680
Views
9
CrossRef citations to date
0
Altmetric
Research Article

The Russian Biological Weapons Program: Vanished or Disappeared?

&
Pages 241-261 | Published online: 19 Oct 2008
 

Abstract

The legacy and arsenal of biological weapons Russia inherited from USSR in 1991 became a lingering unsolved issue, in terms of a prime strategic arm that ought to be eliminated, advisably, in accordance with the Biological Weapons Convention Russia is committed to, and considering further undertakings and declarations made by the Russian regime. Indeed, that inheritance was created by USSR as a powerful, highly sophisticated component of utmost importance within the Soviet military paradigm, based on a wide spectrum of virulent, stabilized pathogens and toxins plus delivery systems. Moreover, remarkably advanced biotechnologies were thus applied to procure stockpiles of military-grade pathogens and toxins. Yet, an intriguing debate aroused with regard to the extent of the weaponized biological inventory accumulated by USSR, as well as the in effect attitude of Russia towards perpetuating or wiping out that inheritance. It turned out to form a far reaching and challenging complexity, both strategically and scientifically. The present study concentrates on the strategic as well as scientific spheres shaping that overall issue at large, attempting to thoroughly analyze it through an innovative methodology. One main conclusion thereby reached at is that the Russian military still poses a potential menance, in terms of both stockpiled, probably deployable biological weapons, and prevailing production capacities.

Notes

1 Arkady Shevchenko, the Soviet diplomat who defected to the USA, and at the time under discussion was a personal advisor to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko.

2 Sojourning in 1973 for several months as a guest of some most advanced US bio-centers, Ovchinikov left the country keeping in one blazer's pocket several tubes with steeled cultures of modified bacterial strains, and professional secrets of their developments in the other. As son of a famous hero of WW Two, he used the opportunity to meet within few months Brezhnev himself and explain him what smart and powerful weapons they can invent from microbes' genes, especially after 1972, when US and UK took the obligation not to develop new BW. The communists leader liked such an idea to fight “imperialists with their own invents” Interview with the late Dr. Max Rokhlin, deputy of Y. Ovchinnikov in the Institute of Bioorganic chemistry during the 60s and 70s; Moscow, June 1995. see also http://www.expert.ru, 18 2002 Vaccine for Life, and http://www.vector.nsc.ru/ex1102-r.htm

3 Ovchinikov often used to hint that actually he put the ‘Enzyme’ money into development of fundamental biology and fool the top brass generals in the name of progress of real science. The generals in their turn laughed over such “intelligent” rumors—they knew that only a small part of the budgets went to non-military research, to be used as a carrot for scientists who loved the freedom of science. (Interview with Max Rokhlin, 1995)

4 Literaturnaia Gazeta, no. 34, Sep. 1990.

5 Literaturnaia Gazeta, 02.10.91.

6 Literaturnaia Gazeta, 14.04.93.

8 TASS, 26 Feb, 1992.

9 “Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on Fulfilling International Obligations with Regard to Biological Weapons,” Moscow, April 11, 1992.

10 Interview with General Kuntsevich in Rossiyskie Vesti, September 22, 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-186, September 24, 1992.

11 Among the few valid ones was the analysis by journalist Sergey Leskov, who spent several months in the US and compared the US and Russian BW programs. Leskov stated that information on Russian BW production is scarcely available. As he said, even in 1992, this was a “very impolite question,” asking authorities about BW, the equivalent of asking to hold the “nuclear briefcase” for a while. (Izvestiya, 26 June 1993)

12 TASS, 29 May 1995.

13 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention website www.opbw.org/

14 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention website www.opbw.org/

15 TASS, 21 Nov. 2001.

16 Vorobiev, A. V., Working on the compliance regime for the BWC; Chem. Biol. Convention Bull., 31, 2-4, 1996.

17 Pugwash Annual Meeting: From Confrontation to Reconciliation, Sep. 1987, Austria.

18 The DUMA (Russian Parliament) website (in Russian): http://www.akdi.ru/GD/plen z/2000/s27-10d.htm

19 Izvestiya, 3 March 1998.

20 Yadeirnyi (Nuclear) Kontrol, no. 4, p. 19, 1999.

21 Rossiyskie Vesti, 22 Sep, 1992.

22 Rossiyskie Vesti, 22 Sep. 1992.

23 General Anatolii Kuntsevich was dismissed, two years later (in April 1994), and charged with selling some 800 kilograms of chemical precursor for chemical weapons to Syria and with the attempt to sell another consignment of chemicals whose export is banned. These had been stolen from an institute developing CW in Moscow. After months of investigation, the charges were dropped and the case never made it to court. (Nezavismaia Gazeta 24 October 1995)

24 Krasnaia Zvezda 29 Sept. 1992 p. 3.

26 He said as follows: “… in the USSR and in Russia modeled real foreign ammunition—aviation bomb from 1 to 4 pounds in weight. “Turned out” singles samples of it, produced tests in real condition on the animals on the testing plots. (In Russian. … B http://www.vremya.ru/2003/74/6/56655.html 24 April 2003

27 PИA (Russian Information Agency) Novosti, 2 Nov. 2001.

28 Interview in the Russian newspaper “Courier,” 24 November 2001.

29 Vedomosty (Moscow), 27 March, 2003.

30 Krasnaia Zvezda, 29 Sept. 1992.

31 http://www.expert.ru, 18 2002 r Vaccine for Life.

