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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we argue that the formulation of typical expert judgements – here referred to as ‘judgement calls’ – entails figuring out how to apply ‘general knowledge’ to specific circumstances (what we call the ‘relevance query’). This requires wisdom, in its original Aristotelian sense, on the part of the scientific expert, as knowledge of laws and initial conditions is not sufficient to make judgement calls. Experts need to take into consideration factors coming from ‘outside’ the remit of scientific theory, thereby crossing the divide between empirical evidence and socio-political input (what we call the ‘expert query’). Arguing against some form of the fact-value distinction is far from an original move, but we will do so both by avoiding the conclusion that expert judgements are nothing but political (against the received view in the sociology of science), and by advocating a somewhat novel perspective. We will claim that expert scientific knowledge proves to be inadequate when it is not integrated with local knowledge, which we define as the knowledge of all factors, which are deemed relevant to the application of general knowledge to specific circumstances. The possession and role of this type of knowledge, though partly an empirical (or sociologically situated) question, can be justified by epistemological reasons.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1. It is interesting to note that even some sociologists of science have begun to distance themselves from the corrosive scepticism of much sociology of science, which tends to delegitimize the very notion of scientific expert. See for instance Collins and Evans (Citation2002, Citation2017). However, Collins and Evans continue to support the irrelevance of epistemological studies – a view from which we differ.
2. Obviously, we do not purport to make a ‘neutral’ use of philosophy-of-science tools. These will be inevitably adapted to carry out the analysis of the queries we focus on in this article. Furthermore, we will avoid any excessive use of technical/analytic details. The task we set ourselves here is to bring in enough reasoned evidence to show that epistemology is not as ‘boring’ (read ‘useless’) as Bruno Latour repeatedly argued (see, for instance, Latour Citation2005). Nothing in the following denies the importance of sociological categories when reflecting on of the role and function of experts in societies. Equally, we believe that epistemological categories provide for relevant and specific tools of analysis.
3. The idea hinted at by this type of cooperation (i.e. the institution of a single community of inquirers) is developed more in detail in Barrotta (Citation2018).
4. Cf. Aristotle (Citation2002) 1104a5-10, p. 112: ‘But if one says universally it is like this, what one says about particulars is even more lacking in precision; for it does not fall either under any expertise or under any set of rules – the agents themselves have to consider the circumstances relating to the occasion, just as happens in the cases of medicine, too, and of navigation’.
5. We here stick by a deliberately simplified picture. We do not distinguish between causal and coexistence laws. We do not mention the material condition for proper explanation. We do not bring in the controversial “correspondence rules’, which connect theoretical terms with an observational language. Though important, none of these issues is directly relevant to the problem we are trying to articulate.
6. Hempel’s view raised wide discussion. See, for instance, Coffa (Citation1973), Giere (Citation1988), Lange (Citation1993), Lipton (Citation1999), Pietrowski and Rey (Citation1995), Schiffer (Citation1991).
7. Cartwright (Citation1999), p.188.
8. It might here be appropriate to reiterate the thrust of our argument: local knowledge, in the sense specified in this paper, becomes essential as soon as scientific results – as established by laboratory science – are transferred outside the laboratory and applied over and beyond the strictly controlled environment of the laboratory itself. As argued above, we are interested in the role of ceteris paribus clauses 1) in so much as the local factors they bring to bear on the applicability of general knowledge ‘transcend’ the realm of what a theory, a law, or an experiment are able to point at, and 2) as long as they prove to be factors not to be kept at bay, but rather to be included in what counts (in some circumstances) as relevant knowledge. We thank an anonymous referee for raising the question about local knowledge and laboratory science.
9. For a more detailed historical reconstruction, see Barrotta and Montuschi (Citation2018).
10. This is the acronym from the Italian name of the corporation, i.e. ‘Società Adriatica di Elettricità’.
11. Better, Semenza only started considering the relationship between the two types of knowledge too late, and the very connection was not approached with the attention and competence it deserved.
12. For a more detailed reconstruction of this case study see Montuschi (Citation2017).
13. As for example emphasized in Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, v. 2, 2008, p. 101.
14. We are echoing here a 2011 government policy document on the badger question, where we read that effectiveness of culling is to be considered ‘a matter of judgement, not of science’ (Defra 2011, 11).
15. For example it has been pointed out how in the dispute over badgers different images of, and feelings for, these animals play a rather important role in the way issues are framed by opposite sides. The image of a ‘rogue badger’ portrays a bad, deviant and antisocial creature, ‘senile and virtually toothless (…), whose actions could be presented as a basis for intervention against a cherished animal’ (Grant Citation2009). This image is in striking contrast with the sympathetic, favorable image adopted instead by animal protection groups, or by a large part of public opinion. See on this Montuschi (Citation2017, 73).
16. This is why we have always been careful to use inverted commas when referring to ‘non-experts’.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Pierluigi Barrotta
Pierluigi Barrotta is full professor of Philosophy of science and the Head of the Department of Civilizations and Forms of Knowledge at the University of Pisa. He is currently carrying out research on the relationships between science and democracy and the role of scientific experts in society. He has recently published Scientists, Democracy and Society: A Community of Inquireres, Springer, New York 2018; and along with Giovanni Scarafile he edited Science and Democracy. Controversies and Conflicts, Benjamins, Amsterdam 2018.
Eleonora Montuschi
Eleonora Montuschi is associate professor in Philosophy of Science in the Department of Philosophy and Cultural Heritage at the University Ca’ Foscari of Venice. She is also senior research fellow and project leader at the Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Her research interests include objectivity (scientific and social), the theory and practice of evidence, and epistemological and methodological issues in the philosophy of expertise.