The African ethic of Ubuntu/Botho: implications for research on morality

Abstract

In this article we provide a theoretical reconstruction of sub‐Saharan ethics that we argue is a strong competitor to typical Western approaches to morality. According to our African moral theory, actions are right roughly insofar as they are a matter of living harmoniously with others or honouring communal relationships. After spelling out this ethic, we apply it to several issues in both normative and empirical research into morality. With regard to normative research, we compare and contrast this African moral theory with utilitarianism and Kantianism in the context of several practical issues. With regard to empirical research, we compare and contrast our sub‐Saharan ethic with several of Lawrence Kohlberg’s views on the nature of morality. Our aim is to highlight respects in which the African approach provides a unitary foundation for a variety of normative and empirical conclusions that are serious alternatives to dominant Western views.

Acknowledgements

The authors are grateful for written comments on an earlier draft received from Sharlene Swartz, Monica Taylor and two anonymous referees for the Journal of Moral Education, one of whom provided unusually detailed and thoughtful reflections. We have also benefited from feedback received at the inaugural conference of the African Moral Education Network (AMEN), sponsored by the Journal of Moral Education and the Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa, 9–11 September 2008.

Notes

1. The next two paragraphs borrow from Metz (2010, p. 83).

2. In the remainder of this article, we speak of ‘Ubuntu/Botho’, conjoining two terms to connote a single concept.

3. For instance, political power, workplace organisation and environmental ethics are discussed in the review article ‘Recent work in African ethics’ in this Special Issue (see Metz, pp. 381–391).

4. On which see Mogobe Ramose’s contribution in this Special Issue, pp. 291–303.

5. For an overview of critical work on Kohlberg, see the Special Issue of the Journal of Moral Education edited by Don Collins Reed (2008).

6. After all, Kohlberg suspected that some graduate students in philosophy had exemplified Stage Six reasoning (1984, pp. 272–273).