Who is a Conspiracy Theorist?

ABSTRACT

The simplest and most natural definition of the term ‘conspiracy theory’ leads us to the conclusion that we are all conspiracy theorists. Yet, I claim that most of us would not self-identify as such. In this paper I call this the problem of self-identification. Since virtually everyone emerges as a conspiracy theorist, the term is essentially theoretically fruitless. It would be like defining intelligence in a way that makes everyone intelligent. This raises the problem for theoretical fruitfulness, i.e. the problem of how to define the concept in a theoretically fruitful way. I suggest that these problems are currently causing confusion in the literature and present us with a dilemma, the conspiracy definition dilemma. I will present an analysis of the literature and what are on my reconstruction the solutions on offer, and argue that none is satisfactory. Either a) the solution will solve the problem of self-identification or b) it will potentially provide a theoretical fruitful definition, but no account does both.

Video abstract

KEYWORDS:

• Conspiracy theory
• conspiracy theorists
• explication
• conceptual engineering

Acknowledgments

I want to thank M Dentith, Julia Duetz, Axel Ekström, and Will Mittendorf for their comments on an earlier version of the paper. And an extra big thank you to Erik J. Olsson for all the wonderful conversations that has helped shape this paper.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. Simple CT, as stated here, follows the philosophical tradition, which typically does not include the condition of ‘powerful conspirators’ (see Hagen 2018; Dentith 2016, 2018); although some proponents of this definition do accept certain conditions, for example that the conspirators are ‘morally suspect’, ‘nefarious’ or ‘powerful individuals’ (Keeley 2007; Pigden 2006).

2. I assume, minimally, that a person subscribing to or believing in a conspiracy theory has some level of commitment to it (Sartwell 1991, 158). For a non-doxastic account see Ichino and Räikkä (2020).

3. An exemption would be a person completely uninterested or purblind to current affairs or history.

4. To self-identify as a conspiracy theorist is simply picking oneself out as such. Hence, I am not using the term in the sociological sense of group identity. Other terms would be possible instead, such as self-attribution, but for simplicity I made this choice of term.

5. In this essay I’m not discussing the practical usefulness of definitions such as usefulness for the promotion of social justice.

6. Here I follow Coady and define the official stories (or narrative) as ‘a version of events propagated by an institution which has power to influence what is widely believed’ (Coady 2003, 208). This includes, but is not limited to governments; other sources include media and the academy. For an extensive discussion on the difference between official stories and alternative narratives, see Hagen (2018).

7. For an elaboration of this point see Duetz (this issue).

8. Here I assume for the sake of the argument that not everyone would qualify as a conspiracy theorist on Sense-Making C-ST so that the minimal requirement on theoretical fruitfulness is satisfied.

9. A person may for example identify with their family, religious group, political party and so on. In social psychology ingroup and outgroup is not viewed as a normative distinction. According to the minimal group paradigm, the psychological membership of one’s ingroup is associated with a variety of phenomenon, which can include ingroup favoritism to achieve positive distinctiveness, which do not necessarily include any derogatory or discriminatory characteristics towards the outgroup. For a more detailed discussion see Tajfel (1970); Tajfel and Billig (1971); and Tajfel et al. (1974).

10. For other discussions in this issue around the conceptualisation of both ‘conspiracy theory’ and ‘conspiracy theories’ see Duetz (forthcoming), Keeley (forthcoming), Pfeifer (forthcoming), Pigden (forthcoming), and Shields (forthcoming).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Melina Tsapos

Melina Tsapos is a doctoral student at Lund University, Department of Theoretical Philosophy. Tsapos’s philosophical interests are mainly in epistemology (knowledge and beliefs) and the philosophy of mind. Tsapos’s research focuses on conspiracy theories. With a background in cognitive science Tsapos is particularly interested in cognitive architectures and how we can study beliefs within the predictive processing (and the embodied cognition) framework. Tsapos also has an interest in how empirical research is currently conducted around conspiracy theories, and the explication of the term.