Realistic virtues and how to study them: Introducing the STRIVE-4 model

ABSTRACT

This article argues that ordinary virtue trait attributions presuppose the existence of realistic traits that fall short of, for example, Aristotelian ideals and that debate about the existence of virtue traits should be reoriented in the light of this fact. After clarifying and motivating that basic thesis, we discuss what the existing psychological research shows about the existence of realistic traits and how future psychological research could be designed to show more. Our first conclusion is that current psychological research (weakly) supports virtue trait optimism not skepticism. Our second conclusion is that psychologists will need to adopt new models and conduct new studies before they can convincingly answer questions about the existence, development and normative significance of virtue traits. In short, we argue that there is no mature science of virtue today but that we can and should develop one. We end by presenting our STRIVE-4 Model, which is designed to guide future work.

KEYWORDS:

• Virtue
• psychological realism
• character
• Doris
• Miller
• Alfano

Acknowledgements

This publication was made possible through the support of a grant from the Templeton Religion Trust through the Self, Motivation & Virtue Project. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Templeton Religion Trust or the Self, Motivation & Virtue Project. We want to thank Christian Miller and Mark Alfano for insightful comments on an early version of this article. We did not have space to adequately engage with all their arguments and points, but the paper was certainly improved thanks to their generous efforts. We also benefited from the comments of two anonymous referees.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. Our thinking about the importance of non-ideal, realistic normative targets is partially inspired by Kant (1793/1998). As he suggests, unrealizable ideals can usefully inspire us and provide us with benchmarks to calibrate our ethical and political thinking, but we also need realistic ideals that we can hope to emulate and that confirm our faith that a significant form of moral excellence or goodness is within our reach. If we have only unattainable ideals, we will likely lapse into despair or even hatred of humanity.

2. For example Merritt (2000) urges us to adopt a Humean ideal instead of an Aristotelian one, and Adams (2006, pp. 200–211) sketches a pluralist account of virtue ideals.

3. For example, Adams (2009, pp. 14–35, pp. 48–62) defends the intrinsic value of traits, Hurka (2003) focuses on the value of virtuous mental states, and Driver (2001) focuses on the value of consequences.

4. Even philosophers who deny that such normative significance is necessary for virtue could accept this claim about the virtues and vices we attribute in ordinary thought and practice. Driver, for example, could agree because she admits her externalist account of virtue traits is revisionary relative to ordinary practice and thought and because there are plausible consequentialist reasons for us to value traits that have the features mentioned in the main text.

5. We characterize realistic virtues by contrast with broadly Aristotelian/Confucian ideals for the sake of exposition. Even philosophers such as Driver who reject Aristotelian/Confucian ideals could accept our claims about the realistic virtue traits embedded in ordinary thought and practice. See also footnote 3.

6. Our views about realistic virtue traits are similar to Adams’ (2006) views on virtue, but we are proposing our account as an account of the traits attributed in ordinary thought and practice, not a philosophic account of virtue and its value. Our view therefore does not face objections such as the ones that Bradley (2007) lodges against Adams.

7. We focus on trait attribution conditions in order to remain neutral on questions about the nature, value and metaphysics of virtue traits—e.g., questions about whether virtue traits are really unified dispositions. Imagine that neuroscience reveals that the psychological and behavioral dispositions that warrant attribution of the trait of compassion are ultimately grounded in multiple, independent categorical brain structures. Such a discovery would raise doubts about the metaphysical status of the trait of compassion. Some might suggest that this ‘trait’ is not fundamental or real and that it is just a name for a set of distinct dispositions with different categorical bases. Because our aim is to identify psychological models that can guide research into empirical questions about whether people have virtue traits such as compassion and fairness, we leave all such metaphysical issues aside. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pushing us to clarify our metaphysical commitments.

8. For similar claims about virtue (and not just ordinary attributed traits) see Adams (2006, pp. 115–125). Cf. the ensuing discussion in Doris (2015) and Adams (2010).

9. Some philosophers would deny that virtue traits, or ideal virtue traits, are essentially multi-modal but they can still grant that the empirical studies of widely recognized virtue-traits such as compassion, fairness, justice should model the traits as multi-modal entities. See also footnotes 3 and 4.

10. For related discussions of the unity of the virtues see Adams (2006), chapter 10 and Russell (2009), chapter 11. As mentioned in other footnotes, our view about the traits people attribute in ordinary practice is most similar to Adams’ account of virtue.

11. Adams (2006, pp. 138–143) discusses role-relative virtue traits, but we have not found a place where he discusses the way that standards of virtue vary with role and relationship context.

12. Adams (2006, pp. 155–158, pp. 181–184) argues that traits can deviate from the ideal in many of the ways we have indicated and still be virtues but we have not been able to identify his criteria for deciding when a less than ideal trait is a virtue. As mentioned before we propose our criteria as criteria that underlie ordinary practices of virtue trait attribution. They may also be plausible as a criteria for a trait being a virtue, but unlike Adams, we are bracketing that issue.

13. In response to Adams, Doris (2015) seems to concede that local traits as he understands them may be normatively significant. It is possible that Doris does not currently endorse ordinary virtue-trait skepticism (as Miller does).

14. Cf. Adams (2006, pp. 144–158).

15. For example, see the metaphysical issues mentioned in footnote 3.

16. The broad brush framing description that heads the list of items on the scale is also, we think, typical of extant psychological work: ‘Now, we will look at situations in which you notice or learn that someone else is being treated unfairly, put at a disadvantage, or used.’ (Schmitt et al., 2010, p. 234).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Templeton Religion Trust [Self, Virtue, and Motivation Project].

Notes on contributors

Bradford Cokelet

Bradford Cokelet PhD (Northwestern University, 2009) is a moral philosopher at the University of Kansas. His research centers on questions about good character and the ways that individuals and institutions can cultivate virtue in modern, liberal states. He pursues projects related to these questions in contemporary normative theory, cross-cultural philosophy, the history of ethics and empirically informed inquiry. He has articles published in Ethics, Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics and European Journal for the Philosophy of Religion.

Blaine J. Fowers

Blaine J. Fowers PhD is Professor of Counseling Psychology at the University of Miami. He conducts theoretical and empirical investigations of virtue and flourishing. Fowers is the author of The Evolution of Ethics: Human Sociality and the Emergence of Ethical Mindedness, Virtue and Psychology and Beyond the Myth of Marital Happiness and a co-author of Re-Envisioning Psychology and Frailty, Suffering, and Vice: Flourishing in the Face of Human Limitations. He and his research team study virtues, higher order goals and their links to choice-worthy goods and human flourishing. Fowers has published over 90 peer reviewed articles and book chapters. He was a Distinguished Visiting Professor at the University of Birmingham, England in 2016. He is a Fellow of the American Psychological Association and a recipient of the Joseph B. Gittler award for contributions to the philosophical foundations of psychology.