How to Last Alone at the Top: US Strategic Planning for the Unipolar Era

Abstract

This article investigates how key actors within the US defence policy community realigned their interests to forge a new consensus on the redirection of US defence strategy following the ‘peace shock’ they faced with the collapse of bipolarity. This consensus centred on the idea that achieving US security in the ‘age of uncertainty’ demanded overwhelming US military power, which was widely interpreted as necessitating military capabilities to fight multiple major theatre wars simultaneously against regional ‘Third World’ adversaries. This helped to preserve many of the principal pillars of US Cold War defence policy through deflecting calls for more radical organisational changes and deeper cuts to defence budgets.

Key Words:

• US military power
• Post-Cold War US defence policy
• Major theatre wars

Notes

¹See Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of US Diplomacy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 2002), 125.

²US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, Briefing Slides and Fact Sheets (2010), <www.defense.gov/QDR/>.

³Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1965/1971).

⁴Michael Mintrom, Policy Entrepreneurs and School Choice (Washington DC: Georgetown UP 2000), ix.

⁵See, for example, Scott Ainsworth and Itai Sened, ‘The Role of Lobbyists: Entrepreneurs with Two Audiences’, American Journal of Political Science 37/3 (1993), 834–66; Dimitrios C. Christopoulus, ‘Relational Attributes of Political Entrepreneurs: A Network Perspective’, Journal of European Public Policy 13/5 (2006), 757–8; John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (Boston: Little, Brown and Co 1984); Nathan W. Polsby, Political Innovation in America: The Politics of Policy Innovation (New Haven: Yale UP 1984); Nancy C. Roberts and Paula J. King, ‘Policy Entrepreneurs: Their Activity Structure and Function in the Policy Process’, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 1/2 (1991), 147–75.

⁶See Richard C. Feiock and Jered B. Carr, ‘Incentives, Entrepreneurs, and Boundary Change: A Collective Action Framework’, Urban Affairs Review 36/3 (2001), 382–405; Brian D. Jones, Reconceiving Decision-Making in Democratic Politics: Attention, Choice, and Public Policy (Chicago: Chicago UP 1994); Roberts and King, ‘Policy Entrepreneurs’, 158–9, 168; Mintrom, Policy Entrepreneurs and School Choice; Michael Mintrom, ‘Policy Entrepreneurs and the Diffusion of Innovation’, American Journal of Political Science 41/3 (1997), 738–70; Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies.

⁷Caner Bakir, ‘Policy Entrepreneurship and Institutional Change: Multilevel Governance of Central Banking Reform’, Governance 22/4 (2009), 574.

⁸Adam D. Sheingate, ‘Political Entrepreneurship, Institutional Change, and American Political Development’, Studies in American Political Development 17/2 (2003), 198.

⁹Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, 59.

¹⁰US White House, National Security Strategy Review, 12 (3 Mar. 1989), <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/pdfs/nsr/nsr12.pdf>.

¹¹Ibid., 1, 2.

¹²See Colin L. Powell, ‘National Security Challenges in the 1990's: The Future Ain't What It Used To Be’, Speech at the Army War College (16 May), Army (July 1989), 12–4; Colin L. Powell, ‘Address before the National Press Club on June 22, 1990’, Congressional Record (10 July 1990), S9463–5; Colin L. Powell, ‘US Foreign Policy in a Time of Transition, Address before the National Press Club on October 27, 1988, Transcript’, US Department of State Bulletin (Jan. 1989); cf. Christopher D. O'Sullivan, Colin Powell: American Power and Intervention from Vietnam to Iraq (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield 2009), 71, 80.

¹³Powell, ‘Address’; Eric V. Larson et al., Defense Planning in a Decade of Change: Lessons from the Base Force, Bottom-Up Review, and Quadrennial Defense Review (Santa Monica: RAND 2001), 9, 16; Lorna S. Jaffe, ‘The Base Force’, Air Force Magazine 83/12 (2000), 56–7; John F. Troxell, Force Planning in an Era of Uncertainty: Two MRCs as a Force Sizing Framework (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College 1997), 10.

¹⁴Colin L. Powell, ‘US Foreign Policy in a Changing World: Keeping Democracy Alive’, Speech to the Town Hall of California, Los Angeles (23 Mar. 1990), in Vital Speeches of the Day, LVI/14; Powell, ‘Address’.

¹⁵Lorna S. Jaffe, The Development of the Base Force 1989–1992 (Washington DC: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1993), 11; Leslie Lewis et al., Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: Assessment of Policies and Practices for Implementing the Total Force Policy (Santa Monica: RAND 1992), 37; Colin L. Powell, ‘A View to 1994: The Base Force’, CJCS Working Paper, 12 May 1990, Washington DC: Office of the CJCS; Powell, ‘Address’.

¹⁶Lewis et al., Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces, 48–9.

¹⁷Powell quoted in Don M. Snider, Strategy, Forces and Budgets: Dominant Influences in Executive Decision Making, Post-Cold War, 1989–91 (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Inst, US Army War College 1993), 7; cf. ibid., 10.

