Introduction to Special Issue of Social Epistemology on “Collective Knowledge and Collective Knowers”

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Notes

[1] See Goldman (1999).

[2] See Berger and Luckman (1966).

[3] See Popper (1972).

[4] See, for example, Searle (1995), Tuomela (1995), Gilbert (1989), and Bratman (1999).

[5] See, for example, Gilbert (1987), Tuomela (1995), Schmitt (1994), Pettit (2003), and Tollefsen (2000a, 2000b).

[6] See, for example, Sugden (1993) and Graham (2002)

[7] See Giere (2002).

[8] Those engaged in this debate include Heimir Geirsson (2004), Margaret Gilbert (1987/1996, 1989, 1994, 1996, 2000, 2002, 2004), Raul Hakli (2006), Christopher McMahon (2003), Anthonie Meijers (2002, 2003), Gerhard Preyer (2003), Frederick Schmitt (1994), Deborah Tollefsen (2002a, 2002b, 2003), Raimo Tuomela (1992, 1995, 2000, 2004), and K. Brad Wray (2001, 2003).

[9] Raul Hakli’s article most directly engages with the previous literature on group belief; his article is a good introduction to the issues involved.

[10] This distinction has recently been questioned in Stanley and Williamson (2001). For a critical discussion of the Stanley and Williamson argument with regard to how we can learn the skills necessary for collaborative research, see Thagard (2006) and Fallis (2006).

[11] For an argument that groups’ views, although based on acts of acceptance, may not always be voluntary, see Mathiesen (2006).

[12] See Hakli (2006) for a discussion.