Signaling and Military Provocation in Chinese National Security Strategy: A Closer Look at the Impeccable Incident

Abstract

On 8 March 2009, five Chinese vessels shadowed and aggressively maneuvered in close proximity to the US Naval Ship (USNS) Impeccable. This paper seeks to explain the incident and its aftermath in the context of Chinese coercive diplomacy. China's strategy, designed to motivate the US to cease surveillance operations near its militarily sensitive areas in the South China Sea, included three components: (1) the use of military provocation, (2) a coordinated media campaign, and (3) a challenge to US interpretations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS). This study goes beyond traditional research on Chinese use of force to explain why China's coercive diplomatic campaign took the form it did. Only by understanding the nature and factors affecting Chinese coercive diplomacy can the US design the effective counter strategy needed to protect US regional and global interests.

Key Words:

• US–China relations
• South China Sea
• Impeccable incident
• Coercive diplomacy

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Thomas Christensen, David Dorman, Bonnie Glaser, Keren Yarhi-Milo, Andrew Erickson and an anonymous reviewer for their comments on earlier drafts.

Notes

¹For a special issue dedicated to the China challenge, see Journal of Strategic Studies 30/4–5, Aug. 2007.

²See Aaron L. Friedberg, ‘Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia,’ International Security 18/3 (Winter 1993/94), 5–33; David Kang, ‘Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytic Frameworks,’ International Security 27/4 (Summer 2003), 57–85; Thomas J. Christensen, ‘Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and US Policy Toward East Asia,’ International Security 31/1 (Summer 2006), 81–126; Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Is China a Status Quo Power,’ International Security 27/4 (Spring 2003), 5–56.

³Mark Burles and Abram N. Shulsky, Patterns in China's Use of Force from History and Doctrinal Writings (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation 2000); Allen S. Whiting, ‘China's Use of Force 1950–1996, and Taiwan,’ International Security 26/2 (Fall 2001), 124; Andrew Scobell, ‘Show of Force: Chinese Soldiers, Statesmen, and the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis,’ Political Science Quarterly 115/2 (2000), 228.

⁴John W. Garver, ‘China's Push Through the South China Sea: The Interaction of Bureaucratic and National Interests,’ China Quarterly 132 (1992), 999–1028. Chinese officials allegedly went so far as to tell two visiting senior Obama administration officials that the South China Sea was regarded a core interest on par with Tibet, Taiwan, and Xinjiang. See ‘Chinese Military Seeks to Extend its Naval Power,’ New York Times, 23 Apr. 2010.

⁵Capt Raul Pedrozo, ‘Close Encounters at Sea: The USNS Impeccable Incident,’ The Naval War College Review 62/3 (Summer 2009), 101.

⁶Ibid.

⁷‘US Ups Ante in South China Sea by Sending Destroyer,’ Taipei Times, 15 Mar. 2009.

⁸‘Destroyer to Protect Ship Near China,’ Washington Post, 13 Mar. 2009.

⁹‘Chinese Vessels Shadow, Harass Unarmed US Surveillance Ship,’ American Forces Press Service, 9 Mar. 2010. Furthermore, the 1974 clash with Vietnam over the Paracels started with two Chinese fishing boats entering the area, ostensibly to entice the South Vietnamese to fire the first shot. For more, see Garver, ‘China's Push Through the South China Sea,’ 1003.

¹⁰For an excellent overview of the facts of the incident from the US and Chinese perspectives, see Jonathan G. Odom, ‘The True “Lies” of the Impeccable Incident: What Really Happened, Who Disregarded International Law, and Why Every Nation (Outside of China) Should Be Concerned,’ Michigan State University College of Law Journal of International Law 18/3 (2010), 1–42.

¹¹Peter A. Dutton, ‘Testimony before the US–China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on the Implications of China's Naval Modernization for the United States,’ 11 June 2009.

¹²For details of other incidents, see Pedrozo, ‘Close Encounters at Sea’.

¹³For a history of this ‘longstanding strategic chess match in the South China Sea,’ see Judah Grunstein, ‘An Impeccable US–China Incident at Sea,’ World Politics Review, 13 Mar. 2009.

