Reflexive Control as a Risk Factor for Using OSINT: Insights from the Russia–Ukraine Conflict

Abstract

Special governmental services, security services of leading companies, and private researchers rely on open-source intelligence (OSINT). With the development of the Internet and social networks, open-data intelligence is increasingly turning from a subtle art into a “mechanical” process—the more data, the better. OSINT professionals’ competence enables verification of information and minimizes the chances of deception unless the intention of the investigation and the data’s locale are previously known to their adversary. In this very case, the hunter can get into a trap dexterously rigged by an adversary. This article discusses the risks of disinformation through open sources in the context of the Soviet concept of “reflexive control”; that is, imposing unfavorable decisions on the enemy through the introduction of incorrect premises, exemplified by the experience of the Russian–Ukrainian conflict since 2014. The article evaluates the influence exerted on the governmental and military decisions by disinformation through open sources, examining several reported cases. Systematization of data on previous attempts at reflexive control, such as Russian information operations, can increase the accuracy of assessing the depth of an enemies’ reflexion, which helps to reveal their operational plans and predict further actions because disinformation often precedes other forms of aggression.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I thank Dr. Anatolii Melnychenko from National Technical University of Ukraine Igor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute, and Dr. Benjamin Martill and Dr. Vasileios Galanos from the University of Edinburgh, for useful discussions and feedback.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

The author reports there are no competing interests to declare.

Notes

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14 The author’s personal knowledge of the language allows the following remarks: rank of reflexion refers to the Russian term “ранг рефлексии.” A more accurate translation into English would suggest “level of reflexion” or “degree of reflexion” (the best capacity to imitate an opponents’ thoughts or predict their behavior). However, in the English-language scientific literature on the Soviet theory of reflexive control, exactly this term was firmly trenched.

15 Dmitry Novikov and Alexander Chkhartishvili, Рефлексия и Управление: Математические Модели [Reflexion and Control: Mathematical Models] (Moscow: Издательство физико-математической литературы, 2013), pp. 194–195.

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22 According to the “Bonanza Media” statements: JIT WITNESS: Two Fighter Jets Were Following MH17, YouTube (Bonanza Media, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CE9dqAaxoes; MH17—Call for Justice, YouTube (Bonanza Media, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wkDWwYk4-Ho

23 The Russian government is widely known to struggle actively against domestic opposition media, thus confining the main source of information that runs counter to the official narrative to foreign media. Meanwhile, certain information from the foreign media that is covertly controlled by Russian authorities is targeted at the Russian audience that mistrusts domestic sources. Nevertheless, the majority of the audience perceive the above publications in the Western press as reconfirming the trustworthiness of official sources.

24 Yevgeniy Golovchenko, Mareike Hartmann, and Rebecca Adler-Nissen, “State, Media and Civil Society in the Information Warfare over Ukraine: Citizen Curators of Digital Disinformation,” International Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 5 (2018), p. 984. doi:10.1093/ia/iiy148

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27 The “New START” treaty, signed 8 April 2010, by the United States and Russia, aimed at restricting the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1,550 on each side, as well as limiting the overall amount of intercontinental (including submarine-launched) ballistic missiles, and strategic nuclear-capable bombers. The treaty also provided various verification and transparency measures to ensure compliance with the stipulated limits.

28 Bill Gertz, “CIA: Leak of Nuclear-Armed Drone Sub Was Intentional,” Washington Free Beacon, 18 November 2015, https://freebeacon.com/national-security/cia-leak-of-nuclear-armed-drone-sub-was-intentional (accessed 8 December 2022).

29 2015-11-10 21-00, YouTube (RussianArms YouTube channel, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_FgPBGteLzU

30 Anton Mardasov, “‘Убийцу Американской ПРО’ Направят Под Иркутск” [“American Missile Defense Killer” Will be Sent Near Irkutsk], Свободная Пресса, last modified 23 September 2015, https://svpressa.ru/war21/article/132431/ (accessed 8 December 2022).

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32 Ken Dilanian, Courtney Kube, Carol E. Lee, and Dan De Luce, “Bold, Effective and Risky: The New Strategy the U.S. Is Using in the Info War against Russia,” NBC News, last modified 6 April 2022, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/us-using-declassified-intel-fight-info-war-russia-even-intel-isnt-rock-rcna23014 (accessed 4 June 2023).

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35 The territory of present-day western Ukraine changed its ownership many times. The last time it was included in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (UkrSSR) after the Red Army’s intervention in Poland in September 1939.

36 Yuri Zoria, “Ukraine under a Cyberattack with a Russian Trace,” Euromaidan Press, last modified 14 January 2022, https://euromaidanpress.com/2022/01/14/ukraine-under-massive-cyberattack-with-a-russian-trace/ (accessed 8 December 2022).

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40 Lepskiy, Technologies of Control, p. 174.

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42 Ukraine and Poland, as neighboring countries, have a centuries-old complicated history of relations, sometimes experiencing acute tensions. Therefore, on 24 September 2019, just before the day of the fake release, Ukrainian Ombudsman Lyudmila Denisova and her Polish counterpart Adam Bodnar signed the so-called anti-xenophobic covenant, meant to protect the rights of Ukrainian citizens in Poland and Poles in Ukraine.

43 Ruslan Leviev (@RuslanLeviev), tweet, 14 August 2022, https://twitter.com/RuslanLeviev/status/1558880955657584642

44 The High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) is one of the highest priority targets for Russian reconnaissance. For example, see: “Ukraine: What Are Himars Missiles and Are They Changing the War?” BBC News, August 30, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-62512681

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59 Ibid., pp. 9–18.

