China’s ‘New International Order’: The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in Afghanistan and Syria

Abstract

Ever since its establishment, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) has positioned itself as representative of a ‘new international order’ in contrast to the US-led ‘old order’. This article argues that analysing the SCO’s response to international crises as practical implementations of its ‘new international order’ offers crucial insights into China’s vision for international relations. To that end, it examines the organisation’s response to crises in Afghanistan and Syria, outlining what kind of order the SCO propagates and what this means when acted out. The findings are based on qualitative content analysis of PRC and SCO documents and semi-structured expert interviews.

Acknowledgements

The research for this article was conducted during the author’s doctoral studies at Freie Universität Berlin, Germany. The author would like to thank all interview partners for their time and insights, and also Elena Meyer-Clement, Giulia Sciorati and Jonna Nyman for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. I would also like to express my gratitude to the two anonymous reviewers appointed by Europe-Asia Studies, as their comments greatly improved this article.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 As of 2023, SCO members’ combined territory is over 60% of the Eurasian landmass, and their combined population makes up almost half of the world population. The combined economic power of all SCO states is estimated at about a quarter of world GDP (Li 2023).

2 Notable exceptions include Aris (2012), Cheng (2015) and Zhao (2016).

3 This view is grounded in two arguments. First, in terms of economy, China is by far the strongest state in the group. It is actively pursuing a strategy of integrating SCO states in its ambitious economic plans, which has already led to, and is expected to lead to even more, dependence by other SCO members on China. Second, considering the organisational setup of the SCO, it is difficult to doubt Chinese leadership. The name, ‘Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’; the location of its permanent executive body, the Secretariat, in Beijing; and the fact that its first secretary-general, Zhang Deguang, was a Chinese diplomat, are further evidence of China’s leading position in the group, at least in initiating the organisation.

4 Also, interviewee 6, scholar, university, Beijing, 4 April 2018; interviewee 9, scholar, think tank, Beijing, 9 April 2018; interviewee 11, scholar, think tank, Beijing, 10 April 2018. The ‘New Security Concept’ was first enunciated in the 1990s under Jiang Zemin. It emphasises mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation.

5 See, for example, SCO (2017a).

6 For an in-depth study of China’s socialisation processes in international security institutions, see Johnston (2008).

7 The interviewees’ affiliations should be kept in mind when evaluating their opinions and comments on China’s international affairs.

8 Given that several interview partners asked to remain anonymous, all interviewees are anonymised except SCO Deputy Secretary-General Wang Kaiwen. Interviews were conducted between February and July 2018 in Beijing and Shanghai. Most interviews were conducted in Chinese, while a few were held in English. All translations are by the author.

9 The need to establish a ‘new international order’ was first officially agreed upon by China and Russia, when presidents Jiang Zemin and Boris Yel’tsin signed the bilateral ‘Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Order’ (PRC/Russia 1997) on the sidelines of the 1997 Shanghai Five summit.

10 However, not all official documents refer to the SCO’s envisaged order as a ‘new international order’. Rather, I use the umbrella term ‘new international order’ to refer to the SCO’s official vision for the kind of international order that it advocates as desirable in the twenty-first century.

11 Interviewee 16, senior scholar, think tank, Shanghai, 21 June 2018.

12 Interviewee 16, senior scholar, think tank, Shanghai, 21 June 2018.

13 Interviewee 3, senior scholar, think tank, Shanghai, 19 March 2018; interviewee 8, senior scholar, think tank, Beijing, 9 April 2018; interviewee 11, scholar, think tank, Beijing, 10 April 2018; interviewee 15, senior scholar, university, Beijing, 12 June 2018.

14 Interviewee 16, senior scholar, think tank, Shanghai, 21 June 2018; also, interviewee 3, senior scholar, think tank, Shanghai, 19 March 2018.

15 The SCO secretariat’s website is available at: http://chn.sectsco.org/.

16 Between 2001 and 2021, the SCO also published statements regarding the Kyrgyzstan revolutions in 2005 and 2010, the Russo–Georgian War of 2008, the 2016 South China Sea tribunal, the Korean Peninsula, the Iran nuclear issue, Taiwan and Ukraine. While Afghanistan and Syria were mentioned in the majority of heads of state summit declarations and several foreign ministerial press releases, the SCO’s remarks regarding the other issues were typically much shorter and also rarer. For instance, only one brief comment regarding Taiwan could be found, and a mere two SCO documents mentioned the South China Sea dispute.

17 The SCO offers the status of observer state or dialogue partner to countries interested in a formal association. These statuses allow governments to participate in important SCO events, such as the heads of state summits.

18 In 2005, after several other so-called ‘colour revolutions’ in post-Soviet states, Kyrgyzstan became the first (and, to date, the only) Central Asian republic to experience a colour revolution, the so-called ‘Tulip Revolution’. Another revolution, known as the ‘Melon Revolution’, followed in 2010. The Third Kyrgyz Revolution took place ten years later, in October 2020.