32 “At Face Value,” The Sunday Times, March 27, 1994.

33 Spirande said “the number of our experts in military institutes and labs is the minimal for their tasks”… (Interview with Spirande, op. cit.)

35 http://www.expert.ru, 18 2002 r Vaccine for Life

36 Interview with Spirande, op. cit.

37 Vorobiev, Alexander. “Countering Chemical/Biological Terrorism in the Former Soviet Union: The Need for Cooperative Efforts,” Politics and the Life Sciences, [London], 15, September 1996, 233–5.

38 Pravda, 15 May 2002.

40 New Russian-American Collaboration Against Bioterrorism: Moscow's International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) participating, Pravda, 17 Sept. 2003.

41 Izvestiya 25 April 1992, p. 1.

42 Izvestiya, 22 Sep. 1992, p. 8.

43 ibid.

44 Vechernii Sverdlovsk (city newspaper) 25 November 1998.

45 E. Shliahkov, personal interview, Tel Aviv, June 2000.

46 Krasnaya Zvezda, 19 Dec. 1992.

47 Interview with Spirande, op. cit.

48 Department of Defense, DIA report, Filename: 22010910.94a, May 26, 1994; IIR 2 201 0910 94/RUSSIAN BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER. 〈html〉 〈head〉 〈/head〉〈body〉〈pre〉<html> <head> <www.fas.org/irp/gulf/intel/950719/22010910_9

49 Gazeta.Ru, December 5, 2002, US paper to face Russian smallpox lawsuit, By Yelena Vrantseva.

50 Robert Goldberg, The Russian Strain (Commentary), Wall Street Journal, March 27, 2003.

51 Robert Goldberg, The Russian Strain (Commentary), Wall Street Journal, March 27, 2003.

52 Rohde, D., ‘A possible Russian link to Iraq arms buildup,’ New York Times, 12 Feb. 1998, URL 〈http://search.nytimes.com/〉; Smith, R. J., ‘Did Moscow try to skirt sanctions?,’ Moscow Times, 13 Feb. 1998, URL 〈http://www.moscowtimes.ru/archive/issues/1998/Feb/13/story2.html〉; Smith, R. J., ‘Russian firms discussed factory sale with Iraqis,’ Moscow Times, 19 Feb. 1998, URL 〈http://www.moscowtimes.ru/archive/issues/1998/Feb/19/story4.html〉; and ‘Russia denies allegations in “Washington Post,”’ RFE/RL Newsline, 12 Feb. 1998, URL 〈http://search.rferl.org/newsline/1998/02/120298.html〉.

53 Robert Goldberg, The Russian Strain (Commentary), Wall Street Journal, March 27, 2003.

54 Interfax, 1224 GMT, 11 Dec 98; FBIS-TAC-98-345.

55 Khachtrian, E. and Danielyan, E., US named Armenian firm subject to Iran sanction; RFE/RL Armenian Report, May 16, 2002.

56 Oleg Khrabryi 〈www.vesti.ru〉, May 28, 2002.

57 H.R. Tavakoli, Isolation of Clostridium botulinum (types A, B & E) in sediments from coastal areas of the north of Iran; R. P. Langroudi, Large scale cultivation of clostridium chauvoei (Blackleg) vaccine by fermenter. The 3rd International Iran and Russia Conference “Agriculture and Natural Resources,’ September 18–20, 2002.

58 TASS, 12 Sep. 1992.

59 Matsumoto, G., Anthrax powder: state of the art? Science, v. 302, 28 Nov. 2003, pp. 1492–1497.

60 Parts of the following information are based on Soviet and Russian microbiological and medical scientific literature.

Reprints and Corporate Permissions

Please note: Selecting permissions does not provide access to the full text of the article, please see our help page How do I view content?

To request a reprint or corporate permissions for this article, please click on the relevant link below:

Academic Permissions

Please note: Selecting permissions does not provide access to the full text of the article, please see our help page How do I view content?

Obtain permissions instantly via Rightslink by clicking on the button below:

If you are unable to obtain permissions via Rightslink, please complete and submit this Permissions form. For more information, please visit our Permissions help page.