https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8955-0193
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ABSTRACT
In 1949, Simone de Beauvoir cited the fairly unknown author Poulain de la Barre in an epigraph for The Second Sex (1949). When reading The Second Sex, one soon realizes that there are profound similarities between the two authors’ discussions of women’s situation. Both Poulain and Beauvoir view the subjection of women as a process that includes choice as well as force. Liberation necessarily requires overcoming opinions rooted in custom and prejudice. The article develops a comparison between the arguments of Poulain and Beauvoir in order to illuminate interesting features in the works of both authors. The focus is on similarities as well as differences. The first section examines how prejudice and the practices of men’s self-interest have contributed to the reification of women. Section 2 discusses the peculiar nature of prejudices about oneself and section 3 focuses on the metaphysical relation between freedom and materiality. Finally, section 4 examines how mutual recognition becomes possible in the context of freedom, the search for truth, and friendship.
Acknowledgements
I presented a first draft of this article at the conference Recognition and Respect in Early Modern Philosophy (University of York, 2019). My most profound gratitude goes to Heikki Haara and Tim Stuart-Buttle, who organized the conference and edited the papers into a special issue of the BJHP, and to my fellow participants for their engaged comments. I presented a later draft at the Australasian Seminar in Early Modern Philosophy (University of Queensland, 2019) and thank the organizers and participants of that event. Special thanks for their excellent comments to Marguerite Deslauriers, Marguerite La Caze, Sameema Zahra, Kate Sotejeff-Wilson, and two anonymous referees.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 On Beauvoir’s reading of Poulain, see also Welch, “Introduction”, 32–3, and Schmitter, “Cartesian Prejudice”.
2 Here we should note earlier work on Beauvoir’s relation to Cartesian philosophy, see James, “Complicity and Slavery”; Heinämaa, “The Soul-Body Union and Sexual Difference” and “Ambiguity and Difference”; and La Caze, Wonder and Generosity.
3 It is likely that Poulain had some familiarity with Thomas Hobbes’ account of human beings in the state of nature (see Poulain, On Equality, 164), but he defends a more optimistic position. On Poulain and Hobbes, see Stuurman, Poulain de la Barre and the Invention of Modern Equality, 177–9.
4 There is an evident parallel between the loss of original harmony and the Biblical Fall. For more detail on Poulain’s view, see Reuter, “François Poulain de la Barre”.
5 When arguing that male rule over women is a form of illegitimate tyranny, Poulain aligns himself with a long Renaissance tradition of defences of women, see Deslauriers, “Patriarchal Power as Unjust”.
6 Honneth emphasizes that this concept of “‘recognition’ in its most elementary form” as a “primordial form of relating to the world” (Honneth, Reification, 37) must not be confused with “that particular form of mutual recognition […] in which the other person’s specific characteristics are affirmed” (Honneth, Reification, 51). Honneth has discussed the latter form in previous works.
7 For a recent feminist discussion of internalized prejudices, see Saul, “Implicit Bias, Stereotype Threat, and Women in Philosophy”.
8 On Poulain’s relation to the Neo-Augustinian tradition, see Reuter, “Poulain de la Barre on the Subjugation of Women”.
9 Though clearly alluding to Neo-Augustinian discussions, Poulain does not relate our wish to live in accordance with others’ opinions to how pride makes us strive for the others’ esteem. For an interesting point of comparison, see Susan James’ parallel reading of Nicholas Malebranche and Beauvoir on how the desire for esteem affects complicity (James, “Complicity and Slavery”).
10 Beauvoir’s discussion of the temptation to remain dependent is embedded in her and Jean-Paul Sartre’s dialogue about the concept he calls ‘bad faith’, see Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 86–116.
11 The main difference between Descartes’ and Beauvoir’s early perspectives on freedom and facticity is that whereas Descartes thinks that God’s freedom is pure and infinite, Beauvoir (and Sartre) emphasise that no such abstract freedom exists, i.e. freedom does not exist outside of the finite human situation.
12 Translation altered by the author.
13 I have previously argued that Poulain does not seem to have adopted Descartes’ concept of will in any detail (Reuter, “Freedom of the Will as a Basis of Equality”, 79–81). For an alternative interpretation, emphasizing the similarities between Descartes’ and Poulain’s concepts of will, see Broad “Early Modern Feminism and Cartesian Philosophy”.
14 Translation altered by the author.
15 It is important to note that Poulain writes “se soument volontairement” (Poulain, De l’éducation, 208), which is best translated as ‘submits voluntarily’. The published English translation has translated the expression as ‘submits of his own free will’ (Poulain, On Education, 182) and this translation has led Jacqueline Broad to use the passage as evidence for her claim that Poulain did indeed adopt Descartes’ concept of free will (Broad, “Early Modern Feminism and Cartesian Philosophy”, 76).
16 Translation altered by the author.
17 On the complementary rather than equal roles of the sexes, see Rousseau, Emile, 358, and on friendship e.g. Rousseau, Emile, 220, 233–5.
18 Neither are they social equals. Poulain makes it clear that Sophia, in whose home the group gathers, has the highest social standing.
19 On the relation between mutual recognition and friendship in Beauvoir’s writings, see Ward, “Reciprocity and Friendship in Beauvoir’s Thought”.
20 I focus only on Beauvoir’s discussion of recognition and friendship, but we may note that she discusses generosity already in Pyrrhus and Cineas (Beauvoir, “Pyrrhus and Cineas”, 123–4). On Beauvoir’s Cartesian concept of generosity, see Heinämaa, “Ambiguity and Difference”, and La Caze, Wonder and Generosity. On Malebranche’s concept of generosity in relation to Beauvoir’s thought, see James, “Complicity and Slavery”.