¹⁴For more on this aspect of Chinese diplomatic strategies, see Burles and Shulsky, Patterns in China's Use of Force.

¹⁵Failure alludes to the fact that China did not achieve its goals short of war. Studies of the 1995–96 Taiwan Straits crisis are one obvious exception. For more on this case, see Scobell, ‘Show of Force’; Whiting, ‘China's Use of Force 1950–1996, and Taiwan’; Robert S. Ross, ‘The 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force,’ International Security 25/2 (Fall 2000), 87–123.

¹⁶‘China–US defense talks “best in decade”,’ China Daily, 2 Mar. 2009.

¹⁷‘Chinese Naval Fleet Sails into Gulf of Aden,’ China Daily, 6 Jan. 2009.

¹⁸Mark Valencia, ‘The Impeccable Incident: Truth and Consequences,’ China Security 5/2 (Spring 2009), 24.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Peter A. Dutton, ‘Testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, China's Views of Sovereignty and Methods of Access Control,’ 27 Feb. 2008.

²¹Peter A. Dutton, ‘Testimony before the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearing on Maritime Disputes and Sovereignty Issues in East Asia,’ 15 Jul. 2009.

²²Alexander L. George, Forceful Persuasion (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace P 1991).

²³Examples of verbal tactics include verbal threats and promises, naming and shaming; economic sanctions are an example of nonmilitary action.

²⁴Alexander L. George, ‘The General Theory and Logic of Coercive Diplomacy,’ in Strategic and Force Planning Faculty (ed.), Strategy and Force Planning, 2nd Ed. (Newport: Naval War College P 1997), 258.

²⁵‘US Protests to Beijing Over Naval Incident,’ The Financial Times (Online), 9 Mar. 2009.

²⁶‘The US Sends Destroyer to Escort the Impeccable to Continue its Rampage in the South China Sea’ [‘Meipai yizhou sidun jian huhang ‘wuxia’ hao jixu hengxing nanhai’], Xinhua Online, 13 Mar. 2009.

²⁷For more on this type of strategy, see George, Forceful Persuasion, 11.

²⁸Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale UP 1966), 109.

²⁹Thomas J. Christensen, ‘Posing Problems without Catching Up: China's Rise and Challenges for US Security Policy,’ International Security 25/4 (Spring 2001), 5–40.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Schelling, Arms and Influence, 89.

³²‘Neighbors React to PRC South China Sea Patrol after Faceoff with US Vessel,’ Open Source Center (OSC) translation of ‘China's Patrol Ship Triggers Reactions from Neighbors in the South China Sea,’ Beijing Guoji Xianqu Daobao Online, 20 Mar. 2009.

³³‘Scholars Meet to Discuss South China Sea Disputes,’ BBC News, 26 Nov. 2009.

³⁵‘China Urges US to Reduce Surveillance Operation,’ Xinhua, 27 Aug. 2009; ‘US Refuses to Cease Surveillance Operations against China, Criticizes China for Lack of Response’ [‘Meiguo jujue tingzhi duihua jinhai zhencha duizhongfang zhize bierbuda’], Xinhua, 8 Sept. 2009.

³⁴Schelling, Arms and Influence.

³⁶In secret signaling only select parts of the government apparatus are informed, for example the top leaders and their advisors.

³⁷Reducing the incentives for other countries to unite in opposition against China is a key component of Chinese grand strategy. See Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China's Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford: Stanford UP 2005), 12.

³⁸Jessica L. Weeks, ‘Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve,’ International Organization 62 (Winter 2008), 37.

³⁹James Fearon, ‘Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,’ American Political Science Review 88/3 (1994), 577–92.

⁴⁰Weeks, ‘Autocratic Audience Costs’.

⁴¹I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this point.

⁴²Fearon, ‘Domestic Political Audiences’.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴³The signaling was private, not secret, because information was withheld only from third parties, not from any particular aspect of either country's government apparatus.

⁴⁴‘Chinese Vessels Shadow, Harass Unarmed US Surveillance Ship,’ American Forces Press Service, 9 Mar. 2010.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁷For the first official statement, see ‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Ma Zhaoxu's Regular Press Conference on March 10, 2009,’ Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States of America, 10 Mar. 2009.

