role the ‘continuity’ claim plays in the current redefinition of linguistic philosophy after the ‘death of the linguistic turn’.
Acknowledgements
Previous versions of this article greatly benefited from extensive comments by Céline Henne, Sigurd Jorem, Joey Pollock, Bjørn Ramberg, Matteo Santarelli and Matthew Shields, to all of whom I am immensely grateful. Obviously, none of the remaining shortcomings is theirs and they might not always be happy with what I made of their suggestions. A previous version of this paper was presented in September 2020 in the research network ‘Oslo Mind Group’. I am most grateful to the insightful comments received in that context. The final draft of this article was possible also due to a generous invitation from the University of Oslo’s Center for the Study of Mind in Nature research group in May 2022.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Cappelen calls this the ‘Strawsonian Challenge’ referring to criticism moved by Strawson towards Carnap. I am not interested in whether Cappelen is construing the debate between Strawson and Carnap correctly (for critiques of this see Jorem Citation2021; Gascoigne Citation2022). I am interested in how Cappelen sets his argument up, what he makes of it, and what he needs it for.
2 There is no consensus in the literature about what CE is exactly operating on, whether it is concepts, word-meaning-pairs, representational devices, inferential devices, etc., nor what each of these aforementioned notions amount to. For various views see (Isaac Citation2020, Citation2021a, Citation2021b; Cappelen Citation2018; Haslanger Citation2020a). For a comprehensive list of positions see (Jorem and Löhr Citation2022) in this special issue, who also state their case for why we should view CE as engineering inferential devices. However, my topic here is Cappelen, and Cappelen does not believe in ‘concepts’ but only in ‘meaning’, where meaning is determined by extensions and intensions. On my reading, Cappelen introduces the category of ‘topics’, which is ‘compatible with changes in extension and intension’ (Cappelen Citation2018, 54), to circumvent the question of just how flexible meaning is. Put differently, someone’s ‘topics’ might as well be someone else’s ‘meaning’. I will come back to this point.
3 That is, the ‘Strawsonian Challenge’, see fn. 1.
4 That Rorty is not a ‘representational skeptic’ like Cappelen (Citation2018, 6) but an anti-representationalist is not important for my argument at this point, though I do think the question of what the difference is between these two positions is an interesting one. On what anti-representationalism entails for Rorty see my (Huetter-Almerigi Citation2020, Citation2022a).
5 Or degeneration, for that matter; on non-inquiry or amelioration-driven conceptual engineering, see (Marques Citation2020; Podosky Citation2022; Shields Citation2021).
6 For a perspectival account of same-saying see Shields (Citation2020), who then suggest that on his version of temporal internal/external perspectivism, one can actually do without the notion of ‘topics’ and still be able to account for change and/or continuity of meaning, respectively. I also take Shield’s account to be pragmatist in nature, as he thinks that what needs to be taken to overlap among speakers are purposes.
7 ‘Changing the subject’ in Haslanger’s sense might not be completely convergent with Cappelen’s ‘change of topic’. However, I believe that for the coarse-grained level of discourse that I am operating on the two are similar enough, and I think Cappelen could agree given that he himself cites Haslanger as one case of what he calls ‘topic-improving engineers’ (Citation2018, 101 fn. 6, 148).
8 Haslanger has held different views over the years regarding amelioration vs. replacement. Further, given her Putnam-style semantic externalism, Haslanger also has theoretical (in addition to practical) reasons for insisting on continuity – on her account, in amelioration, we better grasp what the concept ‘really’ was all about all along, which seems to collapse amelioration into conceptual analysis (this has been noted before, by Cappelen Citation2018, 80; and Jackman Citation2020, 911). However, I am interested here in her practical (not theoretical) reasons.
9 Haslanger differentiates social from linguistic meaning (Haslanger Citation2012, 381–403).
10 On how this involves values and a value-concept circuit, see Santarelli (Citation2022).
11 The inferential language here is mine; Haslanger refers to it as the sharing of ‘social meaning’.
12 On Rorty’s (congruent) take on the causal dimension of Davidson’s metaphors and the role they play in his account of language-renovation, see my (Huetter-Almerigi Citation2022b.)
13 If this unity then lies ‘only’ at the level of terminology, or if it encompasses content, topics, etc., is an interesting question that I owe to Joey Pollock. My intuition is that it is more on the mere level of terminology than we might like.
14 Another important venue for the study of lexical effects is literature. It is common among authors to have lists with words they want to use in their texts, where it is the very sound and rhythm of the word that make it interesting for use, not its semantic content.
15 That is, the choice of certain words and a certain terminology beyond or apart from their content, in as far as such a distinction can be usefully made.
16 Of course, there are many other differences, such as being an anti-representationalist vs. a representational skeptic for whom extension and intensions are equally malleable, among others.
17 Which is simply (nothing more than) our mutual attributions that we are still engaged in the same inquiry.
18 For Rorty and Fricker see Dieleman (Citation2017) and Penelas (Citation2019); for the general problem of speaking for others in Rorty see Voparil (Citation2011b).
19 To fit Cappelen’s view, one would need to say ‘the commensuration of aims’. not meaning (if there really is a difference). As I will detail below, Cappelen introduces the category of ‘topics’ precisely to have it both ways: to allow for discontinuity of meaning (which is determined) and continuity of aims (which are performative). In Rorty, the two facets are integrated in his view of what language is and does.
20 For how incommensurability is not the same as untranslatability see Ramberg (Citation1989). As Ramberg points out, conversation breakdowns are not the end of communication but the very starting point for radical interpretation. However, the end of radical interpretation might not lead to ‘unity of inquiry’.
21 To see what ‘redescription’ means for Rorty, and where the difference with respect to ‘redefinition’ lies, see (Ramberg Citation2006; Voparil Citation2011a). Roughly, ‘redescription’ is what we use to bring about changes in the world via linguistic means and where considerations regarding impact and purposes play a dominant role.
22 As with much of the rest of my analytic training I owe this reference to Bjørn Ramberg, without whom not.
23 Though one should further investigate both what is meant by ‘skeptic’ in Cappelen’s self-description as a ‘representational skeptic’ (Citation2018, 6), and what that in turn implies with respect to the finding-making distinction.
24 For this openness between continuity and rupture in Rorty spelled out in terms of individual subjectivity, see my (Huetter-Almerigi Citation2022b.).