Abstract
South Korea's strategic thought toward the United States has been evolving from a blood alliance during the Cold War era, to a transitional alliance during the post-Cold War era, and to a strategic alliance after September 11. Despite some trials and errors, South Korea has successfully adjusted itself to new strategic challenges by transforming and reinventing its alliance with the United States. As part of a soft-balancing strategy, this endeavor has been conducted in parallel with South Korea's improved relations with other major powers than the United States and its support for multilateral security cooperation so that the United States may not impose its own strategic preferences on South Korea. In these attempts, we can discover strategic elements that are realist (utilizing the U.S. as a strategic balancer between China and Japan), liberal (going beyond the military alliance), and constructivist (joining the regional community-building).
Notes
1. Alastair I. Johnston, “Thinking About Strategic Culture,” International Security 19, no. 4 (Spring 1995): 34.
2. The Korean War also impacted on the United States since high defense budgets, the globalization of American commitments, and the militarization of NATO had been made possible due to the Korean War. See Robert Jervis, “The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 24, no. 4 (1980): 563–92.
3. Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).
4. Shin Wookhee, Dynamics of Patron–Client State Relations: The United States and Korean Political Economy in the Cold War (Seoul: American Studies Institute, Seoul National University, 1993).
5. For example, South Korea's Park Chung Hee government agreed to be “entrapped” into the Vietnam War, since it feared the United States might abandon South Korea from its defense commitment against North Korea. See Han Sung-Joo, “South Korea's Participation in the Vietnam Conflict: An Analysis of the U.S.–Korean Alliance,” Orbis 21, no. 4 (1978): 893–912.
6. Hard-balancing can be defined as the formation of a countervailing coalition to contain the strongest state, while soft-balancing indicates limiting the ability of the strongest state to impose its preferences on others.
7. Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1.
8. M. Huang, “Reasons to Comply: The Case of Military Alliance among Major Powers,” Paper presented at The Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Le Centre Sheraton Hotel, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, March 17, 2004, http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p73674_index.html.
9. Robert S. Litwak, “The Imperial Republic after 9/11,” Wilson Quarterly (Summer 2002): 76–82.
10. Kim Sung-han, “The End of Humanitarian Intervention?” Orbis (Fall 2003): 721–36.
11. See Barry R. Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,” International Security 29, no. 1 (Summer 2003): 5–46.
12. Robert Joseph, Under-Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, said: “If terrorists acquire WMDs, they are likely to employ them, with potentially catastrophic effects. A well-organized terrorist group with appropriate technical expertise could probably create a crude nuclear device once it gained access to fissile material.” Remarks on Meeting the Challenges of WMD Proliferation at the University of Virginia Miller Center, December 9, 2005.
13. Michael F. Altfeld, “The Decision to Ally: A Theory and Test,” Western Political Quarterly 37 (1984): 523–44.
14. Stephen M. Walt, “Alliances in a Unipolar World,” World Politics 61, no. 1 (January 2009): 86–120.
15. Arthur A. Stein and Steven E. Lobell, “Geostructuralism and International Politics: The End of the Cold War and the Regionalization of International Security,” in Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World, ed. David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 119.
16. Han Sung-Joo, “The Emerging Triangle: Korea between China and the U.S.,” East Asian Review 12, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 3–29.
17. The Kim Young-sam government introduced “The Republic of Korea's Paper on Northeast Asia Security Cooperation” at the ARF Senior Officials Meeting (ARF-SOM) in Bangkok on May 23–25, 1994. According to the report, multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia, as a form of preventive diplomacy, should be pursued on the basis of the following principles: (1) respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; (2) non-aggression and no threat or use of force; (3) non-intervention in internal affairs; (4) peaceful settlement of disputes; (5) peaceful coexistence; and (6) democracy and respect for human dignity. Because North Korea still preferred a bilateral framework with the United States, and China was concerned about the requirements, such as respect for human rights, they did not accept the proposal. South Korea's Northeast Asia Security Dialogue (NEASED) proposal was based on the following considerations: (1) for the foreseeable future, a multilateral security dialogue in Northeast Asia should be seen as a supplement, rather than a substitute for the system of bilateral frameworks in the region; (2) a multilateral security dialogue in Northeast Asia should be conducted in a way that is consistent with and conducive to improved inter-Korean relations and reunification; (3) a multilateral security dialogue in Northeast Asia needs to maintain a cooperative and consultative relationship with the ARF; and (4) a gradual approach should be taken to build a common security framework in Northeast Asia.
