![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
Abstract
The conventional wisdom is that human rights have long been off the negotiating agenda at the World Trade Organization (WTO). The failed attempt by Northern states to include a ‘social clause’ in WTO rules during the late 1990s and early 2000s is often cited as having foreclosed bringing human rights to bear in multilateral trade negotiations. This article challenges this traditional view, demonstrating that states are mobilizing human rights at the WTO to shape current global trade rulemaking. Moreover, in sharp contrast to the prevailing assumption that developed countries are the primary champions of human rights in the trade regime and developing countries the opponents, I show that developing countries have in fact become key protagonists in marshalling human rights at the WTO. To illustrate these claims, I examine how developing countries mobilize human rights norms, principles and discourse to shape global trade rulemaking in two of the most contentious issues in recent WTO negotiations: The use of public food stockholding for food security purposes and a TRIPS waiver to ensure access to COVID-19 vaccines.
Acknowledgements
Earlier versions of this article were presented at the Sixth Global International Studies Conference in Buenos Aires on June 20, 2022 and Global Fridays Seminar at the University of Northern British Columbia on October 23, 2022. I wish thank the three anonymous reviewers, the RIPE editors, Kristen Hopewell, Julieta Zelicovich, Paul Bowles and Gary Wilson for their helpful comments and feedback.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 In this article, I use the terms ‘developed country/countries’, ‘developing country/countries’ and ‘North-South’ throughout. Scholars have rightly challenged the use of these terms as analytical categories due to the proliferation of developing country classifications (i.e., Least Developing Countries, Small Island Developing Countries, Heavily Indebted Poor Countries, etc.) and, more recently, due to the increasing economic heterogeneity among developing countries (Farias, Citation2019). Yet the categories of developed/developing countries remain critical to analyzing inter-state politics at the WTO. ‘Developed countries’ and ‘developing countries’ are official, legal categories of WTO member states, with each category carrying different rights and obligations for states, such as developing countries’ right to special and differential treatment (Weinhardt & Schöfer, Citation2022).
2 One notable exception is the Kimberly Process waiver to prevent the trade in conflict diamonds used to finance insurgent groups. In 2003, WTO ministers affirmed that states party to the Kimberley Processes could employ discriminatory export and import controls on non-certified diamonds. The Kimberly waiver was framed as a security issue rather than a human rights issue, and since WTO rules were already seen as allowing states to restrict trade in conflict diamonds under GATT Articles XX and XXI, the issue was relatively uncontroversial at the WTO and swiftly agreed to by states.
3 There have, for example, been debates about the consistency of WTO law with international tobacco control measures (Curran & Eckhardt, Citation2017) and efforts by actors such as the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to establish a ‘human rights approach’ to trade (Lang, Citation2011).
4 Developed countries’ push for the social clause was not primarily about civil and political rights as one might expect, but instead included a mix of economic, labor and political rights. The social clause was linked to the rights to fair wages, safe and healthy working conditions, reasonable limitations on working hours, and the right to form trade unions – all of which are economic rights enshrined in the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
5 Statements by Pehin Dato Abdul Rahman Taib, Brunei Darussalam’s Minister of Industry and Primary Resources at the 1994 Marrakech Ministerial.
6 Malaysian Trade and Industry Minister Rafidah Aziz quoted in Khor (Citation1996).
7 The binding limit is 10% and 5% of the value of agricultural production for nearly all developing and most developed countries, respectively. There is an exception for 32 WTO members, including the US, EU, Japan, Canada, Australia, Korea, Mexico, Argentina and Brazil, that had historically high agricultural subsidy levels and negotiated higher bindings during the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations.
8 Author’s transcription of Union Minister of Commerce and Industry Shri Anand Sharma’s statement at WTO press conference. Bali, Indonesia. December 5, 2013.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Figures reported by the Johns Hopkins University Coronavirus Research Center as of February 15, 2023. Available at: https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html
12 South Africa’s statement at WTO TRIPS Council. 16 October 2020.
13 India’s statement at WTO TRIPS Council. 16 October 2020.
14 UK’s statement at WTO TRIPS Council. 16 October 2020.
15 Press statement by Thomas Cueni, director general of the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-wto-idUSKBN28K2WL
16 Sri Lanka’s statement at the WTO TRIP Council. 10 December 2020.
17 Cameroon’s statement at the WTO TRIP Council. 10 December 2020.
18 Bolivia’s statement at the WTO General Council. 15 July 2021.
19 Mauritius’s statement at the WTO General Council. 4 March 2021.
20 See, for example, Human Rights Watch’s ‘Seven Reasons the EU is Wrong to Oppose the TRIPS Waiver’ (https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/06/03/seven-reasons-eu-wrong-oppose-TRIPS-waiver).
21 Egypt’s statement at the WTO TRIPS Council. 10 March 2021.
22 States were initially given a deadline of December 2022, but later agreed to recommend delaying the deadline to allow for further negotiation.
23 WTO Director General speech at the closing session. June 17, 2022. Available at: https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spno_e/spno27_e.htm
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Matias E. Margulis
Matias E. Margulis is Associate Professor in the School of Public Policy and Global Affairs and Faculty of Land and Food Systems at the University of British Columbia. His research interests span international trade, development, and food security. His recent book is Shadow Negotiators: How UN Organizations Shape the Rules of World Trade for Food Security (Stanford University Press, 2023).