https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8813-8447
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Abstract
When actors engage in attentional biases, they focus on one area of knowledge at the expense of others. In contrast to previous literature, we contend that these biases do not necessarily result in selective ignorance. This is because different attentional biases, informed by dissimilar emotions and logics, affect not just what knowledge is approached over others but how it is approached. It hence produces different types of ignorance or non-knowledge—and by extension, forms of power—in the political economy. We develop a novel conceptual framework on hypervigilance as attentional bias. Then, through discourse analysis, we demonstrate how hypervigilance engendered practices of knowledge distortion; knowledge avoidance and elimination; and knowledge rejection which resulted in the (re)production of inaccurate knowledge and willful blindness that stifled the growth of China’s fledgling halal industry and halal Belt and Road Initiative. This article contributes to the literature on social identity’s influence on economic policies and politics, particularly to nascent scholarship on the links between non-knowledge, ethnoreligious identity and political economy. It proposes pathways through which attentional biases as ignorance extend racialized power, affecting access to resources, opportunities, and participation in the domestic and international political economy.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the editors and anonymous reviewers for their valuable feedback and guidance.
Disclosure statement
The authors declare no conflicts of interest.
Notes
1 Halal food is commonly taken to be food without pork or alcohol. Other technical criteria must also be met for food to be considered halal rather than haram (lit. non-permissible), however. Generally, this means that halal food cannot include carrion or blood; it must also undergo the proper slaughtering process and not come from plants or animals forbidden for consumption.
2 A 2012 estimate puts the number at 20.32 million, but the Seventh National Population Census undertaken in 2020 does not provide a detailed population breakdown by ethnic group. See, for instance, National Bureau of Statistics of China (Ning, Citation2021).
3 This was particularly the case after the 2009 Urumqi riots. See, for example, Durneika (Citation2018) and Ho (Citation2013).
4 Interviews 7, 15; Aida Lim Abdullah, former CEO of Penang Halal International: personal communication, April 5, 2022.
5 Dr Hew Wai Weng, Head of Centre for Occidental Studies, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia: personal communication, April 8, 2022.
6 Ibid.
7 Pan-halalization’ or ‘pan-halal tendency’ is a term introduced by the state-run Global Times to describe Muslim demands for ‘things to be halal which cannot really be halal, such as water, roads, and toilets’ (Ye, Citation2016).
8 Interviews 9, 11.
9 Specifically, state media branded pan-halalization as part of the ‘three evil forces’ (separatism, extremism, and terrorism). It also attributed the influx of halal-labeled products to a capitalist plot, wherein unethical traders and businesses ‘confused the market’ by introducing halal labels for items that cannot be halal in an attempt to ‘loot’ the Chinese market (i.e. capture the market share of non-halal businesses) (Journal of Yili Prefecture, Citation2018).
10 Interviews 6, 7, 8, 9.
11 Interviews 15, 16.
12 Notably, however, inter-ethnic mingling is more prevalent in regions such as South China and university dorms.
13 Interview 7.
14 Interviews; participant observation.
15 Interviews 6, 13.
16 Dato’ Sheikh Hussain Yee, Religious Advisor, Japan Halal Foundation and Member on the Islamic Da’wah Council’s Halal Advisory Committee (Philippines): personal communication, 25 April, 2022.
17 Interviews 7, 11.
18 Interview 7.
19 Personal communication, Sheikh Yee.
20 Personal communication, Dr Hew.
21 Personal communication, Ms Abdullah.
22 Although Harmonized System (HS) data does not indicate whether these products are halal, it can be assumed that these Chinese products met some threshold of permissibility to be imported for consumption. These estimates were calculated using HS data from the Observatory of Economic Complexity (Citation2021) from 2010 to 2019 for the six GCC countries. With the exception of Bahrain, as well as Oman, these countries generally imported less than 2% of animal and vegetable products, by-products and foodstuff from China.
23 Personal communication, Ms Abdullah. Personal communication, Dr Hew.
24 Interview 10.
25 Ibid.
26 Personal communication, Sheikh Yee.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Amalina Anuar
Amalina Anuar is former Senior Analyst at the Centre for Multilateralism Studies, S Rajaratnam School of International Studies. Her research interests include the governance and alternative modernities of international trade and technology.
Chan Xin Ying
Chan Xin Ying is a PhD student in the Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore. Her research interests include state-owned enterprises and public policy administration.