18. Concerning the relationship between an East Asian Community and the United States, see Thomas Christensen, “Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster?: The Rise of China and U.S. Policy toward East Asia,” International Security 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006); and Simon Tay, “An East Asian Community and the United States: An East Asian Perspective,” Singapore Institute of International Affairs (2005).
19. Termsak Charlermpalanupap, “Toward an East Asian Community: The Journey Has Begun,” ASEAN, http://www.aseansec.org/13202.htm.
20. Paradoxically, that would probably foster a closer U.S.–South Korean relationship. See Strengthening the ROK–U.S. Alliance: A Blueprint for the 21st Century. This report is the result of a panel convened in 2003 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University and the Seoul Forum for International Affairs in the Republic of Korea.
21. A political prerequisite for the creation of a peace mechanism on the Korean peninsula involves an atmosphere of “political confidence-building.” Political confidence-building between the two Koreas refers to a situation in which North Korea renounces any intention of engineering a subversive revolution in South Korea and agrees to abide by the spirit of the North–South Basic Agreement, while South Korea promotes an environment in which North Korea is convinced that the South has no intention of achieving unification through the absorption of the North. Since military confrontation on the Korean peninsula reflects underlying political antagonism, military confidence-building will more easily replicate successful political confidence-building once the two Koreas build political trust. The foremost focus in promoting confidence-building in military relations involves the prohibition of the development, possession, and use of WMDs. If either North or South Korea possesses or attempts to develop nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, it would shatter the political goal of peaceful coexistence and create a fundamental obstacle to the development of inter-Korean relations.
22. See Park Seo-Hyun, “Domestic–International Issue Linkage in Alliance Politics: A Comparison of Post-Iraq War Japanese and Korean Relations with the United States,” Paper presented at The Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Chicago, February 28, 2007.
23. Charles Krauthammer argues “Thinking about post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy has been led astray by three conventionally accepted but mistaken assumptions about the character of the post-Cold War environment, namely: (1) that the world is now multipolar, whereas it is in fact unipolar, with the United States as the sole superpower, at least for present policy purposes; (2) that the United States domestic consensus favors internationalism rather than isolationism; and (3) that in consequence of the Soviet collapse, the threat of war has substantially diminished.” Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs 70, no. 1 (Winter 1990/1991).
24. Frank Umbach, “The Future of Multilateralism in Asia,” IRI Review 9, no. 1 (Winter 2003/Spring 2004): 179–226.
25. Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Why is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism,” International Organization 56, no. 3 (Summer 2002): 602.
26. “Coalition of the willing” is a term used to denote a group of states that cooperate in an ad hoc or informal fashion, outside of more formal multilateral institutions and alliances. The term has been used recently to describe the group of countries supporting the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, but its origins predate the George W. Bush administration. While the term usually refers to cooperation for military purposes, it has also been used in relation to other economic and human security issues in the Asia–Pacific region.
27. He urged the countries of Northeast Asia to take four key steps to achieve greater regional cooperation: (1) create a new regional order for economic cooperation and integration; (2) forge a regime for multilateral security cooperation; (3) underscore the role of the United States in creating a Northeast Asian peace and security mechanism; and (4) confront the past and build a common ground of historical understanding. See President Roh Moo-hyun, “History, Nationalism and Community,” Global Asia 2, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 10–13.
28. A “strategic alliance,” as we can see in the U.S.–U.K. alliance or the U.S.–Japan alliance, is one in which two allies cooperate to accomplish mid- and long-term goals based on their shared values and worldviews. A “tactical alliance,” on the other hand, as seen in the efforts by the United States and Pakistan to combat terrorism, is cooperation based on limited goals or interests (for example, the arrest of Osama bin Laden) between nations with different values and worldviews. In this regard, the Roh Moo-hyun administration approached its alliance with the United States from a tactical viewpoint to deal with the North Korean nuclear issue.
29. The joint vision stated, “Our security alliance has strengthened and our partnership has widened to encompass political, economic, social and cultural cooperation. Together, based on this solid foundation, we will build a comprehensive strategic alliance of bilateral, regional and global scope, based on common values and mutual trust.”
30. For more than 2,000 years, the fate of Korea has been a function either of the predominance of one nation controlling Korea, or of a balance of power between two nations competing for that control. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), 177.
31. Robert Dujarric, Korean Unification and After: The Challenge for U.S. Strategy (Indianapolis, IN: Hudson Institute, 2000), 56.