19 Interviewee 12, senior scholar, think tank, Shanghai, 11 May 2018.

20 For example, SCO (2012, 2013, 2016a, 2016b).

21 For example, SCO Secretariat (2010, Art. 8).

22 Interviewee 5, senior scholar, think tank, Shanghai, 29 March 2018.

23 Interviewee 1, scholar, university, Shanghai, 7 March 2018; interviewee 8, senior scholar, think tank, Beijing, 9 April 2018.

24 Interviewee 12, senior scholar, think tank, Shanghai, 11 May 2018.

25 Interviewee 12, senior scholar, think tank, Shanghai, 11 May 2018.

26 The ‘Heart of Asia–Istanbul Process’ was first initiated by Afghanistan and Turkey in 2011. It brings together regional countries as well as regional and international organisations that aim to enhance economic and political cooperation centred on Afghanistan. The ‘Paris Process’ or ‘Paris Pact Initiative’ is an international coalition for combatting illicit traffic in opiates originating in Afghanistan. It is made up of 58 countries and 22 organisations, including the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

27 Interviewee 8, senior scholar, think tank, Beijing, 9 April 2018.

28 Interviewee 8, senior scholar, think tank, Beijing, 9 April 2018. As of 2023, the regional anti-drug centre is yet to be established. In April 2023, representatives from SCO countries met in Dushanbe to discuss the creation of the agency (SCO Secretariat 2023).

29 ‘Syrian National Dialogue Congress Aimed at Intensifying UN Activities on Syria—Lavrov’, TASS, 15 January 2018, available at: https://tass.com/politics/985057, accessed 29 May 2020.

30 Interviewee 1, scholar, university, Shanghai, 7 March 2018; interviewee 2, senior scholar, university, Shanghai, 13 March 2018; interviewee 16, senior scholar, think tank, Shanghai, 21 June 2018; interview with Wang Kaiwen, Deputy Secretary-General SCO, Beijing, 22 June 2018.

31 The principle of non-interference is one of the fundamental UN norms and closely connected with the norm of sovereignty. It is also one of the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’ (heping gongchu wu xiang yuanze), which China repeatedly refers to as the basis of its relations with other countries (SCIO 2011; Xi 2017). Unsurprisingly, it is the central norm officially guiding the SCO, along with state sovereignty (Lewis 2012, p. 1224).

32 Interviewee 17, scholar, think tank, Beijing, 22 June 2018.

33 Interviewee 16, senior scholar, think tank, Shanghai, 21 June 2018.

34 Interviewee 6, scholar, university, Beijing, 4 April 2018.

35 Interviewee 4, scholar, think tank, Shanghai, 20 March 2018.

36 Interviewee 1, scholar, university, Shanghai, 7 March 2018; interviewee 4, scholar, think tank, Shanghai, 20 March 2018.

37 Interviewee 1, scholar, university, Shanghai, 7 March 2018; interviewee 12, senior scholar, think tank, Shanghai, 11 May 2018; interviewee 14, senior scholar, think tank, Shanghai, 28 May 2018.

38 Interviewee 1, scholar, university, Shanghai, 7 March 2018; interviewee 16, senior scholar, think tank, Shanghai, 21 June 2018.

39 Particularly noteworthy here is the use of the term ‘forces’ (shili) to describe protesters of the Arab Spring, the same term as in the ‘three evils’ (sometimes also translated as ‘three evil forces’). Hence, even though officially the SCO remained neutral in its judgement of the protests’ (il)legitimacy, here it becomes clear that the Chinese vice-foreign minister assessed the protesters as including threatening and possibly illegitimate forces, which could also be related to the ‘three evils’.

40 Interviewee 8, senior scholar, think tank, Beijing, 9 April 2018; interviewee 15, senior scholar, university, Beijing, 12 June 2018.

41 While most of these statements do not make explicit Syria’s ‘historical and civilisational specificities’, the Astana Declaration (SCO 2017a, Art. 3) notes that ‘Only the Syrian people can determine the future of a new, secular, and democratic Syria in which people of all ethnic groups and religions live in peace and security, and enjoy equal rights and opportunities’.

42 See, for example, SCO (2017b).

43 ‘Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Encouraged the SCO Member States to Participate in the Humanitarian Operation in Syria’, Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, 28 August 2018, available at: http://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12193013@egNews&_print=true, accessed 1 December 2020.

44 Interviewee 2, senior scholar, university, Shanghai, 13 March 2018; interviewee 16, senior scholar, think tank, Shanghai, 21 June 2018.

45 ‘Russian Top Brass Reports it has Proof of UK’s Involvement in Douma Chemical Incident’, TASS, 13 April 2018, available at: https://tass.com/defense/999641, accessed 27 May 2020.

46 Such overt criticism of Western states’ actions regarding Syria is absent from the 2019 Bishkek Declaration, the 2020 Moscow Declaration, the 2021 Dushanbe Declaration and the 2022 Samarkand Declaration. Similarly, the SCO has not openly taken sides in Russia’s war against Ukraine.

47 The call for regional solutions is in no way unique to SCO member states (Kingah & Seiwert 2017).

48 For example, PRC Embassy Germany (2020).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Eva Seiwert

Eva Seiwert, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Institute of Political Science, Kochstrasse 4, 91054 Erlangen, Germany. Email: [email protected]