Abstract
This paper examines Korean–Chinese relations in the context of the framework of the strategic partnership that has been in place since the 1990s. The relationship was considered to share the same characteristics as those between China and Russia, China and India, China and Vietnam, and China and Pakistan—yet differed in terms of content and significance. Despite its strong non-alliance policy toward foreign nations, China still pushed through with the forging of a partnership with the Lee Myung-bak administration, which had just been launched under the newly reinforced ROK–U.S. alliance. This paper examines the reasons behind this partnership, theorizing that the significance hierarchy within the partnership had been weakened, and that the meaning of “strategic” had been expanded. Other reasons contributing to the forging of the new partnership between Korea and China included the following: counter-balancing the excessively pro-U.S. policy adopted by Korea and subsequent renewal of the strong ROK–U.S. alliance; a strategy to win over Korea to complete China's East Asian regionalism; continued cooperation with Korea to deal with North Korea and its nuclear ambitions; and, concern over direct U.S.–North Korean talks possibly leading to “excluding China” and measures to prevent this. Despite the current strategic partnership between Korea and China, the two countries show clear differences in their respective views of a unified Korea, the ROK–U.S. alliance, North Korean issues, and mutual understanding; all of these will likely make the officialization of strategic interests a challenge for both countries from the mid- to long-term perspectives. To overcome such challenges, China may have to strike a balance between its traditional friendship with North Korea and the Korean–Chinese strategic partnership. For its part, Korea needs to find its own balance between the ROK–U.S. strategic alliance for the twenty-first century and the Korean–Chinese strategic partnership. Considering its weakness in terms of a clear sense of gravity and independence, Korea appears to require a considerable amount of time to deepen its partnership with China. At the same time, Korea needs to address the problems of coming up with its own strategic visions.
Notes
1. Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of the Rest,” Newsweek, May 12, 2008.
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7. Stability on the Korean peninsula has many implications: (1) continued division of the Korean peninsula; (2) maintenance of peace and absence of war in the region; (3) sustained dominance by the United States and the U.S.-centered alliance; or (4) the continued “creeping” influence of Beijing over the peninsula at large. See Jae Ho Chung, “China's Korea Policy Under the New Leadership,” The Journal of East Asian Affairs 18, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 2004): 14; Tania Barnigan, “North Korea's Nuclear Test Puts China in a Tight Spot,” The Guardian, May 29, 2009; the opinion that peace and stability on the peninsula override all other goals is based on Sun Cheng, “The Second DPRK Nuclear Crisis,” Guojiwenti Yanjiu [International Studies], no. 3 (2003): 19.
8. Shambaugh also views the Chinese endgame for the Korean peninsula as mostly connected to the North Korean regime. David Shambaugh, “China and the Korean Peninsula Playing for the Long Term,” The Washington Quarterly 26, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 44–52.
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13. Shambaugh, “China and the Korean Peninsula,” 49; Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations, 240–5.
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25. The Chinese view is to assume responsibilities for the international community and to pursue foreign relations, thereby helping to contribute to global society. Shiping Tang and Peter H. Gries, “China's Security Strategy: From Offensive to Defensive Realism and Beyond,” EAI Working Paper, no. 97 (East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, 2002).
26. Interviews with former NSC Officer in Seoul, December 12, 2007.
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30. Interview with Korean officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, May 4, 2009.
31. See the following: Yong Deng, China's Struggle for Status, 128–51, for the analysis that a Sino-Russian partnership is being pursued to help offset the dominance of the West and counter-balance the power of the United States. For the Sino–Russian summit joint statement, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-05/23/content_8239464.htm (in Chinese) (accessed on July 5, 2008).
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33. For the joint statement between China and Pakistan, see http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/3296768.html (in Chinese, accessed July 3, 2009). Some view China's move to strengthen relations with Pakistan and pursue a power balance in the conventional sense as similar to America's support for Israel to help maintain Middle East order. Steven Cohen, India: Emerging Power (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2001), 259.
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40. This could be viewed as China's favored model. Shiping Tang, “A Neutral Reunified Korea: A Chinese View,” Journal of East Asian Affairs 13, no. 2 (Fall/Winter 2002): 464–83.
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43. Interview with former senior official in the NSC, June 6, 2006. This asserted the need to pursue the U.S.–Korean FTA, raise issues of a Chinese threat, and maintain a balance against China's expansion policy.
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47. This is the common view emerging in the interviews with China's experts on the Korean peninsula. Based on interviews with experts, Beijing, August 7–9, 2008.
48. See http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2008-05/27/content_8264427.htm (in Chinese, accessed May 28, 2008).
49. China is also preparing for various end-games. For the introduction and evaluation on this, see Shambaugh, “China and the Korean Peninsula,” 44.
50. In the foreign ministry spokesman's statement and the interview between Wen and Bush, it was mentioned that “concerns over the North's rational security assurance must be resolved.” Renmin Ribao [People's Daily], December 10, 2003.
51. Wang Jisi, “China's Changing Role in Asia,” in Rational Rectification on International Politics, ed. Wang Jisi (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2006), 310.
52. Heeok Lee, “Problems of the ROK–China Relationship in the 21st Century and Exploratory,” Zhongguo Zhanlue Guancha [China Strategic Review], (April 2008): 27–8.
53. Jaeho Hwang, Heungkyu Kim, Byung-kon Jun and Myong-Chul Cho, “Possible Scenarios for China's Future Relations with North Korea: South Korean Perspective,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 18, no. 3 (Fall 2006): 134–9.
54. Sukhee Han, “Korean Perception of China's Rise in East Asia,” in Korea in the New Asia, ed. Nicolas, 12–16.
55. Various surveys show such changes in perception (1996–2005). For a summary, see Jae Ho Chung, Between Ally and Partner, 96–100.
56. “The Research Project of Northeastern China” has distorted history, especially regarding the kingdoms of Goguryeo and Balhae, which has triggered political disputes with South Korea. Heeok Lee, “China's Northeast Project and South Korean–Chinese Relations”; Heeok Lee, “China's Northeast Project: Political Background and Implications,” East Asian Review 18, no. 4 (Winter 2006).
57. The joint survey by KBS and Media Research (September 8, 2004) showed preference for (40 percent) and aversion to (58.2 percent) China, with the aversions somewhat higher. Media Research (December 2004) presented the opinions on the Korean government's Chinese policy: inappropriate diplomacy (70.9 percent) and appropriate diplomacy (26.4 percent). The East Asian Institute study showed that 89 percent of Koreans sense the Chinese threat. JoongAng Daily, December 13, 2006; JoongAng Daily, June 29, 2007.
58. Shambaugh, ed., Power Shift, 12–19.
59. Evans S. Medrious and others, Pacific Currents: The Response of U.S. Allies and Security Partners in East Asia to China's Rise (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2008), 15–24.
60. Jae Ho Chung, “China's Ascendancy and the Korean Peninsula,” 162.
61. Taeho Kim, “An Emerging ‘Strategic Partnership’ between Beijing and Seoul? Myths and Realities,” The Journal of East Asian Affairs 22, no. 2 (Fall/Winter, 2008): 99.
62. Jae Ho Chung, Between Ally and Partner, 112.