The Normative Turn in Conspiracy Theory Theory?

ABSTRACT

The papers contained in this special issue are evidence that the philosophy of conspiracy theory is undergoing a ‘normative turn’, with earlier concerns about the epistemological soundness of conspiracy theories now being supplemented by a shift to concerns about discursive and epistemic justice. This is a welcome development. Nonetheless, these normative concerns need to be seen within the context of an ongoing and largely undeclared disagreement between generalists and particularists over just how conspired the world really is.

KEYWORDS:

• Conspiracy theory
• particularism
• generalism
• epistemic justice

Acknowledgments

My thanks to M R. X. Dentith for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Patrick Stokes

Patrick Stokes is associate professor of philosophy at Deakin University in Melbourne, Australia. He works on issues of personal identity, death, moral psychology, and the work of Søren Kierkegaard.