⁴⁸For more, see Donald R. Kinder, ‘Communication and Politics in the Age of Information,’ in David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis (eds), Oxford Handbook of Political Pyschology (Oxford: Oxford UP 2003).

⁴⁹Seminal works on coercive bargaining include Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard UP 1960); Schelling, Arms and Influence; George, Forceful Persuasion.

⁵⁰The message that the US position was not based on international law will be discussed in detail in a later section on why China chose to couch its demands in legal terms.

⁵²‘PRC: US Ship “Violates” World Law; US Must Stop “Bullying,” Exist “Harmoniously,”’ Open Source Center (OSC) CPP20090319587001 translation of ‘“Harassment?” Or Great Timing?,’ Jinan Dazhong Ribao, 13 Mar. 2009.

⁵¹‘Sino-US South China Sea Incident is a Foreign Policy Scheme of the Hawkish US Military’ [‘Zhongmei nanhai duizhi shijian xi meijun yingpai cehua de waijiao yinmou’], Xinmin Weekly, 25 Mar. 2009; see also ‘Top Military Officers Lash Out at US Espionage,’ China Daily, 11 Mar. 2009.

⁵³‘HQSB Report: US Military Busy Spying on China's Peripheral Areas,’ Huanqiu Shibao, 12 Mar. 2009, translation OSC CPP20090325710010. Dutton notes that the Soviet intelligence-collection ships, hydrographic research vessels, space-support ships, and military reconnaissance flights regularly operated off US coastlines without US legal objection. See, e.g., ‘Cuban Armed Forces and the Soviet Military Presence,’ Reprint of Department of State Special Report No. 103 (Aug. 1982), <www.disam. dsca.mil/pubs/Vol%205-2/Cuban.pdf>.

⁵⁴‘In the Aftermath of the Impeccable Incident, the US Sends Destroyer Chung-Hoon to go to the South China Sea to Serve as a Bodyguard’ [‘Wuxia shijianhou, mei zhousidun fu nanhai dang baobiaobiao’], People's Daily, 18 Mar. 2009.

⁵⁵Ibid.

⁵⁶‘Expert Explains the Impeccable Incident: The US does not Accept China's Rise’ [‘Zhuangjia jiangshe ‘wuxiahao’ shijian: meiguo bu ganxin zhongguo jueqi’], Guangzhou Ribao, 16 Mar. 2009.

⁵⁷Ibid.

⁵⁸‘HQSB Report.’

⁶²Emphasis added. See ‘PRC: US Ship “Violates” World Law; US Must Stop “Bullying,” Exist “Harmoniously,”’ OSC CPP20090319587001 translation of ‘“Harassment?” Or Great Timing?,’ Jinan Dazhong Ribao, 13 Mar. 2009.

⁵⁹See John W. Garver, Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China (New Jersey: Prentice Hall 1993).

⁶⁰‘US–China Military Exchanges have Thawed, the South China Sea Naval Incident Added Fuel to the Fire’ [‘Zhongmei junshi jiechu chuxian jiedong, nanhai meijian shijian huoshangjiaoyou’], Nanfang Daily, 12 Mar. 2009.

⁶¹See Jessica Weiss, ‘Powerful Patriots: Nationalism, Diplomacy and the Strategic Logic of Anti-Foreign Protest,’ Unpublished manuscript, <http://weber.ucsd.edu/∼ jweiss/research.html>.

⁶³PLAN officers condemned it as an ‘inappropriate reaction.’ See ‘Pentagon Reaction to Row “Inappropriate,”’ China Daily, 13 Mar. 2009. For a scathing Chinese critique, see ‘Why Did the US Navy Dispatch the Chung-Hoon to Escort the Impeccable?’ [‘Meiguo haijun paichu “zhongyun” hao wei “wuxia” hao huhang yiyu hewei?’], Sina.com, 12 Mar. 2009.

⁶⁴‘PRC: US Military Must Stop “Reconnaissance” on PRC Periphery,’ OSC translation.

