Abstract
Taiwan is a vexed issue, and having no definite sovereignty status at the inter-state level, it carries the potential for conflagration. There is palpably a contradiction between its de jure and de facto status. Contradiction is also discernible in realizing the right brand of nationalism and the question of justice in adopting the appropriate hierarchical mode of governance. As such, there is a need to rethink its status and also the surrounding security architecture. The actors concerned may have to confront high stakes if its status quo is changed. The “one China” policy is accepted by all—but its varying interpretations and ambiguities in different official documents and pronouncements, made mostly keeping in view the geopolitical and nationalist compulsions, give rise to concern. It has turned out to be a flashpoint whose political status will, hopefully, be finally decided peacefully in a mutually accepted agreement through dialogue and confidence-building measures. This paper examines the present status of Taiwan and the suggested ways forward for its final settlement, keeping in focus the security, political and economic realities—both in the People's Republic of China and Taiwan, as well as the surrounding region. There is a suggestion for a people-centric, like people being masters of their own destiny (people-first) solution—maybe in order to preclude the geopolitical complexities.
Notes
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