¹⁸Jaffe, ‘The Base Force’, 61; see also Jaffe, The Development of the Base Force, 22–4.

¹⁹Ibid., 27; cf. Snider, Strategy, Forces and Budgets, 7.

²⁰Jaffe, ‘The Base Force’, 61.

²¹Jaffe, The Development of the Base Force, 23, 27.

²²Ibid., 26–7.

²³James S. Chestnut, Political Foot-Soldier: Colin Powell's Interagency Campaign for the ‘Base Force’ (Washington DC: National War College 2002), 3–10; Snider, Strategy, Forces and Budgets, 9.

²⁴Jaffe, ‘The Base Force’, 61.

²⁵Larson et al., Defense Planning in a Decade of Change, 10; O'Sullivan, Colin Powell, 75, 81.

²⁶Jaffe, Development of the Base Force, 35.

²⁷Snider, Strategy, Forces and Budgets,19; Lewis et al., Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces, 23.

²⁸Cf. Lewis et al., Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces, 22–3.

²⁹Snider, Strategy, Forces and Budgets, 19.

³⁰Ibid., 22–3; Lewis et al., Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces, 26.

³¹Bob Woodward, ‘Making Choices: Bush's Economic Record’, Washington Post (6 Oct. 1992), A14.

³²Jaffe, Development of the Base Force, 35.

³³Lewis et al., Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces, 27.

³⁴Jaffe, Development of the Base Force, 36; ‘Cheney Offers No Change in Defense Budget to Summiteers’, Defense Daily (8 June 1990).

³⁵William W. Kaufmann, Assessing the Base Force: How Much is Too Much? (Washington DC: Brookings 1992), 3; Larson et al., Defense Planning in a Decade of Change, 20; cf. Pat Towell, ‘Cheney's Latest Plan Shows Only Part of the Ax Blade’, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (23 June 1990), 1975.

³⁶See Alexandra Homolar, ‘Rebels without a Conscience: The Evolution of the Rogue States Narrative in US Security Policy’, European Journal of International Relations, <http://ejt.sagepub.com/content/early/2010/11/20/1354066110383996.abstract>.Cf. Alexandra Homolar-Riechmann, ‘The Moral Purpose of US Power: Neoconservatism in the Age of Obama’, Contemporary Politics 15/2 (2009), 179–96.

³⁷Homolar, ‘Rebels without a Conscience’.

³⁸See for example ibid.; Jaffe, ‘The Base Force’, 24; Snider, Strategy, Forces and Budgets, 18–21; Dale A. Vesser, Memo to Scooter [Libby]: First Draft of DPG, Secret, Excised Copy (3 Sept. 1991), <www.gwu.edu/∼nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb245/index. htm#doc2>, I.

³⁹Jaffe, ‘The Base Force’, 44, 64.

⁴⁰Lewis et al., Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces, 34–5; William W. Kaufmann and John D. Steinbrunner, Decisions for Defense: Prospects for a New Order (Washington DC: Brookings 1991), 27; cf. US Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States (Washington DC: Government Printing Office 1992).

⁴¹Homolar, ‘Rebels without a Conscience’.

⁴²Cf. Eric Schmitt, ‘Pentagon Plans Big Budget Cut, Saving Billions’, Special to the New York Times (30 Aug. 1992), 1-1.

⁴³US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Brief to DPRB (5 June 1991), <www.gwu.edu/∼nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb245/doc01.pdf>.

⁴⁴Ibid., 2, 6–7.

⁴⁵Ibid., 5.

⁴⁶Ibid., 25.

⁴⁷Vesser, Memo to Scooter, I.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Ibid., 2.

⁵⁰Ibid., 20.

⁵¹Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense Planning Guidance, FY 1994–1999: Revised Draft for Scooter Libby, Secret, Excised Copy (29 Feb. 1992), <www.gwu. edu/∼nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb245/index.htm#doc4>.

⁵²‘Excerpts from Pentagon's Plan: “Prevent the Re-Emergence of a New Rival”’, New York Times, 8 Mar. 1992; Patrick E. Tyler, ‘US Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop: Pentagon's Document Outlines Ways to Thwart Challenges to Primacy of America,' Special to The New York Times, 8 Mar. 1992, 1-1-1.

⁵³US White House, National Security Strategy of the United States (1991), <www.fas.org/man/docs/918015-nss.htm>, Section V; cf. Dale A. Vesser, Memorandum to Mr. Libby: Comments Received on Draft DPG – Potential Issues, Secret, Excised Copy (17 Mar. 1992), <http://www.gwu.edu/∼nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb245/ index.htm#doc5>, 58a.

⁵⁴Jeffrey R. Gerlach, ‘Pentagon Myths and Global Realities: The 1993 Military Budget’, Policy Analysis 171 (24 May 1992), <www.sas.upenn.edu/∼dludden/USmilitarybudget02.htm>; Robert S. Litwak, Rogue States and US Foreign Policy: Containment after the Cold War (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars 2000), 28; cf. US White House, National Security Strategy of the US, Section V.