⁶⁵One article argues that ‘Washington should recognize and see clearly the fact that China is growing stronger; especially with this ongoing financial tsunami, which the United States cannot address without China's involvement.’ The implication is that the US should give in to China's demands. ‘HK Paper Says US Impeccable “in Chinese Waters” Based on UN Convention,’ OSC CPP20090317710010 translation of ‘A Look at the Reasons Behind the Border Incursion by the USNS Impeccable,’ Hsiang Kang Shang Pao, 17 Mar. 2009.

⁶⁶‘Media Frenzy Over Impeccable Incident, the US Government and Military Attitudes are Not in Line with Each Other’ [‘Meiti richao wuxiahao shijian, mei zhengfu, junfang taidu bu yizhi’], Nanfang Daily, 17 Mar. 2009.

⁷¹Ibid.

⁶⁷Ibid.

⁶⁸‘Clinton's Remarks After Meeting Chinese Foreign Minister Yang. US State Department, Washington, DC,’ 11 Mar. 2009, <www.america.gov>.

⁶⁹‘Sino-US South China Sea Incident is a Foreign Policy Scheme of the Hawkish US Military’ [‘Zhongmei nanhai duizhi shijian xi meijun yingpai cehua de waijiao yinmou’], Xinmin Weekly, 25 Mar. 2009.

⁷⁰‘Media Frenzy Over Impeccable Incident, the US Government and Military Attitudes are Not in Line with Each Other’ [‘Meiti richao wuxiahao shijian, mei zhengfu, junfang taidu bu yizhi’], Nanfang Daily, 17 Mar. 2009.

⁷²‘Naval Ship Unauthorized in South China Sea, Like the Pot Calling the Kettle Black’ [‘Meijian shanchuang nanhai bing eren xian gaozhuang’], Nanfang Daily, 11 Mar. 2009.

⁷⁶‘Expert Explains the Impeccable Incident: The US does not Accept China's Rise’ [‘Zhuangjia jiangshe ‘wuxiahao’ shijian: meiguo bu ganxin zhongguo jueqi’], Guangzhou Ribao, 16 Mar. 2009.

⁷³See China Security 5/2 (Spring 2009) for three major articles discussing the Chinese and US legal positions. On legality issues, see also Pedrozo, ‘Close Encounters at Sea’; Odom, ‘The True “Lies” of the Impeccable Incident’. Unless noted otherwise, all information in this paragraph comes from James Kraska, ‘Sovereignty at Sea.’ Survival 51/3 (2009), 13–18.

⁷⁴For the details of the legal positions, see Law of the People's Republic of China on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf, 26 June 1998; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, <www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm>; China's Statement upon Ratification, <www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm#China%20Upon%20ratifica tion>. For a thorough analysis, see Dutton ‘Testimony before the US–China Economic and Security Review Commission.’

⁷⁵For China's interpretation of UNCLOS, see ibid.

⁷⁷‘US–China Military Exchanges have Thawed, the South China Sea Naval Incident Added Fuel to the Fire’ [‘Zhongmei junshi jiechu chuxian jiedong, nanhai meijian shijian huoshangjiaoyou’], Nanfang Daily, 12 Mar. 2009; ‘Naval Ship Unauthorized in South China Sea, Like the Pot Calling the Kettle Black’ [‘Meijian shanchuang nanhai bing eren xian gaozhuang’], Nanfang Daily, 11 Mar. 2009.

⁷⁸Ibid. This quote moves away from earlier denials that the Chinese actions were ordered from the top.

⁷⁹‘Expert Explains the Impeccable Incident: The US does not Accept China's Rise’ [‘Zhuangjia jiangshe ‘wuxiahao’ shijian: meiguo bu ganxin zhongguo jueqi’], Guangzhou Ribao, 16 Mar. 2009; ‘PRC: ZTS Article Says US Spy Ship Monitors PRC Nuclear Submarines in South China Sea,’ World News Connection, translation of ‘US Spy Ship Monitors Chinese Nuclear Submarines,’ Zhongguo Tongxunshe, 14 Mar. 2009; ‘Naval Ship Unauthorized in South China Sea, Like the Pot Calling the Kettle Black’ [‘Meijian shanchuang nanhai bing eren xian gaozhuang’], Nanfang Daily, 11 Mar. 2009; ‘The Impeccable Incident Uncovers the Inner Workings of the US Spy Ship, Naval Command Operations' [‘Wuxiahao Shijian jie Meijiandie Chuan Neimu Haijun silingbu caozong’], Beijing Evening Post, 15 Mar. 2009.

