https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9555-1934
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ABSTRACT
Disagreements between European Union (EU) member states constrain the Union’s capacity to manage conflicts such as Kosovo-Serbia. While Kosovo has long received EU support, five EU member states do not recognise its independence. How does the EU manage to work around member states’ vetoes and mitigate contestation? In contrast to previous scholarship, the analysis of the EU enlargement process and visa liberalisation, the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue and the EULEX mission illustrate how institutional, technical and diplomatic solutions have allowed the provision of support to Kosovo, despite internal disagreements. EU member states have delegated to EU institutions the responsibility of overseeing day-to-day conflict management and integration policies concerning Kosovo and Serbia. EU institutions also use technical and constructively ambiguous language to manage conflicts and navigate the absence of political consensus regarding Kosovo’s statehood. Additionally, the EU has fostered diplomatic collaboration with the United States (US) and with actors from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to navigate through the Kosovo-Serbia conflict.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Riccardo Alcaro and the rest of the JOINT colleagues for the comments on previous drafts of the article. The authors would also like to thank the two anonymous reviewers and the editors of the journal for constructive critiques and suggestions. This article has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 959143 (www.jointproject.eu). The article reflects only the view of the authors and the European Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains.
Notes
1 Interviews were conducted in line with the ethics guidelines of the JOINT Horizon project, of which this research was part, approved by the Italian CNR Research Ethics and Integrity Committee on 9 August 2021.
2 Interview #5, Policy expert, Athens, Citation2022; Interview #6, Academic expert, Athens, Citation2022. See also Armakolas (Citation2020).
3 Interview #35, EU official, Brussels, Citation2022.
4 See, for example, European Commission (Citation2023c).
5 Interview #34, EU official, Pristina, Citation2022.
6 Interview #36, EU official, Brussels, Citation2022.
7 Interview #7, Civil Society, Belgrade, Citation2022; Interview #8, Academic expert, Belgrade, Citation2022; Interview #11, EU official, Belgrade, Citation2022. See also Petrovic (Citation2021).
8 Interview #10, Policy expert, Belgrade, Citation2022.
9 Interview #11, EU official, Belgrade, Citation2022; Interview #36, EU official, Brussels, Citation2022.
10 It is beyond the scope of this article to examine the reasons behind Serbia’s foreign policy choices and its (de-) democratisation trajectory in the last three decades. For a discussion, see Bechev (Citation2021), Panagiotou (Citation2021), Ross Smith et al. (Citation2021), Richter and Wunsch (Citation2020).
11 Interview #29, (Former) Kosovo official, online, 2022. See also UN General Assembly (Citation2010).
12 Interview #8, Academic expert, Belgrade, Citation2022.
13 Interviews#24, EU official, Pristina, Citation2022; Interview #30, EU official, Brussels, Citation2022.
14 Interview #27, International official, Pristina, Citation2022.
15 Interview #27, International official, Pristina, Citation2022; Interview #30, EU official, Brussels, Citation2022. See also Semenov (Citation2021).
16 Interview #23, National official, Brussels, Citation2022; Interview #30, EU official, Brussels, Citation2022.
17 Interview #22, (Former) Kosovo official, online, Citation2022; Interview #26, International official, Pristina, Citation2022; Interview #27, International official, Pristina, Citation2022; Interview #30, EU official, Brussels, Citation2022.
18 Interview #7 Civil Society, Belgrade, Citation2022; Interview #8, Academic expert, Belgrade, Citation2022. See also Tadić (Citation2019).
19 Interviews #1, Spanish official, Madrid, Citation2022; Interview #2, Spanish official, Madrid, Citation2022; Interview #3, Spanish official, Madrid, Citation2022.
20 Interview #8, Academic expert, Belgrade, Citation2022.
21 Quoted from NATO (Citation2023).
22 Interview #24, EU official, Pristina, Citation2022.
23 Interview #24, EU official, Pristina, Citation2022.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Pol Bargués
Pol Bargués is Senior Research Fellow at the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB), Barcelona, Spain. Email: [email protected]
Assem Dandashly
Assem Dandashly is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Maastricht University, Netherlands.
Hylke Dijkstra
Hylke Dijkstra is Professor of International Security and Cooperation at Maastricht University, Netherlands. Email: [email protected]
Gergana Noutcheva
Gergana Noutcheva is Associate Professor in International Relations and European Foreign Policy at Maastricht University, Netherlands. Email: [email protected]