⁵⁵Troxell, Force Planning in an Era of Uncertainty, 12; Larson et al., Defense Planning in a Decade of Change, 13–6; Richard Cheney, Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy (1993), <www.informationclearinghouse.info/pdf/naarpr_ Defense.pdf>.

⁵⁶See for example Bill Clinton, A New Covenant for American Security: Remarks to Students at Georgetown University (Washington DC: New Democratic Leadership Council 12 Dec. 1991), <www.dlc.org/ndol_ci.cfm?=128&subid=174&content id=250537>.

⁵⁷Cf. Mark A. Gunzinger, ‘Beyond the Bottom-Up Review’, Essay on Strategy XIV (Washington DC: Inst for National Strategic Studies, National Defense U 1996), 2–3.

⁵⁸Aspin cited in John T. Correll, ‘The Base Force Meets Option C’, Air Force Magazine 74/6 (1992), <http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/1992/June%201992/0692watch.aspx>, 1; Litwak, Rogue States and US Foreign Policy, 29–30.

⁵⁹Gunzinger, ‘Beyond the Bottom-Up Review’, 1–3; Larson et al., Defense Planning in a Decade of Change, 44.

⁶⁰Litwak, Rogue States and US Foreign Policy, 30.

⁶¹Les Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review (Oct. 1993), Excerpts, <www.fas.org/man/docs/bur/index.html>, Section I.

⁶²Larson et al., Defense Planning in a Decade of Change, 57, 72.

⁶³Colin L. Powell, My American Journey (New York: Random House 1995), 564.

⁶⁴Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, Section III.

⁶⁵Ibid., Section II.

⁶⁶Ibid.

⁶⁷See Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, ‘Military Expenditure Database’, <http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_database1.html>; Americans Talk Issues Foundation, ‘The New World Order: What the Peace Should Be’, ATI 15 (Washington DC: Americans Talks Issues 1991); Gallup, ‘Public Divided on Defense Spending’, 2006, <www.gallup.com/poll/21739/Public-Divided-Defense-Spending. aspx>; Program on International Policy Attitudes, ‘Americans on Defense Spending: A Study of US Public Attitudes, Report of Findings’, 1996, <www.fas.org/man/docs/pipapoll.htm>.

⁶⁸Lawrence J. Korb, ‘US National Defense Policy in the Post-Cold War World’, in Ann R. Markusen (ed.), America's Peace Dividend, Ch. 2 (New York: Columbia International Affairs Online 2000).

⁶⁹See Les Aspin, ‘An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces for the Post-Soviet Era: Four Illustrative Options’, White Paper (Washington DC: House Armed Services Committee 25 Feb. 1992), 2–3.

⁷⁰Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, Section II, Section IV; cf. Larson et al., Defense Planning in a Decade of Change, 49; Gunzinger, ‘Beyond the Bottom-Up Review’, 2–4.

⁷¹Jeffrey D. Brake, Quadrennial Defense Review: Background, Process, and Issues (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service 2001), 2.

⁷²US Congress, HR 3230: The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Public Law 104-201 (Washington DC: Library of Congress 1996), <www.nps.gov/legal/laws/104th/104-201.pdf>, 2623–4.

⁷³George C. Wilson, This War Really Matters. Inside the Fight for Defense Dollars (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press 2000), 15.

⁷⁴William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (May 1997), <www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr/index.html>, 1.

⁷⁵Ibid.

⁷⁶Ibid., The Secretary's Message.

⁷⁷Ibid., Section IV.

⁷⁸Ibid., Section II, Section VII.

⁷⁹Ibid., Section IX.

⁸⁰Ibid., 1.

⁸¹Ibid.; cf. US White House, A National Security Strategy for a New Century (1997), <www.fas.org/man/docs/strategy97.htm>.

⁸²Project on Defense Alternatives (PDA) ‘A New US Military Strategy? Issues and Options’, Global Beat Issue Brief 65 (May 2001, Cambridge, MA: Project on Defense Alternatives, Commonwealth Inst.), 2.

⁸³Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, Section III.

⁸⁴Cf. Wilson, This War Really Matters, 29; McGinn et al., A Framework for Strategy Development (Santa Monica: RAND 2002), 2.

⁸⁵US Congress, HR 3230, 2626–28.

⁸⁶National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century (Arlington, VA: National Defense Panel 1997), <www.fas.org/man/docs/ndp/toc.htm>, Section III/1.

⁸⁷Michael G. Vickers and Steven M. Kosiak, The Quadrennial Defense Review: An Assessment (Washington: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 1997).

⁸⁸Bacevich, American Empire, 125.

⁸⁹Korb, ‘US National Defense Policy in the Post-Cold War World’; Cindy Williams, ‘Holding the Line: US Defense Strategy’, Foreign Policy in Focus, 6/19 (2001), <www.fpif.org/briefs/vol6/v6n19defense.html>, 2.

⁹⁰See Alexandra Homolar, ‘The Political Economy of National Security’, Review of International Political Economy 17/2 (2010), 410–23.