⁸⁰‘Top Military Officers Lash Out at US Espionage,’ China Daily, 11 Mar. 2009.

⁸¹Ibid.

⁸²‘The Impeccable Incident Uncovers the Inner Workings of the US Spy Ship, Naval Command Operations’ [‘Wuxiahao Shijian jie Meijiandie Chuan Neimu Haijun silingbu caozong’], Beijing Evening Post, 15 Mar. 2009.’

⁸³Ibid.

⁸⁴‘PRC: ZTS Article Says US Spy Ship Monitors PRC Nuclear Submarines in South China Sea,’ World News Connection, translation of ‘US Spy Ship Monitors Chinese Nuclear Submarines,’ Zhongguo Tongxunshe, 14 Mar. 2009.

⁸⁵George, Forceful Persuasion.

⁸⁶Kraska, ‘Sovereignty at Sea’.

⁸⁷Ibid.

⁸⁸Even if US regional maritime presence is not reduced, but just shifted to different zones, US concessions in the face of Chinese coercive diplomacy would still cause anxiety in the hearts of US allies about US willingness to absorb costs to stay active in the region and protect allies' interests.

⁸⁹‘DoD News Briefing with Geoff Morrell from the Pentagon,’ 11 Mar. 2009.

⁹⁰‘Sino-US South China Sea Incident is a Foreign Policy Scheme of the Hawkish US Military’ [‘Zhongmei nanhai duizhi shijian xi meijun yingpai cehua de waijiao yinmou’], Xinmin Weekly, 25 Mar. 2009.

⁹¹I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for clarifying this point.

⁹²See China Security 5/2, (Spring 2009) for three articles discussing the Chinese and US legal positions. Other examples include Pedrozo, ‘Close Encounters at Sea’; Odom, ‘The True “Lies” of the Impeccable Incident’; Kraska, ‘Sovereignty at Sea’; Dutton, ‘Testimony before the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee.’

⁹³‘New Incident between China, US: Pentagon,’ AFP, 5 May 2009.

⁹⁴Cited by Dutton, ‘Testimony before the China Economic and Security Review Commission.’

⁹⁵For more on this point, see Elizabeth Economy and Michel C. Oksenberg (eds), China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects (New York: Council on Foreign Relations P 1999).

⁹⁶‘Offering to Aid Talks, US Challenges China on Disputed Islands,’ New York Times, 24 June 2010.

⁹⁷The following are particularly informative articles about Chinese views on the use of space assets in warfare from a journal published by the Academy of Military Science, Zhongguo Junshi Kexue; Chang Xianqi, ‘Space Strategy and National Security’ [‘Kongjian zhanlue yu guojia anquan’], Zhongguo Junshi Kexue 1 (2002), 12; Feng Shuxing and Cui Yang, ‘The Space Strategies of the United States and Russia’ [‘Mei e kongjian zhanlue chutan’], Zhongguo Junshi Kexue 1 (2002), 45; Zhang Zhiwei and Feng Chuanjiang, ‘Views on Future Air-Space Operations’ [‘Shixi weilai kongtian yiti zuozhan’], Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, 2 (2006), 52.

⁹⁸Schelling, Arms and Influence, 118.

⁹⁹For an excellent study on the strategic calculus of regional players on China's rise, see Evelyn Goh, Meeting the China Challenge: The US in Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies (Washington DC: East-West Center 2005); Robert S. Ross, ‘Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia,’ Security Studies 15/3 (2006), 355–95.

¹⁰⁰Dutton, ‘Testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission.’ For more on China's anti-access strategy and recommendations for the US, see Oriana Skylar Mastro, ‘Testimony before the US–China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China's Active Defense Strategy and its Regional Impact, 27 Jan. 2011.