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Extended Book Review

Virtue science and productive theoretical neutrality: Review of Wright, J. C., Warren, M., & Snow, N. Understanding virtue

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ABSTRACT

In this wise and creative book, Wright, Warren, and Snow propose a path-breaking interdisciplinary research program that promises to ground a mature science of moral virtue. Their theoretical framework and ideas for measurement are designed to guide psychologists as they study the individual traits that people have, the ways that traits interact or conflict, and the ways they change over time. While lauding the authors’ impressive achievements, I criticize the contentious Aristotelian assumptions they build into their program. I argue that the science of virtue will be better served if researchers restrict themselves to more neutral assumptions and convert philosophically contentious views into competing empirical hypotheses.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Bradford Cokelet

Bradford Cokelet works on analytic moral philosophy, the empirical study of virtue and philosophy instruction, and Chinese philosophy. He has published papers in Ethics, Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Cognition, Perspectives on Psychological Science, the European Journal for the Philosophy of Religion, and the Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture.

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