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Abstract
We all pursue epistemic goals as individuals. But we also pursue collective epistemic goals. In the case of many groups to which we belong, we want each member of the group – and sometimes even the group itself – to have as many true beliefs as possible and as few false beliefs as possible. In this paper, I respond to the main objections to the very idea of such collective epistemic goals. Furthermore, I describe the various ways that our collective epistemic goals can come into conflict with each other. And I argue that we must appeal to pragmatic considerations in order to resolve such conflicts.
Notes
[1] This summative goal is the collective epistemic goal on which Alvin Goldman (Citation1999, 93–4) focuses.
[2] This is actually just one of several types of group belief that Tuomela discusses.
[3] The notion of “objective knowledge” arguably provides another attribution account of group belief, at least for one particular group. According to Popper (Citation1972), society as a whole knows p as long as it has been written down and stored in a library. All that matters is that this knowledge could be retrieved. It does not matter whether anybody has actually retrieved it.
[4] On attribution accounts of group belief as well, there might be purely pragmatic reasons for why a group has a particular belief.
[5] As I will discuss in the final section of this paper, pragmatic considerations do play a role in determining exactly what our epistemic goals are. But this applies to the epistemic goals of individuals as well as to the epistemic goals of groups.
[6] These collective goals are a central part of their analysis of collective action.
[7] Of course, many philosophers (for example, Zagzebski Citation2003) also think that knowledge is more valuable than true belief.
[8] In addition, even if the various members agree on a reason, they might disagree about why it is a good reason (cf. Schmitt Citation1994, 278–9). If this is also required for justification, then it is even more difficult for a group to be justified in its beliefs.
[9] It might also be the case that it is less valuable for a group to achieve such epistemic goals.
[10] Mathiesen (Citation2006, 165) claims that at least some group beliefs are not under the voluntary control of the group.
[11] If we have other epistemic goals (e.g. gaining understanding), then there is the potential for many other conflicts.
[12] Ideally, we would have all possible true beliefs and absolutely no false beliefs. In that case, there would be not conflict. But this is clearly not feasible (cf. Latus Citation2000, 32).
[13] John Stuart Mill (Citation1859/1978, 36) claims that “if opponents of all‐important truths do not exist, it is indispensable to imagine them and supply them with the strongest arguments which the most skillful devil’s advocate can conjure up.” However, it may not be possible to come up with such arguments unless some people actually have false beliefs on the topic.
[14] There might also be conflicts between two groups with less extensive overlaps.
[15] This is not necessarily just another potential conflict between the goals of a group and the goals of its members. New knowledge may have been discovered even if the group itself does not have the knowledge.
[16] Several philosophers of science (for example, Kuhn Citation1977, 324; Maher Citation1993, 210) have made similar points about other epistemic goals.
[17] Strictly speaking, Goldman focuses on maximizing the average number of knowledge tokens possessed by the members of the group.
[18] In order to really count as knowledge, however, this “objective knowledge” probably needs to be accessible to the members of the group.
[19] Successful scientific research also requires the dissemination of existing knowledge among the members of the scientific community. However, such dissemination is primarily valuable as a means to the discovery of new knowledge.