Freud and the mind-brain problem

ABSTRACT

The author argues that we can better understand Freud’s perspective on the mind-brain problem by considering his Kantian view on natural scientific knowledge, namely that there is an essential limit to our knowledge of physical reality. This means that even though conscious states are identical with brain states, it is impossible to explain the events’ conscious properties physically. Further, it is argued that if Freud took an identity theory for granted, it is not fair to criticize him for attempting to construct neuro-psychological mechanistic explanations of psychoanalytic phenomena. It is concluded that Freud’s perspectives on consciousness, the mind-brain problem, and the nature of psychological explanation are philosophically sophisticated and interesting also from a contemporary point of view.

KEYWORDS:

• Sigmund Freud
• mind-brain problem
• consciousness
• psychoanalytic explanation

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. Cf. Auchincloss (2015). For the purposes of this article, it is not necessary to consider Freud’s later structural model of the mind (id, ego, and super-ego).

2. Freud (Freud, 1939, p. 97, 1940a, p. 164). See also Freud (1915b, p. 202 & 209–215).

3. Most psychoanalysts agree that ‘drive’ is a more correct translation than ‘instinct’ of the German word Trieb.

4. Strachey points out in the introduction to The Project that it contains within itself the nucleus of a great part of Freud’s later psychological theories. See ‘Editor’s introduction’ to Freud (1895, p. 290).

5. My italics.

6. Langton (1998) provides a detailed exposition of Kantian humility regarding our knowledge of physical entities’ intrinsic nature.

7. ‘Inscrutability of matter’ is Lockwood’s (1990) apt phrase.

8. Russellian monism is also known as Russellian physicalism. My account of Freudian theory’s view on the mind-brain problem is similar to Nagel’s (1982) and Wallace’s (1992) dual-aspect interpretation, although they do not make any explicit connections to Freud’s Kantian epistemology.

9. I have argued elsewhere that Russellian monism does not imply epiphenomenalism (Gundersen, 2015). However, the topic of this paper is Freudian theory and not Russellian monism per se. Therefore, it is beyond this article’s scope to deal with how Russellian monism can handle the problem of epiphenomenalism.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Ståle Gundersen

Ståle Gundersen, is associative professor in philosophy at the University of Stavanger, Department of Cultural Studies and Languages, Norway.