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62 RT на русском (@rt_russian), Telegram repost from Исповедь сотрудника ФБК (@confessionfbk), 22 April 2019, https://t.me/rt_russian/14350 (accessed 8 December 2022).

63 RT на русском (@rt_russian), Telegram repost from Исповедь сотрудника ФБК (@confessionfbk), 24 April 2019, https://t.me/rt_russian/14378 (accessed 8 December 2022).

64 “СБУ Оголосила Про Підозру Відомому Проросійському Пропагандисту Шарію” [The SSU has Announced the Suspicion of the Well-Known Pro-Russian Propagandist Shariy], Security Service of Ukraine, last modified 16 February 2021, https://ssu.gov.ua/novyny/sbu-oholosyla-pro-pidozru-vidomomu-prorosiiskomu-propahandystu-shariiu (accessed 8 December 2022).

65 Igor Karmazin, “‘Украинские Журналисты Упали Ниже Дна’ Как Блогер Анатолий Шарий Уволил Министра Информации Украины” [“Ukrainian Journalists have Fallen Below the Bottom”: How Blogger Anatoly Shariy Fired the Minister of Information of Ukraine], Lenta.RU, last modified 2 June 2017, https://lenta.ru/articles/2017/06/02/sharij/ (accessed 8 December 2022).

66 Oleksandr Skrypnyk, “Як КГБ СРСР Поховав Ще Живого Ярослава Стецька” [How the KGB of the USSR Buried Yaroslav Stetsk Still Alive], Історична правда, last modified 5 July 2021, https://www.istpravda.com.ua/articles/2021/07/5/159786/ (accessed 8 December 2022)

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68 Ben Wallace, “Video Released Showing Russian Hoax Call with UK Defence Secretary,” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, last modified 21 March 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/21/video-released-showing-russian-hoax-call-with-uk-defence-secretary (accessed 8 December 2022).

69 Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine (@DIUkraine), Telegram post, 3 March 2022, https://t.me/DIUkraine/27 (accessed 8 December 2022).

70 Mark Krutov (@kromark), tweet, 14 August 2022, https://twitter.com/kromark/status/1558884637224624128 (accessed 8 December 2022).

71 “2022 State of Competitive Intelligence Report,” CRAYON Inc., last modified 21 December 2022, https://www.crayon.co/state-of-competitive-intelligence (accessed 8 December 2022).

72 Rob Lee (@RALee85), tweet, 14 February 2022, https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1493153810725941249 (accessed 8 December 2022).

73 “Минобороны: Россия Начала Возвращать Войска с Учений в Места Дислокации” [Ministry of Defense: Russia Has begun to Return Troops from Exercises to Places of Deployment], BBC News Русская служба, BBC, last modified 15 February 2022), https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-60385611

74 Conflict Intelligence Team (@CITeam), Telegram post, 20 February 2022, https://t.me/CITeam/2297 (accessed 8 December 2022).

75 Mykhaylo Zabrodskyi, Jack Watling, Oleksandr Danylyuk, and Nick Reynolds, “Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine,” Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 30 November 2022, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/preliminary-lessons-conventional-warfighting-russias-invasion-ukraine-february-july-2022 (accessed 4 June 2022).

76 Taras Tarasiuk and Andreas Umland, “Unexpected Friendships: Cooperation of Ukrainian Ultra-Nationalists with Russian and Pro-Kremlin Actors,” The Illiberalism Studies Program, 29 September 2021, https://www.illiberalism.org/unexpected-friendships-cooperation-of-ukrainian-ultra-nationalists-with-russian-and-pro-kremlin-actors/ (accessed 4 June 2022).

77 Ibid.

78 “European Parliament Resolution of 13 December 2012 on the Situation in Ukraine 2012/2889(RSP),” European Parliament, 13 December 2012, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-7-2012-0507_EN.html

79 Brian Nichiporuk, Andrew Radin, Michael Kofman, Katya Migacheva, Olesya Tkacheva, and Jenny Oberholtzer, Lessons from Russia’s Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine (RAND Corporation, 2017), p. 20. doi:10.7249/RR1498

80 Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, George Barros, Angela Howard, and Mason Clark, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 10,” Institute for the Study of War, last modified 10 September 2022, https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-10 (accessed 8 December 2022).

81 Slovo i Dilo, “ВСУ Планируют Идти в Контрнаступление На Херсон—Ким” [AFU Plan to Launch a Counteroffensive on Kherson—Kim], Слово и Дело, last modified 27 April 2022, https://ru.slovoidilo.ua/2022/04/27/novost/bezopasnost/vsu-planiruyut-idti-kontrnastuplenie-xerson-kim (accessed December 8, 2022).

82 Україні Потрібна Сучасна Протиракетна Зброя. Звернення Президента 14.06.2022 [Ukraine Needs Modern Anti-Missile Weapons. Address of the President 06/14/2022], YouTube, Office of the President of Ukraine, 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JHHNmg3i-n8 (accessed 8 December 2022).

83 Jim Sciutto and Tim Lister, “Ukrainian Forces Aim to Retake Kherson by Year’s End as Gains Made in South, US and Ukrainian Officials Say,” CNN, last modified 7 September 2022, https://edition.cnn.com/2022/09/07/politics/ukraine-russia-war-kherson/index.html (accessed 8 December 2022).

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Additional information

Notes on contributors

Illia Varzhanskyi

Illia Varzhanskyi is the Head of the Operational Security Strategies Laboratory at the World Data Center for Geoinformatics and Sustainable Development and a Serviceman in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. His research focuses on reflexive control theory, information and psychological operations, and open-source intelligence. He is a Ph.D. student at Igor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute as well as at the University of Edinburgh. The author can be contacted at [email protected].